DFDR parallel subset on demand streaming
 

In an interim report on the feasibility of implementing improved aircraft tracking services across the Atlantic and on demand data streaming, the European Oceanic Position Tracking Improvement & Monitoring (“OPTIMI”) program has cited AeroMechanical’s (“AMA”) technology as a readily available solution for the airline industry.

The full press release on advanced proposals for trials in the NAT and EUR regions of patented systems developed by AeroMechanical Services of Canada can be found here.

An ICAO document on the “OPTIMI” program is available in PDF format.

mm43

According to the report (june 2010) from CNRS, IFREMER, WHOI, METEO FRANCE, CLS, NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHY CENTRE et MERCATOR

On June 2 2009 at 8h16 a possible pollution spot was detected near 30°30.5’W 2°43.4N by the synthetic aperture radar (SAR) on board the COSMO SkyMed 1 satellite. Figure A7_1 below shows the cusp shaped spot detected, which does not have the characteristic elongated form of an oil spill coming from a ship. it is not impossible that this pollution spot may be the remnant of a kerosene release by the plane AF447

SPA83;

As mentioned by CONF iture a few posts back, this matter has been discussed commencing here.

mm43

I expect a whack to the head for this question, but here goes:

What motive does BEA, Air France, France, Brazil, and the Brazillian and French navies, have to expend X amount of funds (available through what funding stream?) to reopen the search for the sources of the answers to what happened? (I refer to FDR & CVR).

ICAO treaty and agreements, and altruism, considered here. The cost benefit of needle in haystack searching in the current political environment of how everyone's operating in the red must be compared to what else competes for the scarce dollar/franc/euro whatever.

Me, I'd love to see the search reopened, and I'd love to see the exotic sonar tech find that needle in Davy Jones' haystack. I want to know, even if it means that a few of the theories floating about are either affirmed, or something else is discovered.

A purely objective analysis of the odds of finding what they seek strikes me as dismal in the extreme.

Related to this is a question I am utterly ignorant of: whose funds pay for the costs of the search and discovery requirement under the ICAO agreements? :confused:

If AF447 black boxes are not found and another Airbus aircraft is lost under similar circumstances, there will be a crisis of confidence in Airbus aircraft. The financial implications of such a crisis would be much worse than the cost of this search. The sooner they find the black boxes and determine the cause, the better for Airbus and all who depend on Airbus.

BEA has a daunting job making sure that they get the best bang for the Franc.

Just my take on the situation. I know some are much more skeptical.

they will never find the blackboxes because the french and airbus would want those evidence destroyed

duyentranvan: I wasn't asking for a "conspiracy theory" answer to my question, thanks all the same. :cool:

While being no less ignorant than you, I would submit that ICAO Annexes etc. generally address its member states. I wouldn't expect them to go into the question of who pays for discharging obligations placed on those states.

regards,
HN39

motive
 

The motive for the search is surely to find out what exactly happened and to prevent it happening again.

dave:(

I think it's scandalous to suggest that anyone would hide any
evidence from the FDR or CVR, duyentranvan.

In this PPRuNe forum we have heard from many sharp minds who have no interest in commercial politics or the courtroom dance of legal fault-finding and finger-pointing and the messy business of claims and counterclaims. Most contributions have sought to distill from very scarce data credible, if not expert, explanations for the AF447 upset.

Too many scientists, consultants, corporations, international agencies and academic institutions have already been formally involved in the investigation to allow much space for the dark, secret places where conspiracies and data-suppression occur. Tacit agreements by handshake or mutually-shared interest, if at play, would still need to survive the pressure of world-wide scrutiny, and would necessarialy collapse if facts do not support the agreed-upon point of view. And there is always the threat of WikiLeaks for sunlight as a disinfectant.

There is simply not enough information or evidence about this incident for BEA to reach a satisfactory conclusion about cause. Otherwise, BEA would not be discussing a 4th search phase and would already be preparing a final report.

Perhaps BEA should take a happy lesson from the Chileans and stage the Phase 4 search as a very transparent but controlled "event" complete with corporate sponsors and advertising, IMAX film rights, interviews, and inside tracks to the reality of trans-oceanic flight, with undersea exploration and ROV footage at YouTube a bonus! The search would pay for itself using this 21st Century business model, but the authorities would need to think outside of the box. Chi chi chi, Le le le! I did hear that the Chilean mine video feed was on a 30-second delay loop, though, just in case. Probably more than one Canal+ producer in Paris has the experience to put it together and pull it off.

GB

Great Bear

Greetings once again. I have taken note of what I consider to be the first (and serious) part of your posting. The second part I will answer first. A popular (reality?) event might work, and I don't doubt the potential for profit. Even Cousteau was an accomplished Capitalist, eh? The sad truth is that if people won't take their safety seriously, Aviation cannot change.

There is absolutely no excuse for a widebody blessed with the finest powerplants, engineering, pilotage and electronics to have an incident over water, leave alone an accident.

Galley: The tray cabinet and the kitchen module cannot look like they do and have survived an impact entertained by the BEA. It is not possible. Some circumstance of hull ejection (at altitude) of cabin parts easily explains the lack of catastrophic damage to these parts.

Spoiler: The damage evident again argues against a flat impact on the Sea. The characteristics of aerodynamic destructive forces are unmistakable.

FA seat bulkhead veneer: Once again, a part that shows no damage to speak of other than separation from its mounts.

Cabin liner: This is harder to suss, its shredded state could be indicative of impact stresses, but it has failed along the line of the Ports/windows.
If the hull split open, it is reasonable to assume that the area above the "window Line" parted the upper cabin from the portion merging at the Floor/Hold line.

There are dozens of other "conclusions" available.

I simply repeat what I have maintained all along. Where there is "commentary"/conclusion by BEA, it is supportive of earlier "unfounded" (to my belief) conclusions they made, absent the mention of any evidence that would disagree, or not solidify "The best decisions available". (Politically).

bear

Aaah, Bearfoil,

Of course "there are dozens of other 'conclusions' available." That is why, I'm sure, no conclusions have been reached by BEA and why a final report would not be easy to write under present circumstances. No need to rant about these other conclusions until the "final" conclusions are reached: then, if these final answers do not resonate with a ring of truth, is the proper time for contention. So far we have seen only "preliminary" data but can be sure that BEA is aware of the sketchiness of some of the published preliminary thinking and of the intense scrutiny and potential criticism of their work by outsiders such as yourself. Patience. Be glad you are not in the hot seat and REQUIRED to reach conclusions, knowing each must be defended.

In a former life I had the pleasure of negotiating across the table from J. Cousteau. He was, indeed, a very savvy and inventive thinker and willing to work outside of the box -- even non-profit operations need cash flow -- and were he with us today, I'm sure he would be contributing in his sometimes gadfly way (as you are) to the solution of this mystery.

GB

N.B. "Gadfly" is a term for people who upset the status quo by posing upsetting or novel questions... (src Wikipedia)

This sort of discussion has been coming up from time to time almost from the second day after the accident. Each time I’ve been racking my mind trying to imagine what terrible, unimaginable secret there could possibly exist to justify the things that some posters suppose.

The easiest way out would have been to declare shortly after the accident that the airplane must have hit a very strong gust that exceeded its design limits, it broke apart and the pieces fell to the earth. That would have been an ‘act of god’, nobody to blame, not Airbus, nor Air France, or DGAC. Not even a need to spend millions trying to find the recorders.

In its first Interim Report BEA went out of its way to argument that that didn’t happen. Their ‘finding’ may have been poorly worded, evidently hastily put together, and perhaps somewhat premature in the light of the meagre evidence and analysis available at that time. Nevertheless, it meant that BEA committed itself to a long and costly investigation that is still continuing.

In rejecting the theory of an immediate break-up, BEA must almost inescapably assume that a loss of control occurred, probably strongly related to the loss of airpeed indication. In that context, I still cannot imagine the inimaginable secret that would make the difference between disintegration at impact or sometime before that.

regards,
HN39

P.S. My thanks to GreatBear for expressing my feelings better than I could myself.

HazelNuts39

The inimaginable might be the one rejected by BEA at the outset, as you describe. Fine. So then everything but the BEA's quick shuffle and deal of the evidence becomes Impossible? I cannot follow your reasoning. If in fact the a/c did simply enter the cell and break up, fine too. AF had the luxury of easy standards re: Press Release, and initially had the deal done.

"Fortes Turbulences". Unfortunately, that was a soon discovered Lie. Posters here are NOT the only ones reaching "Possibilities" on slim evidence, it occurs to some that BEA has done the very same: The difference is they are the ones with the Trust, the Money, and the future well being of Aviation in their collective word processors. If one is satisfied with the status quo, and supports BEA, well and good, to each his own. Why the constant criticism of those who have other opinions? Believe me, I know whereof I speak relative to investigative traditions, and Legacy.

take care,

bear

bearfoil
Because spreading conspiracy theories is dangerous, frustrates serious discussion and forces BEA to keep its doors tightly shut? Does it serve any useful purpose?

regards,
HN39

HN39

After an event like AF447, the Manufacturer absolutely needs to know precisely what happened, but he does not necessarily want to share with the all world what he has just learned or what he could learn ...

Absence of transparency would be more appropriate that conspiracy theory.

HazelNuts39

I do sincerely respect your position. I would prefer that the favor be reciprocal, but it is simply not necessary, and speaks of another red Herring: allowing any endeavour to become personal. For me, my 'shoe' may well be GreatBear's suggestion of 'gadfly'. It feels like it is fitting, so be it. I am not a theorist of dark and imagined far out possibilities. What I regret in our culture is the death of scepticism.

Trust in the Industry when freely given and without consideration is not wise. We all have motives, goals, and issues, frequently unattached and ill fitting to those of other's.

If anyone is doubting the primary motive of any investigation, anywhere, I will remind you it is control. It is not sinister, it is the nature of the enterprise. It is not a violation to take the product with a dash of salt.

bear

well they just wont find it

We all probably think you are right - but for the wrong reason.

bearfoil;

Thanks for your reply. I hope I have not been lacking respect. It's not personal. I'm expressing my feelings with regard to a recent flurry of posts suggesting, without cause, that BEA is not sincere in its efforts to find the cause(s) of this accident, and to publish what they find. Of course you have every right to be sceptical, I'm too at times, but I protest when scepticism turns into plain distrust and insinuation.

CONF iture;

Agreed, but I think the discussion is primarily about BEA.

regards,
HN39

Bearfoil,

I understand and respect your motivation of keeping the pressure up on BEA.
However, I'm not sure if this is really the right platform and the ideal way to achieve this.
What is written here will have very little effect in the grand scale of things....
Secondly, I'm not convinced that not finding the recorders is really in the interest of Airbus.
It leaves a doubt.
Which cannot be resolved without the recorders.
So they must be surely interested in finding it, to make clear that it can't happeb again to an Airbus (except if AF447 was really knocked out of the sky by the big one).
And if AI is interested in finding it, why should BEA be not.

Discussing all possibilities and their probabilities on the other hand is valuable and IMHO also appropriate here.

henra

Thank you for your patience and insight, and also to HazelNuts 39.

This is Tech Log, after all, and I may seem to have lost the plot, perhaps I have. I too regret the appearance of unfounded criticism, and believe all comment should be backed up by experience and evidence; if I have missed the mark, I apologize. What I see as predictable, others see as acceptable, and the two are intertwined. That is the last I will refer to the lack of visibility and comment from the principals.

I think what got us relocated was an involved discussion of engineering, structures and their performance in flight, something I think is productive and adds to a community of understanding.

thank you both again.
bear

BOAC,

May be a bit too soon, still, to throw in your cards. Several promising areas of seabed have emerged from this thread's event analysis during the summer, where the lawn has not yet been mowed by the ROVs: near the LKP and southeastward towards the "slick." BEA, too, is revisiting their search assessments and calcs, and should present findings soon. Never having won the Lotto, for some reason I remain an optimist.

Being a recovering gadfly (but more of an iconoclast), I would join HN39 in welcoming Bearfoil's contributions. Masking out the anti-establishment invective, he has made some valid points. I myself often wonder how the Crew Rest with very little accompanying cargo hold luggage was ejected, not to mention PAX distributed from the very front to the very back of the A/C, in BEA's "flat" splash scenario.

GB

The BEA's "mission statement" published on the home page of its website, proclaims the following:-
I for one, believe that that is exactly what they have been doing regarding the AF447 accident. Surely, "Time is of the essence", I hear some say. That part is agreed, but based on the evidence they have acquired at various points into their investigation, the BEA has revealed its analysis of that data in a timely manner.

The current hiatus is nothing more than checking that the "deck chairs" are where they should be. As the construction of the DFDR/CVR packages were designed to withstand the known forces of the impact and the depths of the ocean, the data they contain will be available once they have been recovered. IMHO the right thing to do in these circumstances is to consolidate and investigate means of achieving a successful outcome of a further search.

To do so, a huge reanalysis of all data in their possession is reasonable, and in the case of the early air searches, a complete re-evaluation of their effectiveness is certainly in order. I am sure that when all that data has been considered in its entirety, that a case can be made for the spread and funds required to implement a Phase 4 search.

The only "bone of contention" I have in what has been achieved to date is, that if the MoD and MoT hadn't had their spat over the L'Emeraude pinger tapes during the Phase 3 search, and the search had continued as planned, we may not be currently having this discussion .

mm43

p.s. The "actual" underlined in the BEA statement is a word substitution not in the original. Makes for easier reading (imo).

Crew Rest

The unit was posed for its photo oriented base down, as evident by the signage and the assumed attempt by its holders to present evidence in a reasonable way. It thus appears to have experienced catastrophic loads in a way suggestive of a Cabin deck impact from above, against a resisting Hold deck below. For purposes of discussion, I use the nautical "deck" rather than floor, to include all structures as "decking" also.

The height as seen may be the end static dimension, or represent a "rebound" to the unit that returned some of its height post impact. It also appears to have failed almost completely in the vertical. If there was a horizontal component to the impact, it must have been minimal, or the unit may have slid forward to have then be collapsed in place. How did it escape the Hold to be discovered, where was its buoyancy to remain afloat? Trapped air most likely, even in a turbulent sea. As Great Bear asks, where are cargo containers? where are film wrapped pallets, materials that are buoyant on their own? For the Galley mod to have survived, the Cabin must have opened after the module was damaged. Or somehow it escaped a collapse of the fuselage upon it? Similar in fashion to the FA seat bulkhead, tray cabinet, etc.? Thence sent into the sea? The timing and descriptions (BEA) of the inferred impact explanations are not instructive, here.

The crew rest has the look of a laminated and boxed unit. From only the photograph it appears that the laminae failed and exposed their adhesive layer, an apparent phenolic film. In my experience when laminations part, it can be indicative of an explosive failure, such that the metallic layers vibrate beyond the film's strength due to extremely dense acoustic vibration.

Please know that here I describe a simple gas and pressure relief, not a chemical or man made device. The failures are not indicative of high outside pressure, but instead higher gas pressure within, perhaps showing a collapse while closed, and reasonably hermetic. This goes to the rapidity of the failure, nothing else. I do not see a photograph of the crew rest after it was opened. Of course it was opened. What was inside?

Has an a/c disintegrated at altitude before? Comet? Has a hull lost its integrity to survive? Aloha? (Except for Emily, who was ejected over the Pacific). Has an a/c fallen into the sea seeking the inverted, but run out of altitude? Alaska? Has an a/c impacted the surface and distributed all its pieces (Save the tail)? Afriqiyah?

Failing a logical introduction and chain of evidence for each of its descriptions, the reports infer alot. Possibilities are somewhat a different animal to inferences.

bearfoil,

I share your thoughts. I tend to come to the conclusion that such high-speed impact with water is a chaotic process. Trying to visualise it in 'slow motion' involves a lot of speculation. There must have been high levels of vertical and horizontal acceleration, water rushing in at a pressure of over 200 psi. Perhaps instead of saying what caused a particular damage pattern, it would be better to think in terms of what could have caused it. Can you conclude that it could not have happened as BEA describes it, or just that it could have happened differently?

regards,
HN39

I have continuously struggled to find some since of explanation as to why such a minimum of debris was recovered much less discovered. Other than precious little, historic accidents at sea have yield this limited amount of aftermath. When airplanes make contact with the water, or ships sink, the pattern of debris is normally very large in that most items surrender to the sea reluctantly. In this case, I guess most of you can recall, throwing a flat rock to skip across a pond, only having the air catch it, provide lift, and the rock rolls on it side and enters the water vertically with a kerchunk and barely a splash. Seems like this phonomia fits, only airplanes hardly contact anything with a kerchunk, and subsequently without a large reaction. However, ValuJet in 1969, left very little evidence on the surface where it impacted. Given the debris pattern, or lack thereof, simular thing in this case?
Contrary to BEA, other than high (load) vertical impact, and if wings level, would not lend itself to a rapid sinking.

Hi,

YouTube - Crash Landing - Ethiopian Airlines http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tZyDrpeWoBw&NR=1B767

As HN39 said...I was already tempted to try and post the same link that jcjeant just put up.
It is really anybody's guess how much, and what, debris the uncontrolled impact of AF447 would have left on the surface.

CJ

CJ, good point and a reminder that "uncontrolled impact" is the RESULT, not the CAUSE of this upset. Indeed, the recovered floating debris, while confirming the catastrophe, provides few clues about WHY the event happened.

All the more reason to continue the search for the CVR/FDR. Without hard data from before and during the upset, we are left with a string of ACARS messages, meteorology, and a great deal of guesswork -- not enough information or definition to reach the sort of conclusions expected from a BEA or a NTSB...

GB

Here is some free speculation on the AF447 breakup sequence.

I've been studying the wreckage origination charts of the second interim BEA report. The large items found seem to be in close proximity to the doors. Not that I think the doors sprung open and the stuff floated out, it seems likely that the fuselage broke at or near the door openings.
See page 14 of the 2nd interim report and look at the blue and pink colored areas. These appear to be adjacent to entry doors.
Specifically, behind the cockpit, in front of the wing, behind the wing, and in front of the vertical stabilizer leading edge (4 locations).
It could be that the doors are near splice areas of the fuselage or that the door openings reduced the bending strength of the fuselage in that area.

The green marked overhead items probably all tore loose on impact throughout the aircraft except perhaps over the wing center section. Depending on the attitude of a section as it sank, pieces could be preferentially lost from one side of the aircraft.
If Bearfoil perceives overpressurization in the crew rest module, it wouldn't be surprising. Take a box that is sealed and crush it rapidly. The air trapped inside will cause any unsupported area to bulge before it blows out.

The Ethiopian 767 impact was a very different accident with significantly more horizontal velocity than this aircraft had. Only useful to show how rapidly things can turn chaotic. Didn't the wing tip hit a reef? It looked like the wing box was torn from the fuselage.

Hi,

So far I have not accurate information about the horizontal velocity of the AF447 on impact .. do you have one ?
The BEA report about horizontal velocity is only assumptions .. nothing verified by datas or witnesses .. no movie on Youtube ....
Black boxes are holy grail and must be found.

I think the ultimate informed theory will benefit from "unwinding" the evidentiary trail, in "backwards" fashion. Instead of the "body" of evidence informing the upset, it will be the upset directing the results. If the "upset" is based only on informed possibilities, it would not be the first time.

When confronted by an horrific event, it is in the nature of humankind to demand an explanation. Eventually the boxes will be found. My guess is that the data they contain will put a fine point on something offered before, perhaps even an initial PR release: "Fortes Turbulences".

"Fortes Turbulences" is by definition the cause, regardless of posits here and elsewhere, correct? The a/c stopped flying. From a general conclusion of upset (what else) every other surmise flows inevitably.

It is informative to nitpick at every informed piece of knowledge, but the fact remains most of the evidence and discussion is proprietary. To the extent that the authority can "embrace" data, the conclusion is of necessity closed.

No conflict should exist between the Public's demand for openness and the authority's command of the data. Yet there is one.

bear

jcjeant
Sorry, nothing I can easily pass on. Only a somewhat calibrated eyeball.
What I see in the AF447 wreckage that has been pictured is a strong vertical component of damage, a weaker horizontal component of damage, and a relatively short/low energy (less than 160 Knot total velocity) churn time (but my eye has been calibrated by just a few accidents involving smaller aircraft).

jcjeant

In searching for a compelling composition of evidence to inform a "small horizontal component" of velocity, I look at the engineering involved in plain sheet design. It is not an accident of design that aircraft are built to resist longitudinal loads far more than "Horizontal ones". Tailstrikes, slips and skids, excessive Yaw are simply not primary considerations in commercial and utility a/c. It is assumed that flight aspect other than trimmed longitudinal is an aberration, forced upon a pilot(s) by artifacts of poor design, poor training, mechanical deficit or other "unusual" (and unexpected) circumstances. In flight, a "slippery" a/c is the goal, as evidenced by stowed (in flight) aero devices: Flaps, Slats, and Rats. Reconfig is an essential part of modern flight, where an a/c must be a truck and a bird, (hopefully not at the same time!). 447 experienced other than trimmed flight by definition (per ACARS: a/p drop). A water entry in vertical aspect is as far from designed for considerations as man can get. I wonder about BEA's "conclusion of low horizontal" velocity. An a/c is much more able to resist lengthwise loads than vertical. In flat vertical impact, evidence of this "design" is apparent, as in CAL Denver and Turkish Schiphol. Vertically, the a/c really is a "tube". Cylinders (fuselages) as structural concepts are meant to handle "bearing" load, not "rectilinear compression". Per Machinbird and his post, it is at "splices" (joins) where most of these failures accur. It is a consideration of "poly-geo" construction that we see this. Where once Vertical, horizontal, and spanwise elements were built as a unit, in one location, we now see fuse, tail, wing, and engine pylon/engine assemblies borne across Oceans on ther decks of freighters, or in the hold of high lift a/c.

An example would be the nose fail of the 737 at Schiphol and Denver, or the Tail assembly of AA587 La Guardia. Looking at bare brackets where an epoxy tab is missing is part of the "new" engineering. Do I disagree with this approach? Only when it causes the loss of an a/c and its people.

bear

Sorry if this is covered already recently in this massive thread but is there any kind of search continuing for this aircraft?

Hi,

http://www.pprune.org/5976292-post2213.html

Greatbear: Excellent post. So much of what we see here is sausage filling. Thank you.

bearfoil: Huh? Explanation or clarification please...

grizzled

In a direct way, an a/c can succumb to disrupted airflow either passively, as in a cell, or create its own airflow problems by upset. I should think that it is apparent 447 did either one or the other, or both.

cheers
bear