In true 'wet blanket' mode, I am minded to quote (from Wikipedia) from William Chillingworth's Religion of Protestants.[5], where he accuses unnamed scholastics of debating " Whether a Million of Angels may not fit upon a needles point?"

Much as I am in awe of mm's invaluable contributions elsewhere on this thread, I cannot believe we are down to surmising how many g (to one decimal point indeed) were experienced at impact. Only those who have had 'hands on' those bits of metal and plastic, and, sadly bodies, will have a 'feel' for what happened. High speed wing down/bottoming out, ripping the fin off at high forward g (causing the belt injuries), low speed vertical, flat spin - all supposition. Indeed, despite the language issues, the deceleration COULD have even been 36g as well as the part number! It is all very interesting and extremely clever but it doesn't really move anything forward. Far more important is to identify what went wrong at cruise altitude, examine the software interactions involved and correct any deficiencies. If/when more bits/recorders are located we move on to the detail of the impact. This really should be the thrust of this thread - in my opinion.

Maybe a thread split (mods?) is called for so we can focus more clearly on the progress of the search (as per title) as opposed to hypotheses on just one part of the accident.

36g, continued
 

RE: Diversification #471 - 36g again
I respectfully submit that we have two translations - one with the linguístic and engineering expertise of the BEA behind it, and one from "a person born in the UK, educated both there and in France, and who has lived in France for over 40 years".
The latter may well be linguistically correct, but in my opinion it does not reflect what the BEA is trying to say. In my opinion the word "corresponding to" is intended to link "120 000 N" to another quantity, e.g. "36 g", and not just an arm.

Edit:
Its turns out that my first calculation was too simplistic and it has therefore been deleted. The FAR Part 25 regulations specify an ultimate load corresponding to 24*1.5=36 g. The rudder and supporting hinge brackets must be able to support an inertia ultimate load acting parallel to the hinge line of 24*1.5=36 times the weight of the rudder. Since Arm 36g is at an angle of 38 degrees to the rudder hinge line, 120 000 N in the direction of that arm corresponds to 94 561 N along the rudder hingeline, and hence to a rudder mass of 268 kg.

regards,
HN39

36g
 

I wouldn't expect an engineering report to be concerned with the equivalent acceleration. UTS and/or breaking force yes as this would be directly available from the design intent and FE models. That's why I bought in to '36g' not being an acceleration.

36 g
 

Hazelnut.
I will try to explain and motivate my opinion. When I/you look carefully at the photo where the corroded edge of "arm 36 g" and the bolt is shown it is rather obvious that there was no movement between these. Any such movement would have been stretching of the arm and would have lead to scratching and deformation of the "lock" substance still surrounding the six-edged bolt head. My very personal opinion is that what we can see from the picture is a corrosion damage to the arm. Possibly induced by the tension caused by the bolt. I have seen very similar corrosion phenomena on some older outboard engines.

PJ2

I have a few questions.

At "unreliable airspeed" and a/p disconnect, was the a/c experiencing attitudes/control inputs that had exceeded the autopilots programmed range? Or did the a/p decouple simply because of uA/S?

Other a/c had encountered unreliable a/s, without turbulences forte, could 447 have been in still air? How quickly did the a/c revert to Alternate Law II, then Direct?

Could the pilots have been so quickly left with an a/c needing manual control only that they overcontrolled into upset?

RTLU. Is travel limited by mechanical (dynamic) stops? Or is it restricted by pressure/sensing of hydraulics?

At 4/8total sweep, (degrees) and mechanical stops, without hydraulics diminished, can the Rudder experience rapid reversals and subject the a/c to cycling divergent Yaw?

ACARS cadence. Could the a/c have remained under control through all ACARS, and at altitude?

Cabin. Could the Cabin Pressure FAIL transmission have been an auto alert that pressurization was lost, at altitude?

On mm43's excellent "debris" graphic, isn't the Vertical Stabiliser/Rudder shown at the "Start" of the field? The Spoiler well "past" it?

Had the a/c 'disintegrated' (this is a very loose term, meaning lost parts at altitude), wouldn't the debris field be expected to be compact? Would it not also indicate a quite "rapid" descent to the Sea, explaining the proximity of the debris on the surface to 447's last "reported position"?

bear

"arm 36 g" corrosion
 

RE: Diversification #471

I am hesitating to respond to your opinion because, as you said in your post #449, this has probably little to do with the cause of the accident and even less with the search.

I have carefully looked at the photo, but my untrained eyes don't see what you see. I would think that, if "arm 36 g" had been substantially weakened by corrosion, that fact would have been much more evident to the experts examining the vertical tail structure, and BEA would not only have mentioned that finding in their report, but would have called for an immediate inspection of that part on all A330/A340's.

Regards,
HN39

I think what Diversification is suggesting has merit. Vertical Load attenuation by Arm 36 (g) is accomplished by "snubbing" tension between the Pivot Sheath and the Vertical Aft Spar (not seen) in the Vertical Stabiliser. The "Lobe" (tip) of the Arm is missing. It has escaped from underneath the shoulder of the "thru-bolt" securing (both) VA assemblies.

It has done this without evidence that the Bolt's seat upon the remainder of the starboard ARM has been disturbed (by observation). To do this, the tip will have had to have been loaded by the Bolt, whose appearance disavows any lateral movement. An alternate explanation would be perhaps that the Rudder was exposed to Load, and thence severe vibration, such that the tip was ejected by the remaining mount structure (Barrel, Bolt, Arm), under stress. This would suggest the Arm had been degraded in some way, weakening the attachment at the lobe. Corrosion would be an obvious precursor.

Further, consonant with vibration of the Rudder, an alternate compression as a partner to the loss of the Arm tip. Vibration? Not unusual, but without degradation of the Arm's tip, it will have had to have been a result of severe and un-engineered for (catastrophic) stress. Flutter comes to mind, or rapid cycling control inputs, either pilot induced or a/p.

This (potential) vibration would go some way to explain the loss of skin and ribs at the base of the Rudder. Aerodynamic in nature rather than impact related. It would also account for the undisturbed hinges and their mounting. These "plates", each a pair bracketing the Rudders pivot, are not seen to be deformed, again suggesting that though a part of the Vertical was destroyed in Tension, there was insufficient "stretching" of the Pivot. One would expect a deformation downward in these plates, had there been enough movement in the vertical to fail the end of the ARM, absent the vibration or some other as yet not explained loading.

bear

Very nicely put, and as you have said, "Language - spits", and my pedantic use of acceleration instead of the succinct deceleration falls into that category. Numbers unfortunately have a life of their own, and "one" is always wrong when you mean "1.001"!

BOAC, your point is taken regarding the name of the thread, but I note that there's no comment on the BEA's "Search delayed" news release. Are we all waiting with baited breath for the substantive update on Monday?

Just a minor point regarding the Interim Report No.2 translation - a careful read of a few paragraphs and sentences in and around the 'Arm 36 g' location will reveal that possibly three persons have had a hand in the result. The literal translation of "dérive" has resulted in "fin", "vertical stabiliser" and "vertical stabilizer". They are all correct. So wonder not, when the "de 36 g de" business gets raised, along with the staple "en ligne de vol".

Answers to the cause, rather than the result is what is truly needed, and there will always be a case for determining what could have been done in the intervening period. In the meantime, "Idle Minds" will play with 36g, the vertical stabilizer and belly flops.

mm43

Search to resume 25 March 2010 -
 

The following is a Reuters India report quoting Le Figaro -

Air France black box search to resume on Mar.25 - paper | World | Reuters

The BEA's press release on Monday may not be so speculative.

mm43

bearfoil, your questions in black font, my thoughts in blue:

At "unreliable airspeed" and a/p disconnect, was the a/c experiencing attitudes/control inputs that had exceeded the autopilots programmed range? Or did the a/p decouple simply because of uA/S?

The autopilot will disconnect if the pitch attitude exceeds 25deg NU, 13degND or 45deg Roll. I believe the AF330 in question was equipped with EGPWS which in some installations will have a "Bank Angle" warning. I would expect at some point that an ECAM message to be generated but we dont' have enough information to make this assumption. For further, the BEA 2nd Interim Report,

"1.16.3 Study of losses of or temporary anomalies in indicated speeds occurring in cruise on Airbus A330 / A340", can be referenced. The autopilot and autothrust disconnected in ten of the thirteen recorded cases of this series of events.

Other a/c had encountered unreliable a/s, without turbulences forte, could 447 have been in still air? How quickly did the a/c revert to Alternate Law II, then Direct?

Assumptions made that the a/c was in turbulence would come from the many weather and satellite images available and the most-likely track information provided by many very skilled posters.

Such conclusions may even be reasonable but there is nothing to directly indicate or necessarily conclude that the a/c was in turbulent air or convective weather.

None of us (I assume) has actually examined the wreckage first-hand and with sufficient engineering knowledge come to conclusions which are substantially at odds with the BEA statements regarding the likely trajectory and attitude of the aircraft.

This is not stating that the BEA conclusions are necessarily what happened but a lot of people who kick tin and who can "read" metal have not put forward theories explaining the evidence from the wreckage which supports contrary theories. Many I'm sure would be very interested in serious theories based upon alternate interpretations of the traces in the metal and the cabin material which support for example, mid-air loss of the VS.

One possibility we might anticipate when the recorders are found and read is the loss of data after the loss of control. The recorders are powered off the AC1, AC2 and DC2 busses. I have long theorized that once LOC occurred and the descent established, due to extreme angles of airflow across the engine inlets upsetting the flow through the engines that the possibility exists that they may have flamed out at . Loss of the AC1 and AC2 busses would deploy the RAT for hydraulics and the AC and DC Essential busses, (again, no recorders powered) but again very high angles of airflow relative to the longitudinal axis/chord of the aircraft would preclude its use; if the RAT is the only source of power, load-shedding begins if the CAS is < 260kts. Whether the APU would start in such circumstances, (using APU-dedicated battery) and whether that occurred is also cannot be known.

Could the pilots have been so quickly left with an a/c needing manual control only that they overcontrolled into upset?

Highly speculative when involving human and environmental factors but in what may have been more benign circumstances we have thirteen other examples of loss of ADR data due loss of pitot information in which no loss of control occurred. We cant' conclude that no loss of control would occur as a result of a sudden requirement for manual flight. I can't see experiened pilots "over-controlling" the airplane into a loss-of-control merely from loss of airspeed information, (fly pitch, bring the thrust levers back out of the CLB detent and set the N1 that was being used before the problem, get the checklist out), but that said, we have also seen a number of industry events in which wild excursions occurred as a result of untoward pilot input so we know it can occur.

RTLU. Is travel limited by mechanical (dynamic) stops? Or is it restricted by pressure/sensing of hydraulics?

Rudder travel is limited in two ways both of which are mechanical: the PTLU and RTLU are similar in structure. According to a schematic, they are co-located in the VS, the RTLU about 1/2 the way up the VS, the PTLU at the base of the VS where the rudder and VS structure join. From the BEA 2nd Interim Report:

"1.12.3.5.5 Examination of the Rudder Travel Limiter Unit (RTLU)

The RTLU was found in its place in the fin and disassembled. An examination
was performed at the manufacturer’s and showed that it would allow travel
of the rudder measured as 7.9° +/- 0.1°. As an example, at FL350, this travel is

obtained for Mach 0.8 +/- 0.004, corresponding to a CAS of 272 +/- 2 kt."

At 4/8total sweep, (degrees) and mechanical stops, without hydraulics diminished, can the Rudder experience rapid reversals and subject the a/c to cycling divergent Yaw?

I'm not qualified to say it isn't possible from a design or engineering pov. I have done in the past a survey but not an exhaustive study of Advsories and Directives on other matters and there was not a reference to such an issue or event. To my awareness there is no known occurrence of uncommanded rudder reversal or rapid reversal movements recorded or discussed in any Airbus literature/incident/safety reporting system I have seen or have access to and have studied nor have I experienced it in any aircraft.

The BEA Report indicates that the RTLU permitted a rudder travel of 7.9deg.

ACARS cadence. Could the a/c have remained under control through all ACARS, and at altitude?

There are important understandings about the ACARS messages one of which I stated very early in the first AF447 thread which was eventually closed, and which was clearly stated in the 1rst Interim Report. That comment was, "It is therefore possible in a CFR to find an ECAM message preceding a fault message that is nevertheless timed one minute before it." So the assumption that the ACARS messages are in some meaningful order from which possible cause may be derived, is incorrect. Rather, the need for examining what caused within each affected system a ECAM Class 2 message to trigger as well as understanding what the protocols of that system to send the notice-of-failure to the CMC and for the CMC to prioritize the message and send it thence to the ACARS, must be appreciated.

I do not see direct evidence in any of the ACARS messages that the a/c was out of control. The "Advisory Cabin Vertical Speed" has been cited as one indication of loss of pressurization but the conditions are a rate < or > 1800fpm as compared

Cabin. Could the Cabin Pressure FAIL transmission have been an auto alert that pressurization was lost, at altitude?

As described in the previous response, although it is possible we cannot conclude this. There are a number of interpretations from the FCOM; the AMM does not do a good job of covering Advisory messages. Essentially, the FCOM actions required for this message are to switch CPC's...Cabin Pressure Controllers. Control is switched to MANual then back to AUTO which changes the CPC's. Although one would believe the 1800fpm rates to be those actually sensed, I can imagine at least one interpretation where that is the rate commanded by a CPC and a switch to the other CPC is required. Digging this deeply in the corners for any hint that the cabin itself was structurally compromised is at best a tenuous endeavour.

I hope this is somewhat helpful. I think re-reading the BEA first and second interim reports is well worth while.

PJ2

Bearfoil
The Vertical Stabilizer was recovered from 3°36.7N 30°37.1W at around 1400z on 7 June 2009. The position has been extracted from graphics data published by the BEA. The following graphic shows my backtrack from there using Oscar/NOAA satellite smoothed current data and Quikscat satellite surface (+10m) wind data to a possible impact position of 3°12.3'N 30°54.1W at 20090601-0230z. The V/S was found floating on its port side with a small sail of torn off empennage skin attached at the forward end.

http://i846.photobucket.com/albums/a...set-leeway.jpg

The relative position of the V/S to a body found on 6 June and another 5 found on 7 June 2009 is shown below. The calculated position for the V/S after the leeway vector has been removed is also shown. My considered opinion is that though the bodies in general suffered some windage, it wasn't evident immediately as they initially sunk to an equilibrium depth and slowly surfaced. Another reason why they were not located sooner.

http://i846.photobucket.com/albums/a...rrent-vs-3.jpg

The Port Outer Spoiler was found NxE of TASIL 6 days later and recovered from 04°42.1'N 029°55.6'W at 20090613-1321UTC. The assumed reason for it being north and east of most other recovered debris was that it floated flush with the surface and was well anchored in the water by the attached framing on its underside. Leeway due to surface wind has not been an issue with it.

The presumed location of this accident was effectively at the center of the doldrums and the surface currents were flowing slowly NE and turning left near 3°30N and increasing in velocity from that point. The spoiler appears to have missed the turn and like some other debris continued on towards and past TASIL to join the North Atlantic Equatorial Counter Current.

mm43

mm43
Thank you for the lead in.
When an aircraft crashes in a deep stall, it is reasonable to assume that it was also in a deep stall at higher altitudes, and that it transitioned to this condition at still higher altitudes.
Agreed, there are a number of ways to transition an airliner into a stall, but in general, more dynamic stall entries leave residual inertial moments on the airframe and work against developing a stable stall. It appears that AF447 hit the water in a stable stall configuration.
I have been looking at scenarios where an A330 could decelerate into a stall while maintaining normal attitudes. The Perpignan accident involving A320 D-AXLA, although a different Airbus model, indicated to me the amount of pitch authority Airbus builds into their THS designs and how an aircraft could be left with full nose up trim and only the manual trim wheel available to reduce this trim. When added to a triple pitot tube freeze up, and a full trim tank, the resulting cockpit “pinball show” could easily confuse an unsuspecting aircrew until it was too late. I also suspect cockpit design made it too hard to get the critical information needed (actual power setting, THS position, actual angle of attack) and as a result, the aircrew was unable to develop the big picture of what was happening. I also suspect that the A-330 can be held in a deep stall by full nose up trim and an aft CG and yet be stabilized in a relatively stable normal flight attitude by the flight control system.
Admitted, these are a lot of unproven suspicions at this point but none particularly illogical.
Consider these paragraphs from David P Davies book, “Handling The Big Jets”. Mr. Davies was Chief Test Pilot for the Air Registration Board and carried out certification testing of a large number of jet transport aircraft.
From the section on “ The Super Stall” commencing on the bottom of page 120 in my second edition copy, bold print is my emphasis, italics, the author’s. (The previous paragraphs explained why swept wing aircraft tend to pitch up after a stall.)

http://home.comcast.net/%7Eshademaker/Fig5pt20web.jpg
“Having explained the elements of the deep-stall let us now look at the complete picture. Figure 5.20 illustrates pitching moment and lift coefficient against angle of incidence. This shows that as incidence is increased toward the stall there is a stable nose down pitching tendency. Notice particularly the increase in stable slope of Cm just before the stall. This is typical of some aircraft types and reflects the success of the designer in achieving an inboard stall first, thus producing a nose down tendency. After the stall, however, the aeroplane pitches up at increasing angles of incidence until it reaches a more or less stable state at around say 30 degrees. So far so good, for a purely academic illustration. In real life, however, the manoeuvre is more treacherous than the illustration suggests, for two reasons stemming from the same source. It has been explained previously that below, say roughly 1.4 Vs, an increase in incidence causes drag to increase faster than lift and thus the aeroplane tends to sink. It is most important to realize that this increasing sinking tendency, at a constant pitch attitude, results in a rapid increase in incidence as the flight path becomes deflected downwards. Furthermore, once the stall has developed and a lot of lift has been lost, the aeroplane will start to sink rapidly and this is accompanied by a rapid increase in incidence.
This matter of a downward inclining flight path producing rapid increases in incidence compounds the entry to, and the progression of, the super-stall. It must be emphasised again that this can occur without the need for an excessively nose high pitch attitude. It can happen on some types a an apparently not abnormal pitch attitude, and it is this quality that can mislead the pilot because it looks very similar to the beginning of a normal recovery.”
http://home.comcast.net/%7Eshademake...ttitudeweb.jpg

Now skipping down a half paragraph, “There is no point in discussing the irrecoverable case any further, except perhaps to say that those aeroplanes which have been lost in such manoeuvres finally reached the ground substantially level laterally, having defied all efforts to roll or spin them out of the stabilized condition; only slightly nose down in pitch, with little or no forward speed; at an extremely high incidence; rotating only very slowly in yaw; with (in one case) all the engines flamed out because of being exposed to such massive angles of incidence; and finally with an enormous vertical velocity.”
I would especially appreciate comment from A330 knowledgeable individuals on the availability of the 3 pieces of information that I suspect are not continuously displayed in the cockpit.

Super-stall
 

RE: Machinbird #493

Perhaps two additional sentences from the section "The super-stall" in D.P.Davies' book will help to put the whole thing into perspective:

"Recovery from a super-stall should not really have a place in this book since the book is written for airline pilots who have every right to say that they have no interest in an aeroplane which can achieve a super-stalled condition."

and two pages later:

"It must be emphasised that we are still in the rather academic field because an aeroplane capable of super-stalling would not, of course, be certificated without adequate protection".

Regards,
HN39

- "angels check in":ugh:

36g, continued (2)
 

For whom it may interest, my post #483 above has been revised.

BOAC;
The trend of the discussion is frustrating but so is the absence of information. There is nothing to go on except the wreckage, the ACARS series, the two BEA Interim Reports and the thirteen other similar events which occurred to the A330.

More to the point, I think it is important for understanding the airplane that system and handling questions be elaborated upon but not with the intent of "solving" causes. So much has been written about this accident out of just plain ignorance of the airplane and how airlines work and how accident investigation works that, for those with the patience anyway, it is important to remain in the dialogue. Understanding this airplane is important if we are to triage the many possible causal pathways to what happened at 02:10Z and the ensuring six minutes or so, the only important point since last June.

I happen to think, (and have said why, above) that the BEA Interim Reports have something to say regarding how the aircraft struck the water and that may narrow the antecedents so perhaps the debate is in this sense, worthwhile and sometimes the devil does indeed lie in the minutae, among the angels...

HN39
First "super-stall" is not a well defined term. Perhaps it should be defined as an aircraft that will lock itself into an irrecoverable stall (one that cannot be recovered from no matter what combination of control inputs are made).
Deep stalls are generally achievable on swept wing aircraft by virtue of the pitch up characteristic at stall. Deep stalls have no place in airline flying. Airbus has built a series of protections into their flight control system to prevent achieving a deep stall. In Alternate law and Direct Law, the protections revert to IAS basis instead of AOA. It may be that even in Normal law, erroneous airspeed indications that pass the validation criterea could create a stalled condition. When a system such as the airspeed input is triple redundant, it is obviously very critical that it remain functional. It is pretty clear from the ACARS messages that it did not.
That is a certification issue that has been fixed (perhaps) by pitot probe diversity between manufacturers.
If the initial phase of erroneous airspeeds was biased to the high side, the aircraft would begin decelerating and the THS would be trimming nose up. The only clue would be an increasing deck angle and reduced power settings.. If at this point the "pinball show" commenced there would not be a lot of time to sort it all out before the aircraft decelerated into a stall.
Would you care to comment on the availability of the following 3 parameters in the A330 cockpit. I have never been in an A330 cockpit, but from other postings, it appears that there is a multifunction display that can display engine parameters or other data. I suspect that things like THS position and AOA also fall into this category and that none of them are displayed full time in the cockpit.
Not trying to be a wise guy here. Others have posed similar questions. Just trying to assemble the evidence into a sensible scenario.

From an ancient...

One... I agree the "super-stall" terminology shouldn't really be used... It applies / applied mostly to T-tailed aircraft where the aircraft ended up in a 'locked-in' high-AoA attitude with the stalled airflow from the wing totally blanking the horizontal tail / elevator, leaving the aircraft to mush into the ground without any pitch control left to the pilot.

Two... Once all these 'protections' of the 'flight control system' have been exhausted.... I have the impression there is no way the aircraft is fully "handed back to the pilots" to try and fly out of the situation themselves.... even if possibly the control authority (in terms of control surface deflection) might still have been there.

I've worked on AFCS a long way back, not on the current video game cockpits.

I'm not trying to be a wise guy either, just to understand.... which is why I'm still following this thread, BTW.

CJ

'Arm 36 g' again!
 

HN39 Thanks for that! The Arm was given a "descriptive" name, and the reason for that lay in the minutiae of the regulations. http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/sr...ies/thumbs.gif

Talk about left turns, right turns, red herrings and tangents - we've had the lot! http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/sr...lies/wink2.gif

mm43

THS position
 

Machinbird; Thanks for elaborating, and your reference to the Perpignan accident makes it clearer. The Alpha floor protections, the aft CoG and the trim tank have all got a hand in this. You have painted a picture that certainly draws attention to the position of the THS when the AP threw the towel in.

My reference is http://www.andytracy.net/files/27FLTCTL.doc , and I'm sure there will be further discussion.

mm43

PJ2 (responding to an aparently deleted post)
I apologize for being unclear.
As I understand it, there is no full time indication of engine thrust in the form of EPR, Fuel Flow, or RPM and that this data is relegated to a page of the multifunction display. Any one of these would probably be sufficient to clue a pilot to a power setting problem. If this is a correct understanding, then it could interfere with an aircrew rapidly assimilating this data in the presence of other cockpit warnings. The other two items are of course Angle of Attack and Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer position.
Thanks for any input provided, even if you tell me I'm out in left field.
Machinbird

RE: Machinbird #498
Thanks for elaborating on the lost high-AoA protections in Alternate and Direct flight control laws. I had not fully appreciated it was that bad. As to your question:
I'm sorry I cannot be of much help. I have never been in an A330 cockpit, and all I know about it is from contributions on this and the previous thread. From these I understand that AoA is not available, engine parameters are available by selecting a particular page on the ECAM, and about THS I know nothing. I would expect that display of engine parameters is automatic in some abnormal conditions, but don't know if A/THR OFF is one of these.
regards,
HN39

Machinbird;

The following are images of the two ECAM pages which are always default-visible during the Cruise phase of the flight.

System pages may be viewed at any time on the bottom ECAM display by selecting that system from a panel on the pedestal, just below the ECAM displays. Should an abnormality occur, the affected system page is displayed automatically.

A very brief description:

The E/WD appears on the upper ECAM display unit (DU).

– The upper part of this DU displays :
• Engine parameters (refer to 2.71.90)
• Fuel on board (FOB) (refer to 2.28.20)
• Position of slats and flaps (refer to 2.27.40)

– The lower part of this DU displays messages generated by the FWC :
• Warning and caution messages when a failure occurs
• Memos when there is no failure

The lower part, which is dedicated to ECAM messages, is divided into two parts of several lines each.
Left part :
– Primary or independent warnings and cautions, or
– Memo information
Right part :
– Title of system affected by a primary or independent warning or caution in case of overflow on the left part, or
– Secondary failure, or
– Memo, or
– Special lines (such as “AP OFF”, “LAND ASAP”)

As soon as the FWC detects a failure, and if there is no flight phase inhibition active, the E/WD displays the title of the failure and actions to be taken.
The action line clears automatically when the flight crew has executed the required action.

A picture is worth a thousand posts. Top ECAM E/WD, Engine and Warning Display:

http://i277.photobucket.com/albums/k...M_EWD_page.jpg


The Lower ECAM, SD - Status Display.


http://i277.photobucket.com/albums/k...CruisePage.jpg

The THS setting is not displayed but the GWCG (Gross Weight CofG) is. The THS setting is available on the F/CTL - Flight Control ECAM page; note that the bottom section of the display remains the same:

http://i277.photobucket.com/albums/k...-03_174943.png


Below is a clearly-visible mechanical indication of the actual THS position right beside the mechanical THS trim wheels on the pedestal. the small pointer below the scale is the position of the THS. Along with the indication on the ECAM and in the MCDU, (Multi-Purpose Control and Display Unit -the interface keyboard with the FMGEC), it is checked for correctness on takeoff after the T/O data is received and the THS manually set (using the trim wheel).

Trim is otherwise automatic in flight.

The photo is taken from the F/O's seat.


http://i277.photobucket.com/albums/k...0_IMG_3037.jpg


Below is a very good image of an A330 cockpit at night. Notice the center ECAM screens in the standard cruise configuration; the THS actual position is visible in the green band beside the THS wheels on the thrust lever quadrant.

http://i277.photobucket.com/albums/k...ht_sharp_f.jpg


If I may offer a thought on this, what you're describing is a masking effect of an autoflight system; in such a scenario, the aircraft is assumed to be seriously out of trim but the autoflight system is masking the circumstances causing the mis-trimming by deflecting the flight controls or trimming to extreme positions. Across-wing fuel imbalances are thought to be one example.

The trim tank on the A330 holds about 4200kg of fuel, taking the CofG further aft to off-load the horizontal stabilizer from the traditional work it must do to during flight. The CofG is usually run between 29 and 37% MAC with a max after CofG, if I recall from a previous post, of around 39%.

That the THS began to trim NU to the point of "deep stall" (once the autopilot disconnected?) as a result of erroneous data signaling lower airspeed (requiring more NU trim) was not observed/noted in the other thirteen pitot/airspeed events which are listed at the end of the BEA Interim Report 2. I don't believe that the THS would be trimmed NU, while on autopilot, to the point where a deep stall condition would be latent with a resulting LOC once the autopilot disengaged. Just a thought....I may be misunderstanding your thought however!

We don't know anything about the THS setting for AF447 and so anything is conceivable. Whether it is probable, meaning that the possibility is within the design scope of the airplane, is, up to a point, a discussable matter. In the end, I believe that software engineers of extremely sophisticated systems such as exist in aircraft, will tell us that all possible modes of response can be known or tested nor can software be validated for all existing possibilities (whether they have occurred or not). I believe the QF A330 experience was like this; the BEA Report 2 does observe however that the QF event bears no similarity to AF447.

Hope this helps, Machinbird. It is far more difficult to explain the airplane in a typed discussion than by either flying it or even talking about it.

PJ2

Superstall?
 

Having had the opportunity to look at the B747 and MD11 stall, and additionally B737 stall behavior, I would be surprised if the spanwise flow of the A330 wing caused any aberrant pitch effects in the stall, and would expect that the aircraft would respond in time to a nose down elevator input if introduced, if the elevator authority has not been reduced by the stabiliser setting. In cruise flight, notwithstanding the use of fuel trimming tanks, the stabiliser setting is NOT a high nose up position. For the B744 (44%MAC, way outside limits...)and B777 (42%MAC) with aft CG, this still is not the case. The washout and engine pylons act to reduce the spanwise flow effect which is otherwise the principle cause of premature tip stalling.

The A310 AFL593 accident was a stall/spin event;
The CAL140 A300-600R event at NGO was due to engine thrust pitch up moment coupling with the nose up trim of the autopilot in opposition to the pilots nose down elevator response.

"* The F/O inadvertently triggered the Go lever. It is considered that the design of the GO lever contributed to it: normal operation of the thrust lever allows the possibility of an inadvertent triggering of the GO lever.
* The crew engaged the APs while GO AROUND mode was still engaged, and continued approach.
* The F/O continued pushing the control wheel in accordance with the CAP's instructions, despite its strong resistive force, in order to continue the approach.
* The movement of the THS conflicted with that of the elevators, causing an abnormal out-of-trim situation.
* There was no warning and recognition function to alert the crew directly and actively to the onset of the abnormal out-of-trim condition.
* The CAP and F/O did not sufficiently understand the FD mode change and the AP override function.
It is considered that unclear descriptions of the AFS (Automatic Flight System) in the FCOM (Flight Crew Operating Manual) prepared by the aircraft manufacturer contributed to this.
* The CAP's judgment of the flight situation while continuing approach was inadequate, control take-over was delayed, and appropriate actions were not taken.
* The Alpha-Floor function was activated; this was incompatible with the abnormal out-of-trim situation, and generated a large pitch-up moment. This narrowed the range of selection for recovery operations and reduced the time allowance for such operations.
* The CAP's and F/O's awareness of the flight conditions, after the PlC took over the controls and during their recovery operation, was inadequate respectively.
* Crew coordination between the CAP and the F/O was inadequate.
* The modification prescribed in Service Bulletin SB A300-22-602 1 had not been incorporated into the aircraft.
* The aircraft manufacturer did not categorise the SB A300-22-6021 as "Mandatory", which would have given it the highest priority. The airworthiness authority of the nation of design and manufacture did not issue promptly an airworthiness directive pertaining to implementation of the above SB."

There was no stall related pitch up...

http://aviation-safety.net/photos/di...0&vnr=1&kind=G

The CAL676 A300-600R event at TPE was due to an out of trim stabiliser and thrust pitch up moment not being countered by the pilot.

"The investigation team determined that the the following factors combination caused the accident:
1. during all the descent and the approach, the aircraft was higher than the normal path;
2. the crew coordination between the captain and the first officer was inadequate.
3. during 12 seconds, the crew did not counteract the pitch up tendency due to the thrust increase after go around, and then the reaction of the crew was not sufficient.
As a consequence the pitch up increased until the aircraft stalled."

there was no stall related pitch up....

AFL593 pitch was responsive to elevator throughout the upset, even when the aircraft remained in stall and post stall autorotation.

There have been numerous pitch up events with the A310 and A300-600, as well as some with the A320, such as Interflug @ UUEE, YouTube - Blackbox - 05 - Blaming the Pilot - Part 5 of 5 TAROM at CDG, http://www.bea.aero/docspa/1994/yr-a...r-a940924a.pdfUSAir @ Washington Reagan. They have invariably been the result of out of trim condition of the stabiliser ("THS" - Airbus...) and rapid pitch up trim related to the application of full TOGA thrust. Numerous of these resulted in aerodynamic stall, none resulted in stall related pitch up.

The A330 has (and it pains me to say so :}) a beautifully designed wing. Doesn't look like it but it truly is a great bit of aerodynamics. It is a far better wing than the A300/310/320. The leading edge radius is much larger than any Boeing design, and promotes a gentle aerodynamic stall break.

I have only ever looked at one stall event of an A330, which resulted from an overspeed causing a FCS related uncommanded pitch up which also exceeded max operating altitude of the aircraft, and resulted in a short duration of the aircraft being below VS1g, with varying gz causing short period stall. The recovery was normal, and I cannot recall any evidence of a further uncommanded pitch moment developing. Don't try this at home, but the A330 is a docile handling aircraft. (I remain unconvinced about the justification of having a full rating TOGA setting for day to day go arounds)

This is not Airbus bashing; I have seen B744 events where the crew have ended up in a fairly spectacular unusual attitude through the application of TOGA x2 pushes, and getting full TOGA thrust on a light weight go around. As good as an airshow, and the pax don't have to pay extra! :D

At altitude, the AFR447 engines would not generate that much thrust, a little over 50% of sea level rated thrust, so the potential for pitch up resulting from thrust couple is reduced, but still exists to an extent.

The touchdown attitude some minutes after the precipitating event does not necessarily bear any direct relation to the initial upset.

regards,

FDR

PJ2
Thank you for a very detailed answer. I understand the difficulty in explaining these systems in a clear and succinct manner. The paper manuals for the aircraft are hundreds of pages long. I'm going to take a little time to be sure I understand the available aircrew information. At this point, it appears that Airbus did an admirable job in their cockpit design save for the typical airliner aversion for displaying AOA. Can I assume that the manual trim wheel turns as the automatic system trims the aircraft?

Actually, the thought runs a bit differently.
If the initial airspeed errors generated were to the high side of the true value and did not yet exceed rejection criterea, the autothrottle system would throttle back to bring the aircraft back on calculated target speed. As the aircraft slowed, the auto flight system would trim nose up to keep the elevator centered and the aircraft on altitude. Suppose the aircraft lost perhaps 30 knots actual IAS before the airspeed rejection criterea activated and thrust lock activated, throwing the aircraft into alternate law. As long as the aircraft was in alternate law the THS would continue to autotrim and the flight control system would maintain aircraft attitude absent an input from the aircrew, however the aircraft would be seriously under-throttled and decelerating. When the aircraft then transitioned to Direct Law, auto trim would stop, but by then THS position could be very nose up. Of course, Airbus may very well have written protecting limits into their software that would stop this sequence before it progressed this far.
(Note: writing this at work so I don't have references at hand)
Thank you again PJ2 for your response. After all the posts on this and related threads, it is probably hard not to say, "Oh No! Here is another one of those."
Machinbird

Machinbird;

Airbus did a brilliant job. The ECAM warnings and drills are extremely well thought out and works providing the crew are very strictly disciplined and follow the ECAM drills to the letter, and right to the very end of the drill. Great confusion/wrong airplane system responses can occur if the crew doesn't do this.
The THS trim wheel moves and is very visible in it's motion in the cockpit, day or night. The only thing it's missing is the noise from the B727's trim wheel. It just goes silently about its business. Trimming using manual trim in an emergency (loss of all electrics - the motors still require hydraulics), is not difficult, (in the sim).
Some research done into speeds may be helpful here plus some understanding of Airbus Reversion Laws when speeds change from computed/commanded for whatever reason. Let's look at the speeds then your assumptions.

Assuming AF447 weights or a bit heavier:
A330-200, 211T, 25%CofG, FL350 (FuelOB 64.9T), Cruise M0.81

TAS..........................................469kts
CAS..........................................274kts
VMO.........................................292kts
Green Dot, (best L/D)...............249kts
Vls, (lowest selectable speed)...214kts
AlphaProt.................................203kts
AlphaMax.................................196kts

In Normal Law, AlphaMax is the maximum angle of attack that can be flown. The airplane can be flown with full backstick and will not stall (go below AlphaMax).

In Alternate Law the airplane will go below this speed without automatic response from the engines but the crew can apply TOGA thrust and execute the standard response to the stall. The stall characteristics are benign although at altitude it can take a lot of sky to ensure recovery and avoid a secondary (to quick to increase AoA) stall.

To your example then, assuming normal cruise speed of 274kts CAS, the airplane is almost 80kts away from AlphaMax speed and 60kts away from the lowest selectable speed. In fact in your 30kts-lost example we can see that the best L/D speed is just under 30kts away from the cruise CAS.

So, to the point, it isn't a matter of 30kts away from difficulty even this early in the flight, (some have suggested the airplane was very close to "coffin corner" - not the case, as shown here). The airplane is no different than any other - the trim does respond to reductions in airspeed as does the autothrust - one sees this especially in mountain waves and while the point is understood, the numbers don't bear out the theory and Airbus has indeed built protections in as described.

One important point which seems to be at odds with your scenario is, the airplane does not revert to Alternate then Direct law merely as a function of reduced speed. Reverting to Alternate Law or Direct law means a loss of data references has occurred and the airplane has no target speeds to maintain. The airplane is a DC8, etc and one must be a pilot, not a manager.

Airbus speed reversions are much less interventionist than Alternate/Direct law. In cruise flight, the a/t maintains speed very tightly. One rarely seems the trim wheel move a great deal.

However, (and only if flying manually) and in a climb or descent and one does not follow the flight directors and either pitches NU beyond commands or levels off before capturing the set altitude without intervening in any other way, the speed will indeed bleed off (because there are no FCU/Autoflight conditions to be satisfied) until about 4kts or so above Vls at which time the a/t reverts to "SPEED" or "MACH" and the engine power increases to regain the last set speed. It can be exciting...but in normal law the airplane will not go below Vls unless in Alternate or Direct Law.

In Alternate 1 or 2 laws or Direct law, it is a "normal" airplane like a DC8 etc and one must fly it incuding the engine thrust.

In short, even in very low speed circumstances as described and with the standard CofG with trim tank full, I think the THS would be a long way from a setting which would take the airplane into a deep/super stall as per Davies' description, all on its own, beyond the control of the crew.

fdr's comments are well worth reviewing, especially regarding the power available....the engines are running at 93% in cruise most of the time. Max CL N1 is around 104% if I recall...there just isn't much more available to either pitch up with or overspeed with (on engine power alone).

PJ2

PJ2
Thank you again for a thoughtful and careful response. The scenario described was intended to be AF447 specific, ie. impending loss of all ADRs. Once you have a double ADR fault, autopilot and autothrottles drop out. With ADR disagreement, you have ALT 2 flight control laws which also means loss of Alpha Prot. in this case. When 3 PRIMs drop out, which appears to have happend in AF447, you have Direct Law. The 30 knot suggested hidden airspeed dropoff would have been just the beginning. The cavalry charge alarm would announce the remainder.
What ECAM procedure would have priority on the display in this situation? Logically UAS should be, but are their exceptions in the logic?
Thanks and best wishes,
Machinbird

RE: Machinbird #498
There is also Stall Warning and Stall Ident. To get a feel for the deck angle variation I have estimated the AoA for the speeds given in PJ2’s #507 in the table below (deck angle equals AoA in level flight):

A330-200, 211T, 25%CofG, FL350 (FuelOB 64.9T), Cruise M0.81
............................................................ ............. AoA (deg)
TAS..........................................469kts
CAS..........................................274kts ............. 2.9
VMO.........................................292kts ............. 2.0
Green Dot, (best L/D)...............249kts ............. 4.4
Vls, (lowest selectable speed)...214kts ............. 7.3
AlphaProt.................................203kts .............. 8.5
AlphaMax.................................196kts .............. 9.3

regards,
HN39

HazelNuts39;

I wonder if you meant pitch attitude? The AoA at stall is, just guessing, going to be around 14 to 18deg perhaps a bit higher given the wing.

Again, for everyone's information, none of these images "points to cause" - I am providing them only for demonstration and understanding and not for speculation or investigating:

For 212k kg, FL350 the pitch attitude at AlphaProt is almost 9deg; the CBT autoflight software doesn't simulate Alternate law and remains in Normal Law so it correctly pitches down at AlphaProt engaging the autothrust Alpha mode and won't give the pitch attitude at AlphaMax. Snapshot below:


http://i277.photobucket.com/albums/k...Prot212kkg.jpg

Machinbird;

If I am understanding correcly are you suggesting that crews would not notice (because AoA is not annunciated or THS setting etc?) a 30kt drop in airspeed and "the cavalry charge alarm would announce the remainder"? That's what I'm reading in between the lines. If this is not the thinking perhaps I have misread.

Notwithstanding the one glaring example of a crew not paying attention to airspeed while flying the airplane on approach, a 30kt loss of airspeed in cruise is HUGE; ten knots and the crew is all over it monitoring autothrust response. It's not that uncommon and mountain wave activity is a primary example; speed variations of that order (10 to 15kts sometimes more but less so) are not uncommon in heavy turbulence, but again the crew would be all over it. I've disconnected the autothrust many times and left it at one thrust setting and let the speed wander up and down, within reason of course. In rare, serious displacements such as in substantial up/down drafts in convective or mountain wave activity, one lets the altitude wander just to ensure that a reasonable pitch attitude is maintained; otherwise large excursions and the scenarios outlined by fdr above can develop. And all this would be open to professional discussion and perhaps disagreement as others may have slightly different approaches but the essentials are what I'm trying to convey here.

In the scenario you're positing, the cavalry charge would signal disconnection of the autopilot long before speed was lost simply because of the loss of the PRIMs. The single chime would announce the disengagement of the autothrust and would also be continuously sounding, announcing new ECAM messages which would be appearing on the lower ECAM and which would be continuously re-prioritizing. As to which ECAM procedure would be prioritized, I have no idea but there would be a lot of them but that's what we train for.

To this end, as I have described before, great discipline would be required under such circumstances waiting until the airplane and warnings settled down so one could do the drills. The absolute first priority is flying the airplane by pitch attitude (which they had) and power both of which should instantly be in the hands of the PF; that is what the Unreliable Airspeed drill is all about. BTW, the unreliable airspeed abnormal does not come up on the ECAM - the first few items are memorized, (which should be obvious) and the entire drill is in the QRH. Examples of the AF drill are shown in the Appendices of the BEA 2nd Interim Report.

PJ2

quote PJ2

Unless you encounter a double engine failure/flame out, where Airbus instructs NOT to follow ECAM, as it could lead to wrong decisions/switchings!!
In such a high risk upset you have to grab the QRH in the semi-dark and start reading and acting .......

Brilliant job indeed.

BEA - Press Release 15 March 2010
 

Flight AF 447 on 1st june 2009
A330-203, registered F-GZCP

Information, 15 March 2010

The arrival of the « Anne Candies » from the United States has been delayed, as the BEA announced in a previous release. Arrival in Recife is now planned around 24 March, depending on the sea conditions encountered. It will join the « Seabed Worker » there.

A stopover is planned for the transfer of the equipment transported by the « Anne Candies » onto the « Seabed Worker », and to take on fuel. During this short stopover, the BEA will hold a press conference in the presence of the teams of investigators and those involved in the sea and undersea search operations.

Given the uncertainties surrounding the date of arrival of the « Anne Candies » and the length of the stopover, the date of this press conference cannot be set until Friday 19 March at the earliest.

Link to above - Information, 15/03/2010
-------------------

mm43

Does anyone other that me get the idea that perhaps the airplane etc does not want to be found. From where I sit, the delays are dumb founding, and the silence deafning. The longer the procrastination, the more likely, no airplane, leaving the way to determine what ever cause seems to fit the situation. Hello Concord.
ww

At FL350 ?
Never been there by chance but would be very surprised by such AoA figures ... !?

To me your CBT autoflight software is not really representative performance wise, a simulator would be a better reference.
I believe the numbers produced by HN39 for the AoA make more sense, I would be interested to know how he did estimate them ?

ww, you're pretty close ...

AoA
 

Probably been said before better.

FWIW, clean, the wing will stall between 11-12 alpha, without the activity of autoslats (don't know if the A330 would have that at FL350...).

What the crew face is a known area of turbulence, likely causing variations of ATT, Mno, THR, and some short period variations of IVSI & ALT. At some point in the encounter, the pitots fail causing erroneous CAS data, which upsets the PFD CAS/Mno displayed, and would affect the ATR THR settings by altering the targets. (IIRC, the EPRL will still be correctly set though using the engines own P1/T1 probes). The only real indication of speed for the crew is the ATT of the aircraft which is being affected by turbulence... and so is difficult to evaluate. The alpha is not displayed on the PFD's as a discrete display, (on Boeing's the AoA vanes provide one of the inputs to the minimum speed displayed on the PFD... don't know about A330's)

The stall warning would still be valid if occurring, but may occur at the same time that the crew get ambiguous warnings such as overspeed etc. Coupled to all of this is that until the PRIM/SEC detect that sensor error(s) exists, the flight controls are getting inputs from false data, including potentially both high and/or low CAS conditions where FBW envelope protections occur.

This condition is bad enough in day/VMC conditions, in night/IMC/turbulence, distinguishing what the error is and what valid sources exist would be challenging.

This event also follows the QFA072 A330 upset where the causal factor was the AoA vane data to the ADIRS.

The final indicator of performance remaining to the crew was the pitch ATT (theta) relative to the horizon, which infers the AoA, and therefore CAS. This is functionally removed due to the turbulent state as being accurate information.

IMHO, what is surprising is that on numerous occasions previously, this form of ADIRS data failure has not caused an accident.

The recovery from an upset without valid primary data is at best difficult, and in night/IMC I would wager improbable for the first crews to encounter such a case. Would the next crew fare better? I would hope so.

]

[note: if the A330 does have autoslat capability at altitude, the potential for aggravation of the flightpath management exists, they cause no end of problem at high mach... I don't have the books here with me at home to check the AI systems...]

regards,

FDR.

Seen from where you're sitting, the world is still flat.
Could you please start your own AF447-bat thread, and take your ignorance there, rather than act the fool here?
By the way, there once was an aircraft called Concorde... but I suppose you are referring to the battle of Concord?

CJ

There is a function which inhibits slats retraction at high AoA or low speed, but no autoslats deployment on the A330.

Not on the 330 but from memory, the AoA will trigger the stall warning.

CONF iture;
Well, I hesitated using the CBT for this very reason but did so because these speeds (but not the pitch although I have no basis to doubt it) were independently verified as accurate from book sources.

For clarity, the term "Angle of Incidence" is sometimes used instead of "Angle of Attack". I know also "incidence" means the angle at which the wing is mounted on the fuselage, (chord vs longitudinal axis).

Of course, pitch attitude and AoA are entirely independent of one another.

Recovery from the stall is part of the script for initial conversion. From simulator experience during initial training on the airplane the pitch attitudes described and on the CBT are in the ball park, perhaps higher.

(To get the simulator to actually stall, a failure has to occur so the airplane is in Alternate (or Direct) Law. It takes a great deal of back-stick pressure to get the airplane to stall. In my recollection it was very docile, at low altitude, (14,000ft AGL, anyway.)

We don't know what the AoA was during the exercise of course because there is no cockpit indication of such. Traditionally the industry has never used AoA because for any specific weight there is a direct, corresponding relationship between CAS and AoA regardless of altitude. "For every air speed - as indicated on the Air Speed Indicator - there is a corresponding angle of attack at which level flight can be maintained (provided the weight of the aeroplane does not change)" - Kermode, Mechanics of Flight, 1962.

The actual VS is not displayed in the A330. AlphaMax is VS 1.0g and is slightly higher than VS, (explained below). VLS is 1.23 VS 1.0g for the approach phase. Vapp is VLS +5kts plus FMGC-added wind to maintain the energy of the aircraft in strong winds and/or shear conditions.

From actual experience with flight data, for Vref +5kts (which is "Vapp" in the A320), on approach we will typically see AoA's of 5 to 6deg with pitch attitudes of 2 to 3 degrees at 1.23VS 1.0g. So "6deg of AoA" is not close to the stall.

On my "guess" regarding the AoA, I thought of Davies' diagram, (Davies uses the term, "Angle of Incidence" or just plain "incidence"), in which the C/Lmax occurs at around 18deg AoA or incidence. Now I fully realize that Davies' work is dated and the diagram is (necessarily) generic but in the absence of solid information anywhere, I posited the notion that an AoA for a swept wing on a transport to stall would be around 14-18 degrees. It's not 6 or 7.

The following is from the FCOM regarding VS:
So regarding AoA, this leaves us with an open question which may or may not be thread drift depending upon what the recorders have to say. If they are found...

As always I am happy to be corrected in any of this, with information or data that supports the opposite view. I'm posting for learning, not to be right or "win the debate".

PJ2

Anne Candies
 

To view an Atlantic significant wave direction and height animation for H to H+180 hours, go to -

North Atl Animation

The predominate wind and sea conditions along the northern South American coast are 060°T/20KTS height 9FT/2.5M becoming 090°T/5-10TS height 3FT/1M in next 5 days.

It would seem the vessel is not handling the conditions that well, and the North Brazilian current is very strong at this time of the year, which wont be helping. An approximate position for the vessel at 1200z 16 March 2010 is 4°45N 49°00W. The distance from Grand Isle to Recife is 3976NM.

mm43

AoA etc.
 

RE: CONF iture #514
The numbers are based on the relation between Liftcoëfficient and AoA which I derived from FDR data on an unvoluntary pitch-down/pitch-up maneuver of an A330 in flight QF72 as reported by the australian ATSB. Unfortunately the report does not provide the weight of the airplane and the ambient temperature at the time of the upset, which are essential parameters for this derivation. I have mailed a request for these data to the ATSB but got no reply. The derivation is based on my best estimate for these two numbers and I would be most grateful to anybody having more accurate information.

regards,
HN39

Interesting HN39, thanks.

Regarding QF72, for the temp I don't know, but for the weight, my guess would be somewhere between 187 and 185T ? as the event happened after 3:10 of flight time and TOW was at 207T.

That's the part in red I'm not sure about, but I don't have the knowledge so I'll keep it quiet, maybe someone would explain more ... ?
The best would be to flight test these lower speeds during a ferry at FL something, but I still need/like my job.