Oh dear.

Hope Rainboe's not about.

If you are sir, take blood thinning agents at your earliest convenience


Edit; please previous poster, stop.

You aren't helping anything or anyone.

Least of all the work colleagues or relatives of those concerned

Of course we can't jump to conclusions, the answers will come in the fullness of time, but abrupt pitch ups are not unknown.

24 SEP 1994 - Tarom Flight 381 approach to Paris-Orly Runway 26 and the captain was at the controls. He decided to perform an automatic approach and landing. The flight crew started to put the aircraft into the approach configuration, with slats and flaps at 15/0 at 10.42:05, then at 15/15 at 10.42:53. The landing gear was extended at 10.42:57. Approaching the OYE beacon at indicated speed 250 kt and heading 325, before lining up with the runway, the Captain noted that the aircraft was not capturing the ILS glide slope automatically. He disconnected the AP and continued the approach on manual control, keeping the Autothrottle in operation. As the aircraft descended through 1,700 feet, at 10.43:22, with a speed of about 195 knots, the Captain asked for flap extension to 20 . The VFE, the speed limit authorized for this new configuration, is 195 knots. When the flap control was set to 20 , the thrust levers advanced and engine thrust increased. The flight crew countered the nose-up effect resulting from the increase in thrust by using the pitch controls, with the auto-throttle (ATHR) remaining in automatic mode. The throttle levers were then quickly brought back to the idle position. At the same time, the trimmable horizontal stabilizer started to move in a nose-up direction. The nose up effect that resulted was countered by the flight crew through gradual nose-down action on the elevators. When the trimmable horizontal stabilizer reached its maximum nose-up value and the elevators also reached their maximum nose down value, the throttle levers, according to the FDR readout, moved rapidly to their stops. In a few seconds, the flight path started to rise and the pitch attitude went to 60 . Witnesses saw the aircraft climb. It banked sharply to the left and the right and stalled before adopting a strongly negative pitch attitude (-33 degrees) towards the ground. The maximum altitude reached was 4,100 feet, while a minimum indicated speed of 35 knots was recorded. The stall and ground proximity warnings sounded during the descent. The flight crew managed to regain control of the aircraft, with the lowest point being around a height of 800 feet, that is 240 meters from the ground. The flight crew then performed a visual circuit, followed from the tower by the controller. The second approach was made with a configuration with slats and flaps at 20/20. Landing took place at 10.52:25.

And many more.

FAA human factors report "The Interfaces Between Flightcrews and Modern Flight Deck Systems" http://ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/Aero...0/interfac.pdf

Loose Rivet - no 330 has 'famously' gone into the trees... A 320 once did, but that's done and dusted.

Clearly each engine makes a different sound, don't they ? and a lightly loaded 2 - eng aeroplane clearly can't fly on one engine.

Enquiry complete.

... and where did we get that choice piece of misinformation??

They were on or about the 11DME arc and were apparently cleared to 4000ft.

4NM from the threshold is not over water.

I'll go with Tyres here .. leave it.

Sorry, my mistake, will correct.


Done, yes. Dusted? Situations like that one always leave that nagging doubt. Well, to me anyway.

Porter1 go back to the flight sim forum from which you came and stay there, you're talking absolute bollocks about something you clearly know nothing about. :mad:

I think its less being scared about fly by wire, more concerned about the microchips in between telling the aircraft what the intensions of the pilot might have been. 1:1 transmitting pilot signals "by wire" to the aircraft works fine. Understood the comments like that.

Ok. I'll cross you off that invite for a ride inthe B2 and the one for the F117.:ugh:

"4 NM from the threshold" it definitely was not as the distance to the sea is at least 7 NM. Would have been easy to check.
If they were indeed descending through FL 120 and cleared for 4000 feet for an ILS approach, but were observed to be at roughly 1000 ft some 10 NM out, this would suggest to me their problems had already started a bit earlier and they could not control the descent for some reason. Hope for answers soon.

Fly By Wire
 

ChrisVJ #128

There are cars made in Japan with so called fly by wire steering, that is an electronic link between the steering wheel and the steering rack. The one that come to mind is the new Honda Legend, but no country outside of Japan will certify it for use on their roads so the export models get conventional systems. Makes you wonder why then that aircraft manufacturers can get acceptance from their fly by wire products?

Back in my working day there was a project 'aerosat',
which could have been developed to enable data
forwarding. Before it's time and canceled around 1982 due to lack of interest by the aviation authorities.

How much knowledge do you have of aircraft fly by wire? Any at all? Because the above statement demonstrates to me that you have absolutely no knowledge of aviation, and in particular FBW.

Have you ever operated a FBW aeroplane? Do you understand the word quadruplex, triplex, redundancy or Control-Configured Vehicles? Have you any knowledge of the certification processes required? The flight testing regimes and requirements?

To arrive here with your first post and then condemn FBW aircraft by comparing them to a Honda Legend is brave.

I just discovered that I knew one of the XL cockpit crew involved in this accident and I must say I am a bit stunned.

Let me assure anyone here, there was no lack of experience on the XL crew involved as one was the DO and the other a TRI on type.

The only facts are that whatever happened happened quickly and was beyond normal (words from an Airbus TRE) make of it what you will.

RIP my friend, I hope its only blue skys in the beyond.

:(

Initially, various witnesses reported the roughly 1000ft I quoted. More recently, there is a report from the tower controller (presumably based on the approach radar?) that the a/c was at 2000ft when it started a turn and then descended rapidly until impact.

CJ

I forgot to mention....
On Concorde it was belts and braces and an elastic band and a piece of string....
Three hydraulic systems, two separate electrical signalling channels, mechanical backup (rods and cables) and finally, if the mechanical controls were jammed, strain gauges on the controls, that detected the forces being exerted by the pilots and controlled the system that way.
Don't know what's on more recent aircraft.

CJ

Flight Recorder Found
 

Midi Libre - Fait du jour - Une première boîte noire a été repêchée hierLoose translation: The flight recorder has been found, but access is more difficult. It should probably be recovered today.

And nor do 90% of the "aviation enthusiasts" posting on this thread. The 320 is an extraordinarily capable and robust aircraft compared to many other similarly sized types. Triple hydraulics (yep, with a DEF you get plenty of electrics and hydraulics) and a flight control system that has that many redundancies, backups and internal checks that it makes even the most seasoned Airbus pilot get a minor headache.

This short thread is worth a read:

http://www.pprune.org/engineers-tech...em-voting.html

It would be great if this thread could regain it's focus and be a source of useful information for the thousands of Airbus pilots who are wondering how on earth such an accident could happen. As usual, we need to know whatever it was, so that we can do our bit to make sure it doesn' happen to us. Those who want to copy and paste ridiculous newspaper inventions or spout some regurgitation from the Discovery Channel (or even those who have spend a lifetime in a 737 who want to vent their unfounded opinions on a more modern aircraft that they have never flown) could they please go elsewhere and leave this thread as a place for sensible and informed discussion?

Flyingphil
A 2001 reference

Cross-wired Controls Almost Bring Down Lufthansa Airliner | Air Safety Week | Find Articles at BNET

In all fairness, it's not entirely unknown for some of the professionals on here to expound their own pet prejudices against technologies, borne possibly out of fear they don't fully understand said technologies. "Computer says no" is a funny one-liner on TV because it reflects real-life experience with unyielding technology at home or in the office, but it bears absolutely no relation to the functioning of a modern FBW aircraft control system.

I'm not going to say anything about this accident until we have some more concrete information about what did or did not happen, but it does sadden me to see the finger pointed at technology before any of the wreckage has been brought ashore.

Hindsight Bias is a wonderful thing
 

To all us arm chair critics. Hindsight Bias is great but when things go wrong in the aircraft sometimes speed and altitude are your best friend.
No aircraft or crew is infallible. Look what happened the the QANTAS A330 near Learmonth. No 1ADIRU played up and the auto voting/switching system failed. If the incident had happened at a lower altitude then the situation could have been much worse. Automation is good to a point but if it fails revert to s submode or take over and fly manually (if you have the time).
Rumour mongering helps no one.

http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20081127-0

This website reports that the a/c was on it's second test flight of the day which to me suggests that blocked pitot/static sources are very unlikely.

Of course it leaves plenty of room for speculation that maybe it required some fault rectification before making it's second flight.

However I can find no confirmation that it was indeed on it's second flight.

The facts so far: the aeroplane was on post-maintance test flight, it ended up at the bottom of Mediterranean sea and all seven crew perished. Thats it, and for the time being, that's all there is to it.

So far no radar plot, no CVR transcript and no FDR readouts were made public, ergo we have no idea what really happened. It usually takes 2-3 weeks after data reorders are recovered to put bigger part of the puzzle together. If some signiffcant issues are find regarding aircraft's airworthiness, emergency ADs are issued at this stage. Whatever is found, Airbus industrie keeps their customers updated on progress of investigation, even if the relevant accident investigation authority shuns the public.

However, by the time we get the clear picture of the events, the story has lost its entertainment value and findings don't get reported by the general press.

The DFDR has indeed been recovered yesterday evening.
The CVR is said to be severely damaged and will be difficult to read.
The five other victims have not yet been found.

Crash de l'A320: la seconde boîte noire retrouvée - Yahoo! Actualités

ICAO Annex 13 prescribes the investigating body shall issue a preliminary report 30 days after the accident including facts established at that time. CVR and FDR recovered, so data should be available by then.

Thirty days from the accident will be in the middle of the Christmas period,I doubt if we will see an initial report before the first week of January.

From your link Coquelet ...... tone is already set.

Simple answer: You can buy 10 (ten) brand new family cars for one ADIRU. An Airbus has three of it. And it's but ONE computer sub unit, worth 30 cars alone (including 30 brand new servos for steering).

Got the point? Then it's also obvious why we will never see such systems in general aviation anytime soon. You could buy a complete new Cessna / Piper / ... for just one device.

Absolutely.

What I see people missing is the fact that a mechanical system is nowhere near infallible. It can crack, it can jam, it can come loose, it can be misinstalled, it can corrode, it can loose fluid silently .... which an electric system can't, by the way.

Ahh, people correct me - there are other failure types for electronic systems, like loss of electric power? Exactly. And now experts can do the math and come up with stochastics of failures. No system wins, as they are designed to a certain failure rate, not the other way around. But the electronic does have other advantages.

This "I only trust the mechanic system (with the microcracks I can't see)" debate from the "I don't trust my home PC" and "it's not in my cheapo car" folks gets boring over time. Yes, you will never "see" inside an algorithm, but you would have been equally not able to see the microcrack in the compressor disc that brought down a DC-10 in Sioux City. 'nuff said.

there is a difference though...this crash killed everyone on board, the sioux city crash had survivors.

and now the dc10 has a special gadget to keep some hyrdaulic fluid available for flight controls if another disc burst happens.

'nuff said

That old heave-by-cable MD80 of Alaska Airlines that ploughed into the sea off LAX killed everyone on board too. Best not fly on any aircraft with a screwjack drive for the stabilizer.:ugh:

There have been plenty of accidents involving both types: FBW or otherwise. It's useless and completely oblivious to endorse that one system is less falible then another.

silly silly silly......... I seem to recall many occassions where overspeed and stall warnings have occured at the same time on boeings and DC-9 leading to loss of life and liberty.

It's the ago old argument, and considering loss of control is now one of the biggest killers in aviation AHEAD of CFIT, I can't believe boeing still relies on a stick shaker for windshear recovery.... I cant believe Airbus doesn't allow the throttles to be firewalled (overboosted).....

PS Its the complication of the Airbus flight control systems which bambuzles people and that why people don't like it.. there is no off button. Just remember that if a protection is playing up, its good to know what computer drives what protection.

ELAC, SEC, FAC....... On the A320, if all goes to hell, the second AP is a great place to start, as the Flight envelope protection function on AP2 is driven through FMGS 2 via FAC 2 whose information is provided by ADIRS 2. How to turn the bus into a boeing in one foul swoop...

If that fails, in my misguided opinion (becasue it not written anywhere), both ELACs would be next, because with the AP disengaged the flight envelope protection is send from the FAC's directly to the ELACs..... so get rid of the ELACs. Ok where in ALTN Law, reduced protections, not quite a boeing but getting closer, but the trim is running away because of the static stability of reduced protections ... okokokokokok....... Turn off two ADIRS's to be in ALTN LAW no protections....... fffeeewww

Turning off the FAC might not work because if the computer thinks that the FACs are working fine, even if switched off, the envelope protection still works..... sssiiigggghhhh...... where is that circuit breaker?

its not confusing at all :)........ or maybe I place the aircraft into the emergency elec config..... but do I really want to do that?

no, not confusing at all :}

carnagey matey

nothing is wrong with the plane (md80_ ) that good mx procedures wouldn't fix.

alaska had come up with some really creative ways of saving money, until they lost the plane.

my airline flew this type and never had problems with the stab jack screw...of course we followed the manufacturer's ideas on how to keep the thing maintained.

Quite right, nothing wrong with the good ol' 80, but that crash still killed all on board, just as this one did. Trying to claim that survivability in such a catastrophic incident is somehow related to whether an aircraft has traditional controls or FBW is ludicrous.

Bula:

I don't know who told you that, but they were misinformed. TOGA thrust is always available in an Airbus. Unless of course you are talking about overboosting the engines. If that is the case, then you will find that Airbus is not alone. FADECs are used to control and limit thrust on all modern aircraft, not just Airbuses (or is that Airbi?).

firewalling = overboosting...........

ADIRU
 

It was touched on in an earlier post but it wasn't clearly answered. Could the A320 pilots confirm or otherwise that the ADIRU's in the 320 are the same as the 330?

Bula wrote:


No Bula, firewalling (in the sense that throttles are pushed to the stops) does not equal overboosting. In the Boeings I fly, I would have to start switching off things as well to be able to overboost. Simple.

eeerrrrr........... some poepl are pickey arn't they......

Setting a higher thrust setting then TOGA.

you know what I mean... :rolleyes:

Firewalling an Airbus Is NOT the same as firewalling a 717, 747.

Damaged DFDR and CVR ?
 

Would just like to put it out there that I knew the Kiwi pilot on board (the one in the observer seat). He was an immaculate and VERY proffesional guy. RIP Brian...

We know the DFDR and CVR have been recovered in "damaged condition" Could someone that knows more than I tell us all what the implication of this "damage" may or will be on the data recovery that the authorities most desperately want?

Its more of a waiting game, the authorities in this case wont be releasing information anyway for some time. From latest press release

"Meantime, it is important to note that over the coming days there will be limited information that Air New Zealand will be able to release on the search as the formal investigative process is now underway. This will see our ability to communicate developments increasingly constrained under local law.