Just a note from a mature Yank pilot. When I was first getting interested in commercial aviation around the middle Sixties, Flying magazine (US) had ads from most US carriers featuring the Concorde as the future of aviation. Best of all these were ads to hire pilots, along the lines of "this is your future as an airline pilot-supersonic flight. One offered, "we'll pay you over one million dollars over your career to fly for us." The carriers were TWA, Pan Am, American. The 747 was supposed to a passenger plane as an interim to supersonic flight, it would be a cargo plane. If can find an old magazine and figure out posting it here, I'll do so.

The other great Concorde fact was the variety of simple "rules of thumb" to deal with deceleration and descent over the alert areas off of NYC. CJ or M2, any comments?

With reference to the noise level in the Cockpit with the nose and visor up.


How do you think this compared with say a 747 or 777 at Mach 2 and normal cruise climb levels (500-600) ?


Thanks for the truly fascinating information.

Stilton
 

I think you'll have to speak to the Chinese...They have experience of the 747 at supersonic speeds:ok:

Biggles78
Sorry Biggles78, I'd forgotten to answer your CofG query, so here we go: CofG was a really critical parameter on Concorde, being a delta, with no tailplane made it more so at take off speeds, and as we've previously said, was how we trimmed the aircraft for supersonic flight. CG was expressed as a percentage of the aerodynamic chord line. To get indication of CG you needed to know the mass of fuel in each tank; easy, from the FQI system. You needed to know the moment arm of each tank, (fixed of course). You then needed the zero fuel weight (ZFW) and zero fuel CG (ZFCG); these were manually input into the CG computers by the F/E, from load control data. The final parameter you needed was total fuel weight, again easy from the FQI system.
The 'normal' T/O CG was 53.5%, but in order to increase fuel weight (and hence range) an extra 'bump' was enabled to allow a max T/O CG of 54%. (CG was indicated on a linear gauge, with forward and aft limit 'bugs' either side of the needle. These bugs would move as a function of Mach and at the lower end of the speed range, A/C weight also). As the A/C accelerated, the limit bugs would move rearwards (with of course the rearward shifting centre of pressure) and so the fuel would be moved from the two front trim tanks 9 & 10 to the rear tank. 11. Once tank 11 reached it's preset limit (around 10 tonnes), the remainder of the 'front' fuel would automatically over-spill into tanks 5 & 7. (Once the fuel panel was set up, the whole process was controlled with a single switch). At Mach 2, the CG would be around 59%, the whole rearwards shift being in the order of 6'. As we said before, the 'final' CG could be tweaked to give us a 1/2 degree down elevon, for minimum drag.
I really hope this helps Biggles78.:)

Guys, back to the Airbus thing; My friend ChristiaanJ gave some really accurate insights, (he always does) but there is another legacy that carries on the this day; some of the audio warning tones were COPIED from Concorde into Airbus. (For example, the A/P disconnect audio is identical). I think this is great, and gives 'our' aircraft a lasting everyday legacy.

As far as the fly by wire goes, Concorde had a relatively simple analog system, with little or no envelope protection (Except at extreme angles if attack). As has been previously poted before, production series test aircraft 201, F-WTSB, pioneered the use of a sidestick within a new digital fly by wire Controlled Conviguration Vehicle sytem, with envelope protection and attitude rate feedback. (This evolved into the superb system known and loved by the Airbus community). It is a really bizaar twist of fate that the Concorde FBW system has more mechanical similarities to the system used in the B777 than Airbus. (Mechanically similar at the front end, with an electric backdrive system moving the column in A/P mode; Concorde being backdriven by a hydraulic relay jack).
As a final piece of irony; the Primary Flight Control Computers on the B777 are designed and built by GEC Marconi Avionics in Rochester Kent, now BAe Systems. This is the same plant where Elliot (becoming Marconi and finally GEC Marconi Avionics) developed and built the UK half of the AFCS computers. Isn't this aviation world strange? :8
Galaxy Flyer
Your inputs here are great, and I'm sure appreciated by all. (I assume from your name that you were a C5A pilot. While I was in the RAF on C-130's, our Lockheed rep' used to supply us all with company magazines, that were full of stuff on this new (it was then) giant of the sky. I fell in love with it there and then).
Anyway, back to Conc': The decel' positions were carefully worked out and adhered to; the aim was to be subsonic to within (I think) 50 nm of the east coast. I'll wait for one of my Concorde pilot friends to confirm that here, but i think I'm correct. I do have a fond memory of one flight out of JFK; we were temporarily 'held' by Boston ATC to Mach 1.6 (and at around FL440) because of an Air France Concorde heading for JFK. We saw this guy above us, at around FL580 on a near reciprical , doing Mach 2, screaming straight over the top of us. We were excited by this amazing spectacle, and so were the AF crew over the VHF ('you never boomed us, did we boom you?'). But the most excited person of all was this guy in Boston ATC. ('I've never seen anything like it guys, your two blips whistled over each other on my my screen like crazy').
Stliton
As far as the F/D noise levels were concerned, once the nose and visor were raised, it was as if someone had switched off the noise :). The main source of noise up there was just the equipment cooling, and that was not bad either. It was, in my view, little noisier up than most subsonics. (But not the 744, where you are so far away from all the racket :p).
Ozgrade3
You're making us blush here; thanks for your comments, I think we are just trying to share some of our experiences (and 'bit's we've picked up over the years).
From my perspective, I did write some stuff used by our pilots, AF even got a copy or two I think.

Facinating posts. On the more human side of the story were the flight crew positions on the Concorde awarded by virtue of seniority or was there a different selction process for these positions? Also was there a freeze in that seat once checked for some period of time?

Thanks!:ok:

Ozgrade3,
I would say those books already have been written... from the autobiographies of Turcat and Trubshaw, through the books by people like Brian Calvert, Christopher Orlebar and others, to the Haynes "Concorde Owners' Workshop Manual" (!), that's come out recently.

I've written some bits and pieces, but it's more for my offspring, to explain what all that Concorde junk and documentation in the shed is all about, so they don't all thrash it when I'm gone... I don't think my story would interest a larger public.

As M2dude says, we just like to share some of our experiences with those who are interested.

First, I must apologise to Stilton for hi-jacking his thread. I had inadvertantly asked a question in the wrong thread and have only just realised it, so sorry Stilton. The good part of this is all this delicious Concorde info that were are privileged to be receiving from M2dude and ChristiaanJ is all in the one thread. Unless anyone has any objections maybe the Forum Moderator could merged the other 2 threads into this one.

Thank you for the CoG answer. 6 feet sounds like an awful lot but then I am only able to compare it to the littlies that I fly. The ability to use the trim tanks to only have to use a ½° of elevon must have made a substantial impact on performance and the resulting reduced fuel consumption. To think it was all computer controlled at the time when the PC didn't even exist.

M2, you have said that the fuel system was a work of elegance and the above desciption give me a small insight into this. I know that I am just going to have to find books written about this lady to find out more. I have been lazy when asking about item that I could Google but there was a method behind my laziness. When you and Christiaan share your knowledge there is always a personal anecdote or insight that will never be found in any books that I may be able to find. Gentlemen, for this THANKS seem so insufficient. :D :D

The TOC=TOD had me thinking and I believe insomnia may have assisted with some understanding (otherwise the stupid sign for me comes out again :uhoh: ). Gee I hope I have this even partly right. I assume that when accelerating to Mach 2, that it was done while climbing. I was initially stuck with the compression factor of Mach 1 and without thinking the same would happen at Mach 2 (A C Kermode was the hardest book I have read that I didn't understand :confused: ). Therefore with that in mind I was stuck trying to figure TOC=TOD. Am I right or even slightly so in thinking that cruise climb and cruise descent was the flight and there was minimal actual level cruise in the "pond" crossing?

I had also forgotten to take into account the speed factor, DUH!! Subsonic climbs, what 35 - 45 mins to FL4xx and then it is in level cruise for the next 6 hours before TOD. The lady took what, about 3.5 hours, and the extra 20,000 feet it had to climb and descend ate up or into any level cruise it had (or didn't have). Am I on the right track or am I making an ass out of me and me. :)

I was in the jump seat of a B767 on a trans Tasman crossing, CAVOK, when about 2,000 feet lower a dot followed by a straight white cloud approached and passed by. I found that impressive so the 2 supersonics passing at the speed of an SR71 must have been spectacular. Shame radar track isn't available on You Tube. Oh yes, did they boom you?

As you have said, fuel flow was reduced the higher you got. I think it was 5T per powerplant at FL500 down to 4.1T at FL600. Was there any figures for higher the Levels? I am curious to see how much less fuel would have been used at the higher FLs considering it was reduced by 900Kg/hr for just 10K feet. Very interesting what you said about when the temps were ISA+. I would never have thought such a small temperature change could have effected such a signifigant performance result. It also sounds odd, as you said, the faster you go the less fuel you use.

Last greedy question for this post. How much of the descent was carried out while supersonic and how did this affect the fuel flow?

You have a growing audience. This is turning into an extremely interesting thread. :ok:

What I omitted to say about the Concorde FBW was that autostabilisation commands were superimposed onto the manual/autopilot demands directly at powered flying control unit (PFCU) level, on all 3 axis. . This made the aircraft superbly stable and precise to handle at almost any speed or condition. Apologies for IPhone again ;)

I beg to differ Christiaan. I am certain your Concorde participation story would be of great interest to the aviation community. The project was a considerable undertaking and is made even moreso when you consider that almost 50 years after its' inception there has never been another aeroplane that has come within a mile (1,852mts) of having the performance of her; military included.

I would hate for all the little tit bits of this important part of aviation history be lost.

There is a thread in the Military Forum called Gaining An R.A.F Pilots Brevet In WWII where we are privileged to share some the personal stories of the heroes involved in that war. It is critical for our future generations that these stories are known and the participants, their stories and contributions are not forgotten. While Concorde was not part of any military conflict it is still important that the personal side of this massive engineering feat is not lost.

The technical information that you and M2dude are providing is absolutely absorbing but equally so are the personal contributions. An example is the mention above of the Air France and British Airways Concordes passing each other. Anecdotes like that are unlikely to be in the Concorde history books and I am sure there are thousands of other pieces of information like that from both the ground and air that will eventually be lost for all time unless we can get it written down somewhere. Where better than here.

i think it was mentioned before....however, I will add my own comment. One of my greatest regrets in life, was not being able to fly on Concorde. I grew up during a time when my father took me out to Cleveland Hopkins airport to see one of the very first United 747's. This was the epitome of U.S. aviation, and at the same time that Concorde was routinely flying across the Atlantic at Mach 2!

What an incredibly beautiful aircraft it was....and how sad I am that she is now gone. :{

Please continue posting your personal information about this incredible aircraft! :ok:

Well said Biggles 78. It's not just the technical know how of CJ and M2dude that is so impressive; it's also the clear way that they explain everything.
If an engine had a fire or an explosive failure; it would seem on the face of it that the adjacent engine could easily be affected. As everything on Concorde has a sound technical reason. I have been wondering what that reason or reasons was? and also if there was any inbuilt dividing protection between engines on the same wing?
Not being an expert on jet engines (or any aviation matter), I was wondering am I right to assume that as air pressure decreases with altitude then the amount of thrust needed to maintain M2 would also decrease? This would explain the reduced fuel consumption at higher altitudes.
Would I also be right to assume that the max power delivered by the engines would reduce at altitude, thus even if the engines were run at near to available max power at high altitude it would be no way near the max power at lower levels? The reason I ask this is that I started to think that if the engines were being run at near to max output then the life of the engines would be compromised. Yet if what I have said above is true this would not be the case?
My other query concerns the FE. I understand that he set take off power etc and I can understand that it would be difficult for the pilots to do this at a time of heavy workload. I also understand that he also checked the pilots inputs into the INS system. So was he/she also a qualified pilot?
Once again many thanks

Ozegrade3, Biggles78 and all,
I agree, the more of the history that we can write down somewhere, the better....
Just look at the "Did You Fly the Vulcan?" thread here on PPRuNe....

A chance remark by M2dude reminded me of something I meant to write about sometimes... and that has barely been mentioned in the various Concorde stories.
It's the huge gap between the prototypes on the one hand, and the pre-production and production aircraft on the other hand.

It's not just the visor, or the shorter tail.

In my own "field", the AFCS (autopilot, etc.), there was not a lot of similarity between the prototypes and their successors.
The prototypes were "proof-of-concept", designed in the early to mid 1960s.
The pre-production aircraft were designed in the end of the '60s and already close to the production aircraft in most respects.

Some of this difference was due to the very sudden and rapid evolution in electronic technology, with the arrival of the integrated circuit in particular.
The microprocessor - in a way just a large integrated circuit - didn't arrive in time... I don't think there was a single microprocessor on board Concorde until the days that they had to fit TCAS (in the '90s, IIRC).

I'll have to see how to do it.... maybe write it off-line and post snippets on here, then move it into a blog or suchlike?

M2dude,
Re your story about the Boston ATC comments about the "crossover".
"That reminds me...."

Ancient tale.

There's this SR-71 Blackbird stooging around Cuba on a top-secret mission, at FL500+ and Mach 2+.... when they get a call requesting them to change heading "because of traffic at your altitude".
Traffic at THEIR altitude ??
Anyway, they comply, and shortly, yes, there's an Air France Concorde out of Caracas (Air France flew there in the early days) slowly sailing across their flight path.

Just imagine... two guys in bonedomes and full pressure suits, in a cramped cockpit, watching something like a hundred people in shirt sleeves or summer dresses, sipping their champagne and maybe just starting on their smoked salmon hors d'oeuvres, flying at their altitude and nearly their speed....

Biggles78,

Re your questions about the CofG, this diagram should help you to visualise the CofG "corridor".

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v3...CGcorridor.gif

It's the one for G-AXDN (01) but the production one is closely similar.

To make some more sense of this.... all those percentages quoted are in terms of the "wing root reference chord".
Mentally cut the wing off the fuselage and measure the length of the cut (including the elevons)..
That's the "root reference chord", and it's 27,76 m.
To give you another reference point: the main gear attachment point is located at 57% ""root reference chord".
So any CofG beyond 57% on the ground, and you have yourself a tailsitter (it's happened)..

Biggles78
You are right on the button. Under NORMAL circumstances, Concorde never flew supersonically in level flight. You would always follow the Vmo bug on the ASI during the supersonic climb. (The ASI pointer actually nudged into the bug; it was a beautiful design). Initially this would be at a constant Vc of 400 kts, the 400 KT segment then went off towards 530 KTS as you climbed. You then 'stuck' to 530 knots until a fraction over 50,000', when 530 KTS became Mach 2. You would then continue the climb at between Mach 2 and around Mach 2.02, depending on the temperature of the day. (the colder the temperature, the faster you tended to fly). There was an extremely complex AFCS mode for the supersonic climb, that I promise to cover in anaother post.
So yes, on the whole, TOC did equal TOD.
The 'subsonic climb' wasn't quite as you thought; you'd normally subsonic climb to FL280, staying there (at Mach 0.95) until the acceleration point. Mach 0.95 was 'subsonic cruise'. But you were on the right track. :)
Oh, and NOPE, they never boomed us either :O
Nick Thomas
Keeping the powerplants as separate as possible was a major design headache, but generally they were just that; there was a titanium centre wall between the two engines and a really substantial heatshield above the engine also, to protect the wing above. To give you an idea how all this worked in practice, in 1980 G-BOAF, flying at Mach 2 between JFK and LHR had a major failure of one of the engines, caused by a defective material ingot used in the forging of one of the 1st stage LP compressor blades; which was subsequently shed. (The analysis done by Rolls Royce ensured that no such incident ever happened again in the life of Concorde). The resulting mayhem terminated in a large amount of engine debris flying around, and a titanium fire burning in the engine bay also. The aircraft however decelerated and landed at Shannon safely. On inspection, although there was extensive damage found in the engine bay, the adjacent engine was completely unmarked, protected by the titanium centre wall, and more importantly, when the heat shield werer removed, the wing was found to be completely undamaged!
The only problem you ever had with the dual nacelle arrangement was if you had an engine surge above Mach 1.6 (These were relatively rare, but could happen with an engine or intake control system malfuntion). If one engine surged, the other would surge in sympathy, because of the shock system being expelled from one intake severely distorting the airflow into it's neighbour. These surges were loud, quite scary (to the crew that is, most passengers never noticed much), but in themselves did no damage at all. Delicate movement of the throttles (employed during the subsequent surge drill) would invariably restore peace and harmony again to all. (The intake on Concorde was self-starting, so no manual movement of the intake variable surfaces should be needed in this event). After this was over, normal flying was resumed again As I said before, these events were relatively rare, but when they did occur, they would be dealt with smartly and professionally; the engine and intake structure being undamaged. (Post surge inspetion checks were always carried out on the ground after an event, on both engine and intake, but nothing much was EVER found).
The reduction of fuel flow as you climbed was quite interesting. Although the throttles would be 'at the wall' (dry power remember), the electronic control system was constantly winding fuel off as a function of Static Air Temperature, as well as falling Total Pressure. The system was always 'tweaking' as you climbed, and you only used as much fuel as you really needed to stay at Mach 2. There were various ratings that would also be manually selected at various phases of flight; each rating change 'detuned' the engine slightly, so yes, you did not run the engine when flying fast at anywhere near the levels you did at lower speeds/altitudes. The engine final ratings were changed from 'Climb' to 'Cruise' manually at FL 500, just as you hit Mach 2).

ChristiaanJ
For once my friend you're not quite correct. The Plessey PVS1580 Aircraft Integrated Data System, fitted to all BA aircraft from mid' 1977 used a microprocessor in the data entry panel. In the mid-80's, a fault interrrogation module was fitted to the Engine Control Units; this used a 4 bit Intel 4004. Otherwise (as usual :p) we agree.
I've some production series CG diagrams, that I will post here when I can find out how to do it......:ugh:

All Posters
I'm really touched by your comments (as is I'm sure ChristiaanJ), thank you. It's amazing that so many aviation people are still fascinated by this wonderful aircraft.
I'll happily continue to share some more anecdotes if I can, and try and answer any queries that you may have, either here or through PM.
Thank you all for your kind comments.

M2Dude

Yes, 4,000 hours in Lockheed's contribution to wide-body cargo planes. The marvel in all of these planes from the '60s that they were designed by men who began their engineering careers during WW II, used slide rules and tested nearly everything in the sky. I asked a Lockheed engineer (a Canadian from the Avro Arrow program which throw off a number of engineers to the US) how many guys did the actual design work--his answer was something like 300. With GE engines, the Galaxy is finally reaching its potential. A proper plane--it has a Flight Engineer.

My one contact with the Concorde was when I flew a US corporate jet in the mid-80s for a British-American company (industrial gases, you can guess the rest) whose MD was an American who worked in London. During the summer, like clockwork, he worked in London on the Friday mornings, take the mid-day Concorde to JFK. Customs would meet him AT THE GATE, clear him and turn him over to us for the short flight to Martha's Vineyard. His wife could recognize the plane, meet us at the airport at noon for lunch. On Monday, the return trip would unfurl in reverse. NOT one bit of that story can happen today, I cannot imagine US Border officials doing such a thing.

I did hear that a Concorde did once need a engine change in Dulles.

One more question, could the Concorde lose pressurization, descend to some low level (FL180 or below, perhaps FL100) and make it to scheduled destination or would a divert to Shannon or Gander be required? What was a low level cruise speed?

I was recently at Duxford and did tour the Concorde there, amazing how small the cabin was--DC-9-like.

Nick Thomas

... My other query concerns the FE. I understand that he set take off power etc...

Actually the F/E didn’t set T/O power, but did set most of the other power settings.

Broadly speaking, taxy-out to gear up, and gear down to engine shut down, the handling pilot operated the throttles. At other times, it was (almost) always the F/E.

Bear in mind that several of the routine engine power changes were effected through controls other than the throttles. For instance, selection of the re-heats, engine control schedules, engine ratings and intake lanes were all switch selections.


... I also understand that he also checked the pilots inputs into the INS system...

Correct, using INS3.


...So was he/she also a qualified pilot?..

No, they were professional flight engineers, who held a Flight Engineers Licence; they were not pilots biding their time before moving to the right hand seat.

I believe one or two may have held a PPL, but that was purely incidental, not a requirement.

All of the Concorde FEs had spent years on the VC10, B707, DC10, L10-11 or B747 fleets before coming to Concorde.


Biggles78

...Am I right or even slightly so in thinking that cruise climb and cruise descent was the flight...

Cruise climb, yes. Cruise descent, no.


...and there was minimal actual level cruise in the "pond" crossing?..

Correct, any level flight in the “cruise”, was just coincidence, probably caused by the outside air temperature increasing very gradually. Typically, she drifted up at around 30 to 50 fpm, but, if encountering warmer air, she would start to drift back down, in order to maintain M2.0.


... As you have said, fuel flow was reduced the higher you got. I think it was 5T per powerplant at FL500 down to 4.1T at FL600...

Rather optimistic figures for FL500 I’d have said! 6,000kg/hr/engine would have been nearer the mark!


...I am curious to see how much less fuel would have been used at the higher FLs considering it was reduced by 900Kg/hr for just 10K feet...

The reason the fuel flows dropped so much at the higher altitudes was that the aircraft had to be a lot lighter before she would get up there. It was her lighter weight that was the primary reason for the reduced fuel flows, not the higher altitude.

Forgive me if I’ve misunderstood you, but in her cruise climb, Concorde was flown at her optimum speed (M2.00) with (constant) optimum power set (max cruise power) and so (assuming a constant OAT above the tropopause) the only thing which affected her cruising altitude was her weight.

So, in theory at least, in cruise climb, she was always at her optimum altitude.

Any variation from that optimum altitude, such as a premature climb to higher altitudes, would have cost fuel, not saved it.


... How much of the descent was carried out while supersonic...

At the decel point, the cruise climb ceased and she was flown level at constant altitude. The F/E partially throttled back the engines and she stayed in level flight until her speed reduced to 350kts IAS, typically M1.5.

This took about 50nm, and most of the passengers would have sworn that they were already descending.

She then descended at 350kts IAS, meaning the Mach number would reduce constantly. On a straight in approach to JFK, with no subsonic cruise section, she would become subsonic descending through (around) FL350.

For a straight in approach, in zero wind, on a standard day, from FL600 to touchdown, typical figures would be something like a track distance of around 200nm, flying time of 22 minutes and 3,500kg of fuel.

Into LHR, she had to be subsonic much further away from her destination, and then had a subsonic cruise section on airways, so a slightly different procedure was used, and approaching FL410 she was slowed still further, becoming subsonic around FL400.


Anonymous

In response to your PM, earlier posters were correct in what they posted, however the manual reversion they refer to is a reversion from electrical to mechanical signalling to the flying controls.

There was no way to operate the flying controls manually in the absence of hydraulic power.

Biggles78.


No apology needed, I can't think of anything I have read on this forum that can compare to the delight of this thread.

I feel like the fog is begining to clear and I am getting a slight understanding of how she flew. I was hung up with her flying at Mach speeds where as she was flown at an IAS (specific the the profile she was in). The Mach speed, especially when high, was a result of the temperature and not because she was f a s t ! The altitude flown was due to temperature and weight of the areoplane. This is true of all aeroplanes but due to the extreme environment this was more true of Concorde?

The subsonics have issues with Coffin Corner (I think I read that one Airbus model had somehting like 7kts between the high and low end of the envelope when up high); did Concorde have this "problem"?

I remember reading the BA Concorde flew with 2 Captain Pilots (and of course the most important Flight Engineer) and when I was watching The Rise and Fall of the Concorde, I was looking for the 4 bars in the RHS. Didn't see one but on the Air France Concorde the RHS pilot had 3 stripes. Was this correct or are my "little grey cells" confused?(sorry can't type a Belgium accent :{)

I don't know why this popped into my head but what was her glide ratio if all the engines stopped? Maybe because I remember from my early training being told the a B707 had a better glide ratio than the PA28-140 I was learning in. Now that was an eye opener at the time.

Keep the stories coming!
 

Just wanted to add my voice to those encouraging you to continue... this thread is great stuff! What a fascinating ship; makes my day job on the B744 look plain in comparison :}

I too would like to ask what her idle thrust glide ratio was? From Bellerophon's post: Sounds like a typical airliner 15:1 glide ratio? (but down from FL600 in 22 minutes :eek:?)

From Chariots to the Concorde, how far we have come. Words won't describe the feeling the pilots felt while flying her. This has to be in the top three threads on pprune. Thank you so much for making my day.

:pGalaxy Flyer
We never had a case of lost pressurisation, ever. The cabin windows had dual laminated panes; an inner pressure pane and an outer thermal pane. We had dual systems that kept the cabin at a max diff' of 10.7 PSI, the engine bleeds pushing about 200lb of air per minute into the cabin. This allowed you to fly the cabin at an altitude of around a 6000' maximum only, right up to TOD. If you HAD to fly subsonically, the ideal was Mach 0.95 at FL290. (Subsonically the aircraft had similar range to normal, but took well over twice as long of course). If however you had to shut down an engine, your range deteriorated quite dramatically, and a diversion was usually sought.

It's great that Bellerophon is posting here again; we need a steely eyed Concorde pilot's input here (not just the boffins/nutters and nerds [that's me :\]. To touch more on a couple of his valid points;
Fuel burn: The aircraft would naturally require less fuel as she became lighter and as a consequence gently climbed to maintain cruise Mach number, this is what the engine control system was doing all the time, even though the throttles were wide open it was 'tweaking'.. BUT, the decreasing IAS as you climbed, due of course to the reducing density, just like any other aircraft meant that drag was reducing too, so it was a combination of both of these factors, reducing weight and reducing drag.
Flying controls: It was a slightly weird but wonderful arrangement; pilots inputs would move a servo valve in the hydraulic relay jack, the jack would move in response and drive both a resolver AND mechanical linkages. The resolver ourput was sumed with the flying control position resolvers, and the error signal was fed into an autostab' computer, where it was summed with stabilisation demands (primarily axis rate and acceleration). The autostab computer would the directly drive the surface, and the reducing error signal would reduce the demand etc. While all this was going on, the mechanical linkages would slavishly follow, but as long as you were in FBW (what we used to call 'signalling') mode, these mechanical inputs were de-clutched at the PFCU, so did nothing at all. Only if there was an EXTREMELY unlikely failure of BOTH FBW channels would these inputs be clutched in and the flying control group (rudders, inner elevons or outer and mid' elevons) would then be in Mechanical signalling. The system redundancy was checked after engine start on every flight. But to reinforce what Bellerophon stated, there was no mechanical reversion here; without hydraulics you had nothing. Another aside here; the designers, being paranoid like all good designers (no offence Christiaan :O) were worried what would happen if the controls would somehow jam up. A jammed mechanical flying control input run itself would have no effect on FBW operation whatsoever, due to spring boxes being fitted to the runs. A 'Mech Jam' light would be set, together with a separate red light and audio warning, but this was all. But to completely protect against the aircraft was fitted with a Safety Flight Computer (SFC) system. The idea was, if a control axis (pitch or roll only) jammed up, the captain could press down on a switch light set between the two halves of his control wheel, (at the centre of the 'W') and the Emergency Flight Controls would activate. Strain gauges at the front of the control wheel, two sets on each control column for pitch and roll axis, would input into an SFC that would covert the control force into an elevon demand. These commands were then fed into the autostab' computers, and hence directly into the controls. (A little like L-1011 CWS in a way). There was a little test button that was used to test this system, again after engine start. So although the controls were jammed, the aircraft could still be flown. (Never used in anger I'm pleased to report).
But there was a problem; if this system was inadvertantly used, the results could have been catastrophic, as the system was extremely sensitive indeed, and full elevon movement could be enabled with only moderate effort. Because of this hairy prospect some safeguards were obviously put in place. The first safeguard was an interlock in the autostab' engage logic; If the switchlight had been inadvertently selected beforehand (the light was green by the way) you would not be able to engage pitch or roll autostab's (both channels too) so you would not be going flying until that was fixed. The second safeguard was a little more subtle; A plastic, frangible cover was fitted over the switchlight, unless the captain pressed reasonably hard the cover would prevent the switchlight from being pressed. At least that was the theory, in practice this little bit of plastic could be a pain in the ass :mad:. It was carefully fashioned, and I seem to remember BAe charging the airlines a few hundred pounds each for these things. If some wally fitted the cover upside down (and unless you were careful it was easy to do) THE THING WOULD NOT BREAK!! I remember at Fairford in 1976, G-BOAD was on pre-delivery flight testing, and the late great test pilot John Cochrane was doing a test of the system. The cover on this occasion HAD been fitted upside down, and of course he could not plunge his thumb through it and engage the EFC button. After trying everything, in the end he removed a shoe, took out his pen, and smashed the plastic cover until it broke. (It's OK, the autopilot was engaged at the time). Unfortunately, his combined shoe/pen emergency device also wrecked the switchlight as well, so the system still could not engage. (There was only a switchlight on the captain's side). After he landed and he confronted us all with his dilemma, he was shaking; not with rage but with laughter. (This was the great John Cochrane, sometimes the dour Scotsman but he was always able to see the lighter side). After that event, careful instructions were issued regarding the fit of the cover, and it was modified and made a little more frangible.

Biggles78


...The altitude flown was due to temperature and weight of the areoplane. This is true of all aeroplanes...

Sadly, it isn’t, as subsonic aircraft are allocated a specific cruising flight level and often - for example on the North Atlantic Track system - a specific cruising Mach number as well, and no deviation from that clearance is permitted without specific permission from ATC. Obviously everyone flight plans at the most economic heights and speeds for their aircraft type, but in busy airspace not everyone gets what they want!

Think of your flight plan as being Angelina Jolie, and your ATC clearance as being your wife. Your flight plan is what you’d really like to have, but your ATC clearance is what you’re going to have to live with!


... altitude flown was due to temperature and weight of the areoplane...this was more true of Concorde?...

Subsonic aircraft could equally benefit from using cruise-climb techniques (early long range aircraft crews knew all about cruise-climb techniques and used them when able) but with the large number of subsonic aircraft now using the world’s airways it is impractical for ATC to allow them to drift up and down at will, and so they are assigned specific cruising altitudes.

Few other aircraft got up to Concorde’s cruising levels, and so ATC were able to issue much more flexible clearances to her.

A typical Concorde ATC clearance would have allowed her to accelerate to M2.00 whilst operating within a "block" of altitude, rather than at a specific flight level. Typically this block clearance would have been to operate anywhere between FL450 up to FL600 without restriction.

So, unlike subsonic aircraft assigned a fixed cruising altitude such as FL350, Concorde could, and did, drift up or down, and was thus able to remain at the optimum altitude for the prevailing conditions throughout most of the flight.


... I remember reading the BA Concorde flew with 2 Captain Pilots (and of course the most important Flight Engineer)...

Concorde operated, as did all 3 crew aircraft in BA, with a standard crew of a Captain, F/O and F/E.

A small number of trips had two Captains on board (or two F/Es for that matter) when training or checking was going on, or an extra crew member was carried for PR purposes, but otherwise, the vast majority of occasions, just the standard crew was on board. Everyone preferred it that way, especially the F/O and F/E!


... The subsonics have issues with Coffin Corner (I think I read that one Airbus model had somehting like 7kts between the high and low end of the envelope when up high); did Concorde have this "problem"?...

Have a look at this picture of G-BOAE, cruising at her maximum certificated altitude of FL600, en-route to Barbados on 16 August 2003:


http://i303.photobucket.com/albums/n...P8160022-1.jpg


The available IAS speed range is shown on the ASI, and lies between the yellow and black Barbers Pole, currently indicating 440kts, and the white bug set to 300kts, the VLA (Lowest Authorised speed) at this altitude.

The available Mach speed range is shown on the Mach meter, and lies between the yellow and black Barbers Pole, currently indicating M2.05, and the yellow bug which indicates the lowest Mach number allowed for the current aircraft CG position (the AFT limit) currently showing M1.35.

So, given that at her maximum altitude she had a speed range of 140kts IAS and a Mach range of M0.7, we can see that coffin corner was not a problem!


main_dog


...I too would like to ask what her idle thrust glide ratio was...

By my calculations, the figures quoted for a straight in approach, give an average glide ratio of around 20:1, however these were for a standard decel/descent, and on Concorde the early part of the decel/descent was not flown at idle power.

A considerable amount of power was left on initially, around 94% N2, for various reasons, and only below M1.0 were the throttles usually selected to idle.

I hadn’t noticed it until now but there does not appear to have been a chart giving glide distance at idle thrust!

However, since the speeds to be flown during the “4 Eng Flame Out” procedure were not too far from the normal decel/descent speeds, I’ll hazard a guess (and that is all it is) that the glide distance from FL600, with no thrust, would have been about 150nm, giving a glide ratio of around 15:1.

You're right, M2dude, I should really have written that there were no µPs on board when she first went into service (1976), and that they only slowly filtered in afterwards.

Another example on the BA aircraft, of course, in full view of the pax, were the "Marilake" cabin displays that showed Mach, altitude, speed, etc. that replaced the earlier Mach-only displays, and where everybody just HAD to have their picture taken once at Mach 2. Each of the four displays (two up front, two at the back) had a micro-processor.

Not sure when those were first fitted.... it was during one of the cabin re-do's and livery changes.

Re the questions about depressurisation, this may be useful.

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v3...ompression.gif

It shows the emergency descent profile (solid line, 'Avion'), and the resulting effect on the cabin altitude (dotted lines) in the cases of one window ('hublot') blowing out with either three or four air conditioning packs ('groupes') operating.

As the graph shows, in the worst case the cabin altitude rises to about 40,000ft for about two minutes before starting to drop again, which is survivable when breathing oxygen.

It was studies like this, that lead to the small windows on Concorde. Keen spotters may actually notice that the windows on the prototypes are bigger than on all the other aircraft :8

The diagram is taken from "The Concorde Story" by Chris Orlebar, but the original was so pale that it was uncopyable, so I did redraw it, in answer to a question by a French friend (hence the legends in French).

Sorry Bellerophon, a badly worded question from me but you gave a really good analogy. Gonna remember that even though I don't like my Flight Plans have collagen filled lips. :E I will see if I can reword it to make it comprehensible. :ugh:

Thank you for the Instrument Panel image that I have now added to my collection. What is the Yellow Arc on the Mach metre that starts at about M1.12?
Do you remember if you had a signifigant headwind at that stage? I notice that the G/S is 1,139kts was this fairly standard for an East-West flight? (DUH me. Just read the fastest crossing was an east-west direction. Winds must have been quite favorable) I am now guessing the displayed G/S would be fairly typical, plus or minus a bit.
The Glide Ratio, even if it is a highly educated guess, is impressive. I would not have expected it to have been about the same as a B747. How many more times is this Lady going to surprise me with her performance.

Also notice the ball is slightly off to the left even though it is still inside the lines. Was this normal or does it need a tad more rudder trim? Can't imagine it is really out of balance.

Was that because of the tight fit on the flight deck or because we really don't like others in our workspace? :uhoh:

ChristiaanJ thanks for the CoG diagram. That I am still getting my head around. There is a large range at the bottom and top of the speed range but fairly narrow in the mid speed range. Seems like 165T was a less complex balancing act than it was at 105T.

The center rear fuselage gear unit, what was that for? I have seen it deployed on many occasions but I can't for the life of me remember if it was during T/O or LDG however it didn't seem to be extended every time the aeroplane flew. Was this used during loading so she didn't accidently "rotate" at the ramp or to avoid a tailstrike during LDG? I can't imagine an over rotate during T/O.

And a big Thank You to Bellerophon for sharing his knowledge with this thread.

Re Mach 2 ....

In the earliest days of the project, Concord(e) was described as a Mach 2.2 airliner.

Once the RR58 alloy arrived, and the first thermal fatigue tests were underway, Mach 2.2 appeared as somewhat optimistic, and to assure an acceptable airframe life, the Mmo (maximum operating Mach number) to be certified was brought down to Mach 2.04.

Interesting question just asked by somebody on another forum....
Why Mach 2.04 ? Why not Mach 2.10, or Mach 1.96 ?
With thermal fatigue still being a field that was only starting to be explored, was that a fully technical choice.... or was there a commercial aspect ?

Mach 1.96 would again have meant a few more hours life for the airframes, and would not really have made a significant difference in the flight duration.
But think of the huge difference between "more than twice the speed of sound" and "not quite as fast as twice the speed of sound".....
Mach 1.96 would simply not have "sold"......

I have no answer to the question who finally decided on '2.04', and I don't think many of the people that wrote the "TSS spec" are still with us, so we'll probably never know.


And along the very same lines, another snippet.....

In 1985, during a major cabin upgrade, BA installed the "Marilake" displays, that showed Mach, altitude, groundspeed, etc. in place of the simple Mach-only displays that Air France kept until the end.
Nice display, complete with microprocessors.... you must have seen photos.

Of course everybody wanted their photo taken next to the display saying "Mach 2".
So these display were subtly programmed to read "Mach 2.00" as soon as the Mach number was above 1.98, and they stayed there....even if the aircraft went to Mach 2.03 or beyond.
A tiny bit of cheating... but commercially it made a lot of sense, of course.

Like the earlier BA cabin displays, the Air France displays only showed the Mach number, and they were little more than "rescaled" digital voltmeters that directly displayed the 0-12V Mach signal from the Air Data Computer. They tended to flicker a bit from 2.00 to 2.01 to 2.02 and back, but at least they didn't "cheat". And I still proudly have a photo of myself with a "Concorde grin", at Mach 2.03 !

I have yet another couple of questions and I hope all you Concorde experts don't mind me taking up your valuable time.
As regards fuel burn: was there any difference between each indvidual airframe and if so was it significant enough to be considered when calculating the trip fuel? Also did different engines also have slightly different fuel consumption?
Whilst on the subject of engines, I just wondered how many were required to keep the BA Concorde fleet flying? What sort of useful life could be expected from the engines?

Fascinating thread!

I think (along with the other PAX that day) that I can claim to have been faster on Concorde than anyone else.

Despite many trips, I only flew on BOAB once (sad I know) and there was obviously a malfunction of some sort as the speed (on the Marilake display), instead of stopping in the normal range of 1260-1320 mph continued steadily climbing to 1990 mph.

This was the second "fault" as we had previously begun the flight from JFK with a low speed RTO due to one of the computers disagreeing with the other 2 on takeoff. Despite the slow speed we still had to wait 10 mins for the brakes to cool.

I have it all on Video! (The RTO and the Speed anomaly)

In my case, my time is no longer THAT valuable, being retired for several years !
And I enjoy answering those questions, if and whenever I can!
There WERE differences... after its misadventure at Dakar, F-BVFD definitely consumed more fuel, although IIRC he was already reputed as a gas guzzler even before that incident.
It was one reason why, when Air France withdrew an aircraft from service, Fox Delta was the first one to go.
Also, due to the gradual improvements in production methods, and minor redesign, the last British production Concorde, G-BOAF, was about a ton lighter than the first one (G-BOAC). While the differences weren't huge, they were noticeable.
Of course... but there I have no figures at all, and I doubt the differences, evened out over four engines, were really significant.
Interesting question, and I hope somebody will come in and answer it.
According to 'Wikipedia', 67 engines were built, which would mean, in theory, 64 engines for 16 aircraft and 3 spares....
In practice, of course, fewer aircraft flew at any one time, so the statistics are different, but even so, a lot of engine swapping went on over the years.
As to the MTBO, I don't know... it's not my field at all....

Nice one....
That would have been about Mach 3 !!!!!!
(Without taking head or tail wind into account.)

Christiaan J


What happened to the Concorde at Dakar ?

The story has never been fully elucidated....
But in brief, F-BVFD made an extremely hard landing at Dakar in November 1977, with a vertical speed in the order of 14 ft/sec (with 10 ft/sec being the formal limit).
The result was a major tailstrike, ruining the tail wheel and some of the tail structure.
The aircraft was repaired, repatriated, and put back into service, but it was the first one to be withdrawn from service when the Paris-Dakar-Rio route was closed.

In the end it was scrapped in 1994... only a section of the forward fuselage still remains in the stores of the Air and Space Museum at Le Bourget (Paris).

Biggles78
This is the minimum Mach number that can be flown with the existing CG. (which would be around 59%). Just as the CG indicator (not shown in this photo) gave minimum and maximum CG for a given Mach number, the Machmeter gave a reciprical indication also). You can also see that as the aircraft is not flying at Vmo any more, being at Mach 2 cruise, that the VSI pointer is now away from the orange and black Vmo bug. At our 'not so coffin corner', now that the aircraft is at maximun alllowable altitude, Vmo would naturaly coincide with Mmo; the orange and black Mmo bug being shown at Mach 2.04. This really superb photo taken by Bellerophon gives a graphic illustration of what the panels looked like at Mach 2. Note that the with the TCAS VSI Concorde retained it's original linear VSI also. (Miust have beeen the only aircraft flying with FOUR VSIs. (The originals had to be retained due to the fact that the autopilot Vert' Speed Mode error was derived from the indicator itself. As far as TCAS goes, R/As werer inhibited above FL300 (on acceleration this would coincide with the aircraft becoming supersonic, and the mfrs would not countenance the aircraft doing extreme manoeuvrs as a result of TCAS RAs at supersonic speeds).
The tail wheel was lowered for all 'normal' gear cycles (not stby lowering of free-fall). It was designed to protect the bottom the nacelles in the case of over-rotation, but in practical terms the thing was a waste of space (and weight) and a simple tail skid (used on the prototypes) would have sufficed. Any time that the tail wheel contacted the ground, it would ALWAYS collapse, damage the tailcone structure and in fact aforded no protection whatsoever. Fortunately these events were EXTREMELY few and far between. The biggest problem with the tail wheel was a major design flaw: On gear retraction the assembly would retract in sequence with the nose and main gear, and as it entered the opening in the tailcone, it would release over-centre locks that were holding the spring-loaded doors open. The doors would then firmly spring shut behind the gear assembly and finish the job. UNFORTUNATELY this was a very poor design; if for any reason one of the two doors had not gone over-centre on the previous gear lowering, it would be struck by the retracting tail wheel gear and cause structural damage to the local skin area, that would have to have a repair done. Unfortunately these events were not quite so rare, and several measures were tried to reduce the chance of this happening. Although not a safety issue, it was an issue that was a total pain. (As a matter of interest, G-BOAC had this happen on one of it's first test flights out of Fairford in 1975).
Nick Thomas
As ChristiaanJ said, the last two BA aircraft WERE lighter than the others, and would be preferred aircraft for certain charters. But that is not to say that any aircraft could not happily do ANY sector. We fortunately had no distorted airframes in the British fleet, so this was never an issue. There was very little spread, regarding fuel consumption between different engines; one of the best parts about the Olympus 593 was that it hade very little performance deterioration with time, it was an amazing piece of kit.
Time on wing for the engines was a real variable. Each engine was built up of modules, each one of these had a seperate life. In the early days of operation, time on wing was quite poor, and MANY engines would be removed on an attrition basis. One of the early failure problem was the fuel vapourisers inside the combustion chamber were failing, taking bits of turbine with it!! A Rolls Royce modification that completely changed the design of the vapouriser not only solved the problem completely, but also increased the performance of the engine. As the engine matured in service time on wing greatly improved, and in service failures became a thing of the past. A 'trend analysis' was done after each protracted supersonic flight, where engine parameters were input into a propiatry RR computer program, that was able to detect step changes in the figures, and if this were the case, more boroscope inspections were carried out. The OLY time on wing was nothing compared to the big fan engines, but the conditions that it operated under bore no comparison. Not really sure about absolute figures on this one Nick, I'll ask one of my Rolls Royce friends and see if I can find a figure.

One thing I have noticed on take-off is the way the throttles are handled. Application of take-off thrust is done by slamming the throttles forward rather than the traditional ease them up method used on most other aircraft.

Why.

nomorecatering

...I have noticed...Application of take-off thrust is done by slamming the throttles forward rather than the traditional ease them up method used on most other aircraft...Why...

It does seem rather brutal at first glance doesn't it, especially if you are used to handling piston engines with care!

Firstly however, unlike most jet aircraft, you never set reduced thrust for take-off but always set full power, which on Concorde meant that the throttles had to be fully forward, as far as they would go.

Secondly, you were not actually controlling the engines as directly as you might think. Various control units between the throttles and the engines would electronically regulate everything for you, especially spool-up rates, temperatures and thrust levels, even keeping #4 eng throttled back initially to 88% until reaching 60kts.

In effect, you were really just operating a switch telling the computers to set full take-off power.

And how slowly do you turn on a switch?

The reason that #4 engine was limited to 88% N1 on take-off was an interesting one, down to something known as 'foldover effect'. This was discovered during pre-entry into service trials in 1975, when quite moderate levels of first stage LP compressor vibrations were experienced at take-off, but on #4 engine only. Investigations revealed that the vibrations were as the result of vorticies swirling into #4 intake, in an anti-clockwise direction, coming off the R/H wing leading edge. As the engine rotated clockwise (viewed from the front) these vorticies struck the blades edgewise, in the opposite DOR, thus setting up these vibrations. The vorticies were as a result of this 'foldover effect', where the drooping leading edge of the wing slightly shielded the streamtube flowing into the engine intake. #1 engine experienced identical vorticies, but this time, due to coming off of the L/H wing were in a clockwise direction, the same as the engine, so were of little consequence. It was found that by about 60 KTS the vorticies had diminished to the extent that the N1 limit could be automatically removed. Just reducing N1 on it's own was not really enough however; some of this distorted airflow also entered the air intake through the aux' inlet door (A free floating inward opening door that was set into the spill door at the floor of the intake. It was only aerodynamically operated). The only way of reducing this part of the problem was to mechanically limit the opening angle of the aux' inlet door, which left the intake slightly choked at take off power. (The aux' inlet door was purely aerodynamically operated, and diff' pressure completely it by Mach 0.93).