No news and no report yet.

Investigation (or data evaluation) still ongoing, perhaps a delay due to other investigations (AF 447, IY 626?)?

@ flyingphil: your statement:

"and this is what went wrong!
A test recommended at FL140 or higher that low and without any "special experience" related to this task"

is not correct.
FL140 is the maximum FL for this test, not the minimum recommended!!. Above this altitude the software prevents some automatic functions to be switched off by the pilot. But this "manual" flying is necessary to perform the stall test

Any news or rumours?

twinotter89

Rumour only: The aircraft "protected" itself into the Ocean. allegedly.

bear

Protected itself from what?

It sure didn't protect itself from crashing did it?

lomapaseo

It "protected" itself with its programmed limit, AoA and 'G' prox, perhaps disallowing a nose up that would have avoided contact with the sea, in spite of PF's commands.

Sorry if I sounded cryptic; I assumed that this popular myth (perhaps it is not one), would have been known by those who followed that tragic crash.

cheers, bear

Bearfoil

Please explain how with the "programmed" limit of MAX alpha caused the impact. The pilot pulling more nose up would have resulted in a stall or an in and out of the buffet profile. If the nose had been raised more it still does not "kill" the ROD. There have been many display pilots killed thinking they were getting away with it because the nose was above the horizon! The aircraft impacted because there was insufficient ALTITUDE to recover. Perhaps due to a part of the "test" being carried out at an incorrect altitude.

DF wrong.

If protections worked as planned, we wouldn't have this thread, there would be one more A320 flying around and there would be 7 men more in our ranks.

Both AoA inputs to flight control computers froze at 5° sometime into the flight and remained constant until the crash, which disabled AoA protection. While the aeroplane was slowing down (to test alpha prot), stab got stuck at full nose up deflection. Stall warning fired, crew recovered from first stall but due to stab position and TOGA:

At 15 h 46 min 06.8 s, the record stopped.

Issue was insufficient pitch authority, but not insufficient nose up due to AoA or G protections, rather it was insufficient nose-down due to stuck THS.

Hopefully, BEA will be able to answer how and why did it happen.

Noted. "RUMOUR".

Full Nose Up?
 

How did the THS get to the full nose up position? Did the crew trim into the stall or did the "system" do it?

Smilin Ed
The AP trimmed the THS as the speed reduced.
Clandestino
I don't recall it being established that the THS was "stuck" - all we know from the published FDR data is that it did not move after AP disengagement.

Pardon my level 2 English and indiscriminate use of "stuck". You're correct, of course. I didn't mean to imply THS was mechanically stuck at full nose-up position.

When the aeroplane started tumbling, control law went to direct, which has no autotrim, therefore THS remained in last position before law switching, as expected. However, once the gear was up, law went to alternate, which has autotrim (except abnormal alternate, that disables it while the aeroplane is tumbling, but restores it once it gets upright), yet the THS maintained extreme position. I keep my fingers crossed for investigators to find out why.

At long last (or maybe not ...)

Decision due on charges over Air NZ crash | Stuff.co.nz

I have not dug out the old thread, but is there now a suggestion that perhaps vents were blocked during painting? I recall surprise that such had not shown up earlier in the flight on the old thread.

No, it's all about AoA sensors that could not move freely.

Human error more important than 2 blocked sensors?
 

Human error to blame for Air NZ crash - report
By Catherine Field
4:00 AM Wednesday Jun 30, 2010

Human error to blame for Air NZ crash - report - National - NZ Herald News

PARIS - Experts for French prosecutors probing the fatal crash of an Air New Zealand jet in November 2008 have agreed with air safety investigations which partially blame human error.

The experts say responsibility may also lie with two of the three sensors essential for the plane's computerised flying system, but further investigation is needed.

Their report was ordered by public prosecutors probing the crash of the Airbus A320 in which five New Zealanders and two Germans lost their lives off the French town of Perpignan.

The specialists said the plane was flying at too low an altitude to carry out a low speed test, a finding which was separately reached last year by France's air safety board, the Bureau d'Enquetes et Analyses (BEA).

"There was a manoeuvre....at an altitude which was far too low," state prosecutor Jean-Pierre Dreno told the Herald after receiving the report. "Further investigation" is needed with regard to the sensors, he said.

At a press conference in Perpignan, deputy prosecutor Dominique Alzaeri said it could not be ruled out that the 'jamming of the sensors' may connected to cleaning work carried out the day before.

Dreno said no decision had yet been made about any criminal prosecutions as a result of the disaster.

"Lawyers from other parties such as Air New Zealand and other parties involved have been asked to give their points of view," he said. "We are not yet at the stage where we can give an answer to that question."

One of the air safety investigators involved in the crash probe told the Herald that there are many aspects surrounding the crash which need to be examined, including which of the systems were not functioning and the decisions made by the crew. 'It was a test flight checking the low speed alert system at a very low altitude which is not consistent with that type of flight,' he said.

The crash occurred off France's Mediterranean coast at 4:46 pm on November 27 2008. It cost the lives of five New Zealanders and two Germans. They were testing the twin-engine airliner before it was to be handed back to Air New Zealand by XL Airways Germany, a charter company that had leased the craft.

The five New Zealanders were Captain Brian Horrell, 52, from Auckland; engineers Murray White, 37, also from Auckland, Michael Gyles, 49, and Noel Marsh, 35, both from Christchurch; and Jeremy Cook, 58, an airworthiness inspector from Wellington. The German pair were Captain Norbert Kaeppel, 51, and co-pilot Theodor Ketzer, 58, both from the Frankfurt region.

The BEA's preliminary report in February 2009 prompted the introduction of a range of new safety guidelines for non-revenue flights (flights without passengers). The BEA described the critical moments when the plane, flown by two Germans but under the instructions of an Air New Zealand pilot, began a test to assess the plane's recovery from low speed, at an altitude of 3,000 feet (925 metres).

As the speed fell swiftly from 136 knots (238 kph) to 99 knots (173 kph), the craft pitched and rolled violently while an automatic stall warning sounded. Just 96 seconds from the test's start, despite frantic efforts by the German pilot to regain control, the Airbus smashed nose-first into the sea at an angle of 14 degrees at 263 knots (486 kph).

The BEA recommended that prior to such non-revenue flights civil aviation authorities ensure "the qualifications and training of crews" for carrying out such manoeuvres and called for new rules to ensure flight plans and schedules of tests be filed and approved before take off. The report noted that the German crew had not received "any specific training" for the test flight, although the Air New Zealand pilot had undertaken sessions on a training simulator. Many airlines have pilots who are specially trained to conduct test flights after maintenance and are aware of the possible 'glitches' in the plane's operations.

In September 2009 Airbus Industries introduced a new training programme specifically designed to provide additional training for pilots on technical flights.

In January 2009, the A 320's makers, Airbus, issued a safety recommendation to its entire roster of 218 customers. It warned them not to obscure the sensors during paintwork and reminded them that test flights should be conducted safely and low-speed manoeuvres should not be conducted at low height.

Dreno's remarks come a day after a meeting in Perpignan for the parties involved in the tragedy. Among those present were the two judge d'instruction, Perpignan prosecutor Jean-Pierre Dreno, Air New Zealand chief executive Rob Fyfe and the general manager airline operations and safety, Captain David Morgan.

The BEA's final report into the crash is expected to be issued later this year after being reviewed by all interested parties.
By Catherine Field
View: The Air NZ A320 crash Photos The Air NZ A320 crash (29 pics)

"I think it was the "she'll be right", "mend and make do", "No 8 wire and binder-twine" can-do attitude that sadly led to this tragedy"

What a load of drivel.

to Oleo

"Personally I think the fault lies with the individuals on board and the culture at AirNZ,"

Perhaps it is worth reminding you ( and indeed all the other people who keep referring to this as an Air New Zealand crash ) that this was NOT an Air New Zealand flight , it was an XL Airways flight of an NZ aircraft prior to returning the aircraft to NZ - it was being flown by XL Airways crew who surely ought to have been able to say "No" to any requests by the Air NZ observers on board if they thought it was compromising safety .

why get facts in the way of prejudice

Air NZ crash ruling 'superficial'
 

Air NZ crash ruling 'superficial'

Air NZ crash ruling 'superficial' | Stuff.co.nz

By MICHAEL FIELD - Stuff

A ruling by French prosecutors that an Air New Zealand crash was pilot error, is superficial and unreasonable, one of New Zealand's leading forensic engineers and independent air accident investigators says.
Seven people died when the Air New Zealand Airbus A320, in the process of being handed over from a charter to German carrier XL Air, crashed into the Mediterranean off Canet-en-Roussillon in the South of France on November 27, 2008, killing five New Zealanders and two Germans.
Private accident investigator Andrew McGregor of Auckland based Prosolve Ltd, says the French investigations to date are alarming for what they missed.
"It is easy to blame the pilot, but I would delve a bit deeper and suggest that humans often get the blame over a machine," he said, adding that the human error could be the result of a systemic issue in the Airbus operating system rather than with the crews of individual planes.
A criminal manslaughter investigation has been underway in France along with a formal crash investigation by the Paris-based Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses (BEA).
Yesterday a French deputy prosecutor, Dominique Alzeari, told a press conference in Perpignan that based on their assessment of the BEA's preliminary report the Airbus had performed "an inappropriate test, in unsuitable conditions, with a manoeuvre carried out in an unprepared manner, which made it all the more perilous."
A decision by German pilots Norbert Kaeppel, 51, and co-pilot Theodor Ketzer, 58, monitored by Air New Zealand Captain Brian Horrell, 52, was termed "human error".
The French judicial report, written by aviation legal expert and pilot Claudine Oosterlinck, said that when the plane was at 600 metres and stalling, the pilots opened the throttle.
The plane remained unstable and climbed almost vertically 300 metres before diving over 1000 metres and hit the sea at about 500kmh 20 seconds later.
Mr Alzeari said the accident was not due to the aircraft design, nor to the regular maintenance which was overseen by the Airbus company.
"It was an aircraft that was working properly and was correctly maintained and its design was not called into question by the investigators."
He noted that the aircraft had been repainted just before the flight by Perpignan's Europe Aero Services Industries (EAS).
When it left EAS two of three external sensors essential for the plane's computerised flying system might also be partly to blame for the crash.
Two of the three sensors were not working and thus the excessive pitching "could not be corrected by the electronic brain of the aircraft," he said.
That could be "linked to cleaning operations" on the plane the day before the crash, but he said that "the accident is not due to a maintenance or design problem of the aircraft."
Aviation industry insiders, some with senior Air New Zealand connections but who wished to remain nameless, have suggested that French investigators were always anxious to blame foreign crews while clearing the French manufactured Airbus and the French maintenance firm.
Mr McGregor said the preliminary BEA report was superficial and did not address many aspects which normally feature in a comprehensive international air accident report. Often such accidents can be caused by a whole series of defense breaches and it is not always possible to determine a primary cause.
Despite implicating the pilot and the low flying, there was no evidence in the judicial or BEA statements as to why the plane had failed and crashed.
"There appears to be a lot of criticism about the pilots not conducting the flight tests at 10,000 feet instead of 3000 feet, and this may be a fair criticism," he said.
"But what we don't know is that if they had conducted it at 10,000 feet, whether or not the crash would still have occurred, because we don't have sufficient information.
"We don't know whether an extra 7000 feet would have been enough for them to recover if the same problem occurred."
He said he would want to understand what caused the loss of control because the information available suggested it was not simply a case of being at low level.
"I am not convinced that that was the cause of the loss of control. We don't know why the pilots lost control. It is unlikely to be a lack of skill; they were quite experienced."
He said it was clear the pilots were all highly experienced.
"It is pretty hard to blame the pilots and give credit to the machine with that kind of experience onboard."
Airbus has a highly computer-controlled aircraft and Mr McGregor said investigators should be looking at the man-machine interface.
He said there was no evidence the French had used the FDR and CVR to simulate the accident flight on an Airbus simulator.
"What I would do in the simulator is put myself in the shoes of the pilot and try and replicate what he did and note the problems and issues he experienced along the way, without benefit of hindsight," The preliminary BEA report does not mention this being addressed.
Mr McGregor said his views on superficiality of the preliminary BEA report was shared among many in the aviation and investigation community.
Human error may rest not with the pilot, but with others such as those who designed the aircraft.
"It may be a systemic error, something deeper than an individual pilot making a mistake.
"There maybe a systemic problem affecting all these machines."
Mr McGregor said the question of possible faulty sensors had not been properly considered by the French BEA preliminary report.
"We need to hold judgment. It is unfortunate that the preliminary report isn't more comprehensive than it is," he said.
"We don't know very much at the moment."

So it was not an aircraft that was working properly - another triumph of French analytical thought.

I am always careful with the self proclainmed " Private incident investigators " theiy are paid by someone ( generally the Victim's famillies , not sure who pays this guy , but he ain't working for free surely ), with an agenda. He might have a point, but his speculations are as good as the BEA.

I am not an Airbus pilot nor a Airbus sofware engineer , even less an aircraft painter at EAS, but trying to stall any aeroplane while on base leg to see what happen does not sounds to me to be really a technical issue.

Well that would depend on perspective. One of the problems we have is that modern technology makes aircraft so reliable that human behaviour takes over and we naturally lower our guard towards the unthinkable. "It won't happen to me". Nine times out of ten they probably would have got away with the manoeuvre at that altitude and thought nothing more of it.

So there are two possible paths to take with this investigation:

1) it was crew error full stop. Had they been flying higher this perhaps would not have happened, end of investigation and wait for the next similar accident or

2) expand the investigation and potentially uncover failings or mistakes or oversight within the maintenance environment. Were there issues with 2 out of 3 AOA sensors? If yes what happened?

Were correctly trained staff employed?
Has the company a proper quality system? etc. etc. etc.

Now depending on the answers to question 2 this scenario may well end up incorporating technical issues as well.

There are other departments involved in the safety equation and nobody can state with 100% certainty that this accident would not still have occurred at 20,000 or 30,000 feet. We don't know.

I agree, the big picture is that they were testing the aircraft towards the edges of the flight envelope to check that all systems perform as they should. Obviously one of the possible outcomes is that the aircraft DOESN'T perform as it should! If allowance hasn't been made for this eventuality, you can find yourself, as this crew did, in a nasty spot. :{

Airbus
 

All out of my league but. Heck arn't these AB's supposed to stop this happening? Instead of all these wonderful protections, the plane actually runs wild? I've been well into stall buffets from crop-spray height to 100 feet or so, and my planes didn't go bonkers. Makes me angry these french bureaucrats.

Pointer to good summary post pls ?
 

Read through most of this thread, and the interim report, but I can't get a straight picture between the 'aoa' sensors being called 'essential' and opinions that the a/c 'protected' itself into the sea.

Can someone point me to a good summary post pls ? Particularly interested in how data from the stuck AoA sensors may have misled systems or denied protection and whether the protections were in fact operating during the final sequence.

Can I also ask someone with patience how often max trim is needed in flight ? An amber warning that manual trim is needed seems a bit quiet, is there a case for warning that max trim is being applied ?

The real danger in imminent stalls is that you are way below min control speed should a wing engine falter, or compressor stall, or catch a bird as you are recovering. Then you get to pull the good one back, drop the nose and speed up....

Is not it the job of the BEA to explain that in their interim report ?
Where are they on that ?
Probably too busy to extract some specific words from the CVR that will conveniently help to fully blame the crew.
Typical BEA stuff.

@Huck
 

Your comment refers to airmanship and hands on experience. This old fashioned part of aviation is no longer valid.
Sorry:ouch:

So it was all the German pilots fault.

A single cause airliner accident is rare. Most are the result of the multiple causes.

The following is mainly taken from the BEA report into the loss of D-AXLA.

The traces for the AoA sensors show them working untill approx FL320. The traces then show that they did not moved again. (Page 33).
The latest reports refers to an aircraft wash which suggests that they were contaminated with water and as a result were frozen into the position that they were at that time.
As seen with other accidents, ice evidence can melt after a crash making definitive statements about icing difficult.

The first request for the slow speed check (including an alfa prot check) was made by the Air NZ Captain (who was overseeing the test flight) at approx FL120 which accorded with the advisory paperwork. (page 19) shortly thereafter, the A/C begins a continuous decent taking it out of the advised altitude for the low speed test.

The handling Captain suggested that the low speed check be done later or skipped. This at 5000'. (page 20).

At approximately 4000' the handling pilot asked the Air NZ Captain if he should conduct the slow speed check and this was affirmed. The handling pilot (who was also following ATC instructions and discussing nav with his F/O) eventually initiated the low speed check at about 3000" (page 20).

Due to what? configuration? control law? inoperative sensors? Alfa protection did not initiate. There is no reference in the report as to whether or not the crew had any expectation of this outcome. The aircraft stalled, eventually diving into the sea, which would indicate that they did not.

x x x x x x

From what has now been published the post painting checks for clearance of external sensors were not carried out adequately, eventually leading one way or another to the failure of the AoA sensors to function correctly. This failure played a part in events that has yet to be explained.

Alfa protection did not occur.

Inadequate training? This crew should have been prepared for Alfa floor protection failure and the check captain appears to have been unaware of the altitude requirement.

Inadequate paperwork? The paperwork should clearly identify the risk of Alfa floor failure. The Customer Manual assumption is that the Alfa protection will work.

If the test had been carried out at say FL120 the question remains would the crew have been able to recover the aircraft. What is shown in the traces published on page 34 is the disconnect between the pitch inputs of the handling pilot and the position of the elevators which in the final instance were diametrically opposed to each other. The french have intimated that the programing of the flight control computers is not an issue. Was this the result of the Aoa failure?

A single cause airliner accident is rare. and this isn't one of them.

Scotty Beamup
Was not checking that Alfa Protection occurs at the proper time the purpose of the test? It seems to me that they should have realized that it did not occur and get out of there pronto. :ugh:

I only have the preliminary report, but I have to say that whatever contributory factors arose from AoA sensor failure, having recovered the a/c to 2320ft, 138kts and 7 degrees nose up pitch, it would appear to have been a failure to control pitch plus repeated use of aileron to pick up a fully stalled wing which caused their demise.

The HP removed the full nose-down pitch command, applied a hard nose-up demand and used full low-wing aileron at an unrecorded speed but probably below 100kts and possibly below 46kts.

I don't think so ...
It was more to make sure the Airbus was not overstressed before it hit the water ...

Where is G graph by the way ... ?

What I thought was, what was the fundamental difference between this crew and the French test pilots who first flew an airbus A320 to Alfa floor.

And the simple answer to that is that the French test pilots approached the initiation of alfa protection with the greatest of caution. Being test pilots they had considered all possible outcomes including the possibility of non activation of that protection.

This crew did not because they are line pilots and their experience, in the sim on approach and inflight demonstrations all had positive outcomes.
The only thing left to alert them to the possibility of failure was the CA Manual but it reads "During deceleration observe - The alfa floor activation".

And so the difference between these two crews was "the expectation of possible outcomes", and what this crew needed was someone or something to alter their "expectation of possible outcomes".
But that did not occur.

And so there was no protection for them, in their training, in the paperwork, and finally in the aircraft systems themselves.

Except
 

The pilot was asked to test his alfa floor, then asked if he should "do it now". I have no idea what the indications would be, but surely if your "doing it", you'd be looking for it, even if you wern't a test pilot?

I think BEA's conclusion that this was pure pilot error is indeed oversimplifying but:
Executing manoeuvers to test critical envelope protections at altitudes where failure of these protections leads inevitably to a crash comes pretty close to the defintion of reckless.

Would more altitude have made sure they would not crash in the given scenario:
No
Did the altitude they peformed it in make the crash inevitable:
Likely Yes.

Moreover, the rushed test caused a rather quick approach of Alpha_Floor. This left insufficient time to notice and properly react to Alpha_floor not activating.

During proper test flights approach to Alpha_Floor is done slowly.
Due to the fact that there is quite some margin left to Alpha_Max this normally leaves sufficent time to properly react to such a situation.
This is the reason there are normallly detailed procedures for these kind of tests which reflect the technical dependencies and margins behind which cannot always be derived from pure gutt feeling.

I think in the first place it was indeed important to highlight the piloting aspect of this accident.
This should however not exclude to have a look at the techincal issues in a more detailed analysis

-I cannot agree with both those statements. You have no evidence to support them. Recovery from the dive was in progress from 15:46:01 and speed was adequate. The accident was not 'inevitable' due to the low altitude.

Yes, the technical factors are important, but:-
a) did the software or some mechanical effect prevent normal stall recovery action?
b) would correct stall recovery have prevented the accident?

I wonder what the 'passengers' were saying during this?

If they had reacted (been able to react) to the incipient stall timely, an incipient stall would probably have been recoverable from this altitude.
A developed one: Rather not.

Therefore my comment regarding the speed decrease with which they approached Alpha_Floor.
Once they noticed that something went wrong they got into even deeper trouble by the (Mis-) Trim and sudden Thrust induced Pitch up.
Without enough altitude the chances of recovery in that situation were surely slim.
I wouldn't rule out that a very proficient test pilot would have been able to recover from that situation but probably not normal airline pilots. It's simply not what they are trained/supposed to do.
They have been in deepest test pilot country and at an altitude where even those would have never performed these maneuvers.
Result: predictable

I'm not up on the mechanical factors, but I'd certainly be very surprised if there was a software fault involved - for two reasons:

Firstly, given the herculean level of pedantry that AI went to when designing these systems and the amount of ground and air testing they did, and sometimes continue to do on the prototype testbed, and also that the systems were designed to do everything in their power to avoid a stall situation, I'd be shocked if such a fault didn't show itself in testing very early on.

Secondly, the MidiBus has been hauling passengers around for 22 years now. Even if it hadn't shown up in testing, it would likely have shown up in line flying by now - certainly at a previous handover test like the one in this case.

The only automatics-related caveats I can think of relate to trying to force the nose down when TOGA is applied, and I'm pretty sure that the AI personnel present would have caught that kind of thing if it had happened. Also, I'm presuming that the FDR doesn't reflect this situation, as it would have been discussed to death on here by now if it had been.

DW - yes, I am with you - the reason I mentioned it is because some seem to be looking at some sort of technical problem causing the accident when, as I think you can see from my posts, I put the major cause at incorrect stall recovery.

Obviously the technical issues must be looked at, of course.

I do not agree with your assertion, however, "that would likely have shown up in line flying by now - certainly at a previous handover test like the one in this case." - bear in mind the AoA sensor was thought to be faulty on this flight - how many other 'test flights' would fit that bill?

I'd hope that it would be caught fairly early on - given that the AoA sensor is (or can be) a pretty important piece of kit in the software decision-making process, I'd have thought that they'd have "failed" instruments on the test rig - one by one and then in every possible combination, to see how the control logic adapted. Again, if the system didn't pick up that the AoA sensor was U/S and adapt it's behaviour to compensate then that could be a potential deal-wrecker... But I'd have thought fairly unlikely nonetheless.