Garage Years wrote:
To which Dani replied:
Well I flew for 35 years at a western airline and this was certainly not "absolute normal practice" because there was no "absolute normal practice". Every operation was unique and rest periods were organized by each crew on every given day (or night).

As for the ITCZ, my mob only got to penetrate it late in my career but after discussions with several pilots with extensive experience in it, my rule (and that of many peers), was to ALWAYS be in the seat during that transition. If we were going to tackle with the top of a "dry thunderstorm" I wanted to be in charge.

My opinion only.

That is exactly the meaning of normal practise: Most of them do, some don't. In even more organized airlines, it's the airline that puts rest times into the duty roster. Of course the captain is always allowed to deviate from this if he deems it necessary.

Let me assure that I do it the same way as you do it: I stay in the cockpit if it makes sense, after carefully considering the capabilities of the rest of my crew (i.e. my two FOs). When you fly e.g. from Australia to the Middle East, you have ITCZ almost on all your 14 hrs of flight. So you have to get your rest somewhere in tropical weather. It needs some kind of courage to trust in your crew, you have to sleep, otherwise you will be underperforming during the approach, but you have always your doubts, when you lay in your bunk and cannot sleep because of the Monsoon over the Indian Ocean - especially after we know about AF447.

What also helps is a proper crew briefing before leaving your seat: Discuss the items you think there are weak points among your FOs. See if their memory items are fresh enough, if they have the correct mind set. If they have read AF447 accident reports. But don't forget all the other risks that are somewhat been forgotten: diversion, emergency descent, fire and smoke.

To the contrary, there are some reasons to think that something was not right regarding the attitude in the PFD(s?)

• 30 sec after AP disconnection another source for the PF's attitude was selected.
• Again the selector was moved 90 sec later.
• The Captain called : The wings to flat horizon the standby horizon

No, F/O air data source was switched to ADR3, not attitude (IR).

Both were ...

http://i45.servimg.com/u/f45/11/75/17/84/af447_26.png

Yes, thank you CONF iture

I would not take that as an indication that the PFD(s?) was/were wrong. Indeed, if the CPT was seated in the 3rd seat, the standby horizon was the most "accessible" for him.

Switching to "#3" source fits in the logic to try to get rid of the initial ADR fault (speed indication).

There are many ways of interpreting that - one I quite liked was that he was pointing to all three ADIs, i.e. both PFDs and the standby.

"Horizon, Horizon, Level the wings - *Standby Horizon*"

"The wings to flat horizon the standby horizon" are the words.
Not "Horizon, Horizon, Level the wings - *Standby Horizon*"
Not the first time you change the words Dozy ... but if you 'quite like' it that way ...

AZR,
Actually, the stdby horizon is not as attractive than the big PFDs.
ADR switch for speed indication makes sense, but something else could be at stake when IR switch is performed ...

In the french original:
EDIT: Earlier, the PNF referred to the three (displays?):

@Max Jack:
Probably not. Ice tends to make an airfoil less aerodynamically efficient, and thus lose lift.

If we're going to be completely picky about it, the English translation reads:

and the French original :

So it is said three times (once in fact by the PNF trying to draw attention to something) and my ordering was off, my bad - but it is really such a big deal?

this sequence on the tape is completly irrelevant. The captain tries to show the PF that he is not wings level, which is very difficult in a stalled state (he did in fact a 180 turn in his fall from the skies). The captain might have thought that he was a bit lazy on the ailerons, but of course in real it was the pitch that needed the biggest attention.

The exchange immediately following that one is interesting, because both the PNF and Captain say that the PF is climbing, and yet while the VS trace has gone unreliable, it never indicates above 0 until after 2:14:00, and the altimeter is rapidly and consistently unwinding throughout.

So where do they get "climbing" from?

A simple answer will be "from the horizon indicator" .. provided they don't check the V/S and the altimeter (or they not rely more to those two instruments)

But they were (for the most part) pitched up, but descending. Is there something in the translation from the French I'm missing here? The ADI can tell you how you are pitched and banked, but it can't tell you if you're climbing or descending without reference to the altimeter or VS indicator.

Just tossing one more herring (probably a red one) into the bin.

How many pilots would ever have seen - in real lifre or in the sim - a V/S 'needle' (yes, I've seen what it looks like on the display) pegged at well over 10k f/min ? And accepted it as real ? And drawn the 'right' conclusions ?

Just my herring....

Yes, and they don't understand how that is possible, so either the ADI or the altimeter/variometer must be wrong. The ADI shows an attitude that they associate with 'climb' ("I'm in TOGA, am I not?"). O.T.O.H, if the airplane is descending at a terrible rate, then the speed must be 'terrific'. The possibility that the airplane might be stalled never enters their mind.

Aircraft deficiencies are already in the current reports and recommendations, including the pitots and the lack of AOA indicator. We may see more in future reports on the a/c, and I think more on systemic training and procedural deficiencies. Not just about the crew.

If it happens to you, and I sincerely hope it does not, then there is abundant evidence on here that it wasn't due to lack of knowledge (or desire for that knowledge) of your a/c. [Edit: and that isn't intended as a criticism of this crew, in case it reads that way]. And I would hope you would get a fair hearing based on the facts, and that we all learn and improve. The goal should not be to assign fault or blame, but to understand why. Sadly, there are plenty of places in the world much worse than France for getting that to happen, even when a bus is involved.

One other thing. Anything we build that's as complex as an a/c has flaws. All of them are flawed in some way, and always will be. Even if we might disagree from a design perspective on where those flaws are, I'd far far rather be flown by someone like you who is actually interested in researching and understanding where his machine is or may be flawed, versus a pilot who thinks it is perfect and looks no further than the minimum training. If you are stuck flying a plane you don't actually like (or even actively dislike), then I'm sorry for that (but no design will please everyone), on a routine day you'll be the less happy pilot, but if things go wrong you might well be the better pilot as a result.

Am I the only one here who thinks there is little or no point in an AoA indicator on the panel of an 'ordinary' subsonic airliner?

We've seen arguments for it on carrier-based aircraft, and yes, Concorde had one, but that was hardly an 'ordinary' airliner.

Does anybody here have any suggestions on how you would "fly" an AoA indicator in normal operations? And how you would include it in your scan?

To me, the suggestion of adding an 'unfamiliar, new' instrument (requiring additional training, too) because, once upon a time, people were incapable of inferring the state of their aircraft from the available data, makes no sense.

I hope I made myself clear.