Phugoid
 

Further to my post#545 (p.28), this is how a Phugoid looks like.

Any resemblance to the A340 Airprox incident is coïncidental!

P.S.: Phugoid2: Angles and "gee"

Of interest to note that, on autopilot height lock without AT, the phugoid degrades to an ASI variation. On aircraft with a significant phugoid motion this is quite obvious to the crew.

PJ2

No one is saying Boeing vs AirBus. Or pilot qualifications.

Merely that one key element missing from all of the conversations is, that the fact that thunderstorms are not considered a potential key problem seems to me quite cavalier and attempts to minimize the risk involved are never discussed.
Is anyone saying: "Disregard the potential hazard of violent weather!"

Which raises the question: Does AB seem to feel that AirBus is "Failsafe"?

Is there a culture there which insists on "Staying the Course"?

That to me is the central problem.

If there were a culture of staying on course involved in this accident it would be due to the airline NOT the manufacturer.

Failsafe
 

"AIRPLANE UPSET RECOVERY, A test pilots point of view"
by Captain William Wainwright, Chief Test Pilot, Airbus Industrie,
... There is no need for this type of continuation training on protected fly-by-wire aircraft, although a general knowledge of the principles involved is useful for every pilot. ....
FAST Number 24.

An old reference. I have no idea whether the internal culture has changed.

As it does on an A330 in either normal or alternate laws of course.

Now that is a very good find indeed. From the Full Narrative:...
.....
..So it does appear the aircraft will return to Normal law (which would almost certainly have saved the day in AF 447)from ALT 2 but only if the time which the speeds disagree is short enough. Suspect that needs a rethink, apart from that it's hard to find fault with the aircraft.

Also, there is a note at the bottom which shows the NTSB had made a link between this incident and the AF accident some time ago.

PJ - you may elect to 'opt out' of the argument, but I will continue to press for a major change in attitudes for all, but particularly fbw system training. As I have said elsewhere, a lot of the current 'problems' derive from a mind-set based on 'promotional' talk and an apparent over-reliance on the ability to automate.

You say "you shrink the argument to Airbus system design, resisting every point of explanation regarding the "new" technology offered by those who actually know and fly the machine." No - I was equally critical of the 737 A/T failure at AMS and the 'training' involved. It seems to me that a Gallic shrug is all that is required when the software elects to automatically climb a 340 more than 2000 ft and reduce its speed towards Vls following turbulence and a minor overspeed detection. "It's OK, mes amis, we have changed the code" - not 'why is it designed that way'. Is the way we train our crews adequate for this system design? There has been no "point of explanation" about this logic, merely 'how it works' and not 'why?' Do I take it therefore that you find this 'reaction' acceptable? As for "you shrink the argument to Airbus system design", perhaps revisit the thread title?

As for 'gamers' operating modern aircraft, yes, we will go that way. Let's hope there are always enough tokens for them to put in the slots and that no-one ever pulls the power plug out of the wall.

For 'Smilin_Ed' also, would a competent pilot have zoomed a 340 to 380+ over the North Atlantic with a minor overspeed in turbulence? Most 'competent pilots' know full well that climbing a heavy aircraft from cruise and increasing towards a limiting alpha with turbulence is not a good idea. I would have hoped the designers thought the same way too and that pilots would have flagged this up. That is what I mean. I am not referring to 447. In my book, the jury is still out on the 'zoom climb'.

JD-EE, I disagree - it was the 'system' that trimmed the tail at AMS, PGF and with 447 (and several other cases), not the 'pilots'. In all cases they made no deliberate attempt to trim that far.

Re A340 airprox zoom climb

@Grity

Thanks for the update - I started on a more detailed digitization of the graphs (there are shareware/opensource tools) - but didn't get too far! Your plots do show the effect of pilot intervention to cut the peak height reached, but its interesting to see the AoA on the way down back in same range as on the way up!

@HazelNuts39

Do you get the phugoid plot purely from energy considerations assuming initial AoA correct for 1g flight? If so can it be redone with an initial AoA giving 1.5g which should give a higher climb rate and shorter period.

I assume natural damping very difficult to model but how much of a roller-coaster ride is it in an A340/A330 with rearward cg @FL350 without pitch and throttle control if you don't start with a trimmed condition?

The manoeuvre is driven entirely by AoA, assuming thrust=drag throughout. From time 0, AoA increases linearly in about 3 seconds from the 1g value of about 2.5 degrees to the stall warning threshold of about 4 degrees, and remains at S/W after that. Since I don't know alpha-prot, I used S/W instead. It varies with Mach as shown in the second graph I added in a P.S. to post #596 (p.30), together with pitch, FPA and "gee". You will note that "gee" gets close to 1.5.

P.S. The aero data are those of an A330 at 205t/37%, since I don't have these for the A340 incident.

I presume this discussion on phugoid oscillations relates to the A340 AIRPROX? I used to do a nice one myself occasionally in the climb on aeroplanes like VC10 and B707 – unintentionally, of course, and usually due to coarse pitch selections using the AP pitch wheel.

AF447, on the other hand, seems to have shown no sign of one – probably because of the G-control provided by Pitch-Alternate Law. Unfortunately, that same law, coupled with a lack of any sustained pitch-down commands on the sidestick, seems to have led to the super-stall.

So we can now see only too clearly that the flight-path stability provided by C* Law, with its normal low-speed protections invalidated due to the UAS, necessitates firm action by the pilot if – for whatever reason – the aircraft enters a climb which cannot be sustained by its performance capability. This action seems to have been largely absent in AF447, and seems to have come late in the day on the A340 AIRPROX incident.

This leads me to wonder if, in the event of the systems diagnosing UAS, it would be better for the EFCS to downgrade to Pitch-Direct instead of Pitch-Alternate. It also occurs to me, however, that the PF needs some warning, if at all possible, that he/she is about to lose the longitudinal stability of C*. The AP has already disconnected, but a short period of mental preparation for stick-to-surface control might be useful.

Stick-to-surface hand flying at high altitude, particularly in turbulence, requires a fair amount of concentration. I once shared the task with my skipper on a B707 for the last 6 or 7 hours of a CCS-LGW flight, including step-climbs up to FL410. 20 minutes at a time was enough, and we had the benefit of reliable airspeed indications.

UAS early warning
 

Chris Scott,

It seems useful immediately warn the crew when "UAS starts". I suspect F-GZCP was not equipped with the add on to warn on UAS like N805NW (A330-323). I also would prefer to know (immediately) the reason for Law change, because could led PF to a more "graceful degradation situation" (a/c+PF) specially when facing "extreme conditions".

NW and TAM incidents
 

jcjeant,


Thanks link.

- that should not be a deterrent to adopting Dozy's idea a way back - straight to D Law. This a/c was effectively 'crippled' in terms of continuing to CDG so all that was required (if possible) was a period of stabilisation at FL350, a methodical analysis of the situation, a pitch/power descent under Atlantic emergency procedures while returning to somewhere. No great sweating grunting hand flying for hours, as the pitots would almost certainly have recovered after the descent/turn and I assume some form of automatic flight could have been coaxed out of the beast by deft electronic wizardry. Captain to the bridge anyway and he can do the hero stuff.

Why use redundancy in a System design
 

Hi,

When you have 3, 5, 7, (odd number), etc. critical elements, your System is able to:

1. Compare elements trying to figure out the “truth” i.e. their correct “output”
2. “Vote” to select the best ones (the ones that are probably presenting correct results)
3. Implement a more “fault tolerant” system for a better (safer) System availability
4. Promote a “graceful degradation” in the overall system

But this is only valid for elements with low chances to fail simultaneously. This is well done In Airbus SAS planes with triple critical computing elements (acting as 5). A solid Engineering approach.

When you have identical elements, subjected to the same environment and clearly failing simultaneously (IIRC 38 cases of UAS analyzed since 2003) something should be done earlier (IMHO urgently).

The current redundancy is only useful when you have a Pitot heater failure, interface failure, “wiring”, etc. Simply because the chances of simultaneous failures of this category are near zero.

What is the net result of the current AS "redundancy"?

1. To degrade the System (no longer able to work at “full specs” due a plane itself limitation) triggering (without early warning*) a major reconfig in the plane control System

So the question? Why they used redundancy? The reason i call it “ridiculous” is because the use of n identical and non adequate AS sensors failing simultaneously is absolutely useless.

This seems a “conceptual error” that seems incorrectly being used in other a/c designs. And not helping in two very important "features"

1. Fault tolerance (a/c)
2. Graceful degradation (a/c+crew)

The only result of this redundancy is to realize that the plane is entering a dangerous "space". In a plane using improper AS sensor specification (non adequate product) of an important a/c element (to the control System)

AF447 crew, in the first moment, were informed on UAS condition? When (if ever) they realized the plane was affected by a "simple and brief" UAS condition?

I suspect F-GZCP was not equipped with the add on to warn on UAS like N805NW (A330-323). Is that true? (This UAS early warning “add on” should be a standard item and not an optional item for the operator)

I would prefer to know (immediately) the reason for Law change. Why? Simply because could provide a more graceful degradation situation (a/c+crew) when entering and facing “extreme” conditions.

AF447 (a/c+crew) apparently instead had an “accelerated degradation”, due (triggered by) a flawed System design using "redundant" inadequate AS sensors for typical (possible) atmospheric conditions.

The statistics (low UAS probability) is no excuses in this issue. Urgent results from R&D being done, is required. After all, Airbus SAS introduced "advanced planes" and this seems to be the inexorable industry trend.

(*) From an "instrumentation point of view" i guess it´s possible to have a safe early warning (real time) before a Law change triggered by this condition

Redundancy
 

RR NDB

Excellent post above :ok:

It does an exccelent job of putting perspective how reduncay works in complex systems (with the pilot) and where it might not work.

Your knowledge and understanding is way beyond the more simple use of the words by 99% of posters, you can bet that the Airbus designers have equal but deeper knowlege and understanding as well.

to wit

One might now suspect where to look for the swiss cheese layer that has gone wrong in this accident to make this the only so-far upset accdent associated with a probable icing failure of the pitot system.

To me all this talk about poor design and reversion laws in the many many pages of these postings is way too presumptious

Forgive me, please, if this is too much of a rabbit trail, ....but I always thought the whole idea of the Swiss Cheese analogy was to call attention to the number of slices that could have stood alone to prevent an accident, but didn't.
No single slice alone can be blamed.

On one hand, there is discussion here about the absolute necessity for pilots to exercise basic airmanship and “fly” the aircraft when automated systems degrade…but on the other hand thought is presented as to having the present degraded systems capabilities modified and “improved” so that in a degraded systems situation, “piloting responsibilities” and airmanship requirements are made less demanding by…

...the aircraft systems.

???

Just for information…

I’m often in a simulator by myself, doing calibrations and setups. I can get up and leave the simulator pilot seats unoccupied and the sim unfrozen in alternate law in level flight with constant thrust at high altitude, with A/P & A/T disconnected, and take a ten minute phone call in the back.

When I come back, the only significant change in conditions will be that the sim is now about 70-80 NM down the road. When I climb back in a seat, at this point I can take additional time for mental preparation.

Tolerant? Graceful?

True, it is a sim, but maybe you get the idea.

Hi,

You are lucky .. never the plane go in a right bank .. when you was making your call :)

RR_NDB,
In replying to my post, you have missed the point I was trying to make, although you have made another perfectly reasonable one. I doubt it's possible to delay the downgrade from Normal Law. The question is: should the pitch element be downgraded to Pitch-Alternate (retaining C*) or Pitch-Direct (stick-to-elevator and manual THS)? If the latter (for the reason I stated), it would be a very big, instant step. As the system is capable of providing Pitch-Alternate (ALT 2), my suggestion is that it could do that for a period of – say – 20 seconds with an ECAM warning that Direct law will follow. This might give the PF enough time, if necessary, to discard his/her meal tray, retract the table, and concentrate on the job in hand.

BOAC,
I was not expressing an opinion on whether an aircraft might continue or divert following a UAS incident: that would be for the captain to decide. My little tale about hand-flying stick-to-elevator at high altitude was merely to illustrate to the non-flyers on this forum that it involves a significant workload, even in level flight when airspeed indications are available.

The pertinent points that need consideration are:-

• In the reported UAS instances they all involved a common mode problem associated with short term malfunction and/or disagreement between the airspeeds provided by three pitots.
• The UAS lasted for periods measured in seconds and not multiple minutes.
• All aircraft were in Normal Law in stable cruise.

Bearing the above in mind, the aircraft successfully measured numerous other parameters and applied them to allow the autopilot and autothrust to progress the flight according to parameters entered into the FMS. All these parameters are reflected in the aircraft's Total Energy component, and it is not beyond any software programer to deduce the KTAS/KCAS from the TE.

So why not provide a Normal 2 Law that implements itself in a non latching manner when UAS becomes an issue. This Law would provide a continually updated pseudo KCAS based on all the other environmental data available, including inertial data, and allow the aircraft to maintain stable flight.

Notify the crew and allow them to monitor the situation and ensure that a return to Normal Law occurred when pitot derived airspeeds had stabilized. The object is to remove the "startle factor" and ensure a smooth transition in flight laws to cover what is normally a short period of unreliable airspeed.

Making the aircraft more easily hand flyable by the typical pilot, training him, and requiring him practice it would remove one of the holey pieces of cheese.

3holelover

The anaology is a simple communication tool for those that don't work everyday in safety analysis and/or risk assessment.

It also begins to work with simple minded lawyers who like to paint things in winners and losers :)

In actuality a more descriptive analogy would be a flow diagram where some things are in series with conditional gates while others are in parallel.

When most of us use the simple swiss cheese analogy it's taken as a conditional shield in series. That is if it works the failure condition is arrested (minimized, mitigated etc.) to a point wher a more serious condition is avoided.

More importantly the investigation seeks to indentify as many contributing factors as possible and somewhere along the line safety proffesionals (not necessarily investigators) need to pareto what layers of cheese can be improved for the largest improvement in safety versus available resources (tools equipment, skilled labor, out-of-service time etc.).

Ed, you are talking about the most important layer of cheese. The one that thinks, plans, monitors the other layer of cheese and ultimately with all the other layers can still save the day if you can just fly the airplane with all the other layers not helping. You just need to know how to fly the airplane with no help. That once was the standard.;)

Is there any evidence or reason to suspect that the a/c is difficult to hand fly ? If the initial climb was caused by such difficulties well OK but there is no evidence for that is there, the contending theories being the a/c flew itself under its own logic or that the a/c dutifully obeyed the sidestick inputs -made for whatever reason. I see what CS has said about effort and concentration but I took that to be typical across all types. Since the crew kept the roll excursions controlled then they must have believed the attitude data they were presented with, so the nose up condition must have been appropriate to some perceived state, unless all attention was given to trying to get the automatics back up and playing.

hand flying
 

The answers to my query in #544 about hand flying at cruising level appear to be "Not if I can avoid it..."
The PF on AF447 may have seldom hand flown at cruising level. If, and just if, he had gripped the SS too firmly with his fingers, would this, could this, induce a NU, which in turn would be taken as an order by the trimmer, slowly to wind on full NU ?
A gradual change of whatever indication there may be of the amount of trim might have been overlooked - there was a lot going on. ( I might have a light flash on when more than 75% has been used, just to remind me.)

40 years ago when I was talking to my SLF (as we then could), my F/O reported that the A/P had gone wrong. could I come? We were in a slow descent into the opposite traffic flow. He seemed to have forgotten that the control column could be used above F/L 10.0. He was able to practice all the way home, but at M .5 !

A very good discussion which resulted from BOAC and Nigel-on-Draft's extended discussion on the Airbus Crash/Training Flight thread in R&N, produced links to several interesting documents on redundancy and voting.

"Reaching Agreement in the Presence of Faults", (figuring out the 'truth' in complex systems), can be found on that Airbus Crash/Training Flight thread beginning here. The references are to the Byzantine General's Problem first posited by Lamport, (original comments and link provided by PBL at Post #1297 to which the link above is referenced), and elaborated by Kevin Driscoll and others in Byzantine Fault Tolerance; From Theory to Reality provide a lively discussion on the notion of FCPC (and other computers), "voting", and the problems faced, even by crews, (and NOT limited to the Airbus...the Turkish B737 Radio Altimeter problem is such a problem).

BOAC;

I think we agree on your notion of, "continuing the fight".

What I meant by "narrowing...etc" was, I don't think the fight can be carried forward by criticizing this or that aspect or detail of the one design. The B777 is partially automated, and Boeing's B787 is, one day, going to top the Airbus concept in spades. The problem isn't "the Airbus"; the problem is attitudes and denials of what automation is, what it can and cannot accomplish reliably and the biggest principle of all, "who is in control?"

I have consistently offered the view that "marketing" from the manufacturer and bought into by the customers (airlines) has always led the pathway to automation 'buy-in". Certainly automation does not sell itself through actual comprehension of complex systems and the notion that automation can go wrong is just never discussed in polite sales-and-cocktails circles. Pilots, not MBAs and those informed by and solely driven by finance, knew better but, (and I have many AW&ST articles as well as personal emails from the early 90's discussing "mode confusion" asking how to deal with it), pilots were ignored in favour of cheaper training, common cockpits and the need for lower skill levels in new-hires. Like I said before, George Carlin said it best.

You can see the marketing approach in practically everything Airbus writes or ever wrote. Problem is, while most pilots knew better and just got on with the job of flying an airplane and learning about the new systems and occasoinally providing feedback (which was initially, arrogantly ignored by Airbus), the regulators, airline financial people, the standards, checking and training people and even some pilots took the marketing people at their word. Consequently, here for example in Canada, demonstrating and otherwise teaching/training the approach to the stall is not required for FBW aircraft. THAT is how far the mythology has been entrenched. Now it stands ready to reach those for whom the digitizing and control of flight are an invisible phenomenon and who, as a result, may not have great stick-and-rudder skills or even the raw survival skills so needed to stay alive in an airplane. On this, you and I fully agree.

I constantly support the Airbus aircraft because it is first an airplane, and not because I think or believe that it is a superior concept in solving the problems of flight. I think simpler is better but quite frankly BOAC, we pilots don't drive the industry - finance does, even to the point of throwing dice on occasion. If you want a profound example of a company and a design that truly deserved heavy criticism and I think jail time for that company's management, take a look at "The DC10 Story".

I have also consistently said that the design demands heavy criticism where warranted (and have done so many times), but to be able to do that, and you may not agree, I think one should be trained on the airplane and have some experience with it, because, some of the problems seen by those not on the airplane disappear when one knows and flies the machine.

Mr Optimistic, quote:
"Is there any evidence or reason to suspect that the a/c is difficult to hand fly ?"
Probably not, but perhaps PJ2, CONF_iture or Tubby Linton will comment. We are told that AF447 had a benign CG of MAC 29%, even with fuel in the trim tank, but it would be further aft in most cases. (Fuel could be transferred forward to improve pitch stability, but surely not until the aircraft was in stable, level flight.)

Mr Optimistic, quote:
"...the contending theories being the a/c flew itself under its own logic
or that the a/c dutifully obeyed the sidestick inputs -made for whatever reason."
[my emphasis]
The two concepts are not mutually exclusive. There is no evidence that the sidestick inputs were not "obeyed" according to C* logic. But once the aeroplane had approached the stall, due to the removal of high-AoA protections, this logic became unhelpful.

There is also no evidence that the PF made determined, sustained efforts to avoid the risk of stalling during or after a climb of 2500ft that seems to have resulted from his own sidestick inputs. We may never know, of course, what his ASI may have been indicating. But, on any jet transport, a rapid climb of 2500ft from near the optimum cruise altitude inevitably leads to a serious loss of airspeed, which can only be reversed by immediate descent towards the original altitude or lower. It's an energy thing, and flying jets is all about energy management. Perhaps the standardisation of V-NAV has lowered awareness of that in some parts of the profession. Here's one old fart who very much hopes not.

Hi,

For "hand flying" (really hand flying) I suppose you think that the plane is in direct law state ?
Otherwise .. if in any other laws .. this is not truly hand flying .. but instead hand flying assisted (the automation still plays a role)
And even in direct law .. the automation stay spying in the shadow :)

Hi,

All is there (Criticism and experience) very easy to read and understand about the famous Pitot probes

Airbus. December 1995 TFU 34.13.00.005: « STRONG CUMULO-NIMBUS (Cb) CONTAINING A HIGH DENSITY OF ICE CRYSTALS CAN BEEN ENCOUNTERED, PARTICULARLY IN THE INTERTROPICAL CONVERGENCE ZONE (ITCZ). IN SUCH AN ICY AND TURBULENT ATMOSPHERE, THE A/C AIR DATA PARAMETERS (PRESSURE DEPENDANT) MAY BE SEVERELY DEGRADED, EVEN THOUGH THE PROBE HEATERS WORK PROPERLY. IT HAS APPEARED THAT THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT COULD EXCEED THE WEATHER SPECIFICATIONS FOR WHICH THE PITOT PROBES ARE CURRENTLY CERTIFIED. »

January 1999. Report BFU accident 5X002-0/98 : « The specification for the pitot tubes should be changed so as to allow unrestricted flight operations in heavy rain and under severe icing conditions. The installation of the improved pitot tubes already designed should subsequently be prescribed for all types concerned by the SIL no. 34-0147 (A 320, A 321, A 330, A 340). »

And .... ? .... AF447 :(

Chris;

For Mr. Optimistic, I can offer my own experience at hand-flying the A320, A333, A343 & A345 up to, at, and down from cruise altitude is that they are easy and "normal" to fly. In Normal Law the aircraft is not unstable. I suspect that it is the same in Alternate and Direct Laws but with degraded "damping", one must be very gentle with the aircraft. It's hard work as one is making small corrections all the time, but it is not difficult to fly in the sense that it is unstable. I've only flown Alternate and Direct Laws at cruise altitude in the sim.

The fact that autopilots and now FBW are installed doesn't mean the aircraft are manually unflyable at cruise altitude, but as we move further away from actually flying the machine, we also lose touch with our environment, which is extremely thin air with consequently much lower damping properties.

So one has to be smooth and gentle with the controls and never make large control inputs or stick movements. It doesn't require unusually good hands but it does require practised hands.

As Chris Scott has observed elsewhere, PIO can be a reality in any aircraft being flown at cruise altitudes but without its own damping abilities. One simply never took the yaw damper off the DC9 or DC8 for example.

I hope this helps.

Redundancy, Fault Tolerance and Graceful Degradation
 

LomapaseoChris Scott PJ2, mm43, Allowing the crew to "monitor" small "crisis", raises the alert level and allows learning from subtle events that are routine (masked by System processing in many cases).

IMHO the crew, specially PF must be capable to immediately understand what´s going on. Obviously to a certain extent. Simultaneous "failure" of critical elements should be reported immediately. The masking (a normal characteristic of a System) of certain faults is not the best approach and can led to delays in implementing proper, precise and in extreme cases, decisive actions.

I recall a post in the previous thread from someone who had hand-flown one of the above AB models in alternate law, and who reported the actual a/c was significantly more sensitive than the simulator.

The issue should not be 'how difficult is it to fly by hand?' but can the pilots do it? Essentially, in a fbw system, failures of the sort 447 experienced constitute a major emergency. JC makes a very valid point in #624 - is 'flying by hand' actually what happens or is there still something 'interfering' and thinking it knows better? If the a/c, at whatever c of g has been chose for economy, is not safely controllable by the 'average competent' pilot, then either it should not be certified and/or the pilots need to be changed.

As I have said before, all that needs to be achieved by a crew in the 447 situation would be
1) stabilise the a/c at 'onset' level
2) Achieve a safe descent (or climb - if that is what is needed)
3) Make a successful diversion/return

If these are not achievable, then things need to change. Forget AB v Boeing (but do remember which thread we are in. Like it or not, it was an AB that crashed).

It´s the old basic airmanship when running into non standard situations:

1. Maintain aircraft control
2. Analyze the situation
3. Take proper action

Now let me look in some detail at those points and let me ask some questions to those three points for discussion.

1. Maintain aircraft control
Must this point change to "take aircraft control"? Isn´t it HAL controlling the aircraft and the Crew only monitoring / observing? Is all the information available to gain or maintain control? Is the presentation of information for a high level of situational awareness optimized for a fully operational aircraft and does it also show the degradation of systems with emphasis to the overall aim "maintain aircraft control"? Is the present training for emergency situations focused on "worst case situation" (where you have to handfly in degraded modes while dealing with other non normal problems) or is it mostly relying on HAL doing the flying while dealing with problems? To maintain aircraft control the crew must fully understand the present state, the aircraft is in (FBW mode, systems availability, aerodynamic capability, energy state, degraded systems, .....). Is all this information not only available, but also present in the sense of "does the crew know"?

2. Analyze the situation
If not finished with Nr. 1, this point will start with a limbing leg even with perfect CRM. If the crew is not aware of the state of the aircraft like described in point one when forced to take and maintain control, the "analyze" will be a parallel and interfering action to point 1.
Is the information presented in a way, that the crew can distinguish between priority items like "A" (immidiate action needed) "B" (attention and later action needed), "C" (Nice to know, do it later)? Is the information presented consistent enough till it is no problem any more or is it volatile due to other following problems, or self solutions by the system (What is it doing now?)?

Let me tell an example from my flying live.
We had no ECAM, but a panel with warning lights (red, yellow and green for above mentioned A,B,C items). The panel was structured according some vital systems (engine, flight controls, fuel, environmental, nav, gear and brakes) and the lights where labeled accordingly. Once a red or yellow light was triggered, it triggered a master caution light. One view to the light panel gave you information what system was affected (location on the panel), wether it was Item A or B, and the specic failure of the system. Additional following or parallel system malfunctions triggered aditional lights and would trigger Master caution again (once on, it was resetted to off by a punch on the light), but the former indicated failures kept to be present. It was a one view information system, in my view simple and effective with no need to scroll through pages of letters, sentences and numbers.

3. Take proper action
If point 1 and point 2 from above are successfully accomplished, that should pose no real problem to an aircrew.

Just my view

Absolutely. And the evidence released by the BEA says the time between autopilot disconnect and recognition by the crew ("lost the speeds/alternate law") was 9 seconds.

9 seconds is pretty quick, hard to see how that can be improved. This suggests that specific interface between man/machine was working and the PNF was on the ball.

Indeed. One suspects 'probable cause' will be related to the capabilities of the PF. Contributing factors are not yet known but may include other man/machine interfaces. However even if the PNF had realised in 3 seconds (or 23 seconds even) that there were invalid speeds/alternate law it is hard to see from the evidence so far how that would have changed the end result.

( In fact it might be the case that if the aircraft had simply kept quiet, maintained pitch/power/heading, and waited for the (presumed) ice to melt the aircraft would have made it to CDG with maintanance waiting to see what the earlier messages were all about. Perhaps one day UAS will be managed this way)

Here is an interesting presentation (from Airbus) regarding updated Stall Recovery Procedures presented at the 17th Performance Operations Conference in May 2011 in DXB. The content is based on the findings of the FAA Stall Recovery Working Group...and it seems the industry has realized that something has to be done about the issue...

Quote from BOAC:
JC makes a very valid point in #624 - is 'flying by hand' actually what happens or is there still something 'interfering' and thinking it knows better?

That is why Dozy Wanabee and I are suggesting that, in the UAS case, the reversion should be all the way to Pitch-Direct, requiring the PF to do the pitch-trimming. This stick-to-elevator mode does impose limits on full-travel, according to the aircraft CG (comparable to the rudder-travel limiter, which limits as a function of airspeed). Other than that, there is no interference from the FBW computers.

Early A320s are, in certain failure modes, unable to maintain Pitch-Alternate Law once the gear is extended (due to potential stall of the emergency RAT from turbulent airflow behind the nose leg). The crew knows that they will have to fly the last part of the approach in Pitch-Direct. The handling characteristics do change, and forewarned is forearmed. So, returning to the UAS case, I'm also suggesting a slight pause in Pitch-Alternate, but am all ears for the counter-arguments.

Thanks to all.

Remarkable, Engines have only 2 channels for control, 2 sensors for each parameter; B777 has only 2 AOA vanes fitted.

What happened with redundancy here? even more 'ridiculous' design or clever engineering?