Maybe a good time for philosophy while we wait
 

Well thank you, De Sitter, and hope I am one of the 'real" pilots.

So maybe we take a break and actually discuss philosophy involved with the design considerations and the training and the so-called CRM ( we called it crew coordination). And BTW, Doze brought up the best example of CRM most of us have ever seen. TY.

Unlike Smilin' and 'bird and Retired, I actually flew the grandfather of the FBW systems. Unlike the Airbus folks, we called our "limits" limits, not "protections". But make no mistake, we had one feature that was intended to prevent us from getting into a spin, and another that 100% disconnected us from the stick ( our deep stall). Nevertheless, our limits were intended to enhance our mission capabilities and not make things easier for us.

There is no doubt in this ol' feeble mind that crew error will be the major finding. There is also no doubt that the Airbus control laws and reversion sequence will get some scrutiny. As another contributor points out - why allow the THS to reach full deflection? And the system seems to ignore some valid inputs because other inputs are considered invalid. Sheesh. What do I have to play with?

I would hope that training is improved for the folks flying the electric jets. The basics still apply - both aerodynamics of the jets and proven pilot responses to strange/unusual situations that have served us very well for a century. There is no substitute for being exposed to unusual attitudes and aerodynamic conditions you may never encounter. Just a few training hours, or even minutes, will come back to you when the real thing happens. I never had the responsibility of two hundred folks depending upon me, and I never wanted it. But if forced to do it, I would want to know everything I could about the plane and how to fly the thing in every imaginable situation, wouldn't you?

desitter
I rather get the impression that you have an agenda and that agenda is the sort that gets in the way of the truth. It is clear from the actual airbus pilots that the accident was perfectly recoverable provided the flight crew identified the correct circumstances. Nothing to do with Smilin Ed's rubbish about autotrim delaying recovery.
I will repeat for all of those who seem to be under the impression that the aircraft was a factor in the accident that this is not the case. This is an accident caused by human factors and at the base a flawed and falacious company culture. Almost non-existent CRM and total failure to follow SOPs doomed the aircraft. No other type of aircraft would have survived the PF's actions on that night. Try to focus on that - pilot actions were the cause of the accident nothing else.

oh I do understand all the logic behind the planning taking place all the time with an airline (my son had worked with LH for some years).
But one should not forget to mention in all this: Whatever decision a captain takes to get out of a difficult situation, it is in the first place to safe his own life a nuance which seems to be a bit left outside in all these discussions ;) (the instinct of self preserving is the strongest, together with preserving the human race *laugh*
That he gets the applaus of the world by having saved the aircraft plus its contents is of course justified!

Hello Guys
Here is an excellent analysis of Operation and Safety editor David Learmount about the Loss of control of AF 447 and the 6 LOC that happened since year 2000.
I share this analysis about the atrophy of the mental skills of pilots with the new automated liners, this lack of training of mental skills being directly responsible for the work overload of the pilot during flights in degraded mode.

Thank you Captain G. An excellent summary by DL and I am completely in tune. Now, how do we get anyone to notice?

In his own words - seductively credible but also rather flawed. An examination of airline accidents stretching into the past will turn up a long list of LOC accidents. Automation is not the cause of this nor is it a new phenomena (Clipper Skippers anyone?). Pilots have been losing control for various reasons for a long time and will continue to do so. An examination of one of his examples - the Adam Air accident he mentions suggests other causes for the accident, more relating to CRM than mental atrophy. A reading of the Air France audit (somewhere on this thread) will prove more productive than watching this video.

Thanks Cpt. G :ok:

Here is some more excellent stuff of D. Learmont

Learmount

I fear we head for a circular discussion.... previously in this thread we have decried the obnoxious Airbus automation as somehow evil and root of all issues. I feel we have gotten past that, however now we appear to be calling for limits in Alt Law, which as we all know (right?) is invoked ONLY due to some failure of the system - in this case UAS.

The transition to Alt Law is a heads-up to the crew - something is broken (temporarily or otherwise), since the interaction of the automated control system relies on the sensed performance parameters, would that highly trained human sitting up front please take control?

In the case in question, the aircraft was handed to the human in a reasonable condition, it was not stalled, it was not overspeed, it was not balanced on a wingtip... I accept that the hand-off was unexpected (aren't all system failures unexpected?) and this requires a considered and thoughtful reaction on the part of the PF.

The reaction appears to not have been that, and judging by the amplitude of the control inputs (3/4 travel this way or full to the stop that) excessive - perhaps at low speed/altitude appropriate, but not at M0.8/FL350... did the PF forget where he was, never had experienced hand-flying at this speed/alt (likely, given the Air France training info), or simply panic.... but the crux here is the automated systems and protections/limits available in Normal were by design no longer there, since the inputs and control data necessary to compute those limits were no longer considered VALID.

And so, why would you limit elevator/THS travel based in ONLY AoA? I venture you need a SPEED input to make a sensible judgement on limiting elevator/THS travel... but speed was the input in question.

Was the problem the aircraft did too little, or the pilot too much of the wrong thing?

Last thought - what would have happened if the autopilot/autothrottle had NOT dropped offline when the speed inputs went U/S? What if the system simply went into an extrapolation mode for say 3 minutes... using GPS computed ground speed as the delta control? I'd bet we would not be looking at this thread.

DL makes valid points about the automation / human interface. However, I'm not sure that this accident illustrates his point all that well.

As far as this passenger can tell, airlines prepare for dropout of automation by providing lists of actions to be carried out; in this case, the UAS checklist. These action lists allow the pilots to keep the aircraft safe for a short period while their physiology adapts to the new circumstances.

It deeply shocks me to read the CVR transcript and NOT see the AF447 pilots going automatically into that sequence. Surely there must be something in the displays / warnings that triggers the pilots into recognising why the A/P has dropped out? Concentrating on the UAS actions might have given them time for hands to be steadied, or even for the ice to clear and the speeds to come back to normal. Neither of them said anything along the lines of 'Help, the displays have all gone black' at the start of the trouble, so I assume the information was available to them.

The plane wasn't in immediate danger, apart from the fact that it was ploughing straight through some very bad weather. It was doing this because that's what the human crew had elected to do, not because the automatics had misread the situation. This was not the most low-risk strategy available to the Captain, but he had not only chosen it, he had also reduced the chances of managing the effects of the weather by choosing to absent himself at the critical time. Anxiety about the plane's course seems to permeate the younger F/O's words, and perhaps contributed to his later reactions.

The human /automation interface is undoubtedly a factor in this accident, but I can't see that it's the principle one. The finger has got to point at Air France and their training /management of aircrew, and quite possibly at their culture of performance measurement and rewards. Or is this standard of cockpit discipline the norm in other airlines, and I'm just an innocent to believe otherwise?

Post 1863
 

O.C. You need to go back and read my post 1863. :ugh:

One is not fearful of appearing 'dumb'. Too much in evidence here the posts to state a conclusion, claim others are incompetent, and seek to draw to a close this gfascinating thread. imo

I'll bite, and reiterate. airtren's tracks of specific data challenge me. Here, #1870, is the adress of these data.

The stick stirring, the commands, are quite "over the map". The results of the commands seem to be benign, as expressed in the two trails of elevator position and THS.

With all the stick activity, the controls seem to have responded very little.

They describe very little deviation from the far left, the time when the Autopilot was inputting.

At The STALL warn (the continuous level), the Pitxchups start to go seriously NU.

How did the a/c PITCH up to 10 degrees and "start to climb"?

I am sure am answer will make me look foolish. Bring it.

Anyone?

It may be true that seeing is believing, but just as true that believing is seeing.
 

@overthewing

Maybe there is something in that statement....

Article 3 - Inattentional blindness: let's not blame the victim just yet : The Canadian Aviation Maintenance Council / Le Conseil canadien de l'entretien des aéronefs (CAMC - CCEA)

quote:
Inattentional blindness accidents are especially likely when expectation and distraction combine......

http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/33000/33700/33708/33708.pdf

http://www.humanfactors.illinois.edu...port/90-08.pdf

Hi,

As we like read PDF's :8
Some article interesting to read .....
Current Issue | Flight Safety Foundation
Flight Safety June 2011
http://flightsafety.org/download_fil...june11.pdfRead from page 24 to 27
Ironic ?

That's it: Now, pilots are no longer required to fly the aircraft. they are required to apply procedures. They don't fly anymore with their brains and
their mental skills. So how can we expect to analyse and understand.
Just call the hotline when there is no procedures.....

That particular article should be made obligatory reading for all the posters here and on the other AF447 thread.....

Scale, please. Good scout, I read this "scolding". It is propaganda. A shiny trinket to hypnotize while the real deal slinks away.

Unintentional, I am sure. A stone, while rolling, gathers moss, and analysis paralysis.

Simple is good, for simple things. Just as distractionm is the topic of this "paper", it is itself a distraction. Unintentional, certainly.

It is a bogeyman, and a slap dash solution. How many people when reading this opiniuon forget the dream machine gives up and surprises the crew? This is the real deal, and has a simple solution. Motorcycles are not airplanes, and pilots deserve more respects than "He just hit the pedestrians".

"Lyman",
Is your last post supposed to mean anything?

Go easy on the Jack Daniels.

"ChristiaanJ"

You have obligated several hundred people to read something.

An uninvited Teacher is merely a Preacher.

Lem Motlow, now trhere was a man.

Power issues? You have called people Ignorant, drunks, and other nasties.

You should be more polite.

Bear: Get some help
 

Bearfoil/Lyman/whatever....

Your disjoint ramblings are simply a waste of screen inches.

No one is "obligated" to read anything posted or linked here - choice is an individual act.

Previously there was a discussion regarding not bounding any problem and looking for free thinking "outside-of-the-box". But once the box is clearly misplaced or simply ignored, those comments become redundant or in the case of the recent crop, disconnected and hence worthless.

If it is being suggested the words appear to be Jack Daniels influenced, it is because that is how they appear... not because of any agenda to "get Vinny".

GY
What is an abject waste of Space? All things personal. Check me brother, find some personal attack I have made. Response? you gd betcha. For ChristuiaanJ......

Look at airtren's traces, and please explain to me why I am having sincere trouble why I cannot see how PF's stirring appears to have no effect on the Elevators?

I will not moderate this thread, neither should you. Answer my question or find your golf clubs.

sorry, it's post #1870. IMO, this trace is the maijn plot. Neptunus, can you help explain? Because otherwise, your post is just an editorial?

Can we please get back to the main plot here?

Well, let me quote just one.....
That's what I call a personal attack.
And please, don't run to the mods this time, to weep on their shoulder again.
Hiding behind yet another 'user ID' is despicable....

ChristiaanJ. Of all people, I know tyou can help. The elevator record? How is it that the traces of elevators/THS don't show much response to the PF's mortar/pestle? frrom airtren #1870?

Bear, Lyman, or whoever you are... If you'd ever handled hydraulically actuated controls on an aircraft, you might have noted the same thing... the more demand there is, the more likely will the surfaces be responding a little slowly to your demands... call it a kind of hysteresis. As more fluid flow is asked for (many of those actuators use a fair bit of fluid from stop to stop!), the more the pressure can drop and the slower they'll go.

Bear, Lyman,RWA or whoever.

We know you have difficulty with simple concepts, and I am probably wasting my time, but one more try.

With a FBW airplane operating under C* laws there is no simple relationship between sidestick movement and elevator deflection. The sidestick movement is a delta 'g' command and the FCS adjusts the elevator movement to suit the actual flight conditions. Moreover, the FCS has a pitch damper function, so the elevator movement is further modified by a term that depends on pitch rate. You simply cannot make the sort of comparison you are attempting - it is futile.

Secondly, as has already been stated many times, the THS movement is not linked directly to elevator movement either. The THS is moved in response to the SUMMATED stick demands over a period of some seconds. This quantity varies much more slowly than the actual elevator deflections, so the THS movement is correspondingly sluggish.

No great mysteries, no cover ups and no failures!

Trajectory = pitch/power settings + turbulences.
THS is long term, slow rate... do you know what is trim?
Did you even look at thrust change?
Control surface efficiency is never "absolute", being all the time affected by aircraft equlibrum in the air.
As this has been already discussed previously, maybe you should try some reading instead of constantly trolling and hijacking this thread with your (not so funny) clones.

It's amazing how graceful/forgiving the A330 behaves below its flight envelope (stalled, storm and low airspeed)?

Before this incident if you asked me if a transport can be controlled at ~30kts in a storm then I would guess no, probably tumble and break up. Remarkably the reality is yes albeit requiring aggressive stick inputs to maintain level wings!

Was there a special reasons why AF447 remained controllable at ~30kts? Did the free fall/stall (100+kts vertical) acting on the superstructure provide aerodynamic stability even thought the wings were not flying?
Why did asymetric engine thrust/drag not induce a spin?
Why did the ailerons/rudder generate enough force to keep the a/c in a graceful attitude albeit oscilating in roll?

Power. CONFiture has framed Power for me. So OK. Dozy has said she is not twitchy, so OK. Trim is familiar, so OK. I understand Hydraulics.

I also see that THS has not killed her, it comes in only after the STALL. It is at -3 from ap loss to STALL. The aggressive action of the Pilot is not relevant, except in the long term, takata, you have said that.

So, from handoff, this aircraft exhibits no bad habits, except perhaps following the orders of PF?

I guess the question I have left is, she is well protected, docile and easy.

Until it is absolutely necessary that she be protected, then she is not?

All those protections, but when they are truly needed, they hide?

If controls are deliberate, then mayonnaise is not important, but the controls will slowly take her to STALL? Three pilots are wanting to know what is going on, but she is....silent. Sweet.

At STALL warning and STALL, the THS trims to the stop NU? Fix that?
With a committee of three on deck and focused, can we see what the other guy has done, is doing? Fix That? Can we off some of the extraneous ECAMS when we are about to die? Fix That?

It is a machine. get up off your knees and stop genuflecting.

@takata
 

peut-être je suis la seule genuine ici :ok:
bisous (quand meme *rire*)

you should have understood by the way I posed my naive questions, that that was quite feminine and until now I've never met a real man being able to copy a woman in whatever role imaginable et bien sure vice-versa:= (sorry for the OT)

[Edit: Very sorry Jutta, and welcome (ouch!); I was obviously completely wrong about you!]It is not funny Bearfoil, you're completely lost into your stupid stereotypes, please, stop playing with people by wasting their time.[Edit: see what happen now, Bearfoil? I'm sure you liked it: even genuine ladies would be treated like silly Bears!]

Please ladies and gentlemen, it takes two to tangle. One cannot control another's behaviours, only one's own. If a poster's contributions consistently bother one, go to "User CP > Edit Ignore List > Add User To Your List", then click "Okay", then to exit, place a tick in the "Check" box and click "Save Changes".

The user's name still shows up in the thread but not the post's text. There is a "View post" prompt in the top-right corner of the post so if you wish to view an individual contribution you can do so by clicking on the prompt.

If someone is making your experience here unpleasant, rather than engaging, use the ignore feature and keep contributions to this thread on-topic. If you wish to engage, perhaps the PM feature is a good alternative.

Some enjoy the fight but the thread has deteriorated so badly and there are so many posts to wade through already that it is getting tiresome and unattractive as a technical discussion on AF447.

Of course, you are right and I fully agree...
Until the guy, being ignored by most posters, come back under many identities, spamming, enlighting, his previous postings that always will re-trigger the same odd discussions, over and over again!!

Now, this game is 2 years old.
At one point, all people reading this thread should be aware that someone is constantly playing with them; that many here are wasting their precious time at building serious argumentation; that they are, nonetheless, constantly fooled by someone which is playing this sickening game.

At one point, this should really end, or this thread (and R&N one) won't be worth continuing anyway.

As I say, it takes two to tangle. One quickly recognizes someone who is serious about discussing this accident and who has other motives. The second kind of dialogue shouldn't last two years, it should last two or three posts which is all it should take to realize someone is fooling with us. Otherwise, by responding one chooses to become part of the game, sustaining it, which is fine as sometimes it is challenging and fun for some, but it is so at the expense of the continuity and pleasantness of the thread. The truth of things always comes out sooner or later regardless of how one or another wish otherwise and who try to push conclusions upon others by all means available.

The choice too, for some, is not to come here anymore and for many who enjoy dialoguing with serious, like-minded professionals, that would be a shame.

Disagreement, even vehemently so, is different and should be tolerated and encouraged. And it is very easy to tell the difference.

Anyway, I've said my piece. The thread will go where it will go regardless, so we'll see.

PJ2,
Thanks

Wisdom is talking. So lets try it again... and see what happen.
:)

Back to old obsession:- what exactly was happening just before the incident started - were the controls acting on bad data? I think its possible but only for a few seconds before the air data correctly flagged as inconsistent.

One possible failure mode of pitot tubes when encountering ice is that the drain holes block first and cause a small over-read, then under-read as the total port blocks. With the air speed under auto-control this might not be seen on the Mach No - but may be seen to be calculated as change in wind speed.

Is it it just a coincidence that it all seems to be coincident with the selected Mach drop from M0.82 to M0.80? This seems to have been commanded at 2:09:50, unfortunately the plot of "Navigation Parameters" on English P109 is corrupt while the selected Mach is 0.82 - as mentioned before it appears they are plotting 0 when no update.

The engine N1s start to ramp down from 2:10:00, but seem to have little effect on the indicated speed - but presumably is responsible for the co-ordinated drop in pitch angle? The longitudinal acceleration suggests the plane is slowing (although I don't understand the negative bias on the plot).

It appears the ISIS calibrated airspeed when recovered after the dip is "stuck false high" in period 2:10:10 to 2:10:13 - during which the engine N1s are locked low - but groundspeed doesn't drop off much (perhaps due to plot scale).

It's not all consistent to my eyes, and I hope the BEA can recover more detail data the control hardware around this time (especially the right hand display indications) - BUT - I think you need significant shifts in wind speed/temperature to make it all add up - what if they "nearly missed" a Cumulonimbus?

Im in general agreement with Smiling Ed and machinbirds posts, however the trim issue was a small hurdle to further overcome at the end of a long list of errors. I certainly respect the lifelong experience represented by so many of the forum posts- the kind of experience that safes lives when things go really wrong.

I think in this kind of accident there is a very large list of factors, and they all seemed to concoct for the worst on the day, at the edge of the flight envelope, and the PF's ability.

A few quick matters....I can see a very good argument for visibly linked controls. Its such an aid to situational awareness, and I feel non linked controls are a bit of a by product of low accident rate complacency.

Also,I dont see why an intelligent explicit emergency use of extrapolated speed data with sensible caveats may have at least alleviated the anxiety that seems to have paralysed the situational and perceptual awareness of the crew

The mental fog appears to have descended on the aircrew very early. There must be some professional habbits and training that can overcome what appears to have happened here. How effectivley do AF and the major carriers/ training organisations train to deal with false perceptual expectations/distraction/poor self awareness/anxiety/lax flight discipline/life
threatening CRM issues.

Im not sure how "worlds best practice" pilots do this. I know how I was taught by my most respected instructors and try to practice at my own aviation level.
I try to constantly practice "what ifs" as a trainig tool, as well as reviewing my first emergency responses so they are fluid, at times when they are not needed.
It was that kind of lifelong learning, self discipline,professionalism and deeply embedded training I saw in Sullenberger, that I dealy wish to emulate, and which set such a great example to all.
My day job is medical, but in my years working in emergency medicine, we used to have a saying..." In a crisis, take your own pulse first".

There is in accidents what is called the "procuring cause". It is the beginning; what follows is related, and interesting, but subtract this one first "hole", and 'groundhog day', it is as if nothing has happened. Shall we leave it at that?

Of course not. To leave what follows this first slice as irrelevant is foolish, and a disservice to those who paid.

One does not treat the booboo without focusing on the hemorrhage first?

This hemorrhage, this first slice, was one of 32 previous slices. Shall we wander into confusion? Strikes me that Pride and Prejudice, if allowed at all, should wait, until other more pressing matters are dealt with. One could almost get away with saying: This was NO 'accident'.

Generally, to qualify as an accident, it must meet this: 'UNFORESEEN'.

Hi,

That's not difficult to understand
This was the AF (by the directeur général adjoint des opérations aériènnes Mr Schramm) reaction after the disclosure of the BEA report N°3
This man tell already the contrary of the report .. and some plain lies ... :eek:
Unfortunately in french :) but some here will well understand
It's pretty embarrassing

Nothing looks corrupted here. Change of Mach mode "Selected", set at Mach 0.80, occured at 0209:58 (not 0209:50), only 7 seconds before UAS. Previously, it was Mach 0.82 and the blue line drop is readable behind the "Mach Number" green line. Before this change, the flight guidance mode was different ("Managed"), hence it is painted (in blue) differently with down lines, but the top of blue block is showing Mach 0.82 until this point.

I think that it is not a coincidence as the turbulence level slightly increased, hence aircraft speed was reduced... while the phenomenon occured at this point. The conditions were changing: feeling of warming, smelling, noise, etc. The very same elements were also described during other flights encountering UAS conditions.

Maintained airspeed is primary due to momentum rather than immediate thrust change at 0209:58. In fact, it seems that the first result of this thrust reduction was a slight drop in pitch, down to zero or slightly below, which was followed by a small acceleration, small loss of altitude, slightly negative vertical/speed and also an increase of ground speed (turbulence can play its role also). This looks consistent with airspeed slightly increasing up to 0210:07, when ADR1 became invalid. Hence longitudinal g should have followed the same trend. Once this inertia moment was consummed, pitch increasing, low thrust and climb started altogether to bleed airspeed. But this was not effective before five or six seconds following A/P disconnection (about 0210:11, when gentle descent stopped and climb was resumed).

I don't think that ISIS is either "stuck" nor reading "false high" at this point. Last valid ADR1 was 274 kt at 0210:07 and climb was still not to be resumed until 4 seconds later, hence, 270 kt on ISIS between 0210:10 and 0210:13 doesn't seems false reading but actual airspeed.