Black holes
 

I have been reading the two BEA reports on AF447 back and forth a couple of times now. Compared to earlier AAIB reports on upsets like QF72, and others, the BEA reports are almost completely empty of information about the FBW software/hardware in use and the version of system producing the ACARS messages. The earlier investigations referred to have shown that the software of the ADIRU:s was updated/modified several times, sometimes even making things worse than before with regard to the responses to unusual input data.
Thus we (I) apparently still don't know the software versions and revisions running on the various computers on AF447, and not even the version of computers and details of the hardware used. Was the false airspeed indication due to pitot-icing or to someting else - like one or more software bugs/hardware problems?
Is there any such information available somewhere that I have missed? Please!

Software bugs
 

To Diversification:

should you somehow get the information regarding software versions (which do indeed change, for ADIRUs and other computers, including flight controls :eek:), this would not help you. Unless you have access to proprietary manufacturer's information.

However, someone with a good dose of patience would be able to use the ACARS messages, along with FCOM chapter 27 and determine the way flight controls operate in such dire situation as attested by these messages.

Remember, we only have the ACARS message titles to study from. The real messages should be much more detailed. And they have not found their way into a report yet.

svarin

That is the absolute Truth. A categorical message is a starting point. Wind Shear inop at Cruise? It should be. Just a "heads up"? to not expect the utility at low altitude?
RTLU, Fail. Why did BEA state the Rudder was limited by the control? Was it a status only light? Due to Law change?

Just a little further to go re: 121.5. Wouldn't the crew be disturbed by the lack of following? Or was it received as casually as the DAKAR? What is the Line SOP?
If the crew were experiencing a difficulty, on top of no interrogation by Dakar, why in the World would they hesitate to use 121.5 Fear of the "Guard Police". It is a tool, for appropriate use: recontacting, contacting, reporting, etc.

bear

Re: Black holes
 

Svarin,
I agree to some degree with your statements, however, in my eyes, the reports are still somewhat loopsided giving, e.g. some detailed data on the engines (like their numbers) but not very much of the same detail on the FBW-system.
Make a wild assumption: new software was first uploaded to the ADIRUs of this aircraft before it left France. Could that hint to a possible root problem, that otherwise would be improbable?
Your comments on the incomplete ACARS messages contains info that is new to me. Do you imply that only a fraction of their content was released in the BEA reports?
Regards

Incomplete ACARS messages
 

To Diversification :

I can state that what appears in the pictures relative to ACARS messages as they were shown on this forum, first thread, is this : 'Libelle succint du message'

This translates roughly as 'Shorthand title of the message'

Which means the full details of these messages are somewhere, but not in the reports.

Svarin .
Thanks for the very important info. about the ACARS - which I have missed. Why is it so? This implies that much of the speculation on this thread and on a.net is based in incomplete info (may be even misleading?),.
Regards

Re Radio

There is reason to suppose that things went from the crew having several ("non-emergency") problems to deal with (first few mins of acars), that would not have had them thinking of transmitting on 121.5; to "hell in a handcart" (around 02:14), in which case their priorities and workload may well have disallowed any time and or ability to consider and then actually transmit.

SA

I think all the information is out there (and in this thread), specifically in the QF72 AAIB report: bad sensors+bad algorithm=bad outcome (uncommanded pitch).

Then combine that with AF447s altitude and wx and changing to manual law (no overspeed or stall protections IIRC).

Lost in translation?
 

Are you sure that your translation is correct? You are referring to a printout (presumably produced by an AF Maintenance Dept. computer). The actual messages as sent and received are formatted differently. BEA's 1st interim report gives a detailed description.

regards,
HN39

P.S. For example, the FLR (failure) messages are truncated when their length exceeds the number of characters allowed by the tabulation of the 'Maintenance' printout.

Diversification, Svarin;
I wonder why you are both convinced that there is a heap more information associated with the ACARS messages? Before you leap into answering that, just consider the following:-

• Why has the BEA gone to so much trouble in both its Interim Reports (in conjunction with Airbus) to interpret and explain to the best of its ability the "limited" information those messages portrayed?
• Did they not expand thoroughly the data fields associated with each message?
• How much more data are you proposing was actually sent?
• Why were the messages sequenced and timed the way they were at receipt?

Well you can't expand upon that, because there wasn't enough time (as has been explained in the reports) for any further data to be sent, and that was due to the ACARS protocol/SATCOM link speed.

I'm not disputing that we don't know if there had been a preflight software update to the ADIRUs, but surely if there was, that would have been raised by the BEA and an AD issued if other aircraft had received the same update. Likewise, the facts (as are known) have been dissected and speculated upon 'ad infinitum' in this and other forums, but at this late stage to suggest that there is "non divulged data" associated with the ACARS messages, is IMO approaching the realms of fantasy.

mm43

HN39,
Do you have a quick pointer to the BEA's 1st interim report?
With close on 2400 posts, it would save me a tedious search.
Me too, I start to suspect all we've ever seen is the "libellé" (header), rather than the full message.

mm39,
You may well be right.
A "libellé" refers to a "header", not to a full message.
Whether we're looking at the full 'raw' message content is still an open question.
I'm not familiar enough with ACARS.

CJ

BEA Reports
 

ChristiaanJ, all of the BEA reports are posted on their web site, here:

FLIGHT AF 447 (english)

Edit: I should have pointed out that the original French is here: Vol AF 447

auve-ee,
Thanks, you save me wading through a stack of posts and earlier files.

CJ

Meeting with BEA 13 December 2010
 

The Brazilian "Association of Relatives of Victims of Flight 447" (AFVV447) have met with the Pernambuco Province prosecutor in a bid to get their concerns raised at a meeting with the BEA by the Federal Public Ministry, Federal Police, Cindacta 3 and representatives of the French government to be held on 13 December 2010.

The AFVV447 are seeking to have the search for the flight data recorders from AF447 resumed, and they also want information relating to AF445 which a year ago had what they assume is a similar in flight incident. They have also expressed concern that the level of computerization of A330 aircraft has lead to a loss of safety due to its complication which results in a loss of situational awareness by the pilots.

The above is a précis of an article in Portuguese at Diario de Pernambuco

mm43

Can you blame them, in all fairness the wreckage won't be found in a boardroom. Just how long i wonder will they wait before a private firm is hired to search for AF447. I am sure Dr. Robert Ballard could be persuaded.

It will be a salver, a movie producer, an eccentric billionaire, or the familes group. The BEA is seemingly satisfied with their lack of success, having searched all areas except the part of the Sea they ignored, eg: the most likely spot.

bear, just my opinion.

Anyone, what time of the year is most friendly surface sea wise for another search mission? I continue to hope for an announcement that some additional effort will be put forth, but as each resumption date put forward by the BEA passes by without a substitive comment, one can only think negative thoughts. My initial doubts remain.

Hi,

If this is true and that a search conducted by independents found the wreckage in the area where the BEA did not (refused?) search ... BEA will be prosecuted for obstructing the search for truth.

Thus a serious threat to do just that might get things moving again. I would imagine if the AFVV447 released a press statement along the lines of,

"expression of interest are sort from private deep sea salvage companies for the location of a a recently lost commercial aircraft that has been discarded by it's operator and manufacturer"

Should do the trick.

Or perhaps that is indeed the best way to be sure it is found.

Worked here!!!

South African Airways Flight 295

The South Africans searched unsuccessfully with sonar for the wreckage for two months before abandoning the search on 8 January 1988 when the pingers were known to have stopped transmitting. Steadfast Oceaneering, a specialist deep ocean recovery company in the USA, was therefore contracted to find the site and recover the cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder. The search area is described as being comparable in size to that of the RMS Titanic, with the water at 5,000 metres (16,000 ft) being considerably deeper. However the wreckage was found within two days of the sonar search of the area commencing.

I would imagine that a BEA don't want that sort of thing said about them. They have had enough time to think up ways of moving the blame from them by now, time to get serious and find the thing.

Helderberg search
 

Contracted by whom?