Everyone must be heard. There can be no exclusions. Oddly enough, in the long term, the investigation profits from the lack of a frame, at this level. In confrontation can be progress. I for one am grateful to be heard at all, though it may not seem so, I am.

To the group, salut.

HazelNuts39 said:
Good point-- me too, as long as they weren't hiding behind a mask.

KSPsen added:

....ignoramus?

Ouch, touché! But me? Remain silent? What a concept! :)

KBPsen, eh? Organfreak, some respect, start with spelling.

carry on

Lyman:
Sorry, just human error. I respect most everybody here, but in this case, this person has sent me creepy PMs in the past. :ooh:

One can but hope. Someone mentioned that there had been some 25,000 posts on AF447. I would think some 22,000 of those is nothing but noise drowning the relevant.

There is little need for more noise or paranoia, again.

P.S. Feel free to post anything I have sent you. Fact is so much better than fiction.

All my stupid questions never would have been asked, had BEA been even marginally more forthcoming. To that extent, the noise results from "natural cause". Paranoia? Hmmm......I see no evidence of that.

KBPsen done wrote:This is silly. I wouldn't post any private message, no matter how severely provoked. But, since it's out here now, I would remind you that you accused me of pretending to be somebody else, without saying who, in impolite terms, twice. It was offensive to me, since I am so utterly transparent about myself. Paranoid? Hardly. I'm a facts guy.

Incidentally, I realize that much of my posting could be considered 'noise' by unfriendly readers, however, my inbox is full of kind praise from more than a few pros on this forum, otherwise I would have left long ago.

OK, who did you "think" I was? And who are you?

Which unfortunately ignores the fact that at least two other airliners (a 727 and 757), both of which had linked control columns, also stalled out and crashed in exactly the same way following a UAS incident.

@Conf iture:
 

Isn't the difference between V/S and V/S selected equal to the FD order?
They are both in the same trace.

V/S mode is active from 02:10:26 and on.
FD bars displayed when FG considers 2 or more speeds valid and consistent.
The first 10 sec. after FD comes available the bars are flashing dim/bright.

Max. limit is at 6000ft/min and actual limit is set by Vsw/Vmo when available. (meaning FD bars will not direct one into Vsw/Vmo)

Don't know the exact resolution as displayed on PFD and Vsw/Vmo were available at the moment FD bars were in view.
---

The PNF saw as much blue as PF, BEA and ACARS don't report any CHK ATT message/flag displayed, so FWC considered both attitude signals in agreement.

@ Lyman: The altitude was barely above select cruise, @ 35.3k. @ 2:10:18. So my question might be: only 35,300? Why is this a/c climbing so sluggish? I don't dispute the Pitch picture, but it didn't match with Alt, necessarily, after ten seconds of climbing. The video catch does not represent the dynamic nature of the trends?

If we are 'speaking' may I ask what may be a clumsy question? The Nose was rising at a/p loss, and the PF input NU directly. Yet the a/c has only climbed 400 feet in approx. ten seconds. I've thought about this for some time. See pp 29 BEA#3. Is there any chance, given the FD were left on, that V/S got away from PF, and he was in the weeds, so to speak, re: PITCH and response, V/S?

I mentioned it long ago, something as: "Additive" input.

By the time (2:10:22) A/LAW is annunciated, the a/c is beginning a remarkable climb, can this have anything whatever to do with V/S and V/S select as the summed command, and the climb getting "Away" from the crew?

Thank you for your patience, here.

Well "Bear" still hard at it eh?

OC is on the money.

OC is not wrong. Neither is he "on the money".

Hi glad rag. Target rich environment, via BEA default.

Hi Organfreak

I have no link to Airbus at all and never have had. I just acknowledge the unfortunate truth. If you do want to look at other airlines with similar issues to Air France then try Pan Am late 60's early 70's, Air China 1990's or Korean Airlines, pretty much from 1980s to date. There may well be a pattern here.

OC, thanks for your gracious reply. I take you at your word. Still, I think my question reflects the feeling that some of us have, that blaming this purely on the pilots is an over-simplification. Reasonable people may disagree, or so I've heard.

I'm familiar with the China and Korean stuff, but would you be kind enough to point me towards some of those old Pan Am flight numbers?

:8

As a long time observer/participant in internet pilot forums, let me say this: unless you meet the guy in ground school, you NEVER know who you are talking to so you read the postings and make your assessments accordingly. If OC looks like an AB guy, it's because he posts things that appear to be slanted in AB's direction. No crime in that.

Don't judge me by my profession of being a line pilot, judge me by the content of my postings. I do the same and I don't have to bother my little brain wondering who works for who.:)

Organfreak;

Dig the Hammond!

Re, "Still, I think my question reflects the feeling that some of us have, that blaming this purely on the pilots is an over-simplification."

Those who do this work and those who do flight safety work, investigative work, engineering work as well as human factors experts who write books on this and who may fly these aircraft or may not, know that this is not "just the pilots", and they know that there is no rational opportunity for a legitimate over-simplification of this accident. Most here who have engaged this dialogue already know this or have learned through careful and thoughtful readings of others' contributions. I believe that this is at least one thing which we can take from these eight or nine long threads.

All other crews encountering the variations of this abnormal survived. What is the difference that made a difference?

Their responses require as close an examination as possible so that a fine (as in fine-grained) appreciation of the context of crew-and-machine can begin to be seen which then becomes one context or template from which this accident may be examined and useful conclusions drawn regarding change. This means that airplane systems, procedures, as well as standards/training/checking regimes are all interwined in "the story" of this accident.

The notions of "blame" and "accountability" are legal and corporate terms which have nothing to do with safety processes and "finding out"; - they are not flight safety terms.

The notion of "responsibility" is quasi-investigative because it usefully enframes ways to ask questions, recognizing and beginning with the fact that there were the three crew members on board involved in the accident and that the aircraft was serviceable/flyable just prior to the event, (meaning, there was no catastrophic structural failure and the aircraft was controllable and was taken into and not brought out of a stall) and going from there regarding the trace of factors which may be counted as contributing to final outcomes.

This is a very long way from a view which indicts the PF/PM/Captain.

PJ2;

:D:

Oh, and,

:ok:

Open doors there were for ALT CRZ* around 35000ft on the way up and down as well ...
Also did they keep 35000ft in the FCU ALT window all the way ... ?
Was it selected at any time OPEN CLB ... ?

WHERE is the AP/FD vertical engagement mode trace ???


Early on every Airbus pilot is teached : I HAVE RADIO ECAM ACTION
No such basic wording for AF447 ... Do we think the ECAM control panel was completely forgotten as well during 4 minutes ?
There must be a trace somewhere to tell about the ECAM selections ...

Did they get to the RISK OF UNDUE STALL WARNING STATUS MSG following the little publicized AoA data differencies ?

At least the information was readily available for the PNF to grab : Tremendous advantage !