It confuses me when the what if arguments call for the reader to accept as fact some historical failure scenario, be it the Concorde, British Airtours, Pac West, etc. etc. and then incorrectly interpret the facts to support a pre concieved justification for their action.

If the thread is to stick to engine fires and go-no-go decisions, then perhaps we could rule out discussions relating to ruptured fuel tanks where no fire bell was sounded. Remember that the best protection that you have to prevent an inflight engine fire from disabling the aircraft is the fuel shutoff valve to the affected engine. I don't think that you can statistically cite many accidents where inflight engine fires, within the engine pod system progressed to the point where they prevented the aircraft from flying. Your greatest risk is when the aircraft stops on the runway (including landing)

Rainboe
If I was you I think I would have a talk with my sim instructors and tell them that I would like to try one or two of these tight circuits with ongoing engine fire at or after V1 next time in the sim.
I have done it in the sim and it works. Not much time to think but thats not what you want to do.
Memory items complete and fire still burning initiate the turn needed (as you have briefed in your t/o emer brief)
As parabellum said leave the flap config - this giving a tight circuit and fast landing config

Fat Dog,

Hey!, we agree. In the spirit of the thread (Fire Warning before V1), my reference to not knowing any aircraft that had any fire warning automatic inhibit, I was referring to the BEFORE V1 case. As you have quoted for the B757 -

"Warning Inhibits

The Master WARNING lights and fire bell are inhibited for fire during part of the
takeoff. The inhibit begins at rotation and continues until the first to occur:

• 400 feet AGL, or
• 20 seconds elapsed time

If a fire occurs during the inhibit, an EICAS warning message appears, but the fire bell and Master WARNING lights do not activate. If the warning condition still exists when the inhibit is removed, the fire bell and Master WARNING lights activate immediately."

This is common-place with most aircraft in the modern era for both Boeing and Airbus. My reference was with respect to inhibit below V1.

If you look at the philosophy that the two major manufacturers have used, we can see -

(1) Master Caution is inhibited at a quite low speed below V1, to prevent unnecessary rejects for "less than serious" unserviceabilities, AND

(2) Master Warning and Fire Bell is typically inhibited from V1/Vr through to approximately 400 feet or so, to prevent excessive crew reaction for a SHORT period (you've quoted 20 seconds) during the critical initial flight phase.

Putting these 2 inhibit conditions together, we are left with SERIOUS warnings, such as the fire bell, still completely active right up to V1 or rotation.

Why? Because in the infinite wisdom and experience of Boeing and Airbus, these SERIOUS warnings must not be inhibited at the pre-V1 flight phase so that the appropriate action may be taken by operating crews. And what is the appropriate action that Boeing and Airbus are trying to initiate? REJECT REJECT REJECT!

I think that your quote from Boeing said it all!:ok:

Regards,

Old Smokey

Firstly, for me too it is STOP below V1, no questions.

That out of the way, then, at V1/V1+ the problem is that we have 'grown up' to treat an engine fire in a calm, collected fashion, climbing on the OEI procedure, cleaning up and doing the drills/ c. crew brief etc, because we are taught that an engine fire is not 'life treatening'. Unlike some military a/c I have flown where an engine fire could burn through the flight controls PDQ, the emphasis is on measured response. The thought of someone not trained to actually FLY the aircraft at lowish levels in a hurried pattern gives me the shudders, and could well result in an overbank or CFIT, and in marginal weather............................

Is it indeed time, as hinted here, to swing sim training more to this scenario? Obvious problems with sim visuals etc, but maybe we could practice the old military type short pattern procedure, say at 1000'?

We'd certainly get throught the sim detail quicker:)

Is it indeed time, as hinted here, to swing sim training more to this scenario?

You can count Centaurus and JT in ... works well for confidence building and training exposure .. and might just save the day some time when a real quick circuit is seen to be the best option .. fire or whatever ...

An Eng or APU fire warning is really by design not inhibited in any phase for the A-320 Fam. aircrafts from what I know of. Believe that is also the case for the 330/340.

We seem to be long on opinion here and short on good facts....

Adding to the former, I'd like to suppose that there is good reason for what seems to be a fairly industry-standard paradigm when dealing with engine failures once airborne.

To my mind, the supporting evidence for the evolved methodology ought to be in the public domain, accessible to each and every one of us professional pilots.

This evidence is the litmus test that justifies/underpins the manufacturer's SOP.

It's also going to be extremely helpful to me if I'm ever in the dock.

:eek:

I'd like to see more discussion on V1 spreads. I'd hazard a guess a high percentage of runways most pilots operate from (except those which are field length limited - and even then you may not be limited by the single engine no-go case) have V1 spreads, and that, a high percentage of time, one is not operating up against the limiting case.

It is an added layer of complexity but its extra time available for your decision-making.

I'm quite happy to concede the contrary, especially if the evidence warrants the case, but of course, evidence of successful RTO's in excess of V1 is always likely to be hushed up isn't it?

In fact I can't recall any I've read about....

More training would always be something I'd vote for.

The 80/260 reversal, OEI, low level, FD off (obviously) is something I've tried and like BOAC says, it makes you shudder!

:ok:

Any fire warning is a major Mayday emergency. If the mechanical warning is backed up by calls from the cabin that there is a bright orange glow outside, even after firing all your shots, you have a major Mayday-plus-plus problem. The solution is put it down NOW. Not a nice circuit and complete OEI drill, but now- any runway, large empty road. I know an 80 degree course reversal, at low level, one one engine, is a highly dangerous (and difficult) manoeuvre, especially when you are trying to line up again, or a low level OEI circuit is similarly extremely risky (I didn't discount the danger- my post said <<Maybe an 80 degree low altitude course reversal/land back on reciprocal, on one engine might be pushing one's luck a bit, but I think there is a case for training>> I do recall there have been cases of both low and high pressure Fuel Shut-off valves (which are both in the strut/engine casing) being destroyed, though I can't recall exact instances. At such a time, you would literally have just a few minutes at most only.

Does the panel think we should, when the circumstance demands, be far more 'get on ground soon as poss' minded and perhaps practice such procedures as one engine low level circuits or low level 80 degree course reversals at the end of sims, despite the risk they inherantly are?

One of the sequences in the simulator (737) was a simulated severe cabin fire ar VR and a close-in low level circuit - the object being to land back on the duty runway into wind with minimum delay. Times varied with pilot handling skill and were generally between two and three minutes from lift off, tight left hand circuit and stop. Best times were one minute and fifty seconds.

While considered a "fun" exercise simply because it wasn't in any syllabus we were aware of, nevertheless there was a deadly serious side to it.

We tried the dumbell 80/260 turn to land on the reciprocal of the departure runway but the tailwind component and loss of sight of the runway environment during a large part of the manoeuvre made for a difficult exercise. A tight left hand low level circuit to land into wind as per take off, proved to be the safest (?) method.

I understand that El Airline now incorporates this manoeuvre as part of command upgrade training. In the El Al 737-800, the best time via low level left circuit was one minute and thirty seven seconds from lift off to stop.

The problem with making too much of a 'crocodile' circuit (make it snappy:)) is that if you cock it up and go-round..........................far better to space it out a little and get it right first time. All these 'dramatists' quoting a 1:37 circuit !!TO STOPPING!!! need a chill pill - in my opinion, of course:). Bear in mind that a 360 around the airfield at rate 1 takes 2 minutes, so what bank angle are we diddling with boys? :eek:Far more likely to cause a smoking hole than the UNLIKELY event of an uncontained fire causing UNLIKELY fatal structural damage.

Actually Smokey, it has been 'done' in the latest variant of the DC9, understand that you have some time in the '9'

Boeing 717-200 FCOM Volume III

"Takeoff Inhibits - Level 3 alerts and associated MASTER WARNING lights are inhibited from V1 to 400' RA, but no longer than 25 seconds in flight."

If a FIRE L ENG, FIRE R ENG, or APU FIRE is detected at V1 to 400' RA, the Engine Alerting Display will show a boxed red alert, but no fire bell will sound nor will the red MASTER WARNING illuminate until after 400' RA/25s.

Agree with BOAC. Tried the quick circuit and the turnback manoeuvre in the 757 as a "fun" exercise at the end of a sim. It can be done but it's not particularly controlled and very very easy to cock up.

Although not quite the same, I know of 2 hawk fatal accidents in the early 90s where the pilots elected to turn back, misshandled it and crashed. One was for an oil pressure caption, one for a fire warning. In both cases, the accident report concluded that a normal circuit would probably have been the best course of action.

Given that we only do bi annual sim assessments there is only so much that can be covered and while you may get to have a go at a turnback/short pattern circuit you certainly won't get to be practised at it.

If things really are that dire (uncontained fire) then I'll give it a go based on the thought that if I don't I will die anyway. Nothing to lose. Certainly in my company people do often mention a return to reciprical in extremis and have thought through how to achieve this. How you fly the pattern will depend heavily on the weather conditions at the time.

For me its establishing the severity of the situation that is the key and that will then dictate my actions. Has the fire gone out or has the fire wire just burnt through? How do you know ? In the case of the Nimrods the flight deck had the huge advantage of well trained rear end crew on intercom who rehearsed such scenarios so the flow of info was excellant and enabled quick sound decisions to be made by the flight deck. In the commercial world crew are not trained to respond in that way and the flight deck often do not include them in the loop at an early enough stage to make a difference. We can't see the engines/wing/cabin they can so their discription of what is happening could be key.

I fully support a crew flying a turnback or short pattern in extremis but it is a risky mvr that could in itself lead to tragedy so before its initiated its important to establish that its needed.

I did qualify the question thus:
so it is confirmed you are not having a good day. My query is really this: 'are we too programmed to only look at the traditional circuit/carry out emerg. drill/make PA/fly circuit/carry out app. chks/set up radios/land 10 minutes later rather than think, when you have a confirmed hand warming fire burning, to land within 3 minutes or you're toast?' I'm not suggesting it should be trained and such very hazardous procedure be thought of as an option unless you are burning and unable to handle the problem itself, but I wonder whether we should just occasionally practice a traumatic take-off emergency and aim to get it on the ground rapidly rather than go through drills? One thinks of the Swissair/Saudi Tristar stories where possibly they were not minded enough to get wheels in contact with terra-firma immediately.

Fortune favors the bold,dont they say?Course reversal at 500' but make sure of the speed before going beyond 15 deg bank.Recall items,a Vref and the GPWS override can be done in the reversal procedure.

My concern here is establishing in time what needs to be done. People do not routinely consult the crew at an early enough stage to make a difference. We have lots to do proceduraly and its often several minutes before contact is made with the cabin. The cabin may initiate contact, and will do if its a cabin fire, but they may not. Do we need to train to make more use of the crew and do they need to train for this kind of scenario.

My 10 pence:ok:
I've also tried the 80/260 turn in the sim..with everything lit up flaps 15 and no left Hydraulic system thanks to an uncontained no 1 engine failure and subsequent fire.
It was done with a 800ft base and 2k vis. (a learning non jeopardy exercise)
I found the actual flying the easy bit, 45-50' AOB and watch the IVSI!!! it was all thought about in the brief..and best of all we both understood the maneuver.
Its a tricky thing to do, but not half as much bother as some appear to think...
BTW I add the caveat that I've done about 400hrs below 75 AGL survey flying, although not in a 757:ok:

V1 means go......below V1 means stop

Do you think doing it on one, at night, with all hell breaking loose, is maybe pushing your luck too far?

Personally I think doing it at all is pushing most peoples' luck too far from some of the handling skills I have seen.

Someone mention night? Are you saying you will not die at night with an 'uncontained fire'? If it needs doing, it needs doing night or day, vis and cloudbase permitting. We do, of course, climb to circling altitude, dont we, since we will be out of sight of the runway:)? Don't forget, then, to keep it inside 1.7nm for Terps.

You probably guess I'm not really in favour........................

Hi ITCZ,

Actually, it would surprise me if the B717 did not have an aural fire warning inhibit after V1 (or Vr for non-FMC inserted V speeds aircraft via Air Ground sensing), all aircraft that I know of in the modern era do have such inhibits, NONE that I know of have a before V1 aural fire warning inhibit. On post #44 in this thread I responded to FatDog that I was referring entirely to the pre-V1 case, as that is what this thread is about.

I'm not going into print here to defend myself, but to illustrate again that all manufacturers in the modern era DO NOT inhibit the aural fire warning prior to V1, for the very good reason that it is prejudicial to the safety of flight to continue takeoff with an active fire alert, and it is intended that a rejected takeoff is the appropriate action. (If I must, I will TRY to find the reference from Boeing).

Yes, I did fly the Diesel 9, it had no inhibitions at all, nor did I at the age at which I flew it!:E

I have to ask here - Just what is it that pilots fear so much from a high speed (near V1) rejected takeoff? I'm well aware that a continued takeoff in MOST circumstances is statistically far more attractive, and most operator's policies reflect this. I strongly agree also with being "GO" minded, but with an engine fire? That one, along with control jam and a few other nasties are definately prejudicial to the safety of flight. The aircraft IS certified to safely accomplish a safe RTO prior to V1 (at least in modern aircraft), albeit with lower performance based safety margins than for a continued takeoff, AS LONG AS THE AIRCRAFT IS NOT ON FIRE!

Have we taken being GO minded a little too far, where brakes release is now the commit point?

Regards,

Old Smokey

Kind of sums up my aviating credentials in one succinct phrase TYVM :}

At ease, Sir! I never flew with you:)

Choice of death or give it a go, give it a go.

And that is one of the problems. We spend countless simulator hours ticking the scheduled boxes, engine failures at V1 time after time, year after year, in addition to happily playing at actors and actresses during straight and level LOFT or whatever the latest terminology has it.

CDU buttons are pressed with great aplomb and the wonderfully reliable automatic pilot is used most of the simulator time. Yet hands on practice is rarely made available for the rare events that have really happened to other people. The events that require first class manual handling skills. For example let's include such things as close-in very low level circuits, dead stick landings, full blooded GPWS terrain warning and instant reaction pull-up, flight control failures where only the engines are left to give pitch and roll, the really nasty unusual attitudes and recovery technique, ditching technique in IMC - and other events I am sure readers can envisage.

Rainboe's last post touched on a point I made some years ago which was not widely distributed in the pre-pprune era!
I entlitled my letter to the editor of Flight, Attitude at Impact. I am unsure if it was printed as I didn't and still don't subscribe to the magazine.
In brief, the point of the letter was that we pilots are programmed to behave in certain ways in certain conditions due to our SOPs and our sim rides every six months.
At the risk of a fatwa in my criticism of Captain Haynes and his crew, I mentioned the DC10 crash at Sioux City and questioned the decision of the crew to attempt to land the aircraft on the runway. They had proved to themselves that they had a very limited amount of control over the aircraft. What did they think when they decided to try to land on a runway, 8000 feet long and 145 feet wide? They had the whole of Iowa to land on, a flat and fairly hard landscape, I believe.
Bear in mind that when they were cleared to land, Cpt Haynes replied, 'You want to make it a runway, huh?' I think he was a little late in considering the option of landing elsewhere.
Their thought process was inbuilt over many years of flying experience. My contention is that this subconcious wish to land on or return to a runway is misguided. Our attitudes need to be altered to accept that there will be situations where landing straight ahead is a far safer option than trying any 35 degree turns on one engine with an uncontained fire, or no flight controls, come to that.
I know this thread is not strictly dealing with this issue but it seems like a good place to bring it up!
Slings and arrows this way!

If I'm gonna crash land then you can sure as hell bet that I'd rather do it at an airport where the Emergency Services are on hand within a minute or so as opposed to a field in the middle of Iowa where, if you're lucky, you would get farmer Joe and his trusty tractor on hand to give CPR and pee on your fire a week next Tuesday. ;)

My point exactly. Try to land your uncontrollable aircraft and roll it on its side, tear it apart and burst into flames killing 110 passengers and 1 crew or gently lower it onto the mud and let it slide in one piece to a stop in the middle of the fields.

guest27 has posed a very interesting question; namely.

A modern jet airliner is designed to withstand and contain an engine fire during any phase of flight. This includes from start to taxi, takeoff, cruise, descent and landing.

Considerer for a moment, what is the real world difference between an engine fire at 5 seconds before V1, 5 seconds after V1, during the climb, during the cruise (especially over the mid-Pacific where one might be 3 hours from any possible landing), or during descent etc?

The design engineers have to allow for the case of engine fire and in particular isolating the damaging effects of heat from critical structures for a period of time until the source of fire can be isolated, contained and extinguished. How can anyone say that a fire at V1 is somehow more time critical than a fire in mid-oceanic cruise?

Just going back one step, we all know that a fire can only exist with all three critical items being present; that is, a source of fuel, oxygen and heat. Without one of these elements, fire is impossible. Once an engine is secured, fuel, hydraulics, electrics have been cut off. Next, the extinguisher gases will deplete the oxygen.

Typically, engines that do catch fire continue to produce normal or at least significant thrust until they are secured. This thrust is usable depending on the situation (climbing to 400' agl for example) until the engine is secured.

At speeds close to V1, an aircraft has more potential to go flying than it has the ability to stopping. Indeed V1 for a particular situation may mark the last possible moment in time where the aircraft can be brought to a stop if all the prerequisite retardation devices work and the crew performs their duties precisely. Max/heavy weight takeoff aborts at V1 will always involve wheel fires and possible injuries to pax during any subsequent evacuation.

Your airline standard operating procedures will dictate what your actions should be in the case put forward by guest27. Nonetheless, if you are a Commander or aspiring to become a Commander, it is your personal responsibility to ponder the question that is on the table, in an unemotional and objective manner. Quite apart from the Coroner's Court, you may have to live with your decision for the rest of your life.

As the question stands....I'm a YES. I cannot think of any circumstance when I would not. Fire and humans don't mix. Fire and daralumin structures doesn't mix. What is your V1 for? You haven't got decision thinking time. It should be automatic:.....fire....below V1...stop.

Flexible Response,
actually my concerns are exactly the brakes' efficiency in some specific scenario (fire always involved?) and the predictable pax evacuation in case of RTO procedure.

Many colleagues are contributing with their experiences but I still have some doubts if is better to reject always.
Thank you all,

Guest27

or gently lower it onto the mud

.. if we are talking about Sioux City ... if they had had anything like enough control over the beast to do anything predictable with it ... mud, runway, or whatever ... then they would likely have got away with no consequential damage and no injuries during the landing.

As it was, they had an aircraft which was extremely marginal in respect of any level of control ... Lady Luck helped a bit (except for the phugoid pitch down on short final) ... but full marks to the dogged determination of the crew on the day ..

Taken from FAR PART 25 section 2 - abbreviations and symbols

V1 means the maximum speed in the takeoff at which the pilot must take the first action (e.g., apply brakes, reduce thrust, deploy speed brakes) to stop the airplane within the accelerate-stop distance. V1 also means the minimum speed in the takeoff, following a failure of the critical engine at VEF, at which the pilot can continue the takeoff and achieve the required height above the takeoff surface within the takeoff distance

Taken from FAR PART 25 section 107 - takeoff speeds

(a) V1 must be established in relation to VEF as follows:

(1) VEF is the calibrated airspeed at which the critical engine is assumed to fail. VEF must be selected by the applicant, but may noy be less than VmcG determined under Sec. 25.149(e)

(2) V1, in terms of calibrated airspeed, is the takeoff decision speed selected by the applicant, however, V1 may not be less then VEF plus the speed gained with the critical engine inoperative during the time interval between the instant at which the critical engine is failed, and the instant at which the pilot recognizes and reacts to the engine failure, as indicated by the pilot's application of the first retarding means during accelerate stop test.

_________

So for those of you who still want to continue before V1... :=

So for those of you who still want to continue before V1..

ah .. but one still has the little problem of lining up the black and white of the idealised and repeatable certification animal with the sometimes quite different real world beast.

As the aviation world is moving these days .. one needs an holistic risk minimisation approach to one's decision making .. most of the time the real world matches the ideal sufficiently (or with sufficient margin) that the decision is programmed and easy .. sometimes it is not quite so simple as overlaying the real with the ideal.

john_tullamarine,

Very nicely put, Sir!

Best regards,
Flex

I try again...

quote: V1 also means the minimum speed in the takeoff, following a failure of the critical engine at VEF, at which the pilot can continue the takeoff and achieve the required height above the takeoff surface within the takeoff distance

No time to think - just act. Hence the repetitive practise in the sim...

Well it might be very nicely put, but what the hell does it mean? Is it Yes or is it No?

It either means it is a definite maybe or he's been at the Fosters:)

:ok:

Right on, unfortunately on the internet chats, pilots like to write about what they think should they be in a situation where they have no time to think.

I guess it's a macho thing

It's not black and white. Flying seldom is.

In most cases, it is a stop.

Now consider;

-1600-1800 meter runway.
-Runway is contaminated, mixed snow/ice.
-You use the reported braking coefficient.
-Computer has calculated your max take off weight down to the kilo.
-You are at max weight.

You know that;

-Braking action is measured at 60 km/h, not the required 90 km/h. It's not safe to drive faster.
-Braking action measurement is not an exact science.
-You use the average braking action of the far 2/3 of the runway.
-Conditions vary.

The fire alarm goes off at V1 minus 5. Both engines produce full thrust.

Do you stop?

Are you able to?

Now, as our Danish friend pointed out;

"V1 also means the minimum speed in the takeoff, following a failure of the critical engine at VEF, at which the pilot can continue the takeoff and achieve the required height above the takeoff surface within the takeoff distance."

But he is talking about engine failure, not engine fire. An engine fire may be an engine failure, but it doesn't have to be. With 2 engines running you will have no problems (lifting off) if you continue.

If you continue on one engine, you will still lift off before the runway end. You will not clear it with the required 35 ft, but you will still be airborne.

I realise most of you never see this scenario, but some of us do. We can not afford to treat a situation like this like robots.

I don't feel very macho for saying so.

.. the last few posts represent where the discussion ought to be leading .. one of putting sensible and logically contrary viewpoints for the purpose of discussion and reflection.

Pilots need to have an idea of the real problems as opposed to SOP cant. Note I am not trying to belittle the SOP approach to things as such rigour, on the very great majority of occasions, provides us with a high probability of a successful outcome. The discussion ought not to be centred around what one might do on the day but, rather, examine the ins and outs of what should be considered in the decision making process which goes into the pre-roll briefing etc.

Some thoughts ...

No time to think - just act. Hence the repetitive practise in the sim...

This approach works well most of the time. However, we need to accept the consideration that there will be situations where the highly automated, rule-based, reaction may just not provide a desirable outcome. As is often suggested, it is not about absolutes .. it is about probabilities and the need to load the dice as much as one can in one's own favour ...

In critical circumstances, where the ideal is blurred by the reality of the real ... precisely this desirable skilset may just be the thing which puts the aircraft into harm's way ?

but what the hell does it mean? Is it Yes or is it No?

It means, for this question, that there are three domains of interest ..

(a) low speed black and white .. the probability of a successful outcome is loaded to the SOP stop case .. he who keeps going would be looked upon with critical gaze. This continues to be the case approaching V1 if the field length clearly is non-limiting with a comfortable margin ..

(b) an ill-defined, very greyish, area approaching V1 in limiting circumstances .. each case needs to be assessed separately. What is the best decision ? .. hard to say as the boundary conditions which constrain the decision making process may vary considerably.

(c) high speed black and white (assuming there is no secondary consideration arising which precludes flight) .. similar to (a) but loaded to the GO case.

(a) and (c) generally are easily seen as being rule based and programmed

(b) ... ? it depends ...

or he's been at the Fosters

.. only if there's nothing else on offer ... Hunter and Guinness for this lad by preference ..

We can not afford to treat a situation like this like robots.

That's the point I am trying to get across ...