That's most odd, because the FAA say,
And that's aborting prior to V1. Must be really professional operators that you deal with.

It's really all about the need for routinely operating in a disciplined (ie the opposite of a cavalier winging it) way of doing business.

.. abandoned just after V1... Something went 'BANG!'... They stopped. Subsequently discovered that only 'D' hydraulic system remained. 'D' system didn't do very much.

Hardly the basis of a well executed decision process. The history, on this occasion, says "thank heavens for that". However, on any sort of rational risk managed approach to life, the decision probably was grossly flawed if the story is as presented.

The important thing is to compare the historically based probability of successful versus unsuccessful outcomes in the situation where the reject is initiated late.

The common thinking in aviation is to find answers, post crash, and use those answers as a preventative to future similar problems

exactly the situation .. providing that we are working to a probabilistic gameplan rather than generalising from the exception to a rule.

The myopic view of aviation is to look at ..

The SOP view of things is that we should accommodate the average sort of capability. While the superhero pilot (and these folk exist - a frustration to the lesser abilities residing in the rest of us) may well be able to fly after losing both wings, all engines, etc., etc., most of us are just plodders trying to do our best on the day .. and we do better if we load the dice in our favour.

John, well maybe because I have command experience, that I can't work on probabilities...a bang in the tail after V1, with 6000 feet ahead gives me the choice of stopping a rolling aircraft with twice my landing distance ahead, or taking it up in the air, and hoping I have a flyable aircraft...

Now if we get to brass tacks and have a big stadium full of pilots discussing this...I would move to exclude all the pilots who don't have 10,000 hours, who work for airlines who push V1 down the runway with Flex and such, for airlines who purposely run around with 30000 hour engines...exclude high time FOs and Flight Engineers that never had the wherewithal to be captain...

Now what are we left with...guys who have command of a ship and say...'what the heck, let's fly it up there and see what the problem is?'

Fat chance.

Good sir,

One can only suggest that we should agree to disagree.

The whole Industry is based on probabilities - in general, there are few certainties, if any, about aircraft. That's the nature of distribution curves and probabilities of failure.

with 6000 feet ahead gives me the choice of stopping a rolling aircraft with twice my landing distance ahead

Of course it does.

Now, whether such a decision, on a routine basis, is sound or not is a matter for standardisation debate.

As an aside, what do you do in the case where you have, say, 300 - 400ft spare pad in front at V1 with tiger country in the overrun ?

Looks like I caught your inexperience John...

Run any Part 25 aircraft you want, your choice...and tell me where you can in any way possible be at V1, using legal balanced field numbers and only have 3-400 feet ahead.

It illustrates my point that you guys are purposefully de-rating the thrusts so far back where your balanced field isn't even on the runway, and extends into the weeds somewhere.

Discussion over.

Your question doesn't make sense, we operate a LOT of FAR25 aircraft, some with a MTOW of 16,000 lbs and others with about 870,000 lbs. Almost all of these use Balanced Field takeoff calculations. It is very easy to get a Balanced Field Length Required which is 300-400 feet less than the Available Runway Length. So what's the issue.

As for the second question, where do you get the idea that your balanced field isn't even on the runway, and extends into the weeds somewhere. Do you understand the concept of DERATE at all? Do you know the difference between calculating a takeoff at 40C OAT or assuming that the temperature is 40C?

You need to jumpseat from somewhere in a 747 classic when it really is Field Length Limited, especially if the clearway is used :):) You might end up having a different perspective on things :ok:

J_T....with tiger country in the overrun ?... So true, I wonder how many pilots know what lies right at the end of the runway, case in point look at Surabaya Indonesia, nothing on the airport charts shows that there are massive drainage ditches off the end of both runways, large enough to take your undercarriage off :{

Mutt

Ignorant little **** isn't he. Post your CV John. :ok:

It has been proven time and time again with your numerous aliases that your experience is zip, narda, zilch, nothing.

Posted least anyone should contemplate giving any credence to his ravings.

V1 is a very critical speed at balanced field length airports. It means as we all know we can stop before and go at it. If you don't abide by it you get in big trouble or maybe die with your passengers. True, longer runways you can probably still stop but you are still in trouble. If nothing happens and you reverse to lower speed before brakes you still have the explaining to do if it gets reported. Safety is #1 so use that to decide what you are going to do. The AA DC10 at ORD would have been just fine if they hadn't followed company procedures and slowed down to V2. They might have been in trouble but they would have been alive with their passengers. Just a thought.

I very much doubt it bubbers. On one hand you could make the case that their training killed them (slowing to engine out speed schedule), but what the accident highlighted was,

1. The accident scenario had been considered during design, but considered to be so highly improbable as to be not worth worrying about, and the FAA agreed.
2. No instrumentation to inform crew of slat asymmetry

It's all those little holes in the cheese, the crew were blameless.

Mutt - You don't get a seat at the table to discuss if at the end of the day, your running de-rated departures, flying around on 30000 engines, and packing the cockpits with kids.

Begs to ask the question how many other areas of safety your cutting corners on.

It's appears that you are following the usual cycle, when you can't discuss the technical merits of something, you get personal, then you will usually get abusive and banned from the forum, only to re-invent yourself again and start over......... It's getting kinda boring :{:{

As someone who has read J_T's real resume, I would suggest that you might actually learn something from him, IF you had enough common sense.

Very true, all fleets except one :ok: Oh yea, we will also do them on the 787 and 747-8.....

Nope, most of the fleet won't even have 3000 hours on the engines [/QUOTE]:ok:

Nope, haven't you read our local newspapers?

Given that we are certified under FAR91/121/129/135 with ISO Certification, LOSA and IOSA certifications...... why would you think that we are cutting safety corners on aircraft performance?

Mutt

@whenrealityhurts

No sir, you have been hoisted on your own petard.

What J_T wrote was;

To which you responded with the derogatory comment above and continued with;

This shows that you completely misunderstood what you were replying to. If you read it properly, John's hypothetical was postulating the case where there is only 300 to 400 feet IN ADDITION to the distance required to stop the aircraft from V1. The critical word is "spare".

A little more thought and less posturing might have led to you having a better understanding here.

Aside - for those who might have any concern as to my delicate ego .. have no angst, for I have a thick skin and broad shoulders ...

Inexperienced I may be in many matters .. but in respect of a few I have a passing knowledge. The secret, as most older chaps have come to understand, is to refrain from comment on the former and be prudent in the latter. Occasionally I fail to observe my advice in respect of the former .. there is always the expert who, gently or otherwise, draws my impertinent ignorance to my notice ...

The AA DC10 at ORD would have been just fine if they hadn't followed company procedures and slowed down to V2

While not being at all critical of the poster's observation, it is pertinent to note that, at the time, Industry standard teaching was to fly V2 OEI which the crew did. This was one of those rare out of left field events where the then current rulebook item needed to be ignored .. had the crew had any clue as to the true nature of the failure.

As I recall, it was this mishap, specifically, which led to a revision in thinking to adopt the current approach whereby one holds the present speed at the failure (unless that be excessively high, typically in excess of V2+20-30 or thereabouts).

If you want to play with the big dogs - don't pee like a puppy.

Priceless. Do you claim rights for this observation or may anyone use it on occasion ?

What an arrogant little 29yo brat you are. I have known John
before you were even a hardon in your old man's pants, and
even back then what he didn't know on the subject did not
bloody matter!

And from what I just read I agree with Unhooked - your lack
of knowledge re reduced thrust TOs stands out like dogs balls.

JT,
Re my story about abandon after V1.
I did not wish to present it as a suggested mode of operation but as an exception.
I'd probably have continued - that captain, on the day, did not. I've mulled that one over for years. Will publish when I come up with an answer.

I've met top rate pilots with a LOT less than 10k - and a couple of prats with more.
I'd be excluded because I've never worked for a jet outfit which did not use reduced thrust.

SOPs are a two-edged sword.

They are sound and desirable to follow on the very great majority of occasions due to the probabilistic nature of our activities.

However, there are few, if any, guarantees in flying.

If/when the ducks are lined up against your interests ... on the rare occasion it may be more sensible to ignore the rule and do something different.

However, these rare exceptions ought not to be generalised into some sort of rule-based behaviour.

Two takeoff instances which come to mind -

(a) post V1 with multiple systems failure which will preclude safe flight .. for instance, I wouldn't envy a pilot with a combined engine failure and total hydraulic loss.

(b) low speed schedule with an uncontrollable yaw post V1 OEI again probably due to a systems failure

While noting that the certification paradigm safeguards against such things - in general - if we find ourselves on the wrong end tail of the distribution curve .. it was a day that we ought to have stayed in bed .. and it is then that the Captain gets to earn his/her salary in a few seconds. No necessary guarantees in many instances that the fallback gameplan will work. However, if it has a significantly higher probability of success, it has to be adopted if the main plan clearly has gone irrecoverably awry.

It is for this sort of reasoning that this type of thread is important. It makes the reader think about things ahead of potentially being confronted with something similar.

I did not wish to present it as a suggested mode of operation but as an exception.

Precisely.

JT - I suspect your vision of aviation being so chancy is relative to your ability to mitigate the risk...which in an organization where your told what to do...you can't.

Flying for the airlines is like being a soldier about to hit the beach in Normandy...'isn't there a better way to invade France?'

'Shut up and do what your told'.

Haven't you realised that we are the people who define what others do, if you had given us a sound technical reason to question our modus operandi, we would have listened, but alas you failed miserably. .

Mutt :)

WRH

Please cite your FAR 121 or similar experience (Military heavy jet, JAA ops, etc.) before you state opinions on subjects you seem to know nothing.

All of certification and operational standards are based on probabilities of success or failure, safety itself is based a probability once one leaves the bed each morning, yet we do and in the die in bed.

Your method of aviation appears based on gut feeling, seat of the pants, Kentucky windage. You seem to think you can experience a failure, take a glance out the windshield and decide to stop or not. Obviously, performance theory and practice is a wasted subject on yourself. Once before, I asked if you always calculated a refusal speed (accelerate-stop speed for the runway) for each take-off you do in whatever flying machine you are trusted with, the reason being, so you would know when you could no longer stop. Never answered that one, did you?

I have known of three cases where the performance in the V1 situation was tested. Two, I personally knew the individuals involved; one I witnessed. All, straggly involved bird strikes right near V1 or in the time between V1 and Vr.

The first two, involved loss of one engine between V1 and Vr, the captains took it airborne, as recommended by the "book" and the performance data. They would have clearly overrun with 60 or more knots. The one I saw happen carried 140,000 pounds of HE for the little dustup in '91. Both had additional problems with a second engine after they got airborne with large vibration moments. Both planes landed successfully, one out of a minimums PAR. The resulting investigations upheld the decisions of the captains, one got a peacetime DFC. The point being planes will deliver the performance specified and nobody ever had a collision with the sky--planes are meant to be there.

The third case was a rejected take-off at NAS Sig, where birds struck the plane just prior to V1. No damage was noted, but the commander, who expressed similar stop orientation as you do, elected to stop. I was in the jump seat and really thought we would go off-roading. We made it with feet to spare--the end of the runway was not visible from the front seats, 34 feet above the ground. All of these incidents were thoroughly investigated, resulted in no changes to the SOP and occurred in planes weighing 600,000 pounds or more.

The point of this dreary tale is that pros do NOT merely "do as they're told", they are learned in performance planning; know that briefed SOP is a far, FAR better response to an emergency and odds are vastly more in everyone's favor if one follows it, rather than inventing responses in the "heat of the battle". If you need proof of this, sit thru some tough sims and watch guys struggle making answers up and crashing.

Mutt J_T

Besides US Mil bases where the clearance standards are exceptionally high (basically 1,000' of surfaced overrun plus level ground 500' either side of centerline and extending beyond the overrun), I have seen many, MANY more airports with very nasty terrain beyond the runway than ones with benign areas. Many have drop-offs greater than 50', highways, etc. The KTEB overrun, where the pilot did a "SSG" rejected take-off, crossed a major highway, critically injuring a motorist and smashed into a bakery. He just got sentenced to 180 days of "3 hits and a cot". SWA overran at KBUR into a gas station "eyeballing" an wildly unstable approach, as they did at KMDW, killing a child in a car. Ignoring the considered wisdom KILLS.

GF

Hey GF,

I was with ya right up to last paragraph. (see below) I agree with most of what you, John and others are saying with regard to to the proper attitude to take towards stopping beyond V1. DO otherwise at your own, your pax and any innocent bystanders peril. I adopted this attitude early, even before I understood enough to really know why.

But the corners of the statistical bell curve are there and exceptions to the rule do exist. Whether any of us as individuals will recognize that in real time during a real event is the more compelling question. Perhaps it's as postulated by JT and it just wasn't your day to go flying. But it's also possible that people sometimes make correct decisions contrary to policy without a satisfactory explanation as to why. I've seen it and you probably have too. We often call that luck. When good pilots follow procedure to the scene of the crash, we often call it fate. Or a bad day. Bad luck. Seen that too.

So about that last paragraph GF:

The guy sentenced to the pokey in the Challenger overrun at TEB was locked up for falsifying W&B and other records. There's some CFR other than 49 which covers that. I don't think the flight crew faced any criminal charges for being dumb, though I don't know what if any administrative action was taken against the crew by the FAA. They rejected because the nose failed to lift in spite of full up elevator being applied. Had the takeoff been continued, it would have either become airborne or hit the building at V1 plus whatever speed was gained since passing Vr. I don't know which would have happened and neither does anyone else. Obviously there are cases where a 60 kt overrun yields less disastrous results than a 150 kt plus overrun. But maybe anyone careless enough to get themselves into that situation by grossly misloading the aircraft to begin with has problems enough. I wonder if running the pitch trim NU might have helped? I'm glad the crooks at that company got convicted.

Sometime earlier, the exact same thing happened in another Challenger at TEB. They were lighter and had more runway beyond the BFL and so stopped successfully. Lucky dogs!

A very similar thing happened to a Falcon 900 in SBA, but it was loaded properly and the stab trim set within the takeoff range, though not in the ideal position for the CG. They ended up in a grass field with a damaged airplane and no casualties. DA-50/900 pilots have told me they would have run the trim up if that happened to them. I wonder.

SWA BUR: Nothing to do with V1, just an incredibly ill advised approach, poorly executed and completely lacking in airmanship. 182 kts at the threshold. The FO did everything but bust him in face and take the airplane. Maybe he should have.

SWA MDW. Again a landing accident. But not one which was cavalier or off the cuff by any means. The data indicated it was tight, depending on which runway friction value was used. we all know (or should) how well (not!) runway condition or friction reports correlate with actual performance. In any case the performance study indicated they might have stopped had the reversers been deployed in a timely manner. Autobrake was a new procedure and he'd never done it before, so his (the PIC and PF) performance probably suffered as part of executing in an unfamiliar procedure for the first time while facing "the real thing". SWA subsequently added a fair weather familiarization period to get used to A/B landings. Read the full report, it's very interesting.

So other than picking these three examples to fortify your point, I like your post! Sorry to pick on your post like this because I respect your contributions. But I just couldn't let it slide.

My experience is with smaller jets, but it's the same process using smaller numbers.

Hey it's time for Formula one. See ya!

Best regards,

Westhawk

Enjoy the race!

First, I apologize for the unintended implication that the criminal case resulted from the overrun; it, indeed, was due to other certificate issues. Although, I would submit their casualness about certificate issues drove their casualness about flight ops. Rarely are well-managed, safe flight ops run by dysfunctional or criminal managements.

My point in that last paragraph was related, not to V1 concerns, but to the fact that most runways have very dangerous conditions in VERY close proximity to the EOR. Getting blasé about the possibility of an overrun can be very risky due to the terrain/structures within reach, even in a low speed overrun. I was at a Pacific island airport recently, 75' overrun, followed by a 40' dirt drop- off to the road below. Go off that edge, even at 15 knots, could be fatal.

Our overheated correspondent blows strong against CRM, too. Look at KBUR, were a headstrong captain failed to use the FO's valid concerns--a failure of CRM, not CRM causing an accident.

Lastly, yes, bigger planes, bigger numbers; the basic physics doesn't change, just the magnitudes. For the life of me, I don't understand pilots who get casual with W&B and trim settings. In the USAF, we periodically were given bad data to generate just the situation as at KSBA. Running the trim is often the only situation, but you really need to avoid the situation, in the first place. I had a pilot say, "8 degrees light, 9 degrees heavy", aviation has no room for such casualness.

All that said, as a result of this, and similar discussions, have been considering briefing the "unable to fly" response, especially when large amounts of excess runway exist. The other day at DXB, we had a field length of around 3,900' on 13,123', stopping anytime until actually airborne was reasonable. Every take-off plan in the C-5 included refusal speeds, which gave one an idea what was possible, but what good is a refusal of 170 knots when rotate was 122?

GF

GF:

Wow, great race!

Vettel continues his domination by winning his 7th race in '11. Weber manages 2nd and Button makes a great drive to take the 3rd podium position. Hamilton crashed out again. Alonso struggled for 4th while Shumie makes an incredible drive from starting dead last to finish 5th just ahead of Rosberg.

Now what were we discussing? Oh, right!

"Dysfunctional and criminal managements".

Well put. My first 135 job was with a somewhat "shady" outfit you might say. Our operating philosophy as pilots was to do the right thing in spite of the company. The owner was just smart enough to stay out of our way and we actually ran a pretty clean op from our end considering. But a year was enough. The next 7 years were thankfully spent somewhat less stressfully in more robust safety cultures with better training, maintenance and standards.

"Go off that edge, even at 15 knots, could be fatal."

Yeah, I saw that happen with my own eyes at KSMO once. They fried in the fire before we could get there. Idiot took off with the gust lock installed in his C-340 and unsuccessfully aborted from 100 plus knots. A drainage culvert at the end cleaned off the gear and opened the tanks. Exit speed was probably less than 40 kts. Really nice guy too, but dead all the same.

As to our friend of strong opinions, I don't know what to say. But you know what they say about opinions...

"For the life of me, I don't understand pilots who get casual with W&B and trim settings."

Yeah. Maybe a selection of NTSB reports should be required reading. Maybe you don't have to repeat the mistakes of the past to learn their lessons. Learning from your own experience is good. Adding the experience of those who came before is a learning multiplier. It bothers me that some pilots seem to think required training is enough learning. This aviation stuff encompasses allot more than any company will teach in a classroom or simulator. Put in a little extra work!

I got to ride up front in a Galaxy once. Just myself, one other space-A pax and the crew repositioning an empty C-5 from Travis AFB to MCAS El Toro on the last leg of my trip home from Germany on MAC flights. That big boy leaped off the runway like an empty Learjet! I'd guess the takeoff on their next leg from El Toro to Clark with a full load of Marines and all their stuff was pretty different. It still amazes me that these things actually fly! And I still don't quite understand how that one got piled up at Dover. I read the report years ago and think I understand the flight dynamics involved, but not the crew actions.

Best,

west hawk

Yeah, I took off at Kaneohe Bay to Honolulu once with 28K on fuel, empty. One swoop to 9,000', idle, cleared visual; far different story above about 732K gross weight. Not a lot of power out of those 60's vintage GE hair driers. Many, many take-offs required the entire runway, standing take-off and every inch of runway. 0-120 knots was, typically between 33 and 39 seconds.

Speaking of rejected take-offs, reducing your engine choices down to ONE doesn't make it much easier. Last F-100 RTU class, we were lectured by Vietnam vets on th dangers of high speed rejects. The plane took off at about 165 knots, had a drag chute and marginal brakes. The instructors emphasized the dangers and said taking most problems airborne was preferable.

WRT KDOV accident, dysfunctional leadership is in the background, an IP who shouldn't have been made one, poor CRM skills on the IP's part, resignation and fatigue all play role. But the man in the left seat shouldn't have been there and the two other pilots failed badly to correct the situation.

GF

I suspect your vision of aviation being so chancy is relative to your ability to mitigate the risk

First, I see (scheduled and high end corporate) aviation as having a very high reliability (ie not all that "chancy" as you put it) - the daily successful total of operations provides evidence of that. Caveat - this is not to say that GA has an inherent lack of discipline and safe history - only that it covers a far wider range of activities wherein the less safe taint the statistics of the more safe.

Secondly, if one intends to pursue a strategy other than SOP (and this either can be in respect of managing emergencies or planning non-typical operations), one needs to be able to quantify the risk in order to mitigate it with a reasonable degree of confidence. The necessary safeguard with this approach is that the approval signoff has to be elevated to a level appropriate to the assessed risk - ie often the PIC is not the appropriate level to authorise the non-standard operation (for the planning situation).

In those cases where such quantification is either impractical or time does not permit adequate research

(a) the solution gets progressively closer to the "wing and a prayer" style of management

(b) the SOP approach remains, in all likelihood, the preferred option.

As one who works in a particular environment where "risk mitigation" is a routine buzz phrase, I see many instances of good intentions based on qualitative gut feelings - not quite what the paradigm intends to be the case but better than just winging things on the day.

JT - Well your in fine company....

You would have given your seats up like the first three 9/11 crews...

You would have gone through the fuel dump procedure, rather then get it down in Nova Scotia..

You would have continued with a fire light on the Concorde..

You would have sat up there on the phone messing with the trim while jack screw got worse and worse and worse...

Your 'I don't think, I do what I am told' approach to aviation is a credit to all the airline chief pilots who have specifically culled any independent reasoning ability out of it's ranks.

@whenrealityhurts

I rarely comment on posts such as yours but I can't help myself this time.

Your ignorance regarding the underlying principles of safe aircraft operation are on public display with your last post.

The examples that you have cited in support of your position spits on the memory of the air crew and the passengers that died without offering any positive aspect for your case.

The gratuitous insult that you offer only serves to denigrate yourself and any positive effect (however slight) your posts may have had.

If you really do have the experience that you cite and are actually employed I trust that I never have the misfortune to fly with you as I would be in fear for my life.

WRH

You really should read those accident reports; not the press reports. You have simplified the chain of events to fit your "point of view", untroubled by real knowledge though it maybe.

All four planes on 9/11 we forcibly taken, not the first three. Flight 93's passengers tried to recover the plane and crashed in the ensuing battle. The hijackers just didn't walk in and ask for the planes and the crews gave their planes to them. To say otherwise is to display your total lack of knowledge of history.

GF

WRH
I thought John Wayne died some years ago?

WRH, please state who you work for so we can all steer away...
(this guy can't be for real)

Sometimes even poorly presented and what many would consider to be extreme points of view contain elements of truth hidden beneath the hyperbole and histrionics. I'll attempt to find some nuggets of wisdom in WRH's last post.

You would have given your seats up like the first three 9/11 crews...

Galaxy Flyer addressed this point already, but I'll add that while government and airline policy directives promoted "cooperation" with hijackers right up until that day, not every airline pilot planned to "blindly" comply. Even so, none of these crews had any reason to suspect the hijackers ultimate intent at the time the airplanes were taken. Prior to that, most hijackings were perceived to be for the purpose of hostage taking for some form of ransom. This perception was apparently a key element of the terrorist's plan. Had these crews known what their ultimate plan was, well let's just say they might have reacted differently. They would now.

I find the question asked to be an irrelevancy and a poorly selected example case to use in an argument apparently intended to promote pilot discretion and critical thinking during an abnormal event. Not much wisdom here.

You would have gone through the fuel dump procedure, rather then get it down in Nova Scotia..

Who knows? We weren't there and we're not sure what information would have been available to us if we were. But I'm reasonably sure that in-flight fires and electrical shorts are something most pilots would consider a higher priority than meeting landing weight limitations. Then and now.

This accident does drive home the point that proper prioritization of objectives is a command function. I think it always was.

You would have continued with a fire light on the Concorde..

I don't know enough about the details of what the flightcrew knew at what time to say. But in this airplane especially, a high speed abort from above V1 with failed tires and fuel pouring out doesn't seem likely to have produced a better result.

Again. maybe not the most applicable case to cite.

You would have sat up there on the phone messing with the trim while jack screw got worse and worse and worse...

This one I can find some agreement with in large part. No I would not. Not then, now or ever. But then I am an experienced mechanic in addition to to my piloting background. I've worked on similar stab trim systems and know/knew what this set of symptoms imply. The company mx controllers and others in the company should have too. While the flightcrew thought they were doing the right thing, there was information to the contrary readily available to the mx dept. This information was NOT made available to the crew. For those willing to spend many hours researching this whole affair, the full story is a stinging indictment of a company cost savings plan gone wrong and a series of what I believe to be reprehensible management actions.

Considering what the crew could have reasonably be expected to know and do given their qualification as pilots, the blame rests squarely on the company. Though some individuals like myself had knowledge beyond the scope of what might normally be expected of flightcrew, that does not serve as an indictment of this crew's following of the direction provided to them by their company, who they might well have reasonably believed knew more than they.

Overall, another poor example even though there is some truth in the argument.

Your 'I don't think, I do what I am told' approach to aviation is a credit to all the airline chief pilots who have specifically culled any independent reasoning ability out of it's ranks.

Do I detect a slight hint of contempt for authority figures here? :)

Well that's understandable. Particularly in today's aviation business environment. Still, it's not an attitude one wants to become widely known for. Perhaps many pilots have made a conscious decision that it's better to question authority more quietly, in a way that doesn't needlessly expose them to unwanted managerial scrutiny. Seems kinda spineless? Such is life in the modern corporate machine. Get used to it, cuz it's here to stay. But that doesn't mean one has to do something they know to be wrong. In real conditions of duress, you may find your fellow pilots to be less sheeplike than you seem to believe. However I have to opine that one would be well advised to reserve acting contrary to SOP or accepted policy for situations where the "accepted" or conventional action is either clearly inappropriate or inapplicable to the circumstances. None of the above examples clearly pass the test. Maybe a better example?

So bringing this back to the subject rejecting a takeoff after having accelerated beyond V1.

Of course we can think of circumstances when the potential consequences of aborting beyond V1 might be preferable to the consequences of continuing the takeoff. Under a "system approach" to the problem, statistical analysis will be a large component of any policy promulgated by airlines, manufacturers or regulators. As the commander of an airplane, your obligation is to do whatever is necessary to preserve the safety of your flight. It may come to pass that doing so requires a departure from regs, policies or established procedures. If so, your every move might later come into question. If you're wrong there may be consequences of a professional, legal or mortal nature. This is what you accept every time you sit down in the cockpit. Rules, procedures and policies define the framework for your operations. It is recognized that operating outside the framework may become necessary under certain circumstances. Better make sure you're right when you do.

Just wanted to let you know: We're all counting on you!;)

Reminds of playing football...the coach gives you a play...you call a different one...you throw a touchdown pass..

One coach is mad...another is glad you got the win...

I follow the line of thinking that if I put points on the board...you can whine all you want about how I am a cowboy...the Prom queen is coming home with me. Results count in this business, not how many buddies you keep happy. Not everyone sees it that way though.

Sully put an airbus into the river...it was either that or hit the side of a building...he gets points for no loss of life...if he had been able to do a u turn, dead stick back to his departed field successfully everyone would have whined about how he could have killed everyone..despite saving the plane as well as people.

Seems the gold standard these days is to what is expected, but if you do a little more your reviled for it. I guess it's ok to be good, just not that good.

He's baaack......

GF

The bewitching hour is upon us once again...:suspect: