Something like this saying Mayday accomplishes absolutly nothing. I would only say Mayday or declare an emergency if I would get preferential handling, not because my wing fell off and nobody could help me anyway. What's the point?

bubbers44 Something like this saying Mayday accomplishes absolutly nothing. I would only say Mayday or declare an emergency if I would get preferential handling, not because my wing fell off and nobody could help me anyway. What's the point?

Well, that's you, bub, and they may have considered a MAYDAY "not relevant to the flight", just like BEA may have, and that may be why we do not see it reported. There were several flights in the area, and they had radio access to these crews, to report trouble. If their radios worked. We see almost nothing of what adds up to an absolutely bizarre absence of acknowledgement of their situation. Whether the astonishing lack of chatter in the cockpit, the lack of radio, and the lack of TCAS, something is not adding up.

Take stock of all that is missing, and remember that BEA have purposely and admittedly omitted data. How much? Unknown. What type? Unknown. Initially the BEA stated the RHS was not recorded on the FDR, yet later we see A//P 2 trace, and stick, etc. What about radios, and the initial MEL re comms2? Cockpit heating, wipers, cargo hold temp, RHS NAV/RADAR 2, and FD2 traces? Which Buss carries RHS data to FDR? How did it not get recorded, then simply appear?
Plus all other parameters. What is up with that? The report claims AP2 was recorded, does that mean 'NOT engaged'? Or OFF? Because Captain told us it was selected ON...it may not matter re: flight path, and at the time, recovery was not possible. What it shows is a couple of disconnects in the report?

Bubbers44
 

Well, how about a lengthened version in that case? :
"CAUTION. Flying debris coming to a flight level near you!"? :eek:

You misinterpreted the statement. It was the RHS *display* that was not recorded, not the RHS information as a whole.

I'd be prepared to wager a considerable amount that the only data not in the report is the data considered irrelevant. Given that there's a plethora of data available in the report (certainly more than I've seen in previous reports from the NTSB, AAIB and - indeed - earlier BEA reports), I can't see why you're convinced something's being hidden.

" I can't see why you're convinced something's being hidden."

But much is "hidden", Doze. I propose that much of it is appropriately invisible, but it is a matter of conjecture what relevance it may have.

You are mistaken about the displays being not recorded. The Captain is recorded telling us the AUTOPILOT annunciator is on the screen....Everything was not recorded does not mean the panel was compromised, or replete with dangerous and erroneous data. It simply "was not recorded"

You don't think like I do, Doze, but you may want to count yourself well off in that regard. I spent a year working for the Government, investigating....the Government. I am a trusting and forgiving person at heart, but if I sniff bull !!!!, and the presence of said bs is meant to fool people, I get right nosy, and persistent.

Really? I must have missed that - I read he was heard to confirm and make sure it was off, but maybe you have different data to me.

[EDIT : Confirmed - FDR shows both AP off from initial disengagement to impact.]

Except for the sound of the selector on the CAM.

A sister ship to the 330 had an electrical short circuit in flight, and the crew lost half of their ECAM, lost Navigation, had cockpit cabin communication failure, and lost effective control of the stick, along with autopilot.

Any of this sound familiar?

Would you like to read the serious incident report?

At that point it was just belt-and-braces to make sure it's off. Unlike the FD there is a distinct and specific FDR trace for AP disengagement and it remains OFF throughout the sequence.

It's possible that the Captain had fallen back to a mental mode where he was attempting checklists by rote and simply double-checking all of the points he could remember. Perhaps he was disorientated and misidentified the selector.

In any case as far as the aircraft systems were concerned, the AP was OFF and stayed off.

As to your other points, AF is not a state airline and Airbus is not a state institution. They are both commercial entities in which the French government has a stake - nothing more, nothing less. Hiding problems will always be a self-defeating action - McDonnell Douglas learned that lesson the hard way, and you can bet the French government took notice because the tragedy that brought the secrecy to light happened on their soil. All claims of cover-up and skullduggery on the part of the French regarding Airbus can be traced directly to a single incident where lawyers acting for a defendant in the case leaked unsubstantiated scuttlebutt to the press, who repeated it unchallenged.

But here we have hard evidence that at least one display was functioning correctly, and no instrumentation other than airspeed was lost. You're trying to draw a false equivalency.

I don't think flight 447 was concerned about a mayday call to warn flights below them at that moment. Would you? Mayday will give you priority but over the Atlantic what does it accomplish, nothing.

Notifying adjacent traffic would accomplish reporting at least, You might be right, they had their hands full, and they may well have decided to remain anonymous. Screwing the Poodle is embarrassing for the French?

I do agree on that.
That being said, the 12 degrees of pitch was absolutely undesirable, but was not fatal. Some 40 sec after AP disc the situation was borderline but had stopped to deteriorate ... until the FD reappeared and the PF got the bad reflex to follow them. That's when everything took the wrong turn and STALL2 arrived.

Now, that's also the precise moment the trim started to roll ...
It is absolutely unprofessional for the BEA to have omitted to include the full analysis on that matter in their final report.

No misplaced autotrim, and 'we wouldnt' be discussing an accident here'.

Without autotrim, the PF would have pulled more to follow the FD, or to maintain 15°, or 12.5° pitch, or to arrest the V/S.

Not to mention that the autotrim does not and did not move of its own volition, but moved in response to the consistent and excessive (for the conditions) backpressure on the stick from the PF.

The fact that the A320 seems to have a hard limit on autotrim in Alternate whereas the A330 does not is an interesting line of discussion, but it's not really a subject within the scope of the report.

Hi DozyWannabe,
autotrim will move the stabiliser without any input from PF. If the speed of the aircraft changes, then the trim will run to help the elevator.

Once PF had commanded a pitch attitude which resulted in a real (not just spuriously indicated) speed decay - even if he didn't touch the side stick again - the FBW computers would attempt to maintain that trajectory by moving the elevators and hence the stab trim.

Agreed. But the culprit is not autotrim, without it the airplane would still have stalled.

That´s DozyW´s Oozlum bird. Either you don´t understand the system in the respective Alt2 Law or you don´t want to know.

Without autotrim only the elevators (already in full NU position by the FCS in an attempt to maintain the trajectory while airspeed decaying) would have been available for SS inputs. Then a further nose up command wouldn´t have changed anything. Although there are no data available (as BEA didn´t discuss that matter in the report) it must be assumed, that the pullup would have been terminated earlier with a higher speed. Without autotrim the mentioned neutral stability (mentioned by BEA) could have not be maintained and a significant nosedrop would have been present.

We still don´t know if it would have saved the day though.
If talking about culprit then the law reversion logic comes into my mind. Unlimited Autotrim in ALT2b in conjunction with only BIO-protection seems not a clever idea. Why was the limit of the autotrim in Alt law out-designed in the A330/340 and not retained like in the 320 series? What kind of situation would necessitate an full up THS when careful handling due to the law degradation is necessary?

For BEA the case looks like lost after the aircraft departed the flight envelope. Does that mean, that there was no chance of recovery or that they didn´t look into that matter? THS position and autotrim would play a role when looking into that phase of the flight.

The movement of the elevator and THS in response to sidestick commands is defined by the system and was determined until the end of the flight. The aerodynamic response of the airplane can only be simulated with any confidence within the known flight envelope.

HazelNuts39

Yes, the aircraft would have Stalled without Autotrim full up. But without the THS authority to keep the Nose Up at STALL, the aircraft's nose may have fallen through, instead of being maintained in the Mush...

No?

( sorry Franzl, missed your post, but it bears repeating, imo)