A&C, no point commenting on your example as it's irrelevant. Your take on my posts is up to you. The purpose of this thread is to shed some light on different angles. I just gave you a glimpse into what an examiner will do during the check. Mind you that a TRE has got a evaluation sheet for each and every phase, detailed and laid out as per SOP. TRE is obliged to tick off mandatory boxes starting from preparation till shut down during OPC. OPC is all about SOPs, as you well know. During the debrief TRE will ask you why you failed to do this or that to determine the cause of failure. If you say, sorry I forgot or didn't know it's still a failed item but not a violation. If you say, listen troll your SOPs are rubbish, well then you've willfully violated SOPs thus rendering the entire check as failed. The choice is always yours. This is just a flow of actions for a check. Attitude determines altitude. Yours will put you far below MSL. :ok:

When it comes to the regular line operation, without a TRE breathing into neck, it's folks like c2 we rely on.

9.G;

I've read your posts and you don't 'read' like a troll at all. You read like someone who knows exactly what they're talking about.

I think your discussion points of the value of SOPs, the value of knowledge and airmanship and particularly the value of discipline in all aspects of one's operation are well worth reading especially for those just getting into the business.

The headset example may not be the best one to illustrate what you mean by "discipline" but anyone who understands the value and the great importance of the points you're making regarding SOPs and cockpit behaviours will also understand your example.

I'd like to talk about the notion of "the bad apple" and organizational behaviour for a sec.

The notion of "bad apple" usually means someone within an otherwise healthy organization, who consistently violates the organization's published-trained-and-checked SOPs.

But if the organization tolerates this in the training and checking process, or if the organization doesn't even know that an individual is not adhering to SOPs and other behaviours known to sustain a safety culture, then it is the organization, not the individual, which has a problem.

The notion of "bad apple" persists and may have some validity in highlighting an individual problem which needs addressing, but since Charles Perrow's ground-breaking insights and work on organizational behaviour (Normal Accidents, 1984) and a huge amount of work done since then by such authors as Reason, Dekker, Helmreich, Foushee and others, the focus is not on the individual but on the organizational environment in which individuals work.

That was Perrow's insight...that organizational values directly affect the work environment including the organization's safety culture. If individual employees perceive that there is an unwritten tolerance for deviations from SOPs then that is the organization's culture and that is how employees will behave.

While there are always varying levels of skill, ability and capacity, SOPs, (as you have pointed out) are intended to provide solid if not straightforward guidance for all. In such an approach, deviations are the exception whereas the notion of the "bad apple", by definition, tolerates the exception.

Nice contribution to the discussion, thanks.

PJ2, thanx. No doubt corporate culture heavily influences individual attitudes.
It's not possible to change someone's temperament but it's surely possible to change the attitude. That's the main task of those creating corporate culture/ ideology. Creating a corporate culture/ideology where an individual identifies him/herself as part of the group sharing common values and pursuing same goals creates probably the strongest profit generator: motivation. For us the ultimate goal is safety so it's all about the safety culture. Somewhat easier achievable in a homogeneous, in terms of values, culture, language etc, environment with a raised and "tuned" generation of the same "breed", if you will, and far more difficult in a heterogeneous one with different cultures, values, languages, backgrounds, experiences etc. With the commercial pressure on top priorities might shift towards profitability reducing the margins, creating tense and unhealthy working conditions. Then there's punitive and non punitive culture, heavily influencing the safety culture as well. It ranges from flying FOQA instead of an airplane and not giving a damn bout SOP coz no actions will be taken apart from a little chit chat or email. SOPs are not flawless and not a panacea but a valid guideline. However a professional attitude towards SOPs should be complied with unless deviation is required due to situation and safety isn't compromised. A professional will use proper channels to contribute towards more efficiency but will lead by an example of a disciplined approach towards SOPs. It's probably the most difficult task to establish a safety culture which advocates for the right attitudes, promotes professionalism, encourages individualism, creates intolerance towards violations and develops consciousness for consequences. :ok:

For every accident where following SOPs was a causal factor there are according to one safety study I have read, over 20 accidents where not following SOPs was a causal factor.

My personal experience is that those pilots who continually fudge/modify/ignore/change SOPs are the ones who are most in need of the operational protection that following SOPs gives and is reflective of a broader pattern of a lack of personal and professional discipline.

The SOP should always be the starting point for every action/situation , but of course there will be cases where the SOP may be inappropriate and this is where good CRM will keep the other guy in the loop and contributing.

With respect to the original poster if the SOP violations described are routine and widespread then his/her company has a culture problem which will sooner or later manifest itself in an accident.......

BPF...Re, "The SOP should always be the starting point for every action/situation , but of course there will be cases where the SOP may be inappropriate and this is where good CRM will keep the other guy in the loop and contributing."

Precisely.

...and re, "With respect to the original poster if the SOP violations described are routine and widespread then his/her company has a culture problem which will sooner or later manifest itself in an accident....... "

Yes, I think so. I would add however, that if it's only one pilot, his/her company still has a problem and it isn't just the one pilot.

9.G
 

You have finally convinced me that you are not a troll, your level of PC retoric is far beond what any troll could achive and as usual with the PC of this world you take the subject far past what is reasonable, a sort of SOP Taliban or Klu Klux Clan, taking reasonable philosophies to extremes and totaly perverting the original good ideas.

As I said on one of my first posts on the subject SOP's are the building blocks of a safe operation but your extreme veiws about the aderance to the letter of the SOP remove all chance of flexible problem solving.

Fortunaly I see very little of your attitude in the airline I fly with, we have a good set of SOP's based on the manufacturers recommendations and aided by modifications to enhance saftey in the prevailing operating environment.

What we are free of is the nif-naf & trivia of people who mandate each last trivial action while failing to understand the very essence of airmanship.

A&C, last attempt to explain. A description of the OPC chart flow isn't my attitude but a regulatory guideline as much as there's a table for acceptable tolerances during mandatory maneuvers for the skill test.
My attitude is plain simple:
compliance with the SOPs is not extremism but professionalism.
complacency isn't equal to flexibility.
Deviations are acceptable provided safety isn't compromised and everybody is kept in the loop.
Violations aren't acceptable.

You're the one who got upset bout the headset requirement and I simply classified your actions. Merry Xmas to you too.:ok:

Very nice discussion (for a very long time on pprune)...
The basic question turns around the definition of SOP violation versus freedom of SOP flexibility. I will refrain myself from giving any definition here (not willing to take any beating :hmm:). For sure one can make a proposition around these two definitions to dig any further into the matter.
It is for sure that a simple stance, described as SOP Taliban, or words of that matter will not enlighten any of us. I am sure the writers taking this side are also able to give examples were they could wish for some more adherence (by others of course) to company procedures for the sake of professionalism.
Do not bother to come along with "roque pilots" or not having enough "airmanship". These terms do not, in my view, describe a meaningfull concept at all. How airmanship can fail is beyond my imagination. Although many efforts to describe these concepts have been made in the past I have yet to encounter a good one. Before (any of) you start a reply along these lines, answer this question first; if "airmanship fails or lacks" what concept replaces it (vacuum not taken for an answer!).
How much flexibility is really needed to do a professional job? Which or what SOP will drive me into a mountain/ground/sea etc... Although I personally prefer less on the SOP side, in the end I am being payed to do as Is written in the books. Furthermore I am still covered to go beyond anything written in case safety is at stake. But to be honest it did not happen often to really say safety was a reason not to comply. Usually any shortcoming in this way is quickly corrected.
So what remains? Culture? If defined as a collection of norms and values by a defined and closed group, it will definitely be interesting in terms of organisational behaviour. I fully agree on the notion that a company with a persistent "bad apple" has a bigger problem than the "bad apple" itself. The thread starter even sees a wider trend in the industry as a whole. Is the noticed trend already past a point where this we created a common ground (or lost ground) on SOP adherence? I don't think so. It is however worrisome that some individuals or even organisations completely underestimate the power of corporate culture. Janis wrote something along the lines where the stronger groupthink existed (esprit de corps) less independent critical thinking could exist (to the point of inhuman and irrational actions). For more reading also try and understand some of Weick's work....
As a last note I fail to see how Perrow comes into work here. In my memory he made the important point of certain industries are too complex AND suffer from tight interaction which make them prone to accidents beyond the point where humans cannot longer effectively intervene. I believe his cultural (or better political) part came from the fact that certain groups of people (poor or otherwise with less influence) within a society have bigger changes to be effected by accidents of complex and tightly coupled systems. I stand to be corrected (but give me time to find the book somewhere in between the Christmas carols and fireworks :hmm:)

Claybird;

Re, "This reminds me of how the Space Shuttle Columbia's accident investigation board described NASA's approach to safety."

Diane Vaughan, writing in "The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA", described the lowering of standards due to past successes as the "normalization of deviance." In the case of Challenger, successful launches occurred at lower temperatures with only moderate burn-through of the sealing O-rings. The engineers argued that launches had not occurred in such low temperatures but management over-ruled the engineers, citing history. Lack of resiliency was considered but until Feynman's now-famous demonstration with a small piece of O-ring, a pair of small vice-grip pliers and his glass of ice-water, the true effects of low temperatures had not been appreciated by the managers and leadership.

The important factor here, aside from normalization deviance is the "new" understanding of organizational behaviour that everyone thought they were doing exactly the right thing. It is a variation on the groupthink theme. Vaughan concluded that there had been no "amoral calculation", (intentional avoidance of standards, and/or negligence). The normalization of deviance concept made visible previously invisible organizational behaviour patterns.

The argument for SOP adherence is grounded in these notions. It can be successfully argued I think that individualism in cockpits, (where a pilot, or the captain makes up his own procedures) can and does work until it doesn't and there is a (perhaps preventable) accident.

In such circumstances the rest of the crew is on his/her own in terms of CRM and otherwise assisting. I argued this in the AF447 thread; - the PF launched individual actions (pitching up) on his own without announcing, (as required by SOPs), what he was doing, without calling for the ECAM actions (as required by SOPs), and, ignoring CRM SOPs by not responding to verbal interventions, (mild as they were) from the PNF.

Judgement is always required in flying airplanes and that is not inconsistent with SOPs. One must know when SOPs must be strictly adhered to for the safety of the flight, and when they must be flexible also to ensure the safety of the flight. Is the problem today not knowing that boundary? I don't know. I do know that despite a slavish requirements which sometimes do not appear to make sense, SOPs are an advancement in flight safety. I know this because as a young oiler I used to keep notes on every captain I flew with and that had ended by the time I had become a First Officer. The one case that comes to mind where a compromise in cockpit SOPs caused the loss of the aircraft and all on board is the Air Canada DC8 accident at Toronto in 1970. See p.91 - 98 of the Report, (give it a moment to load).

There is no argument today for a wholesale setting aside SOPs in favour of individually-created "safer" procedures, especially in air carrier operations.

Perhaps a question that would help here could be, "What circumstances might be more safely handled by varying or even ignoring SOPs, and what operational circumstances demand strict adherence to SOPs?" We all know that both circumstances do exist, otherwise the thread would not be so interesting!

airmanship
 

SKYbrary - Airmanship Any operator striving for safety must have, apart from the mandatory programs like QA, FOQA etc. well established human resources manual addressing various topics but more importantly conveying a clear message of what the company's philosophy is. :ok:

http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/C...ture_(OGHFA_BN)

http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/A...SOPs_(OGHFA_BN)

I leave it to each and everyone to decide and choose. :ok:

There are two parts to this problem. There is undoubtably an issue of corporate culture that affects compliance with SOPS but there is, I believe, a more important issue: the quality of the company SOPS and regulatory instructions above it.

Where an operation has poor SOPS there is a high likelyhood that people will deviate from them. This results in the normalisation spoken about above.

Poor SOPS can come from a number of factors. But examples I can think of include inappropriate procedures (eg from a different aircraft type that don't apply), procedures resulting from incorrect risk assessment (eg a procedure designed to prevent a risk causes a different, greater one) and excessive procedures.

The last, in my humble opinion, is the biggest issue. We live in a world with a surfeit of lawyers and the answer to most incidents is 'write a rule' to prevent it happening again. This results in a complex interplay of legislation, manuals, memos etc that on paper should make us safer but in most cases rules overlap and contradict. It doesn't take much reading of Pprune to see how wide a variety of understandings there are of what rule applies when, before we even get to what is a good idea!

If we have an operation with a succinct set of rule of what shall and shall not be done coupled with guidance of what should be done and a clear understanding of which is which, it all works. People should and generally will follow the SOPS. But if we have a mixiblob of conflicting, impractical, and incorrect instructions coupled with so many pages of minutiae that no one can remember every rule people won't follow it.

headset rule
 

CAT.OP.MPA.215 Use of headset — aeroplanes
(a) Each flight crew member required to be on duty in the flight crew compartment shall wear a headset with boom microphone or equivalent. The headset shall be used as the primary device for voice communications with ATS:
(1) when on the ground:
(i) when receiving the ATC departure clearance via voice communication; and
(ii) when engines are running;
(2) when in flight:
(i) below transition altitude; or (ii) 10 000 ft, whichever is higher; and
(3) whenever deemed necessary by the commander.
(b) In the conditions of (a), the boom microphone or equivalent shall be in a position that permits its use for two-way radio communications.

Now can anyone tell me what's unreasonable bout this rule? We take it for granted that SOP are the best way to operate. Apart from SOPs there's OM A which also sets forth the framework we're all bound by. Last but not least an abundance of reading material was given with definitions, descriptions and examples to distinct speculations from solid theories. So far I've only come across one case where some of the procedures were modified from its' original version due to an attempt to establish a common procedure across all fleets, mainly Boeing and Bus. That's the worst an operator can do in my personal opinion. Part A is common grounds for operational strategy, tactics, policies etc. SOPs should be kept as it was intended by the manufacturer not at last due to easiest way to keep up with the updates and modifications. :ok:

What's unreasonable about the rule?

There are times that we do use our headsets to obtain clearances. Guys have been flying for ages realize when it might be needed. Make it a regulation? :{

"Compton 3G, squawk 1234" requires a headset to understand? :ugh:

the very same notion can be applied to English proficiency. Why all of the sudden after 100 years of aviation history make a reg bout the English proficiency? The answer is: due to hiccups in the past.

Neither am I against it nor for it I simply follow it.:ok:

The two opposing camps
 

may actually agree with each other more than they suppose.I believe in airmanship and judgment,borne from experience and cognition.Airmanship will include many things and is often looked down upon by the SOP technocrats.But actually,the good SOP's,the ones that count and make pure sense as an aviator,come from airmanship.They are the lessons of dead men.So the "airmanship" camp do NOT disregard and disrespect the good SOP's because to do so would be poor airmanship.

Any procedure that is "trifling" is a waste.It adds nothing to airmanship whatsoever.It is there out of someone's misguided need for pedantry.

Example: It matters nothing that you wear a headset when receiving a clearance.What matters is that you hear the clearance,read it back correctly to ATC,and cross-check it with the flt plan and your colleague.If you cant hear it because of extraneous noise,then don your headset and ask ATC to repeat.You,as PILOT,decide this all on your own.

Example 2:It matters nothing which pilot enters the data in the FMC prior liftoff.You can quite easily work that out between yourselves as 2 adults..What matters is that ONE PILOT enters the data and the other pilot x-checks prior liftoff.Or if in flight,the PNF enters the data,the PF x-checks and then the PNF executes.It is the concept of one pilot doing and one pilot checking that is sacrosanct,nothing else.

ALL SOPS can and should be broken where appropiate.Knowing when comes from experience and knowledge.This includes things like we've already discussed like not climbing to flight plan-recommended LEVEL even though the FMC and your over-anxious FO says its okay to do so.Or foregoing checklist discipline to affect an immediate landing if the situation is bad.Or exceeding taxi speed if on a long backtrack and asked to expedite for traffic.Or staying above glidepath(if in a medium ac) to avoid wake if you anticipate it or experience it.Or as said before,two pilots both familiar with home base foregoing a briefing even though it is SOP and airmanship to do one.
All that is required is common sense and good judgment.If the SOP's are good,clear and simple then they'll hardly ever be conflicting.

Regulations like this among with countless retarded SOP's erode the respect for said regs and SOP's. Whats the purpose? Will the airplane fall down and kill people if the FO from far away misses his clearance the first time? Would the use of a headset enhance his comprehension of English? Is it practical to wear a noise cancelling headset during turnaround when you need to speak to the people around you?

Like in one company I was told they add an extra flap check on the list every time a management pilot forgets it. Quite a bit of said type of pilots like to put their mark on something, hence making up something silly in the SOP's. Look at Spanair, their 4 flap checks or so failed, is the answer to increase the amount of flap checks to 6? A well known company introduced Boeing 737's to their fleet with MD80/DC9 procedures, panel scan? what is that?

Some Ill-conceived SOP's are counter productive and ruin the whole purpose. A good guideline is that if you think you know better than Boeing how to operate an aircraft, you are on the wrong track.

I'm not advocating a departure from SOP's but offering ideas why they might not stick in a company.

RTO, the quote is not part of a SOP but a regulation and it's part of OM A. Let's start with comparing apples with apples. SOPs don't tell you to wear a uniform either but OM A does. In the end why do we need all those rules and regs. and SOPs if we all simply use common sense and act responsibly. Statistics prove otherwise. 70% of accidents are due to human failure. Go figure.:ok:

I feel somehow challenged to reply to post #54 where a link is provided to "airmanship". The following is not intended to nihilate the concept of "airmanship". I will try to bring forward arguments why this concept cannot serve as an explanation of certain behavior. Furthermore I will try to convince why this concept may even be counterproductive in an approach to safety.
Looking at the definition provided in the link (skybrary...) it makes use of the terms consistent, good and well developed. It is not clear from this definition what the reference point is to measure/compare these standards with. When is good, good enough? How well-developed does ones skills need to be? If I make an error on these skills or judgement do I cross the line between airmanship and not-airmanship? How small may the error be to be just on the edge, 5 kts or 10% of my judgments? It is impossible to score 10/10, as I am human and therefore prone to making (small) errors.
In my eyes it gets even worse when looking at the " corner stones" in the link provided, besides that these corner stones refer to the airmanship concept themselves (understanding the challenges posed to airmanship...). These cornerstones have such a wide range of descriptions it basically describes the pilot, all the skills, knowledge and attitudes are described. The way airmanship is described it will, at the surface, always apply and therefore must be correct (for the layman not willing to dig deeper). Not adhering to SOP or rules might be a "discipline" aspect of airmanship. The solution, according to this broad concept, can only be more airmanship (or discipline). It does not, however, gives us an explantion why or how pilots do not comply. Deeper questions and well argued (and possible measured) arguments will possible lead us to better solutions. This concept do not point us in that direction.
Looking with a broader view it is, in my opinion, just a way to describe how a professional is defined. Airmanship (seamanship, craftmanship...) is just a common denoter of a "professional" in the aviation world. Not an useful explanation of anything.
The danger I like to point out is that the concept of airmanship puts the "one at the sharp end" central. If we apply the definition of airmanship at the quoted 70% of accidents are human errors where do we need to improve? Look at the inconsistency of ones judgement, bad judgement or under developed skills? In other words remove the culprit from the scene and replace him/her with somebody with more airmanship... In hindsight it is always easy to find the errors, inconsistency, bad handling etc... in somebodies behavior. Especially if we establish where the bar of "good", "consistent" and " well developed" needs to be after the occurence. The airmanship concept fortifies these thoughts. Furthermore another result might be more rules/SOP to avoid the next bad airmanship experience.
If we use the "airmanship" concept carefully (in the bar, with a beer :ok:) and look at human behavior with more detailed and refined concepts (and used by people with knowledge of these concepts AND aviation) we might be able to steer more in the direction where we can really make progress. Good examples are given in previous posts. Hopefully SMS concepts (and some more knowledgeable people in rule making/ government/ industry) will be able to step beyond "airmanship".
:oh:

I think, I'll have another coffee. :ok:

New Member. Hi!

It's obvious that a crew not reading checklists, acting like cowboys shouldn't be in charge of aircraft.

But pros should know when the situation calls for working outside of the SOPs, and not robotically fly to the scene of the accident reading their checklists.

The problem with a SOP can arise when say during an engine restart, they require a full shut down/cage procedure, and you have a mountain just ahead. Or maybe you just leveled at FL450 and there is nothing about checking your O2/mask. ( I added that)

Disregarding SOPs out of hand is silly and unprofessional, but at the same time, there are a ton of accidents where the SOPs got in the way, for instance always trying a fly an aircraft off after VR. Consdier the Jack screw Alaska issue. Instead of flying for another hour, calling dispatch, flipping through manuals, someone should have said, 'hey we've got a flight control problem, that supercedes schedules, my retirment, chain of command, union issues, the check list, let's get it down'.

So optimally we have pilots who can make a judgments where the SOPs mitigate 99% of the potential problems, but maybe you are faced with something where the variables aren't covered in the book. Now make a decision. Some will call a guy a cowboy for disregarding a SOP but the litmus has always been 'yeah, but I saved a plane load of passengers'.

Folks,
One of the sad things about the Australian approach to matters such as 9G raises, the "headset rule", is that the final line of the Australian rule would read:

Strict Liability Offense, XX penalty points. For Strict Liability Offense, see Section XX of the Criminal Code.

The present draft of an Australian Part 91 makes "interesting" reading, with some rules incapable of legal definition, but a breach, nevertheless, is a criminal offence.

For example, what is "normal fuel flow" for any aircraft, when it comes to calculation of such as Fixed Final Reserve or other reserves. The CASA answer is to require a manual that has flat block figures, regardless of weight and temperature. That is just one example.

Similarly, all the provisions of an "accepted" Operations Manual (in Australia they are "accepted". not "approved") which will contains SOPs, are enforceable, and a breach is essentially a criminal act, unless the PIC can prove otherwise --- reverse onus of proof.

It certainly hasn't done anything for the Australian air safety record --- based on ICAO accident definitions, not Australian "modified" definitions --- just have a look at the record.

Tootle pip!!

L.S. this approach is adapted not not only by CASA but many others. Worth a while to note that each jurisdiction will press for its' legislation in case something happens. A movie Flight comes to my mind where an exceptionally skilled Mr.Washington has saved the day and yet went to jail for betraying the public trust. The principle in this particular example is what really matters namely the reason for the mechanical failure causing almost a crash is irrelevant when it comes to scrutinizing the human actions. Some investigators are very keen to connect the dots and call negligence a contributing factor. Does it ring the bell? Last but not least, there's theory and there's the real world with judges, juries and prisons. Any commander out there always thinks bit like a lawyer unlike f/o, nothing wrong with that as it's just a matter of experience. No matter how we feel bout the rules and regs, that's what the lawyers, judges, juries and investigators will go by. The choice is yours. :ok:

P.S. Official investigation and media speculation. The likely cause of the crash is a pilot error, but the investigation is still in progress. Two flight data recorders recovered at the scene are being examined by Interstate Aviation Committee experts. Moscow plane crash: Carnage caught on camera, investigation in progress (VIDEO, PHOTOS) — RT

9G,
I would not entirely agree with you about many other county's rules, the US being a prime example, not all offenses under the FARs are criminal offenses, many are civil or administrative offenses.

In Australia, the whole of the aviation regulatory structure is criminal law. Making an arithmetic error in adding up your log book is a strict liability criminal offense.

A basic tenant of criminal law is that there must be intent --- in the case of a strict liability offense under Australian aviation (or any) law, there is no need to show intent, the prosecution only needs to demonstrate the facts of the offense.

In the Australian criminal code, the only defense is "honest and reasonable mistake", and it cannot your mistake, but something over which you had no control, that caused the offense. For example, you violated controlled airspace without a clearance, because of a mistake in an aeronautical chart, and there was no NOTAM about the mistake.

In an area where pilot judgement and decision making is called for, in legal theory you cannot have a strict liability offense, because the facts of the offense cannot be "black and white".
That doesn't stop our lot.

Many years ago, Qantas had a jet upset, due to an instrument malfunction. The pilot who saved the aircraft was not even on the flight deck at the time. In the ensuing investigation, his contribution to the event was ignored, he was threatened with prosecution for reducing to structural damage speed, in the absence of the Captain, who, on return to the flight deck, thanked the F/O for so doing, with comments along the line of "I should have thought of that".
However, what the investigator heard on the voice recorder was the Captain ordering "standard cruise", and in the absence of the Captain, the F/O "ordered" structural damage cruise -- and the damage was significant.
As far as the Airstapo was concerned , that was "mutiny on the high seas".
After very strong union agitation, and some political intervention, the charge was dropped, but nevertheless, the F/O who saved the aircraft was the only pilot who was officially reprimanded.

An outstanding example of the stupidity that can occur, and continues to occur with the Australian approach to aviation law and enforcement.

Of course, one you wind up with a criminal record, particularly an aviation criminal record, you access to international travel can be severely limited, just look at the USvisa/Homeland Security rules.

As many Australia pilots have discovered, to their severe professional cost.

Tootle pip

The term in itself says it all: Standard operating procedures.

The word standard implies its counterpart non-standard.
As pilots we should be trained to expect the unexpected, thus expect the non-standard and be able to act accordingly. If this is limited to emergency situations, the limits are too rigid, because we face the non-standard on a daily base.

If the approach of any company or regulator is that the non-standard automatically means non-compliance with the standard, we face the "pomstralian conundrum"! Any company or regulator who considers such non-standards as punishable or in some cases even criminal, is not helping to enhance safety.

We are quick to condemn the culturally tied mentalities who would "rather crash than lose face", but we should also be careful not to cultivate the "rather crash than deviate from sops".

The real danger however is the trend to train only up to sops and nothing beyond. The trend of installing very young TRI/Es coming out of this generation does not help either. It definitely explains the rigid clinging to sops, because there is nothing more, but it is counterproductive to overall safety in civil aviation.

Sops are a perfect base for training and operation, but airmenship, common sense and experience should never be allowed to be pushed aside by religiously enforcing sops.

L.S. Civil aviation legislation I couldn't agree more with you regarding the Ozz approach however not entirely as well. The words appearing under some CARs or CASRs 'An offense against regulation ... is an offense of strict liability' imply that the offense is such that it is not necessary to show a criminal intent in order to prove a breach of the regulation — much the same as the road traffic regulations. The criminal law will be applied where referred to and in case a fault element for a particular physical element such as intention, knowledge, recklessness or negligence is present. In case of an accident with casualties for sure. Otherwise penalties as per civil aviation act are applied. That's what I meant by saying many other countries apply the same principle. They include penalties section in their legislation specifically applicable to aviation.

Section 20A

Reckless operation of aircraft
(1) A person must not operate an aircraft being reckless as to whether the manner of operation could endanger the life of another person.

(2) A person must not operate an aircraft being reckless as to whether the manner of operation could endanger the person or property of another person.

[For penalty see Section 29.]

Imprisonment for 5 years. .

Criminal Liability in Aviation

Gretchenfrage, SOP as such isn't a binding document that's why EU OPS has mandated OPS manual as OM A,B,C,D. OM A is an approved and the rest is accepted by authorities. Violations of those manuals under normal circumstances are offenses. Usually operators establish policies of manual compliance to protect themselves from liability. So does the manufacturer. The bottom line is the pilot is the easiest target in any case. A pilot can do him/herself a favor by simply complying with manuals. :ok:

True, but if you look at todays OMAs, they are thicker than they were some time ago, because more and more sops are written in stone in them. The rest is in FCOMs, agreed, but a lot of references there to the OMA. The main part of todays training goes into memorising articles, sops and endless briefings until we are numb to any real world common sense. I'd love some more hands on rather than "that's not the correct call".

We have come a long way from "don't hurt anything or anyone" to todays manuals who read like the fineprint of fishy software agreements.
The main reason, unfortunately, is not improvement of safety, but lawyers of manufacturers, operators and regulators trying to discard any kind of responsibility by shoving everything to the last one in the food chain.

By asking us to adhere strictly to these sops, all other players wash their hands in the black and white printed jungle.
And we all continue to play the game and quite often the scapegoat.

It's like with some religions:
The problem is not the message, it's the interpretation.

The Term SOP is long in the past. It's OM B nowadays and speaking of EU legislation part of the legally binding operations manuals. SOP is a mere recommendation of the manufacturer nothing else. OM A creates a legal framework for operations, something like main law body and is tightened up to the AOC specs. OM B is the executive order if you wish of how to comply with A using a tool such as aircraft. C are aeronautical manuals such as charts. D is training. A clever pilot knows his legal framework and understands the implications of such along with the consequences. On daily basis there's millions of violations all around the world but as long as everything ended well, legal machinery is in hibernation. As soon as the sh&t hits the fan that's when the merciless giant awakens and slaughters the scapegoat without compassion or remorse. Luckily religions aren't part of legislation anymore. :ok:

9G
Using an example from the Australian Civil Aviation Act 1988 (S.20A) is not really an example of what I was talking about.

The serious offenses that carry a potential custodial sentence are all in the Act, and are not strict liability offenses.

It is in the CARs/CASRs that you see the over-reach of the use of "strict liability". In much Australia legislation, strict liability is used for minor offenses, in the motoring area such as parking fines or minor breaches of speed limits.

It is the free use of strict liability in aviation regulations, in a way completely at odds with the traditional view that there must be a "mental element" (mens rea) for an offense to be treated as a criminal offense. The maximum penalty under the CAR/CASRs is 50 penalty points, but you still accumulate a criminal record.

Not only is this increasingly not the case, we are now seeing "reverse onus of proof" appearing. Once again, this is contrary to any reasonable interpretation of criminal law principles, "innocent until proven guilty' and the Crown (prosecution) must prove it's case.

Another increasingly disturbing trend, in aviation,(but generally not other Australian law) is for the meaning of "beyond a reasonable doubt" to be watered down to a lower level of proof required -- or put another way, the bar for "beyond a reasonable doubt" has been lowered --- for aviation.

Tootle pip!!

I've been digging a bit and that's what I found out:

CASR Division 13.K.2
Demerit points scheme
13.370 Offences to which demerit points scheme applies (Act s 30DT)
(1) All offences under CAR and CASR that are specified as strict liability offences are prescribed as offences to which Division 3D (Demerit points scheme) of Part III of the Act applies.
(2) The number of points that are incurred in relation to an offence to which that Division applies are as follows:
(a) if the maximum penalty for the offence is 10 penalty units or less — 1 demerit point;
(b) if the maximum penalty for the offence is more than 10 penalty units but less than 26 penalty units — 2 demerit points;
(c) if the maximum penalty for the offence is 26 penalty units or more — 3 demerit points.

It seems to me that Aussies have established a similar point system to traffic violations. Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998

Strict liability is simply a fact of the violation, without the burden of proof as you already stated. Sample, if you land without clearance there's no need to prove a criminal intent the mere fact is sufficient. That's all it is to it. The fact that the definition of strict liability is contained in the criminal law is the legacy of the common wealth legislation.

I'm not an expert of Ozz criminal law but it seems really odd that one would have a criminal record for a violation labeled as strict liability in down under. Only in case of injuries or fatal outcomes a criminal investigation will be launched by the DA office not CASA. That's when the DA office has to prove mens rea and the burden of proof is upon the DA office. Nobody is gonna be declared guilty till proven otherwise. For the conviction as per criminal law there must be a trial, that's where the principle of reasonable doubt comes in. In any case the plaintiff will use the results of the CASAs investigation to underline the accusations.

That's my take on that.

reference CIVIL AVIATION ACT 1988
Civil Aviation Regulations 1988

Civil Aviation Safety Authority - Infringement Notices/Demerit Points here's what I was talking bout.
Infringement notices are another enforcement tool. They impose administrative fines and are a cheaper and faster alternative to prosecution for breaches of the regulations.

Because they still require the criminal standard of evidentiary proof and may require further investigation, they are generally only issued for strict liability offences. Enforcement Manual, Chapter 8 - Infringement Notices - (Administrative Fines)

If a holder of a civil aviation authorisation, served with an infringement notice (AIN), chooses to pay the fine they will incur demerit points but will not be subject to any further criminal proceedings in relation to that offence.

If a recipient of an AIN elects to have the matter dealt with by the court, it will be open to the prosecutor to charge the recipient with other offences arising out of the same matter. If convicted or found guilty, a holder will incur demerit points in relation to each offence.

The Demerit Points Scheme is a system set up under Division 3D of Part III of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 and provides a staged approach for dealing with a holder who has multiple, or repeated, breaches of strict liability, regulatory offences. Under the Scheme, demerit points are incurred for such breaches on payment of a fine under an infringement notice or on a conviction or finding of guilty by a court. After a predetermined number of points have been accumulated within a specified period of time, all the holder’s authorisations, of that particular class, must be suspended or cancelled. As the period within which accumulation of demerit points may be counted against the holder is determined by the legislation, this largely removes the scope of CASA’s discretion. Enforcement Manual, Chapter 10 – Demerit Points Scheme :ok:

Protest too much
 

Those that advocate routine departures from SOPs are protesting too much. One of our prime directives is to follow SOPs and we should not normally deviate without a safety related reason. Good airmanship will indicate when this will happen and whenever possible, the F/O needs to at least somehow indicate his agreement. Habitual SOP deviation without good reason and without the agreement of the F/O, then Huston, we have a problem!
There may be very minor deviations that are of little consequence. I always wore headset when required by SOP. As F/O, I did not push the captain to do the same. As captain, it soon became obvious to my F/Os that headsets, like other SOPs, were required. I think they liked the idea that SOPs were a routine part of how we operated.
I admit to a couple of habitual infractions, but they were based on airmanship considerations and with F/O agreement. Often I carried more fuel, and on really long taxys, I might have sometimes exceeded the maximum taxy speed for brake temp reasons.

RAT 5
The problem with guidence of wise philosophy is who is wise is not written anywhere, so it is a self assessment. Who would like to think he is a fool? So everybody starts deviating. A culture needs to be built and implmented to respect SOPs. As they say SOPs are written in blood. SOPs are there in every air line but if the culture is to admire rule breakers and not rule followers then thing are waiting to happen.

SOPs and Regulations in a nutshell.

Designed and implemented to protect one's self from their own stupidity.

Think about it.

I've flown for a bunch of airlines. One thing became obvious; SOP's were often at the whim of the C.P. and not always for good rhyme or reason. I was staggered when I first joined the airline business how it was possible to reinvent the wheel, redesign the a/c and how so many airlines chose to re-write the manufacturer's instruction book. I couldn't fathom it; perhaps still can't. I've learnt to live with it, sometime in frustration. I've flown for airlines where they claimed the SOP's to be the approved bible and guarantee of safety. Firstly it was quite obvious that the XAA had not read the whole Ops manual: that was impossible. Secondly the eureka new SOP was changed a couple of weeks later as the line pilot feedback was that it didn't work the way the desk jockeys thought it would. It was often a 'told you so' moment. Thus, I am an SOP sceptic, not in the general sense of SOP's, but in that they are not always the best way to achieve a required task. It is also possible to over SOP a company. I am involved in TQ teaching. The students will join a in-depth SOP airline. They are trained robotic monkeys and guaranteed to survive if they do not deviate. I will debate that. A colleague SFI from another airline is shocked. In his airline , e.g. a G/A ifs flown according to FCTM and the approach chart with good airmanship discretion in coordination with ATC depending on Wx & TFC. In our TQ airline the G/A will be flown to absolute completion, by numbers, with no exemption. This is not the real world. Is it the best SOP? Should it be so? Should discretion be taken away fro the crew? ATC ask if you can abbreviate the procedure and you have to refuse or break SOP's. The same was a classic for years: CAT 2/3 LVO's; maintain 160k to 4nm (ATC) but SOP was F40 at G/S capture. So please, the SOP bible is not always the bible it pretends to be.
What SOP's do is cover your backside in case on an incident. This time "I was only following orders," is a defence. But sometimes it go my goat and irritated the dung out of my airmanship instincts. Times have moved on, peacefully, and the conflicts no longer applies; but sometimes having to teach such stuff just because it's their train set is galling.