To quote the Airbus FCTM

"In the case of strong crosswind, in the de-crab phase, the PF should be prepared to add small bank angle into the wind in order to maintain the aircraft on the runway centerline. The aircraft may be landed with a partial de-crab (residual crab angle up to about 5 °) to prevent excessive bank. This technique prevents wingtip (or engine nacelle) strike caused by an excessive bank angle."

Boeingdriver99

What have either of those events got to do with monitored approaches? Please try to stick to a reasoned debate not unnecessary mud slinging.

Every airline has had incidents, the important thing is to learn from them and increase safety.

In a highly reliable industry it is difficult to assess safety from outcome - failures; we don’t know; and the important issue is ‘knowing what we don’t know’.

There are many factors which could be cited as contributing to modern safety, we cannot quantify them, more often because of human involvement - the human contribution.
The industry judges that CRM and SMS contribute to safety, but we are unable to explain why, thus we are reluctant to ‘ditch’ them. The most quantifiable safety improvement is from technology, where the latest systems appear more reliable than humans; but alternatively we don’t know how often (or how) humans saved the day - adjustments in normal operation.

Where monitored approaches are judged (not proven) to have equivalent safety to alternative procedures, then the advantages of wider experience for all crew members could be beneficial, but always dependent on context. With the very latest systems the least experienced pilot could fly and monitor a fail-op auto-land, experiencing the real visual conditions - placing the simulator in perspective, but still retaining the more experience pilot as an overall monitor. Correspondingly simulator training would focus using technology, and avoidance of adverse human involvement. (See Ziegler's views; BD99 thread in Safety, CRM, … )
Again, depends on context, it is not a universal answer.

The value of this type of thread is its subjective nature; many views and opinions, which if well argued, in context, provide valuable knowledge of airline and equipment operation;- what happens in everyday operations and a more meaningful view of safety.

Because as safetypee points out it is difficult to assess safety from outcomes. Systems and procedures are where one should look for safety because safety is occurring all the time! More often that not things happen safely. But when things go wrong it can be a sign of systemic problems - larger issues within an organisation as a whole with regards to attitudes and attitudes to procedures and design of procedures. For example; doing things a certain way because they’ve always been done that way without regard for hard data.

I don’t think noting three separate incidents that are all of public record and all had procedural errors all under a large, linked system is ‘mud-slinging’ but I do think calling ‘mud-slinging’ is taking it personally and introducing emotion into a pretty emotionless conversation.

Never flown a monitored approach, but I read this thread with interest. Particularly the bits about one pilot telling the other pilot how the approach will be flown.

Is this something that’s briefed in Europe? Unless I’m doing something wildly out of the ordinary, or unexpected, I don’t even know exactly how I’m going to fly my approach until I get there. The plan changes as the situation progresses, and you just adapt and carry on.

The other thing that gives me pause with the monitored concept is how does one learn from one’s mistakes? Traditionally, if the PF screws up, he/she has a chance to recover, or GA and try again. This seems like it’d be difficult with monitored approaches.

I appreciate the potential benefit of a monitored approach of the wx is sketchy, but for normal operations, it does seem a bit superfluous. But again, I’m looking in from the outside.

Yes, only done it a couple of times but I don't like swapping PF and PM roles at TOD. A certain large B ritish A irline used to do this, but I never flew for them.

It disrupts the flow of the flight in my head, whether I am PF or PM. And as you say, telling the other pilot how you want them to fly the descent and approach is weird and anyway you don't know exactly until you get there.

If conditions (or an auto-land) dictate that PM looks outside on finals and lands the aircraft, fine, but otherwise, I don't like swapping at TOD.

1) The procedure puts an absolute stop to willingly busting minima/stabilization criteria by PIC under older-generation CRM environments (with steep cockpit gradients and more). Hopefully, superfluous now.
2) On paper it looks much worse than it actually is.
3) It requires a positive decision to proceed towards the landing. Very different from the required positive decision to G/A, which is not easy to build under all circumstances. Pages 19-20 here [year 2000] and Page 48 here [year 2018]. You don't need to be go-around minded, the procedure is.

I flew at Big Airways for a while in the pre change of hands days and witnessed the angst when the process changed..”don’t like taking control on finals “ etc etc…..some people got so het up about the idea you’d have thought the management had threatened to shoot their pet dog..

…and then it was introduced and after a very short while I think everybody pretty much shrugged their shoulders and wondered what all the fuss had been about..


Buy the concept or not, it’s really not a big deal.

You completely misunderstand what a monitored approach is. No one is telling anyone HOW to fly the approach. The handover is effortless. It can be done pre TOD or even as late as the beginning of vectors for the approach. As with any other aspects of airline ops, if the training is up to scratch there is no issue. It’s simply a different way of doing the same thing. I’ve done it for 20yrs in B727, B744, A320, A330, A340 and A350. No issue at all. Train as you fight, fight as you train.

After the merger, back in the late 1980s, the BA flight operations management team was doing a lot of work (and arguing) trying to agree and introduce a common operating policy across all BA aircraft types. There were clear benefits from achieving this. Despite this, on the 747 Classic fleet, we decided in the end not to introduce the monitored approach mainly because of the perceived resistance that would probably have come from a significant proportion of the line crews, in particular the long-established longhaul pilots. Also, the flight engineers said they found it confusing trying to follow who was doing what, when and to whom.

However, for non-precision approaches, we did inroduce the montored/split/shared approach (call it what you will) because it worked very well in marginal conditions for the reasons stated by several of the posters on this thread. On a fleet which was due to be phased out in a few years time there seemed little reason to make the change for precision approaches where auto-coupling or autoland was available.

Were we right in not making the change? I believe so, because it is important for all crew members to have confidence in the SOPs and for them all to be singing from the same hymn sheet.

Never right or wrong; judged after consulting the users.
Safety is what we do; something was done.

:ok:

I think that’s a good summary of some of the important plus points. I can’t speak for any other operation, but where I work it’s not one person telling another what to do; it is HOW we as a crew are going to carry out a successful conclusion to the flight. A good briefing is interactive and can lead to changes of plan when problems and solutions are identified, whether you are doing a monitored approach or not. The P1 saying I’m going to do this, this and this while P2 sits in silence is no better than the P1 instructing the P2 to do it this way and no other. As FD says, monitored approaches help with cockpit gradients, even unintentional ones, plus checks and balances are more built-in.

After a while operating like this, it just feels natural, and handing control over after a nicely flown NPA or whatever, with the aircraft stable and in the best position to land that you can achieve is professionally rewarding in the same way that flying all the way down and putting it on the numbers is. It is easier, IMO, to one-man-band / fighter pilot an aircraft than it is to bring everyone one along with you, but the second scenario is the safer and often more successful one.

One of the best posts that I have looked at. Great post.

This is sadly the norm for many operators. Mentality like "safety is there, guaranteed". Destination minded all the way. Do not disrupt the network. Efficiency no matter what while in the corners of safety. Of course no guidance is documented because managers will have issues with CAA, but many operators expect you to deal with an issue firstly efficiently, and thats bad prioritization because it hides many dangers of misjudgement by the line pilots. There is no limit on how deep you get in that s**t.

“Sell me the monitored approach”

Why?

If your employer specifies flying your own approaches, then do it. On the other hand, if your employer is Big Airways, then expect to fly what is called ‘monitored approaches’. If you don’t want to fly the latter then don’t work for Big Airways!

I’ve seen some here stating they don’t know ‘how’ they are going to fly their approach until they get there. Well if you don’t know, how in the hell is the other pilot supposed to know when you go off piste? How are they supposed to helpfully monitor?

If we are talking safety, I can think of many, many, many landing/overrun/hot approach, accidents involving self flown approaches. I’m actually struggling to think of any accidents/incidents where one pilot’s approach is to be followed by another pilot’s landing? Am I wrong?

If it didn’t work well, you can take it from me, any big airline would have knocked it on the head years ago!

Also facilitates a more inclusive briefing - ie) how are you going to fly the approach for my landing? What modes are you going to use, what speed gates are you going to agree on etc? Rather than PF just droning on about the ILS frequency and course! Boeing recommend disconnecting A/P around 300-600ft AAL in order to transition to manual flight before the flare.

BOAC did it for many years with very few incidents until the BEA mafia arrived after they had changed their monitored approach “change hands” style..seem to remember the latter had quite a few incidents. Neither the airmiss with the stationary hotel nor the 777 prang demonstrated that the new BEA procedures were foolproof. (For the latter the captain ordered PF to uncouple from the glideslope which didn’t happen allowing the speed to fall below min drag until stall protection kicked in).
As for approach briefing any professional outfit does it with or without monitored approach.

This is kind of what I was getting at in my earlier question. I don’t know what speeds and modes I’m planning to use, let alone talk to someone else about it.

CA, I don’t think the idea is to say to the P2: “...and then reduce the speed to 180kts flap 5, asking for the flap lever to be moved then using the MCP to select the speed, then arm the glide slope capture with the APP button...”, etc. etc. It's more like “Supposing we get a sidestep on to the parallel runway at a late stage, how close in can we sensibly do it, and is it going to be different IMC/VMC?” or “If they clear us for the RNAV onto the opposite end, not the ILS, what are the traps to watch out for?” or “What do you think would be a sensible speed/config at XXXXX, given it’s a 3.3deg slope with a possible tailwind and a density altitude of 9,000'?"

I can’t speak for anyone else but that’s how I generally run things; you’ve all (including “heavy” pilots who may be up the front for the approach and landing) had a chance to discuss what may catch you out and how to avoid/mitigate it. That makes it a bit easier to monitor, although there are always the “unknown unknowns”.

Thanks FullWings. That makes more sense. Your briefings are still a lot more comprehensive than ours, but at least I can sort of buy what you’re selling.

It would be interesting for me to observe a line flight for a European operator.

"BRITISH AIRWAYS FLIGHT MANUAL CLARIFICATION
Of the procedure known in the US as a "monitored approach":

page1image48141616

page1image48147872British Airways Flight Operations Department Notice ...

page1image48166672There appears to be some confusion over the new pilot role titles. The following will hopefully clear

page1image47988080up any misunderstandings.

page1image47990672The titles P1, P2 and co-pilot will now cease to have any meaning within the BA Operations

page1image47998768Manual. They are to be replaced by:

page1image48002384Handling Pilot, Non-Handling pilot, Handling Landing Pilot, Non-Handling Landing Pilot, Handling

page1image48010368Non-Handling Pilot and Non-Handling Non-Landing Pilot.

page1image48015072A. The Landing Pilot is initially the Handling Pilot and will handle the take-off and landing except in

page1image48024000role reversal when he/she is the Non-Handling Pilot for taxi until the Handling Non-Landing Pilot,

page1image48032352hands the Handling to the Landing Pilot at eighty knots.

page1image48037632B. The Non-Landing (Non-Handling, since the Landing Pilot is Handling) Pilot reads the checklist to

page1image48045984the Handling Pilot until after Before Descent Check List completion, when the handling Landing

page1image48602192pilot hands the handling to the Non-Handling Non-Landing Pilot who then becomes the Handling

page1image48780544Non-Landing Pilot.

C. The Landing pilot is the Non-Handling Pilot until the "decision altitude" call, when the Handling

Non-Landing Pilot hands the handling to the Non-Handling Landing Pilot, unless the latter calls "go

around', in which case the Handling Non-Landing pilot continues handling and the Non-Handling

Landing Pilot continues non handling until the next call of "land" or "go around", as appropriate.

page1image48805936In view of the recent confusion over these rules, it was deemed necessary to restate them clearly.

page1image48814768This then should eliminate any confusion."