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Hi,
But I didn't find how to do better, for now. I'm sure others will find better .. more brains .. more fun :) That what worked in the fiftieth already, how come they have to invent it again 60 years later? |
Clandestino,
What I can see here is that you want to mix two things over and over :
Be explicit on your disagreement ...
Originally Posted by HN39
I agree with PJ2 and others that going to 5 degrees pitch is not what one would expect a seasoned pilot to do, and is not the right thing to do in the circumstances. Depending on how quickly the airplane is rotated to 5 degrees pitch, the AoA would probably temporarily exceed the stall warning threshold of about 4 degrees, and in any case the 'stabilized' AoA in still air would move closer to the stall than with 2.5 degrees pitch. On the other hand I believe, based on 'gut feeling' rather than a numerical analysis, that if CLB power had been set and attitude had increased to but not exceeded 5 degrees pitch, that the airplane would not have stalled.
I like that 2.5 deg + N1 between noon and one (or whatever is the reference and general figures for cruise versus eng type) ... |
" ... if he or she recognized being in a stall." HN - I'm just groping for an alternate explanation for his pulling on the stick and climbing the way he did. Maybe he was trying the low level stall warning recovery. But with the storm vividly on their minds enough to mention it in that taciturn cockpit setting, suggests he wanted to be up higher if he could get there. Would that have filtered into his arm's motion when he took control and pulled 8 degrees on the stick? "Maybe" His response was so quick it was almost an instinctive reaction. The more likely explanation is that as soon as he ran into that sloppy roll feeling, and was oscillating back and forth in roll, his hand got a bit tight on the side stick and he was pulling while he was rolling. see the chart in post number 342, airtren, perm link = http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/46062...ml#post6656578 My own personal experience with upset and being behind the aircraft on instruments (albeit not in heavies) is that when one is out of trim, it is easy to get a tight grip on the stick (Thought foremost is "GET BACK IN CONTROL, MAKE IT DO WHAT I WANT IT TO DO!") and end up fighting the aircraft a bit until closer to power / attitude / performance desired. That catching up period (particular event I am recalling was a trim runaway) takes time and you really have to force yourself to get back to the basic instrument scan: attitude, performance, attitude performance. In the AF447 cockpit, the standard scan was not able to reference a key performance crosscheck, which is airspeed. The lack of that cross reference means that his scan (practiced and habitual) would not be serving him as usual: what he was looking for to inform a correction was simply missing. (Granted, his attitude should have told him, his PNF did tell him ... but I digress). A number of members have pointed out over six threads the problem of dutch roll being a characteristic of swept wing jets. This may have contributed to his roll control problem, which raises tension (MAKE IT DO WHAT I WANT IT TO DO!) and result in inadvertent back pressure, back displacement, on SS. Pilots who have flown A330, and who have posted on these forums, have pointed out that at high altitude, the aircraft requires a light touch to hand fly. Occam's razor suggests a case of overcontrolling, even if the weather was indeed a concern for the crew during that phase of flight. |
Never the less, I do agree with you that cutting off the stall warning under (sensed/indicated) 60kt in AF447 was not good. But I didn't find how to do better, for now. Yes, the AoA vane can malfunction (we know that), but its extremely rare, there can be cross-checks for that condition (e.g. a trouble shoot test soon after take-off could be applied)... and additionally, why are more cctv, extrenal web-cam style devices, not used so the crew can - at a glance - inspect all around the aircraft for actual physical configuration and incipient or extant problems. I seem to remember suggesting that such a (potentially low-cost) camera installation would likely have help avoid the Madrid take-off configuration accident. Sometimes the aircraft industry seems overly conservative, despite being knwon as a high-tech leader. I think the industry should make its mind up how much accidents really cost and what that worth is in much better thought through systems and safety double-checks. The Mk I human eyeball seems to have been sorely undererstimated as a troubleshooting device... ? |
HazelNuts39,
Indeed, the graphs at page 41 and 42 with their granularity illustrate better the variations - thanks for pointing that out, and explanation. Following the cause/effect chains a little further: a) Pitch command -> Elevator action -> Pitch Attitude The "integrated" angle of the Elevator NU is roughly 1 degree, perhaps less, in the time interval 2:10:08 - 2:10:16 in which the pitch attitude goes from approx 3 to 10 degree NU, which is a 7 degree delta. b) Thrust -> Pitch Attitude The thrust is on a decreased level, on a downward gradient variation rather than upward, if any gradient variation. c) Elevator -> Normal Acceleration The Normal Acceleration show 2 consecutive aggressive spikes of roughly 0.6-0.8g excursion upward/downward, corresponding to two spikes of roughly 1 degree in Elevator NU. d) Turbulence -> Normal Acceleration We don't have a graph of turbulence alone; it would be interesting to see. But the variations in Elevator angle later on the time scale on the lesser granularity graphs - not present on page 41/42 - seem to correspond to lesser amplitude Normal Acceleration variation. If that were indeed the case, would that leave room for the interpretation that the higher amplitude of the Normal Acceleration spikes between 2:10:08 - 2:10:16 indicates a turbulence contribution to that of the Elevators? Not that it matters much in the larger perspective of the sad things happening during those 2-3 minutes....
Originally Posted by HazelNuts39
(Post 6657173)
The increase of normal acceleration between 02:10:07 and 02:10:15 is strongly correlated with the increase in pitch attitude in the same period. The increase in pitch was in response to elevator movement (quite sensitive at M=0.8) which in turn corresponded to sidestick command - see BEA#3 top of page 41 (english version). [Sentence DELETED. Reason: The graph on page 42 does show the elevator angle]
In an encounter with an updraft the airplane would also experience an increase of normal acceleration, but it would not pitch up in this manner. |
Never the less, I do agree with you that cutting off the stall warning under (sensed/indicated) 60kt in AF447 was not good. But I didn't find how to do better, for now. Once stall warning/condition is detected for more than 5 seconds (or other appropriate small number) latch the warning and do not remove it until valid (unstalled) airspeed and AoA are seen. In other words once in a stall prove to me that we are no longer stalled. Oh and while we are at it flash STALL on all displays every 10 seconds or so. |
Originally Posted by airtren
We don't have a graph of turbulence alone; it would be interesting to see.
|
NO ICE
ICING of the Pitot Probes as some explanation for UAS is a reach. It requires too much of a chaotic system by way of lined up cheeses.
At ~2:10:01, 447 enters a substantial UPDRAFT. Immediately, she does what all large (conventional planform) aircraft do when encountering a robust UPFLOW, she PITCHES DOWN, and DESCENDS. She has a LEFT WING displacement UPWARD due to TANGENTIAL ENTRY into the rising column. airtren's accel trace shows this at 2:10:01 - 2:10:05 from 1.3 down to .7. This accounts for her aspect (NOSEDOWN) at a/p loss, and why the PF felt he had to ROLL LEFT, and CLIMB. What about UAS? takata tells us the AD's three failed simultaneously. If so, that really makes icing suspect, but makes clear the loss of indicated airspeeds due to a consonant loss of AIRMASS to enter the Probes. All three started sampling ambients that had changed heading relative the airframe, and by 90 degrees. So the indications declined by > 30 knots in one second, and the ADs were rejected. The PULL? The NOSE was down by three off 0, and 5.5 off cruise. That's nearly six degrees to make up, and he was too swift, STALLSTALL. Also, the a/p was actively inputting NU to counter the PITCH down. So PITCH is iffy at the a/p drop, and PF needs to fly, and he did. No judgment. There is more, as I see it, and it is in airtren's graph. |
The PULL? The NOSE was down by three off 0, and 5.5 off cruise. That's nearly six degrees to make up, and he was too swift, STALLSTALL. Also, the a/p was actively inputting NU to counter the PITCH down. So PITCH is iffy at the a/p drop, and PF needs to fly, and he did. It does not explain subsequent nose up inputs that lack successful counter-corrections toward a more level attitude. |
What about UAS? takata tells us the AD's three failed simultaneously. If so, that really makes icing suspect, but makes clear the loss of indicated airspeeds due to a consonant loss of AIRMASS to enter the Probes. A seagull embedded on it?:} |
Pilots who have flown A330, and who have posted on these forums, have pointed out that at high altitude, the aircraft requires a light touch to hand fly. From what we see, bank angle control required VERY large ss inputs. In this situation, it seems difficult to criticize large ss NU inputs by PF. That can explain the initial nose up, if the aircraft was not Straight and Level at the point of "you have it, robot taking a timeout, old chap." Any pilot flying an RVSM route will react very quickly to this kind of altitude variation. It does not explain subsequent nose up inputs that lack successful counter-corrections toward a more level attitude. |
From what we see, bank angle control required VERY large ss inputs. (my bold required) |
Originally Posted by HazelNuts39
(Post 6658311)
The graph on page 42 compares the recorded normal acceleration to that calculated from the control inputs without turbulence. That should give you a fairly good impression of the turbulence contribution.
It's also not that difficult "to imagine" based on the page 42 graphs, the graph of the vertical component of the turbulence; if I have time, I may try to generate one for my own curiosity.... By the way, this is an opportunity to mention and praise BEA for its professionalism in having these simulations, calculations, and analysis done, as they are extremely important in understanding and confirming that the plane acted within its intended design boundaries. |
Originally posted by OK465 : No. Just the opposite. |
Exactly.
The difference between "utilized" and "required". If you let go of the SS in a 9 degree bank in ALT 2, the bank will actually tend to shallow out. (It's not just an opinion.) |
Posted on this before, and concur again.
Audio message can be continuously disruptive, visual can be too, if done in certain ways. Being disruptive once, or twice, to gain attention is perhaps enough. A certain very simple, small, visual message can be very strong without being disruptive. An A/C Error Status Panel with 3 color coded LEDs, to indicate and remind the type of Error messages that reflect the current state of the a/c. (1) Emergency/Fatal - maybe RED , (2) Warning - maybe Yellow, (3) Informational - maybe Blue.
Originally Posted by MurphyWasRight
(Post 6658292)
Seems obvious to me so I must be missing something:
Once stall warning/condition is detected for more than 5 seconds (or other appropriate small number) latch the warning and do not remove it until valid (unstalled) airspeed and AoA are seen. In other words once in a stall prove to me that we are no longer stalled. Oh and while we are at it flash STALL on all displays every 10 seconds or so. |
Lonewolf. It is on the graph, imo. The airframe was not S/L. The g accels, the PITCH, and Hazelnuts report of a .6 degree PITCH up moment/sec. So yes, I think safe to say the airframe was active, and on its way up, coincident with PF's first and emphatice NU pull. "Additive" controls, by happenstance, then.
No, I haven't gotten to the inter-relationships of command, result, deflection, TRIM, feel, etc. for the climb. But I believe it is all in there, and hang what PF thought, or BEA, or anyone. The traces are real, they don't lie, and they don't buy/sell/fly aircraft. A thorough dissection of airtren's graph, then? If you need work in silence, I'll read only, and nort disturb. It IS that important to me. :p Gerard C. I think the "initial noseup" started well before the frame you quote and was unrelated to the 360 foot "READ"/discrep in altitude. It had begun in A/P NORMAL, and the PILOT was responsible for piggybacking on the original .6dgree/sec. -imho. The g shows a sharp reduction, as the a/c descends ('turbulence/updraft').This descent: ap commanded, no? mm43. Howdo. "Explain the stuck AoA vane....." WRG/FAULT ?:confused:? |
The difference between "utilized" and "required". Worth looking at is the yaw damper, the rudder and the lateral 'g' traces. Once in the 'mush' the aircraft was 'nodding' and rolling/banking in a synchronized manner as well as 'fish tailing'. http://oi56.tinypic.com/51dok5.jpg Pitch Attitude, Rudder Position and Roll Attitude traces have been overlaid in the second trace in this graphic. |
Originally Posted by MurphyWasRight
(Post 6658292)
Seems obvious to me so I must be missing something:
Once stall warning/condition is detected for more than 5 seconds (or other appropriate small number) latch the warning and do not remove it until valid (unstalled) airspeed and AoA are seen. In other words once in a stall prove to me that we are no longer stalled. Good catch, thank you. So far I cannot find why it would not work (unless you freeze your 3 pitots during an actual stall... what a bad day, then) :ok:
Originally Posted by GerardC
(Post 6658601)
Imho, the initial nose up is a reaction to the loss of 360' (35,024'-34,664') in just 4 seconds (02:10:05 / 02:10:09) that is "only" a 5400 ft/minute rate.
Any pilot flying an RVSM route will react very quickly to this kind of altitude variation. Sorry, I don't find the comparizon very conclusive... --------- [edit/addendum]
Originally Posted by AlphaZuluRomeo
(Post 6657369)
As JD-EE noted, the real airspeed was more in the 100kt range. Pivotable pitots (to let them follow the airflow) would have helped, there. Those exist on the Rafale fighter (and perhaps others), as shown on this pic.
By the way, does anybody know why such combined probes (pitot+AoA) seem to be rare? Not so easy to make/maintain? Too expensive? Never tought about? Not deemed useful on a liner, which should not reach such exotic AoAs? |
Originally Posted by AlphaZuluRomeo
(Post 6658775)
Self-quoting myself (sorry about that) but I just read (here) that the A380 apparently carry MFPs (Multi Function Probes) for Pt + TAT + AOA. Why this choice on the bigger bus? Are those MFPs something "new"?
(Edit - ignore remark about static. Other manufacturers apparently integrate that ...) |
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