HN39 you got it just right i reckon.

Since we first started flying it has been about using the right tool for the job and knowing which one to use. e.g.

EGPWS - Pull stick to back stop and you are doing all the laws of physics will allow to avoid the terrain.

Loss of air data - Fly a sensible power an attitude, if in doubt keep what you have until PNF gets something concrete from the QRH

No rule set changes required just a knowledge about the right tool for the job as you would on any other machine.

AZR - since you appear to be having difficulty reading and understanding posts, let me copy the NTA quote to which I referred i the hope you MIGHT understand this time:

"Its not the crew, the airlines or the training. All airlines train and all crews are trained - it is the type of training that needs to be reviewed. "

Any better?

"I'm not aware of a long list of "AB events such as 447..." Nor am I and nor did I say that. See above.

"but I fail to see how a modification to the protection system would be sensible." - me too - see above.

HN39 - same difficulty? I have passed no comment on the wisdom of "In those situations being able to pull without fear of stalling must be an asset." - I agree - so I presume I can ignore the rest of your post after you 'quoted' me?

Folks, can we keep the basic credo in the landing lights ? - play the ball, not the player.

This in an extremely interesting thread .. at risk of being devalued by getting into gutter tit for tat.

I would hope that censorship is not the way to go but, should that become evident, it shall occur.

BOAC

Quoting it again isn't going to make it mean anything. This point says its not the training. It then goes on to wonder if its the type of training. Well, if its the wrong type of training, then it is the training. As with much of NTA's material it is self contradictory and thus meaningless. I wonder whether that is what AZR is driving at and thus not deserving of a cheap attack at his literacy.

FWIW I believe the training was faulty in the past, in that it did not address power/attitudes appropriate to high level and consequences of inappropriate handling at typical cruise altitudes. It does now in most TRTOs.

Whilst I appreciate AZR is 'located' in France, in English, 'type of training' is a quite specific expansion of 'training'.

Parse the following?

"I am trained"

"I am properly trained"

If there comes a time when applying simple pitch+power to get oneself out of bad air data situation in transport plane is proven to be insufficient, then we might reconsider the need for AoA gauge.

There are times when its appropriate to fly the attitude and times when it's appropriate to fly alpha.

You have no clue. CM2 quickly and decisively brought roll oscilation under control, proving he was looking at the PFD attitude display.

Not just that, critical alpha on anything will vary with mach and difference is very pronounced on A330. No reliable mach - no idea how far one is from stalling. As long as one keeps attitude and power reasonable, no big deal anyway.

Question is: why do folks season the succinct info about flight controls from FCOM with imagination running wild and consequently accuse Airbus of having dr. Jekyll and mr. Hyde kind of personality?

No such things occurs in the real world so there is nothing to forget.

It never existed in airline world because airliners are geometrically limited, with exception of DC-3 and similar.

If I am not properly trained then there is an issue with my training.

Hi BOAC.

Once again, I won't critisize the current or past training as I have no indication that it was wrong re: the flight laws and the consequences of their reversion from Normal to Alternate and/or Direct.

I was under the impression that you were advocating that laws and their reversions were somehow "too hard to learn" for (average) pilots and thus that they should be modified in one way or another.

If that was not your point, sorry for misinterpreting your previous posts. I reacted on that because AFAIK the FCOM and other training materials already were explicit on the laws reversions, and associated loss of protections. Without access to more than those materials, I will not comment on training outside of the said materials.

I certainly won't challenge your feelings on the (type of) training needed.

++
AZR

Please allow me to rephrase the point of my post that you seem to have missed. The single 'rule of flying' that I see is that in general you should not rely on the protections because they may not always be present. However, there a a few very specific conditions where it is appropriate to put aside any doubt about the integrity of those protections.

- not quite. I was suggesting that just as 'mode confusion' is a well-established derivative of our automotive cockpit, so reversionary modes could be causing confusion when infrequently experienced, and then only when things have 'gone wrong' and commonly (outside the sim) with genuine 'startle factor'.

In terms of a 'modification' I would not really know where to start. I suggested a long time ago (PGF) that from my point of view (non-AB) I would have preferred a drop straight into 'Direct' where you know you simply have a basic aeroplane in your hands which, it is hoped, one can fly. Thus none of the (eg) 'divergence' of roll law from pitch law which I understand happens as the laws degrade - all or nothing for me.

- so we are back almost full circle. Was the 447 PF 'relying' on some electronic guardian angel to look after him while he (following the FD?), zoom climbed and then tried to keep the nose up? If so, that is the boil that needs lancing.

As a non-pilot engineer I'm reluctant to speculate on a pilot's forum about what might have been going on in the 447 PF's mind. I just can't see any reason for him to zoom-climb to seek the limit of envelope protection.

I've no experience with FD's but note that they were mostly unavailable in the first 40 seconds of the zoom-climb, and locked on to 6000 fpm V/S then 1400 fpm only after the pilot commanded those RoC's apparently independently of the FD's.

Assuming you have 'finished'? - - why? We believe, do we not, that all altimeters were functioning normally?

OK, thanks for clarifying that for me. I agree that a law reversion is "something more" to take into account for the crew, but I believe that the advantages of normal+alternate+direct laws are more important than the disadvantages (including the quite possible but not proven 'mode confusion').

I understand your PoV here, but I disagree. I have no personal qualifications necessary to defend "my" point of view, so I'll just quote two of the reasons that have brought me there:
- The existence of alternate laws comes from Airbus studies, so it is a conscious and maturely weighed decision (until proven otherwise).
- We do have exemple where the alternate law was appreciated: I mentioned the book "QF32" written by the Captain (and PIC) of this flight, but for those who do not have a copy, you can read the interview with Captain David Evans (Senior Check Captain at Qantas), who was onboard too. Both have experience on Boeing and Airbus types. Here is a short excerpt:
The complete interview is available on a blog hosted by the Royal Aeronautical Society here:
EXCLUSIVE - Qantas QF32 flight from the cockpit | Aerospace | The Royal Aeronautical Society

Now I get it! Mode confusion refers to autoflight, not flight controls system. While modern Georges are far cry from altitude holding autopilots of 80 years ago and nowadays we're blessed with such a fine modes as HDG, WINGS LVL, LNAV, VNAV, FLCH, VOR APP, FPA etc. which provide fertile ground for confusion, there is no equivalent of such different behaviour in Airbus FCS. As long as you are flying, have flight controls continuity and are not stalled, left sticks rolls you left and pull on the sticks gets the nose up, no matter which mode you are in. Instead of trying to memorize the formulas from FCOM for subsequent interpretation, it would be easier to to think about different modes in following terms: normal - aeroplane is flightpath stable (which means pitch stable if you don't vary the speed) and will prevent overspeed, stall and excessive attitude on her own. Alternate law - still flightpath stable but no stops. Direct law - like altn but now you have to trim out the residual stick force after setting the attitude and speed. Nothing there to be confused about.

Natstrackalpha

Taking some of your points in turn:

You have zero, absolutely zero evidence of this. It is extremely unlikely that the attitude indication was affected and the report offers no evidence to suggest it was.

There is. Its flying power and attitude.

How would this have improved anything. I think the difference between alternate and direct is a red herring. If you are flying too high an attitude it makes no difference if you are in alternate or direct law. Plus. Its as easy to fly an improper attitude in direct as it is in alternate.

A standby altimeter would be subject to the same limitations or effects as the main ones. They have a standby altimeter. So what would another one gain you.

Likewise a standby attitude indicator, all appeared to be working, they had a standby and what would another one add?

BOAC
 

Sorry, sorry, sorry I meant to say - stand by Artificial Horizon/ attitude indicator, thus picked up by busTRE

Guyz,

If they had an attitude indicator. why are we here?

If the A/H was operational, then, why did they not look at it? -

See? Their brains curdled into the system . . ?!

If they had looked at it - then they would have recovered the aircraft, instead they were looking at the glistening pinball machine in front of them.

Reminds me of Ka the snake in Jungle book.

- welcome back to the fray.:)

HN39,

You are entirely correct that the pilot would have to be commanding a RoC independently of the FDs for the FDs to default to that RoC when the FDs returned (which the FDs indeed do).

The point you may want to consider is that the FD pitch steering will command an attitude that will provide for the specific RoC in effect at the FD return, in fact the current existing attitude, at least initially.

If the airspeed is continuing to decay, the FD will command a successively higher pitch attitude to meet the Roc requirement that was in effect upon FD recovery.

This commanded continual pitch increase is eventually unsustainable....

OK, thanks, I understand that.

Figure 69 in the Final Report shows the PF Side Stick Position and the FD Pitch Order.

The graph I reposted in #61 shows the PF Side Stick Position and the Pitch Attitude.

My reply #58 reflects my opinion that the latter shows a closer correlation than the former.

Looking at the corrections applied to the roll excursions I think it is safe to assume they were looking at the A/H that is called PFD.
There is also not the slightest indication it didn't work correctly. Please don't let us go back to that tinfoil hat discussion.

It just seems what they saw didn't ring a bell?

HN39,

You may be correct.

The fact that pitch was in the process of being reduced until the moment the FDs made what may have been a decidedly untimely appearance is just one of many observations made in the report.

I think, if nothing else, the fact that until any two ADRs are back within 19 knots (< 20 knots) in a situation like this, the FDs are removed but remain physically selected and then can reappear, may just be one of a number of lessons learned concerning A330 systems functionality that may or may not be specifically relevant to the incident.

NTA

Ok, lets try this from a different angle. What would/could have caused the attitude display failure?

mom pls +++
thanks.

Ice freezes the static and pitot (covers the static and pitot)
Affecting CADC
Affecting the 3 IRS
Affecting (SADC?)
the FACs thus affected (any back up to the FACS similarly affected)

Therefore in my astoundingly limited knowledge the PFD, displays no input from any of the aforementioned. Assuming the acceleromoters in the 3 IRSs
without the input from the CADCs and also the FACs do not function on their own. . . .to produce ATT info - thus rolled and banked - whether we are looking at normal Pitch alternate roll, and/or the whole nine yards - it was not happening because of the Ice/CADC/ and FACs.

Considering the freeze up happened in more or less S+L flight, then that is where (the ATT) remained.

Another theory, for your joy and entertainment is that Stall condition (which came later . . ?) and the protection trying to pitch down is thus offset by a certain somebody holding back press on the stick.

Hmm, considering that 2 stick inputs would sum algebraically would not the same summation occur if airplane wants to pitch down and something is stopping it from doing so? If this latter missive is the case, it would not explain limited or no indication in roll, whereas the CADC and FAC failure might - considering FACs had no input. However, just to shoot that idea down in lfmaes, and stick input woulr override/

Did the THS freeze over? At full forward trim? That would encourage one to pull the stick back coupled with the auto tendency to push the nose down (due to the stalled condition)

but your question was, what, in my mind, caused the ATT to freeze, excuse the pun.

Thanks a bunch bus TRE!

I see where you're going wrong.

The attitude data is provided by IRs. An IR has no air data input for its core functions and its attitude data is unaffected by loss/corruption of air data from pitot or static sources. The ADR would be affected but the IR would not.

Does that help?

@OK465But that's not really the problem; it along with other matters this crew immersed themselves in was provided for in the FCOM and QRH procedures.

The failure of a crew to follow SOP's, to the extent that what happened here, was never envisaged by the designers, test pilots, or TRE's who helped to compile the appropriate documentation.

It really falls into the, "You can lead a horse to water, but ..." equation.

OK465
 

FD 1 and 2 ....................... OFF

Ok, fine.


Thank you for your time and input - so do you want me to delete my original post now, as people may be queueing up to see it? :O

That's a great idea!:D

Just a thought, as I exited the front bog recently at cruise altitude.

My feet and ankles are used to a floor at 2.5-3.0 degrees nose up for the short walk, or the loiter in front galley to liaise with CC.

Even when I'm inspecting the plumbing I'm aware of the step climb the F/O has negotiated in my absence

Can anyone explain why Monsieur Le Capitain did not notice an unusual deck angle during his sprint to the flight deck? Any of us who've walked in the aircraft during initial climb, especially on empty positioning sectors as pax, have been aware of the deck angle and the extra effort to walk uphill.

This must have been a tactile clue to the standing crewmember on his return to the "control center" and yet it failed to trigger a suitable response from him? As a non 'bus driver I felt like getting the thread away from all the exotic Laws various which others have said tend to make diagnosis more difficult.

No AoA probes, no vacuum/wind powered AHs, no reference to expensive ADIRU sourced blue-side up, brown-side down displays, just the plumb bob on a string which we all are when airborne. Yes the craft was probably speeding up, slowing down and bucking around, but the general trend could have been obvious to a standing & walking crewmember, uncontaminated by the confusion forwards of the cockpit door

After that Eurocents worth, back to the darkened room. :confused:

According to your graph, he was already applying full back stick a short time before the nose dropped below that target.
IMO the correlation with the FD reappearance is obvious.

No panic here but the attempt to blindly obey the reappearing FD.

Have a look at pages 60-62 and 95-96 of the English report.

Flight director is out between 2:10:08 and 2:10:18, yet the right stick is in nose up position, pitch increases from 3° to 9°.

FD returns at 2:10:17 for two seconds and commands between 3/4 and full nose down, yet pitch is maintained around 10°

Then it goes out again for a couple of seconds, pitch hovers around 12°.

Between 2:10:26 and 2:10:36 it's back, demanding 6000 FPM climb and nose up, yet nose is slightly lowered, Roc goes from 6000 to 4000.

Again it passes out, still pitch is decreasing towards 6°.

It is back again at 2:10:47, demanding 1400 fpm climb. Stall warning goes off, nose is abruptly pitched up. Flight director is now firmly below aeroplane symbol, yet the pitch goes up and up and up.

Finally, FD moves to nose up command as stall breaks the climb and aeroplane commences her final descent.

Under no circumstances I would find this to be even distantly similar to "blindly following the FD".

A few seconds earlier, when full left SS didn't arrest the roll to the right, PF announced: "Je n'ai plus le controle de l'avion la"

No panic?

Deck angle and Captain's movements?
 

BARKINGMAD,

I assume that the captain made his way forward up the aisle, flustered and sleepy, while the aircraft was rounding the top of its flight profile - and thus he didn't have to climb upwards. On entering the cockpit, I assume that he sat down right away - and thus did not have to hold on as the attitude steepened into the stall.

If he'd woken earlier or later, or crouched between the flying crew, then maybe he'd have experienced some inertial cue from his body, and would have recognized what was going on. Perhaps also if he'd had to grab to hold on in the terminal-velocity nose-high descent rather than just sit in his seat?

Hi,

First is to check where is the rest accommodation for the captain (or the other pilots) in the A330
It's not in the rear toilets .. but just near the pilots office
And that why I don't understand why the captain don't go immediately in the office .. cause all the alarms sounding in the office..
I have always suspected that the captain was not in the rest accommodation

Hi Barkingmad & awblain,

It is impossible for the human brain to distinguish between linear inertial acceleration (or deceleration) from a pitch change. We need a natural horizon or an ADI/PFD to distinguish between the two.

See http://www.blackholes.org.uk/pp/soma... illusions.ppt

Rudder...rat,

Sure, I agree that you can't keep an internal reference to an absolute position, or distinguish whether you're on a vehicle that is slowing down or going downhill. The pitch-up illusion on acceleration on take off in an airliner is by 10-15 degrees or so.

However, when you stand up out of a seat, you can still tell whether the floor is apparently sloping or not. You can tell whether you have to grab the seatback in front and pull to climb into the aisle, or push against it to slow yourself.

During the pitch up (which woke/roused the Captain?), had he been on his feet, he would surely have felt himself to be heavy, and known there was upward acceleration, as in an elevator. When the aircraft was reaching its maximum height he might have been felt a bit light. As he put one foot in front of the other on (the short?) way to and into the cockpit, would he not have noticed whether he had to haul himself up a slope, or was rushed forward downhill? While not being able to perceive absolute motion, he surely would have been able to get a sense of an unusual attitude, unless the acceleration and attitude were unfortunately aligned to make things feel normal when he was on his feet. Or maybe his heart was pounding, and the aircraft was shaking, and he couldn't get any such subtle cues?

toffeez,

yes sir, I've done this many times.

My comment was in reference to the fact that they didn't.

Before reading the report, I was unaware of the exact ADR tolerances (both speed, 19 knots, and time, 10 seconds) that were in play when this FD error is made, nor was I made aware in 330 ground school of the fact that the FD buttons remain latched even though the FDs are removed in certain airspeed discrepancy situations.

One of the recurring complaints about the so-called 'children of the magenta line' is that their training is being 'dumbed down'.

I personally hate the phrase, 'You don't need to know that'.

mm43,

I understand the importance of SOPs, cockpit discipline and following the recommended procedures, but I also believe in knowing everything I can glean about each aircraft I've ever flown so that maybe I have a better chance of dealing with something which 'hadn't been envisaged'.....

not being told,

'You don't need to know that.'

Hi awblain,
Exactly.
Since they didn't change the power initially (thrust lock), then I suggest the deceleration was masked by the increased pitch attitude.

Any short term vertical acceleration could be confused with turbulence.

(bolding mine)

Clandestino,

Using the plots from page 60, 61, & 62......

the pitch attitude is 6 degrees at 2:10:48 and transitions to 11-12 degrees (with 2 very short duration plateaus evident, one at 11 degrees, one at 12) at 2:10:57

this is a pitch increase of 6 degrees in 9 seconds....2/3 of a degree per second. I don't consider this as "nose is abruptly pitched up". It is, however, entirely consistent with use of the FD as airspeed bleeds off.

Using the PFD representations from page 96 (Fig. 69), at 2:10:48 and 2:11:05, they show the pitch steering command within 1 to 2 degrees of pitch attitude, presumably for the entire 7 seconds and maybe longer (next PFD representation is at 2:11:39).

I'm unable to see this as "Flight director is now firmly below aeroplane symbol"

From this point as the airspeed decays more rapidly, yes, the nose goes up, up, up...as does, if you notice, the FD pitch steering command (PFD picture at 2:11:39).

Whole sequence is entirely consistent with attempted use of the FD initiated at 2:10:47....(or it probably wouldn't be included as a possibility in the report).

edit: BTW the PFD picture with the FD well below pitch attitude is from 2:10:27, well before that very critical moment at 2:10:47 when pitching direction is reversed.