RTLU
 

@MM43:

THx, edited the link.

@ CONF iture:

Maybe I was not clear, this did not occur to AF447!.

It was a reply on your suggestion of extending the slats.

When TLU is deactivated (TLU NOT AVAIL) in flight a safety feature is to allow full rudder deflection when needed - at landing -.
Selecting S/F handle to CONFIG 1 will extend slats and if slat arrives @16° a backup circuit drives the TLUs to ALLOW for full pedal(35°) and rudder deflection (35°) if required.

This would have been visible in the TLU trace.

IMO only relevant items have been and will be published.
Nevertheless some questions indeed have to be answered or explained.

Before I adventure further in that exchange, what do mean exactly by 'RVDT angle' ?

'RVDT angle' ?
 

I don't know s*** from Shinola, but that's never stopped me before. :O

Isn't that an angle sensor?

Technology of hydraulic cylinder position feedback.
 

Not quite, or at least not directly. Probably Rudder VDT.
Now what is a VDT? See this link for a clue Modern LVDTs in New Applications in the Air, Ground, and Sea | Sensors
We'll let A33Zab grade this exercise.:} (And the winner is Lyman, it seems!)

Rotary Variable Differential Transformer?


Edit, slow down lyman. Displays my sailboat's Rudder deflection.
.

@CONF iture:
 

Maybe this clears up.

LVDTs
The linear variable differential transformer (LVDT) is a sensor used to measure displacement in the industrial environment. An LVDT consists of three coils of wire wound on a hollow form. A core of permeable material can slide freely through the center of the form. The inner coil is the primary coil, which is excited by an AC source as shown. Flux formed by the primary is linked to the two secondary coils, inducing an AC voltage in each coil. When the core is centrally located in the assembly, the voltage induced in each primary is equal. If the core moves to one side or the other, a larger AC voltage is induced in one coil and a smaller AC voltage in the other because of changes in the flux linkage associated with the core.

RVDTs
The rotational variable differential transformer (RVDT) is used to measure rotational angles and operates under the same principles as the LVDT sensor. The LVDT uses a cylindrical iron core, while the RVDT uses a rotary ferromagnetic core.


Item 6 in drawing below are the 4 RVDTs.

http://i277.photobucket.com/albums/k...0_143738-1.jpg

"Rotary Variable Differential Transformer?"
 

Yeah, Lyman, I Googled it too, but I knew they'd know I Googled it, so I didn't post it. (see emoticon)

I did learn that a transducer can be used instead of a variable transformer, with the same effect.

Maybe I could dispute or argue on those numbers but to be honest I don't have the knowledge and documentation to go much further in that direction.
And overall I like what you said here :
Nevertheless I'd like to see the trace for the S/F lever position, especially when selecting FLAP 1 is at some point part of the STALL RECOVERY procedure.

The AP/FD vertical mode trace is a relevant item for the reason I have already mentioned here but is nowhere to be seen ...


I do feel for the families of the 3 pilots who are put under such a negative light in such a dishonest and oriented program :



The families need all the data - Those data do not belong more to Airbus and the BEA that they belong to them.

Lots of ideas from lots of folks. Unfortunately we have no way of knowing their professional backgrounds. Some engineers, some mechanics, some pilots and some ?????
I have said before and I'll say again this crash could not have happened if the aircraft had been diverted around the CBs as others did.
As pilots, we have all been told about the "ERROR CHAIN" in CRM classes. If you bother to look carefully at this accident, you will find many links in the error chain. If someone had broken any one of those links, the flight would have had a happy ending. I can list the links if required.
Pitot heat : Any system can be overloaded past it's limit. My knowledge of these systems on the ones I flew was "low" heat on the ground and "high" heat in the air. These systems are not able to cope with supercooled water of the magnitude encountered by this flight, hence the loss of many systems which are dependent on proper pitot function.
It's been over a year of chatter on how the crew should have recovered from the subsequent stall while in turbulence with many warnings flashing, ringing and blowing and it doesn't seem as if it will end soon. My view however is as stated above. Stay away from CBs at any altitude but more so at high altitude and arrive alive.

It has been a few years since I roamed the high altitudes with frequently unreliable radars in my military jet, and your statement is very true, but sometimes difficult to fully implement.

Solitary cells are easy to circumnavigate. When they shoulder together in lines and large areas it becomes more problematic. The upper ice crystal portions of Cb clouds are weak radar targets. Although radars can be very helpful, they can also degrade or be mismanaged. When that happens, as it seems may have happened in the AF447 case, it is almost inevitable that you may get closer to a cell or cells than you wished. From the turbulence encountered-judging from the BEA report-they did not fly into the core of a cell, but instead into a peripheral area. But it was close enough to cause a problem.

Sometimes you do not succeed in breaking the first link in the accident chain. For this reason, you should break as many other links in the chain as possible. That is the source of the chatter you remarked upon.

We cannot absolutely avoid some proximity to Cb cells. To attempt to do so would shut down large portions of the world's air commerce. It isn't going to happen.

Dishonest how, and can you prove it?

What would the families do with it? Who would they take it to? The whole point of investigative agencies that are set up to be independent from regulators and the airlines (of which the BEA is one) is that they have nothing to lose or gain in the outcome. The families could take the data and pay someone to read it, but the conclusions derived from that would be worthless on the basis that the families' lawyers would have paid them to try to exonerate the crew, just as the same allegations could be levelled at DGAC, Airbus or AF if they had a hand in the investigative process itself.

Hi,

What would the families do with it?
That's not the good question
Again it's just to try to understand the lawyers position on this problem
It's a law problem .. no more
Airbus is a party cited in the trial has come .. as well as family associations
It should therefore be treated equal .. which is not the case .. since Airbus has access to parts (FDR furnished to them by BEA) that will eventually be used at trial .. while the associations of families do not have access to because that the judge in charge of this case want not joint those pieces to the trial record .. (so far)
Unfair ...simple as that ......
Airbus have not a hand in the investigative process .. fair enough .. but be sure they analyze each stances from the listing of FDR and they can use their results in court if necessary
Family associations do not currently have this opportunity

But Airbus has not been granted access to the FDR in order to prepare a legal case, has it? It's simply because, as the manufacturer of the airframe, they need to ascertain whether or not there is a defect in the design that could cause more accidents. Are you seriously suggesting that such data be withheld until the trial is complete?

Even with the data that has been released, there are those on here that continue to insist that the zoom climb to stall was uncommanded despite the FDR data proving the exact opposite. Even if the raw data was released to the families, they couldn't do much with it. They could try sending it to the NTSB or AAIB who would in all likelihood tell them exactly the same things that the BEA are saying. The trial wont begin until the full report is released in any case, at which point all the relevant data will be in the public domain.

Hi,

Are you naive ?
And again it's not the good question ...
It's regard of laws
The fact is they are cited party in the trial as the families association and must be considered equal..

agree

but I doubt that many posters on this forum will agree on what's relevant, especially if it doesn't match their theory

Hi,

Again ....
Nothing to do with theory or shadow agenda .. it's a law problem

jcjeant,

I think you are getting the cart placed in front of the horse. It is not a "law problem," so far. Determination of the causes or probable causes have not been determined as of yet. The BEA has the responsibility to investigate the accident, assemble all of the available data and evidence, consult with any entity that may provide greater insight into the potential meanings of the evidence and data including providing of specific information to enable testing and confirmation of potential findings, followed by assembling a final report based on the pertinent data and supporting findings as to causes, probable causes and undetermined causes. At the conclusion of the BEA's investigation the final report is issued and presented to the responsible French Court. At the time this transfer occurs, it then become a "law problem" to be resolved. Prior to this report, no party of interest that cannot contribute to in depth understanding, i.e., technical expertise or human behavior as it pertains explicitly to the accident should have access to the full actual data.

The BEA can (as does the NTSB in the US) choose to release certain preliminary information to the general public it has found to be pertinent and indicate what other tasks are being performed in its investigation as it proceeds towards conclusion. The BEA has chosen to do this through interim reports. The BEA may also decide to privately apprise the families of the victims, out of courtesy, of their investigation methodology, status, etc., perhaps more in detail than what may be released to the general public. It is the BEA's call, but nothing is owed in advance of the final report being written and turned over the French Court.

I am not aware of any highly technical aircraft accident investigation where the investigative body could not consult with the airline operator, aircraft, engine or avionics manufacturers to gain additional knowledge of the system or systems, while sharing available need to know data to hopefully enable correct conclusions to be drawn. It doesn't mean the lawyers to be involved in the future litigation are entitled to this exchange of information at the actual time the exchange occurs.

Dozy is correct in his assessment!:ok: Welcome back Dozy

TD

Hi,

It's unfortunate you are not aware of the french laws ... :{
Airbus have entire FDR listing
Families associations have not FDR listings
A complaint against Airbus (recognized as valid) was filed by associations of families
Airbus and families associations are two parties involved in the legal process
Both parties must be treated equally
It's nothing to do with investigation .. or technical recommendations ....

Care to enlighten me? :hmm: Has there been parallel legal investigatory actions on going by the French magistrates while the BEA is doing the technical investigation? The judiciary has priority to investigate any object from the accident site that might be used as evidence which may delay and prevent the safety investigators from carrying out their investigation. Has this happened? Standard 5.12 of Annex 13 explicitly states that the records derived from these devices should not be made available for purposes other than safety investigation unless an appropriate authority has determined that the proper administration of justice outweighs the adverse impact on aviation safety. Have the French magistrates ruled otherwise at this point? :confused:

Hi,

Yes ..
The "juge d'instruction" asked to "experts" called by him (in a pool of experts who are stdby for such investigations) to make their own investigations ..
It's the judicial process ... like in any accident (cars .. buses .. trains)
These experts will present their results at the trial
The BEA will also (certainly called by the judge) present their results
Note that the parties involved can have also their own experts and they will also present their results on the trial
These can be contradictory and it is the judge to decide (it can also call other experts for cons expertise)

well explained
 

jcjeant explained this french confusion very well.

Don't forget the BEA is alone to have the science, the art, the technology, for such an investigation, and the best experts, ... and the pieces of the aircraft !
And the "juge d'instruction" is waiting the final report of the BEA, like us to know what has happened !
I know one of his expert who does not know very much about the A330...

We have to say also that it is a penal trial and not a civil trial. The fault definition is not the same, and the relation whith the fault defined in the Warsawa convention is different, and the consequence of limitation of responsibility for the airline is not clear in the penal trial.

jcjeant & roulishhollandias,

Thanks to both of you for the explanations. :ok: I knew the French law was significantly different from English and US law. One thing, when you say "penal", what does that mean? Is it the same as what I would call "criminal"?

This French system is known as inquisitorial, as opposed to the adversarial system used in Common Law legal systems. In this instance, the judge who is appointed to the case is in charge of preparing the case and assessing whether it should come to court. In the US, this would be decided by a Grand Jury of citizens where the prosecution presents enough evidence to ask the Jury to indict the defendant/defendants. The Jury decides if the evidence presented is adequate to send the case to a trial.

Does the judge consider this? "There is no felony or misdemeanour in the absence of an intent to commit it.
However, the deliberate endangering of others is a misdemeanour where the law so provides.
A misdemeanour also exists, where the law so provides, in cases of recklessness, negligence, or failure to observe."

In the case as referred to in the above paragraph, natural persons who have not directly contributed to causing the damage, but who have created or contributed to create the situation which allowed the damage to happen who failed to take steps enabling it to be avoided, are criminally liable where it is shown that they have broken a duty of care or precaution laid down by statute or regulation in a manifestly deliberate manner, or have committed a specified piece of misconduct which exposed another person to a particularly serious risk of which they must have been aware. (From French Law)

It will certainly be interesting to see how this all unfolds. It is different than the Concorde case in several ways... :hmm:

french law
 

@Turbine_D

You are right, "penal" is "criminal". You will find the french law (in french) in this link.
Accueil | Legifrance - Le service public de l'accès au droit
(legifrance.com)
and then ask "les codes en vigueur" in the "lois et règlements"
Then as "nom du code" you may choose ... want you want, for exemple
- code de l'aviation civile
- code penal
- code de procedure penale

The "juge d'instruction" is very independant in France, but as generally he don't know nothing about aviation, he has to ask for everything.
Experts will come running to explain at the manner they want.

For example in the Ste Odile crash (january 20.1992, Air Inter) the experts did not give to the "juge d'instruction" the french reglementation PANS-OPS in french (about VOR-DME approach), but the ICAO common text in english (despite this text exists in french too), which has not the force of the law, but is only a work text that the differents states member of ICAO use to build their own law.
When the french law is different, for the main rules, the state has to declare the difference, or to do "reserve" (in the sense of the international public law) (according to the Chicago convention).
In this trial, I buyed the french law and brought it to the "juge d'instruction", who said me "thanks, english is not my tea-cup, I learned latin-greek, and said me he had only the ICAO text in english...

The "Juge d'instruction" decides who may be guilty, often many persons.
At the Court, a Prosecuter, who is not independant :oh: from the Government, plaids for the french law. He has the same difficulties as the "Juge d'instruction".
For the families and surviver there is no class action. Their lawers have still very much to learn in aviation law

The greatest difference I see is that years and years are necessary in France to have a definitive Judgment.

(Law lesson is enough for today ! it is not finished).

jcjeant seems to have followed french aeronautical trials too, and he will give you other many indications !:O

Hi,

RH,
Nothing to add ... you explain it very well
Trying to follow the Concord appeal trial .. but no many publicity made about (less than the first trial ...)
I guess the trial has come about AF447 be held as previous .. that is to say in an atmosphere of suspicion and with the consequences of the defects in the French courts for the treatment of such cases
Each trial about aircraft accident in France is always source of controversial comments and critics about a system so many want to be changed ....

HI,
Many lawers do not correctly use the french law in these trials, and hope too much from a criminal procedure. The Warsawa convention (convention de Varsovie modified Montreal) is a very bad system, to old and no more adapted.

But Public wonder that all the parties know another, are smiling and are very polite together... (the cockpit discipline is present).

Important turn in positive French and international law
 

The star french lawyer DANIEL SOULEZ LARIVIERE who already argued such modifications during the Ste-Odile crash criminal trial,
defending the civil aviation (M. FRANTZEN who is also the husband of M.LABURTHE's daughter) has been heard yesterday by the general Prosecutor of the Cassation Court !

Me Soulez-Lariviere asks also introduction of "european law" (which one ??) in the civil part of the trial !

If such a modification is done for the AF447 criminal trial, that would mean that families requests would be throwed off, as the AF447 fell in international waters, and no french Court could judge ! (nor french nor other country's Court !).

It would be a major dissent about public and private international law !!!
http://www.rue89.com/rue89-planete/2...230903surprise ! 06/04/2012 à 07h31
Marée noire de l’Erika : toute la procédure pourrait être annulée

Le 24 mai, la Cour de cassation se prononcera sur les conclusions de son parquet général, qui demande l’annulation pure et simple des douze années de procédure ayant abouti à la condamnation de Total et de trois autres prévenus.
Selon Libération et Ouest France, l’avis de l’avocat général et le texte du rapporteur concluent que la loi nationale n’aurait pas dû s’appliquer lors des procès du naufrage, en décembre 1999, du pétrolier qui avait souillé 400 km de côtes bretonnes avec 30 000 tonnes de fioul.
Plus de « préjudice écologique », et plus de condamnation pour l’affréteur Total, la société de certification italienne Rina, l’armateur italien Giuseppe Savarese et le gestionnaire du navire, Antonio Pollara : le naufrage ayant eu lieu en « zone économique exclusive » (ZEE), c’est-à-dire hors des eaux territoriales françaises, la loi de la France ne pouvait s’appliquer.
Cassation totale, sans nouveau procès

Le ministère public demande donc la cassation totale, sans renvoi – donc sans nouveau procès –, de l’arrêt de la cour d’appel rendu en 2009. Les quatre prévenus avaient été condamnés aux amendes maximales pour délit de pollution maritime, et à verser des indemnité pour préjudices « matériel, écologique et moral », rappelle Libération. Voilà ce qui pourrait être annulé en mai.
Comme le souligne Ouest France à propos de la décision attendue le 24 mai, « les avis des deux rapporteurs ne lient pas les conseillers de la Cour, mais il est toutefois rare que leur avis ne soit pas suivi ».
Dans Libération, plusieurs juristes cités anonymement font part de leur sidération :\:\, que résume bien cette déclaration de l’un d’eux : L’avocat de Total, Me Daniel Soulez-Larivière, est satisfait :

Nice one, roulishollandais....

Back to topic.

Any chances yet to get this subtitled to English: :)

Cheers,

VGCM

Independent investigation?
 

Hi,

IGh:

Quote:

---

After UA811 [Fwd Cargo Door electrically-unlocked during flight] the manufacturer misinformed the NTSB:
"... .. Based on what Boeing has told them, investigators say four independent systems would have had to have failed for the door to open in flight...." [Wall Street Journal, 27Feb1990].
This misleading information, from that manufacturer, led to the incorrect P.C. published by NTSB in their initial AAR.

---

If in a "simple" issue (a door part) this occurred, what could happen when investigating a System (effective aircraft: System + crew) even the designers don't understand completely? AF447 was failing (a closed loop feedback System presenting failures since the beginning: 02:10:05 or even before per ACARS analysis) with the crew applying (surprising ones) inputs based on System outputs we may never know. (RHS was not recorded).

It seems the misleading (may) yet occurred. ("plane operated as designed, etc."). Public (also detected in PPRuNe) was being prepared (induced?) to: "crew error" in the end. If crew error was the cause (if), the media would emphasize (in the headlines just after Final Report publication) Why they made (errors)?

IMO they never could say plane was OK at that "investigation timing". Subtle bias?

Mac

Timing: Paris air show :}

PS

The plane was really, OK? The crew received (required) System "outputs" to proceed safely? System "helped" the crew or mislead them?

@RR_NDB & Sorry, even though it's OT, I can't let this stand. I don't know what Boeing told them, but this door was damaged by improper closure pre-flight, as well as having a design problem that allowed this to occur in the first place. There was nothing "simple" about it. Regardless of any deception that IGh implies, this issue was identified and understood, and properly fixed by Boeing.

--Keepin' It Real

"Insider information" and crew Confidence in the A/C
 

Hi,

Airbus it seems (based on we have) consider UAS an information (not necessarily) to be shared immediately with crew.

Instead, requires (the crew) to scan and assess (then, decide)

And, worse (IMO):

Don't (immediately) inform when UAS ends.

IMO a VERY IMPORTANT FACT to be taken into account immediately.

In order to (the crew) reestablish immediately (necessary) confidence in the System.

That (confidence) seems to be had compromised in F-GZCP last flight.

Mac

"Confidence is the greatest asset of any successful enterprise. Nothing useful survives without it" (Albert Schweitzer)

"Simple" when comparing with AF447
 

Hi,

Organfreak:

"Simple" compared with AF447 (complexity)

I edited post including quotes around the word simple. :ok: ?

Hi Organfreak;

I'm on "break", but reading occasionally. Re, "I don't know what Boeing told them, but this door was damaged by improper closure pre-flight, as well as having a design problem that allowed this to occur in the first place. There was nothing "simple" about it. Regardless of any deception that IGh implies, this issue was identified and understood, and properly fixed by Boeing.", I found the following which might clarify the issue that it was indeed an electrical actuation of a correctly-closed door:

Accident Investigations - NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board

The NTSB Report is here.

Plane also was operating as designed*
 

Hi,

PJ2:

Quote:

---

it was indeed an electrical actuation of a correctly-closed door:

---

Thanks


* No tapes (Aeroperu), no wasps (Birgenair).


Kapton was being used in the (aging) B741?

Burt Rutan on Airbus. (By Bubbers 44) #47
 

I find it so rude and inappropriate for people like Burt Rutan to make a statement such as one published by Bubbers 44, post #47. The airplane that has killed more people than any other is the DC10. This happens to be an American made 'plane the seemed to have been certified under the table due to the RB211/L1011 problem. It had so many flaws that it should never have been certified until those design faults were rectified. The AA crash in Chicago was blamed on the method used by AA to hang the engine. This was grossly misleading. The real problem was the fact that the loss of hydraulics (due to the loss of the departed engine) resulted in the LE slats (on that side) retracting. Why? because they were NOT locked down (as on the B727). The resultant roll caused the loss of the 'plane. What about all those cargo doors that opened in flight causing the loss of the planes?
There are many of us who fly and have flown the A320/330/340 without any serious problems. The AF447 A-330 ( a perfectly good 'plane) was flown into a CB when close to the "coffin corner." The supercooled water encountered caused the pitot tubes to ice over, resulting in the loss of many systems. Unfortunately the actions of the confused pilots resulted in an unrecognized stall and subsequent loss. How is that the fault of the manufacturer?
Did a B737 not crash going into Schiphol airport in Holland recently? Should we blame that on Airbus also?
It would be greatly appreciated if the folks who comment on these and other posts kept to the facts and not point fingers simply because the unit involved was not made in the great USofA.

@PJ2 et al,

I stand corrected on UA811 and do humbly apologize for my bad information and corrective tone. I must have seen and retained the first, wrong report. I will now (make every effort to) shut the hell up! And go back to what I am good at, which is.....uh......
:\ :ouch: :uhoh::oh::O

This damn "we" and "them" is not productive to accident imvestigation and how it is suppose to work.

Of course it needs to be a team approach with the same objectives of preventing the next accident, rather than finding fault or protecting someones reprutation.

All investigators know this (wherever their institution), but those on the sidelines continue with their presumptions of guilt.

Sure Boeing and the NTSB investigators (add others at will) make mistakes in assumptions and investigative findings, but not from a devious plan to obfuscate, We leave that to press releases :)

It's easy to say that it would have taken 4 separate combinations of faults for such and such to happen. After all, that assumption was already verified in the product certification. The objective of the accident investigation was to find "How' and then "why" followed by the lesson learned. From my viewpoint the only criticism would be that an investigation didn't meet that objective.

@ Thermostat
 

That's an excellent idea....
In keeping with that notion could you perhaps provide a source for your assertion that "The airplane that has killed more people than any other is the DC10."?

IOW.... I believe that to be an incorrect/non-factual statement.

Thermostat

First, indeed, the primary cause was blamed on uncommanded slat retraction on the outboard left wing. But there were many other causes and issues identified in the NTSB report.

Why did the slats retract uncommanded? Because the engine and pylon both went over the top of the wing causing hydraulic and electrical damage and failures.
Why were the slats not lock down? Because this was not a requirement at the time.
Why did both the pylon and engine go over the top of the wing? Because the pylon/engine assembly was damaged during installation at American Airline's maintenance facility.
Why was it damaged? Because the forklift being used ran out of fuel and a resulting hydraulic check valve leak permitted the assembly to drop resulting in the initiation of a large stress induced crack in the rear of the pylon.
Why was a forklift being used to remove/install both engine and pylon instead of removing/installing separate units? Because it saved time and money.

Some more details in the NTSB report you failed to mention:

1. Based on a study performed by J.H. Wiggins Company at the time, the probability of an uncommanded slat retraction during takeoff was somewhere between one in one hundred million to two chances in a billion.

2. The forklift being used was written up as defective because it drifted down under load. The engine + pylon assembly weighed over 13,000 pounds. No corrective action was taken until 3 months had elapsed from the time it was used on the assembly in question.

3. The revised Damage/Tolerance concept was not in effect at the time the DC-10 was designed and what was being used at that time did not contain newer requirements on the certification of structural design (the pylon is a structure). Had the requirement for accidental damage evaluation been in effect when the DC-10 was designed, one might expect that such consideration would have been given to accidental damage to the upper flange of the pylon aft bulkhead.

4. The certification of the DC-10 was carried out in accordance with the rules in effect at the time. The premises applied to satisfy the rules were in accordance with then accepted engineering and aeronautical knowledge and standards. However, in retrospect. the regulations may have been inadequate in that they did not require the manufacturer to account for multiple malfunctions resulting from a single failure, even though that failure was considered to be extremely improbable.

5. The uncommanded slat retraction in itself did not cause the plane to crash. Had the dc power been active, the pilots would have received warning of this condition and would have determined the roll to the left was a response to an impending stall situation based on a stall warning devise that was also not operational. They could not see the wing, slats or the missing pylon/engine from the flight deck.

IMHO, using "selective data" from a 30 year old accident to offset an equally flawed (Rutan's opinion) does little to clarify the more recent accident. Hopefully, the BEA final report on AF447 will provide not only probable cause but positive change recommendations, based on their findings, to once again improve aviation safety, just as the NTSB report did 30 years ago…

In additon, I believe a power reduction (Starboard) could have saved the rollover. I think it was in the report, along with speculation that the pilots in handing over ( the F/O took off), back to Captain, the firewalled Right Rudder command was interrupted, causing Yaw left, and Left wing STALL.

TurbineD. Wasn't the Pylon Saddle crack determined to be the result of chronic incorrect hoist? As you say, the Pylon was to have been mounted first, then the engine. It was the AFT Pin join that let go, yes?