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Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
Because the red trace is masked it's hard to tell, but it could equally be the lumps and bumps you'd associate with turbulence.
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The regular periodicity and constant amplitude of the 'zipper' trace shows it is not a real world effect. Some sort of quantisation effect surely. Although the graph shows segmented vertical traces that may be limitations of the printer producing the graph. Is it every other recorded/printed sample ? Notice that in CONF iture's post the red trace in the bottom graph sows three similar similar blip and again it happens to align upwards/downwards to one of the major y axis grid lines. Suspect the plotting software myself.
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If procedures had been followed, the F/Ds should have been switched off until the problem was solved. |
It is a strong guess that they never switched of Flight Directors, otherwise you would hear a remark of the two operating pilots on the tape. Le pilote de gauche : «Remonte ..remonte…. remonte…. Remonte !!!». Le pilote de droite : «Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l'heure». Le commandant de bord : «Non non… non… ne remonte pas.. non.. non..». Le pilote de droite : «Alors descends». Le pilote de gauche : «Putain… on va taper. C'est pas vrai !» Le pilote de droite : «Mais qu'est-ce qui se passe ? |
AlphaZuluRomeo
Note that the BEA is right when it wrote: "This transcription mentions personal conversations between the crew members that have no bearing on the event, which shows a lack of respect for the memory of the late crew members." Or you release all or you release nothing Releasing fragments is bad than better ( the evidence is here before our eyes .. with all imaginable scenarios and speculations that the few lines of the CVR have induced in the endless posts) .. if transparency and credibility is the BEA (new?) politic The families of passengers need also respect and have right to know even if this will hurt the crew families (when their relatives have failed on duty) Releasing fragments of information is a lack of respect for the victims families Victims families need the same respect as the families of the pilots Release of entire CVR is not only when heroes are in the pointing end (Sully and al) .. it's also for those who fail .... Life is not a bed of roses The truth is sometimes hard to hear |
Hi Dani,
It is a strong guess that they never switched of Flight Directors, otherwise you would hear a remark of the two operating pilots on the tape. "The Flight Directors were not disengaged by the crew, but the crossbars disappeared." If I was flying at 02:00 and with all the other noises and attention getters going off whilst keeping the wings level in ALT Law, I also may have forgotten to ask for the FDs to be turned off - simply because they had already disappeared from view. They seem to have simply remembered their previous training (further down on P74) "The two copilots had only been trained for the emergency manoeuvre at lower levels, in the course of which the pitch attitude to adopt is 10° or 15°." |
jcjeant,
I disagree. I'm OK with the BEA policy, here. If a full transcription was officially released, the "doubters" would then ask for the audio. If the audio was released, the "serious doubters" would then ask if the audio hasn't been modified... That's a confidence issue. If you don't trust the BEA (or the NTSB, which does just the same (*)), then you won't thrust anything it releases... (*) expect UA93, but that's another story, with FBI implicated "The families of passengers need also respect and have right to know" => I agree with that. "Releasing fragments of information is a lack of respect for the victims families" => define "fragments of information", please. To my eyes, informations which explain the accident is enough (and whole, once the final report is done). And it's not fragmental, regarding the inquiry/accident. Calling it so is not really "fair"... |
Originally Posted by rudderrudderrat
(Post 6750268)
They seem to have simply remembered their previous training (further down on P74)
"The two copilots had only been trained for the emergency manoeuvre at lower levels, in the course of which the pitch attitude to adopt is 10° or 15°." - not clear call of the procedure - the said procedure asks for pitch 10/15° and power TOGA when low level, the crew initially just adapted pitch (and thrust to CLB) I've read another hypothesis about "why did they pull". Don't have it saved here (@ work), will post it later (from home) but basically the hypothesis was they did try and follow the bird, which was erroneous due to UAS. |
How could they have "followed the bird" from the start ?
BEA page 75 : At 2 h 10 min 47...... The Flight Directors not having been disengaged, the cross bars disappeared and reappeared several times without it being possible, at this stageof the investigation, to know what orders they may have indicated nor to establish if these orders influenced the actions of the PF. BEA page 76 around 2 h 11 min 42.....the Captain said several times “take that”, doubtless speaking of the FPV Hence the messages : 02:11:00 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 228300106FLAG ON CAPT PFD FD 02:11:15 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 228301106FLAG ON F/O PFD FD 02:12:10 - .1/WRN/WN0906010211 341200106FLAG ON CAPT PFD FPV 02:12:16 - .1/WRN/WN0906010211 341201106FLAG ON F/O PFD FPV |
GerardC,
The thing is, the hypothesis was the first I read & think "hey, I see the logic". I didn't had time to check all that (besides not being knowledgeable enough to have all answers), and remember having been confused when checking the BEA text (your quote & other §) vs the FDR traces... Will check what I can & post later. |
Bird
In the meantime, the graph does not mention any bird selection :
http://i45.servimg.com/u/f45/11/75/17/84/af447_24.png Now, what does (EIS2) mean exactly ? Would a (EIS1) trace show something else ? |
Originally Posted by AZR
... the hypothesis was they did try and follow the bird, which was erroneous due to UAS.
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I don't think it was "erroneous", so much as the FPA "bird" appears and disappears with the F/D, which itself is supposed to be disabled in the case of UAS. Possibly something Airbus could look into changing.
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It is strongly recommended that you never use the bird in case of unreliable instruments. You don't know which part of the instruments, ADR, IRS is not working. FPV is generated in the IR part of the ADIRS (the combined computers, 3 on board). Only by positively identifying a working ADIRS, you could use it. But the AF447 crew never got out of state of confusion, they never started real trouble shooting.
QRH 34.07A:
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OK, digged out a bit, here is the hypothesis (in french) the source being a comment on HMC's blog.
Durant le givrage des sondes pitot les vitesses dégringolent et l'altimètre perd 400' ( mais c'est une fausse indication ) On est donc dans le cas ou le bird, le vecteur vitesse, le FPV n'est pas valide comme indiqué partout dans la doc et tout particulièrement celle d'Air France et même son beau FCTM Airbus customizé AF...... Bref le PF voit le bird tout en bas de l'horizon, il cabre pour tenter de le remonter, perdant complètement de vue l'instrument de pilotage normal qu'est l'assiette. Il est obsédé par le bird qui ne veut pas venir vers le haut, et donc il tire il tire il tire...... Au bout de cinquante secondes, l'avion atteint les 37 500' et son énergie potentielle en a pris un sacré coup, mais les vitesses redeviennent normales et le bird est alors sur l'horizon . Fantastique ! les PNT de l'AF 447 ont donc mis l'avion en palier avec le bird sur l'horizon, mais avec une assiette = incidence = 16° situation qui ne peut perdurer mais qui explique l'action continue à cabrer, car le bird s'effondre, la pente passe harmonieusement de zéro à -25 . L'alarme STALL hurle toujours dans le cockpit et la vitesse passe alors sous soixante kts. L'alarme Stall s'arrête alors, car l'incidence n'est plus considérée comme valide, et le bird disparaît car plus valide non plus. C'est le moment ou le message FPV est envoyé par l'ACARS. Ensuite plus de bird, et une bande rouge noir et blanc ( black and red Barber Pole ) est visible sur toute l'échelle des vitesse. Mais ce n'est pas la black and red barber pole de VMO /MMO, c'est la bande basse vitesse c'est à dire la black and amber barber pole de la Loi Normale, qui est remplacée par une black and red barber pole de l'alternate law... Alors évidemment le PF se croit en survitesse .... , car tout est rouge et noir....... During the probe pitot icing, speeds decay and the altimeter loses 400ft (but it is a false indication). Therefore the bird (velocity vector / FPV) is not valid as shown throughout the doc and especially that of Air France - even AF's customized FCTM...... In short, the PF sees the bird at the bottom of the ADI, he pitched up in an attempt to "raise" the bird, completely forgetting the pitch angle which is the basic indication. He is obsessed with the bird that won't come up, so he pulls, pulls, pulls on his stick..... After fifty seconds, the aircraft reaches 37,500ft and its potential energy has taken a big hit, but the speeds are back to normal and the bird is then on the horizon. Fantastic! AF 447 crews have therefore the aircraft level with the bird on the horizon, but with a pitch = incidence = 16°. This situation cannot be maintained but explains the pull-up action. Then the bird collapses, the slope goes smoothly from zero to -25. The alarm still screams 'STALL' in the cockpit and then the speed passes under sixty knots. Stall alarm then stops, because the incidence is no longer considered valid, and the bird disappears as no longer valid either. This is the time the "FPV" related messages are sent by ACARS. After that, no more bird available, but a red black and white ("black and red Barber Pole") is visible over the entire speed scale. But this is not the black and red barber pole VMO / MMO, it is the low speed band that is the black and amber barber pole when in Normal Law, which is replaced by a black and red barber pole in Alternate Law ... So obviously the PF believes he's overspeeding .... Because everything is red and black ....... If someone want to cross check and/or react to this hypothesis, feel free. I thought it was interesting in that if could explain the initial pitch up reaction better than with saying the pilot followed (but only partially) the UAS procedure (memory items) for low level flights. |
What is it that convinces people that the PF sussed UAS when the a/p quit? Why is he expected, here, to instantly apply procedures to a mode that is not known? He has been in turbulence, experienced variations (if ONLY VS), that may have him thinking: A/P LIMIT.
In which case: NORMAL LAW retains. He is also committed to control the aircraft, how is he to know there is A/L in his near future? In the BEA there is PNF mention of the loss of speeds, and reversion of LAW, but ELEVEN seconds LATER. So prove, regardless of bias, that the PF was not flying NORMAL LAW up to eleven seconds post a/p drop? Besides, in A/L, he has PITCH protection, so his focus even after he sussed A/L would quite naturally be on ROLL, perhaps at the expense of PITCH. Not what he "SHOULD" have been flying, but what was possible. Throughout, and including the prior 32 episodes, where is the instantaneous recognition of UAS by the PF? Yet "Do Nothing", "Wait", are the demands of the ex post brigade here, who would have immediately sussed UAS and been the hero. cart/horse |
Lyman, if your questions above are related to my previous post, I'm sorry, I cannot see the logic you pursue, nor understand the said questions.
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The "Initial PITCH UP reaction" was a response to nose low. That tells us the PF was manually controlling the a/c.
Yet, HERE, it is known 'instantly' that UAS is the PROBLEM. I say, Why? Who among the 32 crews and the myriad sim brigade post UAS/447 debrief acted according to the existing briefing of the pilots of 447? UAS at the time was criminally unaddressed, as was the re-select of a/p if it obtained, "The A/C may PITCH UP". STALL? Might be Bogus, OR NOT... Yet here, after two years on, we know UAS was immediately the problem, and the pilot PITCHED UP into STALL that was annunciated once, as bogus, and a second time, as legit? I am not singling anyone out. I merely note the certitude around a situation about which the manufacturer was blissfully unaware, yet pilots here know precisely what to do. Of course, but a bit late, No? The a/c, prior to loss of a/p a/t, experienced some vertical turbulence. Was it in excess of the a/p limit to control? By rate or attitude? Is the zipper an attempt to control the a/c in the last seconds of autopilot, and the drop out was an innocent loss of autoflight due MET? UAS followed, as the a/c reacted to turbulence? Where is the useful CVR data between a/p drop and STALL? Why is it the dramatic and sad exchanges are included, but evidence of handling attitude and cueing are not? |
What part of the graph above (FPV off) do you not understand? I don't see why everyone is focussing on the bird now (also in the other thread). This way of discussion leads nowhere. The bird was not on, the FPV not and the FPD not.
If they would have selected something on the FD, you would hear it on the CVR. He would say "let's switch off the FD" or PNF says "switch off the FD". If you don't have any of the two, only one person would have switched it off. They were not able to simultanously coordinate a switching in both seats without telling each other. |
Dani. A very strong point to be made. Why are we missing the Pilots' side of things? The a/c is shown, yet the Pilot data is not.
Much of "UAS Procedure" (such as it was at the time), is missing, so observed and oriented or no, the pilot's did not act on UAS, seemingly. What was it they thought was going on? In the absence of the record, to accuse them is illogical. |
The CVR trace includes the phrase "We've lost [the] speeds" from the PNF and "We haven't got a good display ... of speed" from the PF between 2:10:14 and 2:10:18, so I'd say they were aware that they had a UAS situation, or something akin to it.
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Originally Posted by AZR
If someone want to cross check and/or react to this hypothesis, feel free.
Originally Posted by DZ
FPA "bird" appears and disappears with the F/D
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Dozy. Of course, I just posted that. I am referring to the assumption here that UAS was instantly annunciated or "got" by the PF, and he perforce needed to....bla...bla...bla...
Where is the fact that shows he knew the problem (a/p loss) was IAS related? Not simply MET related overwhelm in a/p? 2:10:14 is nine seconds after drop, an eternity if manual flight was necessary to control the ship post a/p. Even in NORMAL LAW, nine seconds can be too long to maintain control and formulate a Flight path. Our pilot had ten minutes since rest? Here be HUMANS, Sir. Doze look at your quote from BEA: The PF notices "We haven't got a good speed?"....2:10:14. Doesn't that show you PF was not grokking UAS (If it even existed at drop?) :ok: |
Originally Posted by CONF iture
(Post 6751091)
Does not fit too well IMO : After the initial and rapid drop, the bird would have had to show some positive path to go from 34600 to 37500 feet.
Why should they ?
Originally Posted by Dani
(Post 6750826)
It is strongly recommended that you never use the bird in case of unreliable instruments. You don't know which part of the instruments, ADR, IRS is not working. FPV is generated in the IR part of the ADIRS (the combined computers, 3 on board).
... QRH 34.07A: I'm inclined to think that if a hypothetical pilot tried to trim, required that trim for an escape maneouvre and the control logic stopped them from recovering, that Airbus would be coming in for all kinds of abuse. You can't have it both ways... |
One is extremely impressed with the stability of the ship from STALL.
She "stays where one puts her". Like that's a good thing? Dozy: The aircraft itself disables trim when in Overspeed prot. In a climb, what trim is necessary to maintain PITCH? TRIM is where one wants to "reside"; manuevering with trim when sudden changes in controls may be needed, is a burden, not a help. Especially with powered controls and FBW. Whose muscles need relief? Authority is not in need of enhancement, and feedback is nonexistent. Que? |
Originally Posted by DW
I think Dani summed it up pretty well:
"It is strongly recommended that you never use the bird in case of unreliable instruments." belongs to him, not to the FCOM. As quoted, the FCOM is far less restrictive : "If remaining altitude indication is unreliable: Do not use FPV and/or V/S, which are affected." Something of interest, Airfrance FCTM even recommends its use : It must be noticed that, if the altitude information is unreliable, FPV and V/S are also affected. In this case, the GPS altitude, if available, is the only means to confirm when the aircraft is maintaining a level. When reliable, the FPV should be used. I'm inclined to think that if a hypothetical pilot tried to trim, required that trim for an escape maneouvre and the control logic stopped them from recovering, that Airbus would be coming in for all kinds of abuse. |
When reliable, the FPV should be used. |
Originally Posted by CONF iture
Now, what does (EIS2) mean exactly ?
Originally Posted by CONF iture
Would a (EIS1) trace show something else ?
CONF iture (or anyone else, for that matter), can you tell the difference between following two statements: If remaining altitude indication is unreliable: Do not use FPV and/or V/S which are affected. and If remaining altitude indication is unreliable: Do not use FPV and/or V/S, which are affected. Positive answer to this is crucial towards understanding what Dani has written and what is written in FCOM. Critical reasoning tests during airline selection process are not there to amuse psychologists or create work for them. |
If remaining altitude indication is unreliable: Do not use FPV and/or V/S which are affected. and If remaining altitude indication is unreliable: Do not use FPV and/or V/S, which are affected. "If remaining altitude indication is unreliable: Both FPV and V/S are affected, and must not be used." |
I can positively state that there is a coma.
Anyway, for any pilot there is no discussion of the meaning: If something is not trustworthy, do not use it! Which leads you to the crystal clear conclusion, that you first have to find out what is working before you believe it. Pilots do not read checklists like layers or laymen. Anyway one can safely argue that the AF447 crew did not read the QRH during their last 3 minutes nor did they understand its content. |
As long as we're into vocabulary, the difference in two words helps understand the poor performance.
Chronic, versus Acute. Too little anxiety, Too much Confusion, and little understanding of the destination. At 4000 the Captain decides they will crash? How long does it take a French Pilot to spot a Trend? PuraVida is on the money. This deal had its beginnings well ahead of its beginnings. |
OK, thanks, let's say the hypothesis was null & void, because the bird wasn't present (selected) at the "beginning" (02:10:05).
I'm still unconfortable with what I see as a contradiction (regarding this famous bird) : 1) as CONF iture quoted, no bird selection on the FDR traces:
Originally Posted by CONF iture
(Post 6750569)
In the meantime, the graph does not mention any bird selection :
http://i45.servimg.com/u/f45/11/75/17/84/af447_24.png
Originally Posted by FCTM A330 (AF)
When HDG/VS is selected on the FCU, the "bird" is off, and the attitude is the flight reference, with HDG and VS as basic guidance parameters.
Originally Posted by BEA on §1.16.6.3
The presence of the “FLAG FPV ON PFD CAPT (F/O)” message indicates that TRK-FPA (Flight Mode Annunciator) mode was selected by the crew during minute 2 h 11, but that the FPV was unavailable (see interim report 2 for details on the conditions of availability). Based on a study of the other relevant parameters it may be concluded that the FPV was selected between 2 h 11 min 48 and 2 h 11 min 54.
Originally Posted by BEA on §2 phase 3
At around 2 h 11 min 42, [...] Neither of the two copilots gave him [the CPT] a precise summary of the problems encountered nor of the actions undertaken, except that they had lost control of the airplane and that they had tried everything. In reaction, the Captain said several times “take that”, doubtless speaking of the FPV.
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In a fully functional EIS (which is PFD, ND and MCDU, not MFD) it is not possible that you can have FPV and FD displayed at the same time.
The ACARS message FLAG PFD is there as a proof that bird had been selected. But it does not say for how long. My guess is that they selected it, saw the flag, switched it off again. The time of the selection would be too short to show on the graph. |
...it is not possible that you can have FPV and FD displayed at the same time. The FPV has its own FD in the TRK/FPA mode with the FD button selected. The FD pitch commands for the FPV are 'selected flight path angle' and this value is displayed in the same window where selected V/S is displayed in the HDG/VS mode. There is one button to cycle between TRK/FPA & HDG/VS and there are two FD buttons, one on each side (next to the LS buttons) which when selected will provide a flight director for pitch and bank steering (dual cue) with HDG/VS selected OR a flight director (single cue) for flight path angle and track steering with TRK/FPA selected. Triple ADR bad: No FPV, BIG FPV flag Double ADR bad: FPV available, reliable |
Originally Posted by Dani
How can you know that it's reliable if you haven't even started to compare? The doomed crew wasn't able to start a serious trouble shooting let alone to perform the first few memory items. How could they know which information is reliable and which not? They basically were trying to figure out something, and never came to a conclusion until impact.
Your statement, "It is strongly recommended that you never use the bird in case of unreliable instruments" is not backed by anything. Apparently EIS includes PFDs NDs and ECAM (not MCDU) But thanks to both of you for the replies. http://i45.servimg.com/u/f45/11/75/17/84/af447_11.jpg Clandestino, what is the purpose of your question as Dani and FCOM wrote the very same thing, coma included : "If remaining altitude indication is unreliable: Do not use FPV and/or V/S, which are affected."
Originally Posted by AZR
Is it possible to have a bird on a PFD, and in the same time the HDG/VS - TRK/FPA knob on the HDG/VS position in certain/degraded circumstances?
But if it did happen, it would be a bug ... More interesting than a guy writing a book, why the Judge refuses to include the full FDR data to the procedure ... ? The families should mobilize now or accept to be served a part only of the story, the part with the 'deficient' crew ... My thoughts to the families of those pilots. I know what will be told if I crash my AB. |
Your statement, "It is strongly recommended that you never use the bird in case of unreliable instruments" is not backed by anything. In case of unreliable instruments, switch off everything and fly pure raw data only. First memory items are: autopilot, flight director and autothrottle off. This means that you DON'T switch on the bird (as you do normally in an Airbus when you switch off your FD, e.g. during a visual approach). Then you start your damage assessment: Where I am, what I am flying, where am I going, what is working, what are we doing. When you are stable, you have found some reliable instruments, did your switchings aso, you are allowed to try out the bird. Only then. But not before. One has to realize that the FPV is an even more "artificial design" and further away from raw data than the flight director. That's why it may be even more corrupted than the later. That's why you should never use it with unreliable speed. OK465, the "flight director" of the bird is called FPD, not FD. Of course it has it's own "flight director" but please don't confuse people with wrong names. FD is generated by FMG(E)S, FPD by IRS. |
Originally Posted by CONF iture
Apparently EIS includes PFDs NDs and ECAM (not MCDU)
what is the purpose of your question Dani and FCOM wrote the very same thing, coma included
Originally Posted by AlphaZuluRomeo
I'm still unconfortable with what I see as a contradiction (regarding this famous bird)
Originally Posted by OK465
Triple ADR bad: No FPV, BIG FPV flag
Double ADR bad: FPV available, reliable |
Originally Posted by Dani
(Post 6751578)
My guess is that they selected it, saw the flag, switched it off again. The time of the selection would be too short to show on the graph.
Originally Posted by Clandestino
(Post 6752282)
Seems that TRK FPA vas selected for 6 seconds without apparent effect on RH instruments. However, even if FPA was displayed it would be of no use;
I assume you find those 6 seconds in the §1.16.6.3 of the 3rd report? If so, take care, perhaps a translation issue. The original french text is: L’étude des paramètres pertinents enregistrés permet de conclure que la sélection du FPV n’a pu intervenir qu’entre 2 h 11 min 48 et 2 h 11 min 54. In this text, we speak about the "action to select FPV", and the time frame it may have token place. It means not the "FPV selected state" and the duration of the latter. Now the english version (BEA's): Based on a study of the other relevant parameters it may be concluded that the FPV was selected between 2 h 11 min 48 and 2 h 11 min 54. This means, to me, the "FPV selected state"... which is wrong IMO. Perhaps this is better: (my try, sorry in advance, not english-speaking native) Based on a study of the other relevant parameters it may be concluded that the crew selected the FPV somewhere between 2 h 11 min 48 and 2 h 11 min 54. I agree on the second part of your post, i.e. even if displayed, FPA = no use in AF447's case. I don't understand what are "the other relevant parameters" quoted by BEA. I would like to know if this has something to do with the frequency by which the parameter quoted by CONF iture is registered on the DFDR (and shown on the traces). |
Dozy
Agree, for a full recovery, the pilots needed to put in some nose-down inputs, gain enough speed and then pull back into level flight. My point was that to say the aircraft was 'held' in the stall by the nose-up inputs (and resulting THS position) is false. If they would have reduced thrust the entire decent, we would have seen the nose going up and down continuously as airspeed rose and fell. With reduced thrust, the pitch angle never got over 0. In addition, the stall alarm may have functioned better as the airspeed in that case would have probably been over 60kts most of the time. I have a feeling, if the nose would have been going up and down continuously, the stall alarm was going most of the time etc. that the pilots may have figured out they were stalled. Looks to me like they were convinced that with nose up, full thrust etc. that they couldn't possibly have been stalled especially with the way the stall alarm responded. Also, the decent rate with reduced thrust would not have been 10,000 ft. per minute giving the crew more time to resolve the problem. Sorry to offend by posting my reply in the other thread but the constant misinformation especially about a 'deep' stall has gotten tiresome. |
OK465, the "flight director" of the bird is called FPD, not FD. Of course it has it's own "flight director" but please don't confuse people with wrong names. FD is generated by FMG(E)S, FPD by IRS. My bad. I certainly don't want to confuse anyone. However, the steering cue called the FPD is selected by the FD button, and provides the equivalent single cue steering commands for the FPV that the dual cue pitch and bank steering bars provide for the aircraft attitude symbol in all FMA annunciated lateral and vertical modes other than selected TRK & FPA. It provides, for the FPV, managed nav steering, climb/descent/alt hold steering, approach steering, both ILS & RNAV, all from the same FMGEC inputs that are used by the other 'FD' steering bars. FPD is only purely inertially referenced when TRK & FPA are annunciated in the FMA, precisely because these are inertial parameters. In addition, with failure of any inputs required to display proper FPD steering, an 'FD' flag will be displayed, same as if the dual cue FD had been in use. It's a 'flight director' in the same sense that a HUD steering command symbol is, no different. (As a side note, I still think the jury is out on the pitch moment issue regardless of how 'tiresome' it may be. Lot of assumptions being made...) |
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