I posted this question on another thread, but didn't get an answer. What model radar was Air France 447 using? The new digital Honeywell RDR-4000 is listed as an option on the A330, but I don't think the aircraft was new enough to have it. Does anyone know if Air France A330's are using the RDR-4000?

I didn't see a reply to this, but here's my simple take on this: The last thing you want when fighting for your life and asking for help, is to jam your radio. That is why military pilots are trained to turn off the parachute beacon ASAP. If you are transmitting on 121.5 (or 243.0), then you can't talk on it. If you can't turn it off (you're hurt or unconscious), then you want it to automatically turn on.

Hello everyone, this is my first post here, and i hope i got the right topic for this.

As seen recently in the news, there is a discussion about the un-overridable fly-by-wire technology in the Airbuses, compared to the overridable tech in the Boeing planes.

Now, most of you have a lot more experience in this topic than me, which is exactly why i am asking here.

Please correct me if i am wrong, but if i remember correctly, Airbus planes had (i think it was) three switches to disable all the flight support computers on board and override them manually.

Or am i really wrong on this one?

I'm just asking out of pure interest, would be glad if someone could help me with that issue :)

982500h
 

Sorry, but you are talking Vietnam war technology.
Modern a/c ELTs transmit on 406MHz which is nowhere near any voice band.
MAYDAY calls are made on 121.5MHz or any other available one. This is an ICAO approved procedure - not only a recommendation! And as stated before in post #22 in this forum, I find it utterly improbable and unacceptable that the crew didn't make it! I still believe that finding the reason for this will be a major contribution in establishing the cause for the disaster!
Pls do not mislead the uninformed...
:mad:

Other flights where no mayday was made before they perished:
Perpignan A320
UA585 Colorado Springs
Continental Connection Flight 3407, Buffalo NY
EgyptAir Flight 990
AirFlorida flight 90, 1982
Copa Airlines Flight 201, 1992

They all had time to key the mike. No value, unaffordable, counterproductive. Perhaps if you ever have an urgent crisis you'll understand. Perhaps not.

Amoung those who did: (radio calls)
USAir 427, 1994, ("Oh [unintelligible] Oh [expletive]" and "427 emergency")
Alaska Air Flight 261, 2000, ("Mayday")

I ignored flights where they crashed just short of the runway in bad weather, and a number of others which crashed just after takeoff. It wouldn't be fair to you to add these.

further update from Tim Vasquez
 

Tim has posted a further update on his MET site http://www.weathergraphics.com/tim/af447/ with a specific request for assistance from the pilot community.

Could somebody report this on R&N please? I have no access to it. Thx Bert

Update / June 9, 2009:

Myself (Ed: TIM) and Scott Bachmeier at University of Wisconsin/Space Science and Engineering Center are requesting that airline pilots who observed a significant warming episode at cruise altitude within the past 10 years and know the exact date/time and approximate location please drop us an e-mail with the story and include your credentials (which will remain anonymous). Unfortunately we must have an exact date and time in order to research the event. I have received a number of anecdotes from pilots who report encountering the phenomena, and while neither of us see evidence yet which supports this occurring in the Air France 447 storm cluster we believe it's a good idea to research this further rather than just dismissing it at this point. We appreciate your help.

Complete ACARS Messages
 

Regarding a search for AF447 ACARS messages, i found anywhere
(do not know where), that there should be a guy that holds all
received messages complete.
Is there anyone here, that have these original, not reformated messages
and can send it via private mail and attachment ?
(Or giving a hint, where it can be downloaded...)

ELT's transmit on 406 to talk to satellites for ID (and GPS if available) as per:

http://www.cospas-sarsat.org/Documen...ompleteDoc.pdf

It also includes a 121.5 option

The US FCC (and a lot of others) require 121.5 transmissions as before (but at a lower power) for final homing purposes.

You can find a clean file in R&N thread, or you can look at my post in Italian Forum, under relevant Thread. By the way, the ACARS messages which can be found is only maintenance ACARS without position reports.

Regards,
PapaEcho

EASA Issue SIB about Unreliable Airspeed Indications
 

Hi folks,
as you can see on EASA Airwothiness Directives section, under NON-MCAI, the European Authority have raised a Safety Information Bulletin (something like SAIB for FAA issue) regarding the Unreliable Airspeed Indications, where is required the operators and pilots to start assesment and recurrent training on Unreliable Airspeed Indications condition in order to identify and take corrective action as soon as experienced.

The direct link to this SIB is: EASA Airworthiness Directives Publishing Tool

In my opinion this SIB is a good system to throw media and press attentions out from construcotr and, why not, authority too.
So, now, if the aircraft we fly is not equipped with a satisfactory stand-alone stanby system, the problem is the pilot not trained and the operators poor training about that. :D Thanks guys, I will log on my Logbook anytime I will experience this type of accident stating in the notes "My company not provide training good enough & I'm a dm'ass because I'm not well trainee to read indications from my completely unreliable and failed instruments" :=

PapaEcho

At Boac.
 

Not sure if it's been answered as I'm just scanning the threads but SAT is calculated by the ADC as a function of TAT(measured by the TAT probe (when not iced up)) and Mach number(calculated by the ADC as a function of pressure(static and dynamic))

or at least that's what they told me when i were a lad.

Thanks FE - that was what I thought, but I wondered if there was some canny little thermocouple somewhere out of the airstream.

You are evidently unaware of the physical construction of a Rosemount TAT Probe and its heating system. The phenomenon of rising temperature is the result of the blockage of the air flow through the probe (and there is a flow - the air is not brought to a complete standstill) and subsequent heating of the detecting element by the probe's own anti-icing protection. It takes a lot of energy to raise the temperature of a probe that is air-blasted by air at -40C degrees C, to -5 degrees C, but with a blocked probe that is exactly what will happen. The ice will not penetrate into the sensor cavity and the sensor will be heated by radiant energy.

Greetings,
May the Crew and Passengers of this Flight Rest In Peace.
Why must we assume that it was ice that did provoque an unreliable Airpseed situation.
pitots and sensors are just calibrated tubes or holes, transmitting to the computors whatever is going through.
I think we could focus on the "whatever is going through"
If the recommandation to change the pitot tube had a sense of urgency, it would have been done OVERNIGHT :ouch:
Very often the Radar attracts Lightning, and is not the first time nor the last that the Radom will simply be blown away leaving a flat surface, which highly distrubs the Airflow to the pitots and probes, along with a big drag increase.
Severe turbulence CAN trigger flight controls to revert to DIRECT LAW (shake the controls in the simulator, and watch it happen) and all this happening in a giant storm.
It is easier to blame the technology and probably send the lawyers to try to get some juicy compensations :E, rather than looking at the reality and blame a Giant Thunderstorm. :=

"Very often the Radar attracts Lightning..."

Yeah, sure.

Like I told a line pilot once, "Oh, this is low power radar; it can't attract lightning." And that's the truth..

Greetings,
IONISATION is the attracting factor, not power.
:}

SLF questions here. I am not a pilot, but have over 30 years in the IT industry, most of that focused on user interface. My questions are;

On the 330, when the autopilot disengages, how is that communicated to the crew? Also, from the same perspective, how is the transition from Normal Law to Alternate or Direct Law communicated? Is it possible that when the flight, possibly unexpectedly, entered severe turbulence, that one or more of those cues may have been missed?

audio warning, if it was disabled with a system fault. I agree with what you say but it still rises alot of questions but all answer at the moment are hitting a :ugh: because we can only base these issue on facts.

Because it has happened before. Try checking the reason behind the 2002 Airworthiness Directive and the more recent focus on upgraded Pitot Probes that had not yet been fitted to the accident aircraft.

Lightning damage to radomes is very, very common and the results are not dramatic. Just a series of small holes in the paintwork.

Lets not forget about the bright red Master Warning light flashing in front of your eyes...