@vilas
Thank you, but a little more detail would be helpful since I cannot trace anything on the 'net'
Do you have a URL where the whole article can be read? Who is the MOI published by?
Airbus? or is it an unofficial document of some sort?

BEA Report 3
 

1.12.4.2.1 3 Flightdeck Seats

On the RH-seat, there were no seatbelts fastened whatsover.

The most plausible scenario:
When Dubois asked Bonin if he had a licence -"T'as le PL, toi?" - just before he exited the flightdeck, Robert was already sitting on the LH-seat.
The hashed - censored DCVR- omits the fact that all 3 were discussing the answer of the licence and the only word that officially was allowed to come out was Dubois' reply of "Bon".
What followed before "Bon" and shortly after "Bon" is censored.
Bonin was napping when the A/P cut-off and in the ensuing alarms, panicked and accidentally used the S/S to pull himself out of his reclined position.
This caused the violent NU.
The following 3 minutes, absorbed by panic and impending tragedy, he didn't have time to adjust his seat or to stick one of his belts on.
Dubois wasn't seated on the jumpseat but someone else, most probably Mme Bonin.
This could further explain why Bonin refused to relinquish his grip on the S/S as matter of pride.
Dubois was seated with PAX when he felt the NU and swaying.
He didn't hear the buzzer because he wasn't in the CRA.
What were his first words as entered the flightdeck?
Not "what's up guys?" but "what the hell are you doing!"

@Owain:
 

vilas is correct.

@A33Zab
Thank you A33Zab, that is very helpful and new to me.

Presumably, since the MOI is advanced operational information there will be an official accompanying SB and an FCOM change if and when the modification is fitted? Does anyone know of such a change so we can study it in more detail?

Thank you A33Zab. Finally we have something to chew on!

As O.G. has respectfully asked vilas, is there a source? To me, this reads like an individual Operator's term and not something from Airbus.
A key statement is, "In all cases, the MOIs are to be used for information only, and the contractual flight operations manuals remain the support documentation of reference for flight crews."

I'd flown Airbus from 1992 on, for fifteen years and had never heard of the term. I know of ATB's, (Aircraft Technical Bulletins), SB's, (Service Bulletins), OEB's (Operational Engineering Bulletins, which are issued for immediate action due safety relevance), and those more closely associated with the regulator such as SAFO's, (FAA), AD's, (regulator/manufacturer) and so on. Encountered here and then not defined for others, the term "MOI" remained a mystery.

By the description, I understand that an "MOI" is for flight crew information only and as such is advisory, where (as described) a non-technical description of the more formal SB may be desired for quick distribution. Of course, it is understandable that each carrier may have its own informal distribution network where terms may differ between Operators where they are not part of the continuing airworthiness process.

As such, I doubt if an MOI would be proprietary in the same way an Operator's AOM may be so it would be of interest to have at least a hint of what the actual document stated.

donH
MOI is Airbus term for any modification carried out by them. Published for the operator.

Thank you vilas, much appreciated! As you see, I haven't run across the term in all my Airbus travels. There will be many Airbus terms published/not published by individual operators which do not have continuing airworthiness import but are for aircrew information. This one, I had not ever seen in our own operation. That resolved, is it possible to reproduce, as much as may be possible/desireable, some of the "MOI"?

@vilas
So is there a formal AI mod and an associated FCOM change?

OG
Yes, that is correct.

vilas
So may we know what it is please?

You said the chicken died a horrible death!

"That is correct, Sir!"

Then please describe the injuries inflicted.

"It's all in the MOI, Sir"

Who's death? The chicken or - :ugh:

Winnerhofer you surmised that “Bonin was napping when the A/P cut-off and in the ensuing alarms, panicked and accidentally used the S/S to pull himself out of his reclined position.
This caused the violent NU.”

This is not consistent with Bonin’s first stick actions, discussed at length on previous threads. IIRC, first he countered uncommanded roll by vigorous side movements and accompanying (I believe unintended) minor pitch variations in both directions but on average slightly nose up (the famous “stirring mayonnaise”).

Only after getting the roll under control did he initiate major nose-up movements, and even then not entirely consistently.

It has been done to death before.

Time after time you demonstrate how little you know about the Report, the Official one, but keep pretending quoting stuff that is simply NOT in it.
Move swiftly out at your own pace ...

Those are not extra measures, they're only different. As per CVR the pilot did not elect to permanently inhibit Alpha-Floor, but only temporarily by inhibition upon activation. Doing so is only possible if AoA has already reached 15 degrees, but at the time TOGA was manually applied by the pilot, the AoA had not yet reached such angle.
Too fast he was.

Confiture
OK, so in your view he intended to cancel any thrust increase from Alpha-Floor if it triggered but this intention was overtaken by events when he applied TOGA thrust too early (for Alpha-Floor to trigger that is).
This would seem to make any consideration of the part that Alpha-Floor might play in this affair totally irrelevant.
That take us back to the conclusion that he intended to make this demonstration in manual flight, taking on his own shoulders the responsibility for energy management and relying entirely on his own experience, skill and judgement.

Since there's nothing new to tell about AF447...
 

Actually, problem is mistranslation of section 2.2.3.2. - it deals with what was planned and disabling of the alpha floor certainly was but it was never executed - chalk one up for sloppy execution. Section 2.3 clearly states Alpha floor was disabled as the result of RA going below 100. Now if anyone thinks exact mechanism of disabling alpha floor is of concern in the accident where narrowbody full of passengers was deliberately flown below 100ft at 120 kt and idle thrust - feel free to entertain me further.

Corrected in the final report; after further analysis lap and crotch strap were found to be fastened.

It is advisory only but it's for operator information and it is up to operator to determine what info (if any) from MOI will be distributed to flightcrews and means of promulgation.

Never said it was either.
I was simply pointing out the misinformed comment made by Dozy, which shows how Habsheim, the Report, or the airplane, are still nebulous.
Any Airbus incident accident report contributes (or not ...) to develop the knowledge on that machine. Habsheim is no exception.

MOI - Modification Operational Impact
 

ventus 45,

Thanks for that.

Judging from the example in the link you provided, an MOI is pretty much at the opposite end of the spectrum from an OEB (Operational Engineering Bulletin), in that it seems to be a broad-brush, glossy document prepared weeks or months in advance to hand out at a flight-ops symposium (in this case by a senior AI pilot to CAAC flight ops people at a "workshop" [sic!] in Beijing).

Also, the document is nowhere appended with the MOI term, merely with "...confidential and proprietary document". Can you explain the basis on which you selected it as an example?

@OW
 

A340 (MOI dated 04 AUG 2005 FCOM rev. 20) and A330 (MOI dated 18 NOV 2004 FCOM rev. 16) makes reference to the AP disconnect.

A330 (MOI dated 01 FEB 2006 FCOM rev. 19) makes reference to the "sidestick neutral or forward for 0.5s while AoA<AoAprot"

an identical MOI for A340 is not listed.

Several SBs are involved since subtypes have their own SB number.

For A340-2/3xx SB 27-4131 may be involved since this SB mentions "an improvement in AoA phase out logic" without specifying the improvement in detail.

Thanks A33Zab

ventus 45,
Thanks again - I simply hadn't got to Page 22. Still wondering if that glossy document is itself an MOI, or repeating information previously promulgated in a specific document called MOI.

A33Zab,
Seems the plot is still thickening on these matters...

Quote from Clandestino:
"Now if anyone thinks exact mechanism of disabling alpha floor is of concern in the accident where narrowbody full of passengers was deliberately flown below 100ft at 120 kt and idle thrust - feel free to entertain me further."

Very much associate myself with that sentiment, My base training at Blagnac with AI in March 1988 - around the same time as the Habsheim crew - naturally included that part of the flight envelope. The differences from Habsheim included: safe altitude, no rushed manoeuvering and energy disposal to botch, and NO PASSENGERS. Seeing the Habsheim video a few months later suspended belief, but suggested the protections had worked well.

It is human nature, however, to want to understand the detail of the main factors in any departure.

Chris,

The document is a presentation made to CAAC, illustrated with an image taken out of a MOI.
MOIs respect the general "look and feel" of Airbus' Flight Ops documents.

But the FDR data show that the System had no intention to deliver Alpha Max ...

Quote from Clandestino:
"Now if anyone thinks exact mechanism of disabling alpha floor is of concern in the accident where narrowbody full of passengers was deliberately flown below 100ft at 120 kt and idle thrust - feel free to entertain me further."

To which Chris Scott commented:
Very much associate myself with that sentiment, My base training at Blagnac with AI in March 1988 - around the same time as the Habsheim crew - naturally included that part of the flight envelope. The differences from Habsheim included: safe altitude, no rushed manoeuvering and energy disposal to botch, and NO PASSENGERS. Seeing the Habsheim video a few months later suspended belief, but suggested the protections had worked well.

As shown in my piece on the subject NEW A320 CRASHES AT AIR SHOW (HABSHEIM 1988) in Air Crashes and Miracle Landings the situation was worse than "less under 100 ft" would suggest as the trees in front of them were 40 ft high. It points out that although the captain had performed the "stunt" many times it would have been in the safe conditions mentioned by Chris Scott.
Though the engines did spool up from idle (though not in time), the manufacturer did take measures to improve their reaction time following the disaster. In view of the many other negatives, that improvement might not have been enough, but worth bearing in mind.

Quote from llagonne66:
The document is a presentation made to CAAC, illustrated with an image taken out of a MOI.
MOIs respect the general "look and feel" of Airbus' Flight Ops documents.

Thanks for confirming that an MOI is not a glossy brochure! "No 35811" suggests they may appear at a rate of more than one a day?

If anyone can provide access to a sample, I think several of us here would appreciate it.

*sigh* - If we clear this up now, can we get back on topic?

Right CONF - we know, as you repeatedly point out, that the system's Alpha Prot computations allow for an AoA just (probably just a fraction of a degree) shy of true Alpha Max. This is probably to provide a little extra safety margin - after all we are talking about the boundary of stall here. Your contention is that if the protection wasn't there, Capt. Asseline had the skill to finesse that extra fraction of a degree and cleared the trees. Am I correct so far?

So - let's look at some other evidence. Leaving aside the rather dubious notion of performing that maneouvre with passengers aboard in the first place (for which AF should be - and were - censured) - Capt. Asseline elected, having found himself off course (expecting the paved runway), fast and high, to fudge the approach rather than turn around and try again. This rather correlates some of the anecdotal evidence we have of the guy being somewhat arrogant. The mistranslation I've been working from regarding disabling of A/THR (and thus A. Floor) means that while fudging that approach, Capt. Asseline forgot to follow the protocol and did not cross-check with the crew. This arguably makes him both arrogant and incompetent - and it also demonstrates that his handling skills were not particularly well-developed. He then allowed the engines to spool down, and the aircraft to drop below 100ft - leaving an aircraft that was carrying passengers low, slow and out of options. Arrogant, incompetent *and* careless - qualities reflected in the judicial decisions that went against him.

Arrogant, incompetent and careless pilots have a nasty habit of getting people hurt and killed - and there is no mitigating excuse in the world that can counter the *facts* described in the paragraph above.

There - Habsheim is now discussed for the umpteenth time on a thread that bears little relation to the subject at hand. Permission to move along?

Habshame
 

2.5 deg is NOT a 'fraction of a degree'.

The 'little extra safety margin' is already in Alpha Max, that is why Alpha Max is Alpha Max and not Alpha Stall.

You are NOT.
The contention is that such supplementary restriction is NOT mentioned in the FCOM and not even in the BEA Report that had the duty to list it at a contributory factor.

You can even call him criminal if you wish but not before ALL facts are put on the table.

As you obviously don't know the Report, it would be hard to 'clear anything up'.
You don't have to stick around either ...

CONF - he wouldn't have cleared the trees anyway, and even if he had, he'd still probably have ended up losing his licence on the basis of the video evidence.

Where do you get 2.5 degrees from?

You certainly do not have the knowledge to state so.
The BEA had the necessary tools to get some numbers.

Who cares ?
I'm not reading Paris Match here, I am interested in the technical side.

*sigh* - From the documentation you don't read but still think entitled to make statements on ...

1. no swiveling pitot probes generally and on 330 in particular 2. trigonometry.

Well, that's the beauty in simplicity of the Airbus FCS: it doesn't need q. Pilot inputs G demand, elevator moves to meet it (as measured by IRS) and that's all there is to it. No need for taking q from ADC or elevator pitots to adjust stick stiffness, there is just non-adjustable spring. You might have all air data shot up and still have G command and protection - that's what is meant by obscure (to some) term "Alternate law". Of course, simpler means cheaper but also means there are far less components to break down.

Much ado has been made around here about complexity of reconfiguration laws and how to enter and exit protections. Operationally, all conditions listed in FCOM are of not much significance. What to do if your controls have gone alternate in flight? Nothing, keep on flying as you were. Just don't perform windshear or GPWS escape with full stick back, keep an eye on the airspeed, OK? How much stick and for how long is needed to combat the unwarranted alpha prot pitching you up? Who cares, push the stick to get the attitude you need and prot disconnection will take care of itself, it is meant to be instinctive and it is.

I'm sorry Chris, if my caustic style caused you to believe I was going for a cheap shot here. To make my position clear: I do not find any of the theories that there was anything remotely rational in CM2's action and it was just misunderstanding and misapplication on his part plausible. He meant just to return to altitude? He busted it by a couple of thousand feet. He followed the flight directors? He pulled whether they were there or not. He was cognitively overloaded? For a while the only thing picked up by the CVR is stall warning. The aeroplane developed roll oscillation? Oh sure: maximum amplitude 11°, period approximately 10 seconds, damped actively and completely in 1:30 min. He tried to perform UAS procedure for very low level in cruise? He didn't say so and was persuaded by CM1 to ease a bit anyway but stall warning sent him into another pull-up frenzy.

Now let's have a look at the general state of the aviation safety; despite all the doom-sayers that overuse of automation is going to be the end of us all, year after year we are enjoying the record lows of accident rates, so we must be at least doing something right. Of course, not all or even the most of improvement in the safety record is attributable to automation but there is no evidence it reduced safety, especially if besides the dry statistics we choose to pay attention to all too numerous incidents where automation went ballistic and pilots saved the day, often without anyone noticing except their colleagues informed via internal safety bulletins. So if we (and I mean we as aviation community, not as PPRuNers) want to improve the chances of everyone landing safely by applying the lessons of AF447, we better make sure we understand what really happened, lest we apply the cures that are inappropriate and can turn out to be poisonous.

I do not know what made the whole crew to act as they did but I am pretty sure there are two things that won't prevent AF447-like accident from reoccurring: more raw data manual approaches and more practice in unusual attitudes recovery. Practicing any of them involve preparation and anticipation, things sadly lacking in AF447 case where onset of the trouble was very fast. Again: issue with AF447 is not the pilot unable to handfly the aeroplane; it was pilot unable to understand the situation, implication of his actions and pretty precisely handflying just the wrong way, while his assisting pilot was, unfortunately, as lost as him. Nothing of it can be prevented by practicing eye-to-hand coordination in friendly skies. Also this kind of reaction is very rare and trying to present AF447 as typical of the current state of affairs is misinformed at the best.

I have mentioned that this is just another child-of-the-magenta case and this might be too imprecise; despite significant differences (performance and aerodynamics vs. lateral navigation) both AF447 and AA965 are subsets of the same archetype of accidents: pilots who find themselves on unfamiliar territory, are unable to recognize where they are and how to return to normal, eventually performing the action that results in their premature termination. That is absolutely not to say they were bad pilots: I'm pretty sure if they were presented with the scenario of their final flight, they would vehemently deny they would ever act according to it. As many around here very well know, difference between thought process in the air and on the ground is stupendous, especially at 4AM. Our unfortunate colleagues were suddenly thrown on scales and found lacking and even after final report we are not much smarter regarding what was missing.

To what end? He wasn't censured for failing to clear the trees, he was censured for taking unnecessary risks by improperly conducting an approach, then making a pig's ear of the approach itself - putting him (and his passengers and crew) low and slow with absolutely no safety margin whatsoever.

Then your criticisms of the BEA are unwarranted. They are tasked with providing a technical explanation of what happens in an accident and hopefully formulating recommendations to prevent a recurrence of that accident - nothing more.

What you're demanding - either computations or practical demonstrations to show at what pitch angle the aircraft could have cleared the trees with the airspeed at that point, or indeed if the extra 2.5 degrees (by your reckoning) could have made any difference - does not fall within that remit.


I do have the manuals and FCOM kicking around somewhere, and I'm as interested in the technical side as you are - a reference would be handy.

The pitots don't measure the angle of attack!
Itr's the AoA vanes which swivel.

rrrat - I eventually found the thread trail (25 Oct) you refer to! I think Clandestino will recognise his error in the light of day and realise he has been confused by the IAS inhibition on the stall warning. Indeed, 100kts TAS is well enough to register an AoA on a balanced probe (I assume they are balanced?), even allowing for density, I would reckon.

Hi BOAC,
Unfortunately, I don't think so as this is his 16th attempt (according to his count.)
It will just be another page of copy and paste of random parts of incomplete quotes.

AF Standards
 

@ Clandestino
Again: issue with AF447 is not the pilot unable to handfly the aeroplane; it was pilot unable to understand the situation, implication of his actions and pretty precisely handflying just the wrong way, while his assisting pilot was, unfortunately, as lost as him.

This is exactly the problem with AF's training whose safety record speaks unenviable volumes.
The problem is that AF haven't undertaken the recommendations of the ISRT because of the entire way that AF is run by having overpaid and underworked Generals with no Corporals.
This is reflected by the numerous incidents post-AF447 which indicates that safety culture doesn't run in AF veins.
Now here comes the rub: since 2012, AF has hired A342 instructors from the Estérel squadron at Airbus' behest to retrain AF instructors but so far in vain.
Worse, AF's parlous finances makes it even harder to get on with safety.
I expect DL or SU to leave SkyTeam.
Now watch this space: SU to join SkyTeam...yep Putin's heart pounds for Merkel.

Quote from BOAC (my emphasis):
rrrat - I eventually found the thread trail (25 Oct) you refer to! I think Clandestino will recognise his error in the light of day and realise he has been confused by the IAS inhibition on the stall warning. Indeed, 100kts TAS is well enough to register an AoA on a balanced probe (I assume they are balanced?), even allowing for density, I would reckon.

I'm hoping to find time to answer the rest of his post later (got a car to wash), but I respectfully suggest that you two may be missing Clandestino's point here.

His key word is "trigonometry". Think about it. Compare the pitch attitude of the aircraft, and therefore the pitots, with its steeply-downward trajectory. Haven't got time to check the figures right now, but, although the vertical component of its trajectory is (say) 10,800ft/min (180ft/s, or just over 100kts TAS), the pitot tube is at more than 90 degrees to that.

That's why - I think - he made a cryptic, light-hearted reference to "no swivelling pitots... on 330" (i.e., they DON'T SWIVEL...)

Hope this helps.

Chris, OG, HN39DonH
I can see the discussion has changed track. However I am producing the MOI for your information.
MODIFICATION OPERATIONAL IMPACT (M.O.I)
Aircraft Type
A340
SB Number
27-4101, 27-4116, 27-4131
Modification Number 48753
Modification Title
FLIGHT CONTROLS - FCPC - INTRODUCE NEW L16 SOFTWARE STD ON FCPC HARDWARE 2K0
Issue Date 04-AUG-2005
This information was initially introduced by:
Doc
Volume 1
Volume 2
Volume 3
Volume 4
QRH
FCOM
REV20
OEB
TR
FCOM sections impacted:
Volume 1, Volume 2, Volume 3,Volume 4
QRH. FCOM
1.27.20
OEBs or TRs cancelled by this modification:
Doc
Volume 1, Volume 2, Volume 3, Volume 4, QRH
OEB
TR
Summary of Operational Changes:
This modification consists of introducing the new L16 Software Standard on the Flight Control Primary Computer (FCPC) hardware 2K0. This software introduces a new condition that enables the aircraft to leave the Angle-of-Attack protection.
STLS (FS/EGM) MOI: 48753 (A340) Page 1 of 2
AIRBUS
1 ROND-POINT MAURICE BELLONTE
31707 BLAGNAC CEDEX FRANCE
TELEPHONE 05 61 93 33 33
TELEX AIRBU 530526 F
Modification Operational Impact
STLS (FS/EGM) MOI: 48753 (A340) Page 2 of 2
Description of Operational Changes:
In-flight experience has indicated that strong gusts of wind could unduly activate the Angle-of-Attack (AOA) protection. Therefore, this new FCPC logic is implemented to easily enable the aircraft to leave the AOA protection, when this protection is unduly activated.
With this new standard, the AOA protection is no longer active , when alpha is less than alpha prot, and the sidestick has not been deflected since the last autopilot disconnection.

Technical side is my concern, not Asseline, will you ever get it ?

Ok then where's the technical explanation on why the System refused to deliver Alpha Max ... ?

If you were you would read the Report first before spreading disinformation.

A330 AOA VanesWhat's the point there? In the worst case The AOA vane would be stuck at the maximum AOA (design value). Who cares if that is 30 or 60 degrees, it would be stalled anyway. That is at least true as long as the jet is not stalled inverted.
Or do we have any evidence, that the vane would reverse its travel against the airflow?

If the trigonometry concern is for the pitots, then it may be again fair to ask, why besides the AoA a speed indication is needed to determin wether you are in a full stall.

Hi Chris Scott,
I completely agree. So why would you want to turn off the stall warning when stalled like that?
The 60 kt logic is to prevent false warnings on the ground when the AoA vanes could take up any random position at low speed. Why keep the 60 kt logic when airborne?