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-   -   Airbus crash/training flight (https://www.pprune.org/tech-log/352696-airbus-crash-training-flight.html)

Centreline747 18th January 2009 19:19

Smilin Ed

Quite possible. Only commenting on info I have from friends I have who have been AB trained :) Just a thought!

Rgds

CL747

Smilin_Ed 18th January 2009 19:28

Elevator Authority
 
It's hard to understand why there would insufficient elevator authority to counter pitching moments caused by a power increase/decrease.

In any case we still need to know which came first, the pitch up or the power increase. Until we do, we cannot speculate further on the cause. :ugh:

Carnage Matey! 18th January 2009 21:35

Unless the aircraft was already being flown in direct law there's no reason the FBW shouldn't have coped with any rapid increase in thrust. In normal operation it's quite feasible to apply TOGA thrust rapidly and have the aircraft continue down the ILS path unperturbed. Were the aircraft deliberately placed in direct law then the actions taken would most probably have been verbalised and recorded on the CVR, along with the associated ECAM warning chimes. Even if the aircraft ended up in the unusual attitude variation of normal law the crew should still have had full control authority to move the surfaces, even if they had insufficient airspeed to execute a manouevre. The comparisons with the well documented A300/A310 stall events don't tell us anything about this mystifying incident.

John Marsh 18th January 2009 21:37

QAR?
 
As ANZ want a full recovery of the debris, would there be any chance of retrieving the QAR (if fitted)? Is it possible for QAR data to survive an accident like this one?

Scissorlink 18th January 2009 22:44

Talking to 320 drivers it seems like the planes like making very random decisions. Can anyone else verify that they have had over 50 incidents of computer brain fart?

AerocatS2A 18th January 2009 23:14

Would 50 incidents of computer brain fart be at all significant over however many millions of hours they've flown?

Massey1Bravo 18th January 2009 23:20

I'm surprised that no one here suggested faulty maintenance in Perpignan may have caused the crash, I remembered a few years ago LH Technik screwed up and reversed the roll channel of the captain's sidestick, and the copilot had to take over.

AerocatS2A 18th January 2009 23:27

I'm betting you haven't read all 23 pages of this thread right? The control reversal incident has been mentioned.

Smilin_Ed 18th January 2009 23:54

It Only Takes One
 

Would 50 incidents of computer brain fart be at all significant over however many millions of hours they've flown?

It only takes one to cause a crash.

AerocatS2A 19th January 2009 00:20


It only takes one to cause a crash.
True, but can you deduce from 50 computer incidents over the current life of the model to indicate that A320s "like making very random decisions"?

Scissorlink 19th January 2009 03:13

The most common words said in an Airbus cockpit

"Whats it doing now????"

Jet_A_Knight 19th January 2009 05:30


The most common words said in an Airbus cockpit

"Whats it doing now????"
You mean the most often used cliche about Airbus.:hmm:

bsieker 19th January 2009 07:16


Originally Posted by Scissorlink
The most common words said in an Airbus cockpit

"Whats it doing now????"

Mode confusion is indeed one of the most common problems in human/machine-interaction in modern glass-cockpit airliners, but it is common to all types and manufacturers.

I've never heard of the side-stick-driven FBW system unique to airbus to be a cause for confusion.


Bernd

kaikohe76 19th January 2009 07:50

This point may well have been made earlier & I have never operated any type of Airbus aircraft, so apologies here.
However as I understand, it is being fairly strongly sugested in some quarters, that in this incident there was a sudden & very excessive pitch up. Was this not exactly what happened a few months ago to the Airbus over North West Australia? Not making any point at all, but might this be food for thought?
Nice to see that the Crew Members who were recovered, have been released & will shortly return home for the last time. I do hope also, that at some stage in the near future, the final two Crew presently unaccounted for, will also be able to make the same journey. RIP

Dysag 19th January 2009 08:02

There is only one body still missing.

Pedroski 19th January 2009 08:27

I'll put my neck on the block and suggest the crew switched from auto pilot to manual control and the dramas started from there.. I won't have to wait long to see if I lose my head....

Carnage Matey! 19th January 2009 08:54

The autopilot is never in control of an Airbus, it just does what you tell it (rightly or wrongly) to do. Disconnecting the autopilot should never lead to an extreme out-of-trim condition.

hetfield 19th January 2009 09:34


Mode confusion is indeed one of the most common problems in human/machine-interaction in modern glass-cockpit airliners, but it is common to all types and manufacturers.
It's not only mode confusion. It's also known or unknown software bugs.

Can you imagine the speed tape (VLS) is going down instead of up if you bank the aircraft (known software-bug on A300) or the FMS guided Autothrust pulls suddenly the speed back in cruise flight to achieve Vapp, but stops at green dot (protection), nobody knows why.....

Pedroski 19th January 2009 09:35

seamless...right... I've had 747-400's go-around on more than one ocassion on short final because of auto-pilot issues.. I'm not anti Airbus.
I do have hold some scepticism on the human v computer handshake thing..

JJflyer 19th January 2009 09:52

I've flown the 727, 737, 747 and 767. Some 4 months ago I converted to the narrowbody Airbus fleet. I am a convert in more ways than one. The A318, A319, A320, A321 are excellent aircraft. Much misunderstood by those that do not have training on these or have not flown them. I had a lot of prejudice myself for the systems. But the training, both ground, simulator and FAM (Line Training) flights have alleviated most of my concerns. There are still a few things that I don't like such as the lack of tactile feedback from thrust levers as these don't move with thrust changes nor does the side stick when the other pilot makes inputs.

The aircraft requires a different type of scan from "Conventional" aircraft with FMA (Flight Mode Annunciation) being extrmely important and not reading it after selections on the FCU (Boeing MCP) is a sure way to get into trouble. Another way to get into problems is to forget to think and rely solely on the FMCG (FMS) functions for descent calculations as well as optimum altitudes. I still think to myself and wont stop doing it. The aircraft systems are as good as the info they are provided. Remember BS in BS out.

Other than that the aircraft is a delight to hand fly and performs exceedingly well.

I am yet to ask the question "Whats it doing now" but I am sure it will come :} I was told that someone telling me that they know Airbus in and out are either mad or lie or both. There is no doubt about the aircraft providing tons of information. It is up to the pilot to disseminate it.


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