Are you shure that it does not say "ANY FIRE"

To put it in another way, would you continue take-off with a cargo or other fire.

Bart

What if it was just a faulty microswitch that you aborted for, went off the runway for and the aircraft broke appart catching fire and killing 50 people.

Last time I checked the door opened toward the front of the aircraft. I'm pretty shure the 80+ knots of wind will keep it from opening enough for a passenger that is strapped to it's seat to fall out of.

- well, we had 737-200's at LGW in BA that would reliably give you a config warning just before V1/R - faulty reed switches.

Now, what did we brief we would stop for......................................?

A reed switch? Is that what the Queen's English calls a microswitch? :ok:

My QRH says if you hear that intermittent tone, you assure appropriate takeoff configuration. I've always assumed that you'd do that on the roll if you were over 80 knots. If you needed to go from F0 to F25, you might be in a tight spot.

You would most likely be unable to open the door during the take-off roll. It is a plug type door, which means it has to move in before it can move out. The aircraft is slightly pressurised during the take-off roll, so the chances someone could get it to move in against the pressurisation is slim, if not impossible.

In my experience, a warning light after pressurisation usually means that the handle has moved slightly up - either by vibration or someone playing with it.

- no. Try Google? - if you refer to the 737 I suggest you need to read the whole of the descriptive - and tell us what it says about the warning at 120kts?

No guidance here in the QRH. I don't have may FCTM here, maybe there's something there.

I am struggling also BOAC, 120kts warning??

Obviously a 'different' 737 QRH
VH - it is simple actually - old and dodgy reed switches on the LEDs. Air loads and vibration give 'unlocked' = Config warning @120kts. Had it several times.

So at about 120kts on the roll, the LEDs get pushed into a position where the reed switches sense movement or incorrect config. Interesting. Thanks for the reed switch pointer, too.

Is this a model-specific issue?

Yes - 'was' - "well, we had 737-200's at LGW"

It'd be nice to have a detailed list of the causes of 737 RTOs. I'm sure there's a list somewhere.

Anyone know if there's one available to us lowly pilots?

Engine overheat??? producing thrust??? no fire indication??? keep going sort it out in the while away from the ground.

Here is one. Not me though. B737-200. While taxiing for departure crew see intermittent flashing of wing body overheat light on one side. It goes out after a while. Capt lines up and briefs F/O if the WBO light comes on before 80 knots he will stop the aircraft. Runway length very limited with no over-run area - just a cliff into the sea.

Aircraft scarps down the runway and 10 knots below V1 master caution and wing body overheat occurs. Captain aborts but forgets speed brake for a few seconds and aircraft stops literally 10 metres from edge of cliff.

After taxi back and shut down, startled F/O (total 500 hours on his log book) asks captain why he aborted when he had briefed he would keep going if problem after 80 knots.

Captain was perfectly truthful and said it was an instant reaction when the Master caution light came on and he could not explain why he made the decision to stop.

It was an interesting and thought provoking statement. The shock of seeing a master caution light coming on at high speed has caused many pilots to abort the take off run when there was no need to. A lightning fast reaction may seem all very professional but could also lead to more problems than it solves. That is why there is wisdom in the manufacturer's recommended standard procedures which are often based on world wide experience gleaned from accidents.

regarding the go no go decion during t/o we have a "guideline", but in my opinion there are many factors to be considered (even if rwy tables guarantee...):
-speed
-aircraft weight
-rwy length and conditions
-wind
-crew operational fatigue(time reaction)
-etc.

anyway statistics indicates that after an rto, an overrun may occurs