Landing Distance Regulation versus RLD?
 

Good Day All,

Regulation states: JET have to stop within 60% of the LDA.

However, when I check the RLD definition from books (Airbus Fcom, Getting to grips with, EFB user guide, company OM)
They used the following calculation:

REQUIRED Ldg distance: DRY
ALD x 1.67 (same as ALD/0,6)

REQUIRED Ldg distance: WET
ALD x 1,92 (same as 1,67 x 1,15)

It seems they multiply the ALD by 60% (which is different)
Any clue??

Hi,
Thanks for help, but still don't get it?

Runway length (LDA): 3000 m
By regulation, I must to come to a complete stop by 1800 m at latest (To stop within 60% of LDA)

Today, rwy is dry and ALD = 1200 m
RLD = 1200 x 1, 67 = 2004 m

I must be wrong somewhere, cause 3000 m is more than correct for a runway and 1200 m ALD is quiet a small value for landing distance.

Following on from the previous post,

(a) the actual minimum landing distance is something the test pilots achieved. This was after some dedicated practice work and, even then, the "bad" test runs will be discarded by the OEM TPs and a few more by the backroom aerodynamicists analysing the test results data. The OEM/Regulator TPs will come to agreement on what figures they are going to OK for the aerodynamicists to use in developing the AFM (certification) data.

Having been in aircraft during maximum performance landing tests, might I suggest that you and I, as mere mortal line pilots, are NOT going to achieve what the TPs have put in the AFM as actual figures. That is to say, we will end up in the fudge factor region to a greater or lesser extent, even if we reckon we have done a real beaut job of getting the aircraft on the ground and so forth.

(b) the operationally required landing distance includes fudge factors to provide some fat. Typically, these are 1.67 for dry and 1.67 x 1.15 = 1.92 for wet conditions. Note, if you wish, 1/0.6 = 1.67.

Regulation states: JET have to stop within 60% of the LDA.

Perhaps, providing you read LDR instead of LDA, but let's not read that literally. What it means is that the required AFM landing distance x 0.6 will approximate the flight test actual landing distance. You and I are NOT going to achieve that, as a general rule, regardless of how well we do the task. The statement should be read as "you need to have a 1.67 factor on top of the flight test actual distance achieved for the AFM required landing distance".

Providing the runway LDA is longer than the factored AFM LDR figure then you should be reasonably safe to operate. Do keep in mind, though, runway surface friction characteristics need to be taken into account when considering the landing exercise.

Some jurisdictions permit 1.42 (in lieu of 1.67) for heavy props and alternates but the basic idea remains the same.

I was on some max performance landing tests many years ago - I don't recall being overly impressed by the pilot skills involved (although the test pilots I flew with were very, very good). What I do recall being impressed by was how fast a big airliner (767) could stop. The deceleration at max braking was amazing - so much so that if there was anything loose around the cabin, it quickly ended up against the forward bulkhead. After coming to a full stop, we'd promptly take off, fly around for 10 or 15 minutes with the gear extended to cool, then we'd do it again.

That's the size of it. A good TP can make the bird sit up and sing quite nicely. We line folk are a bit more sedate and that routine precludes a reasonable expectation that we can replicate the practised performance of a TP out to get the best data feasible for the OEM.

Sometimes it goes a bit wrong .. eg let a bit too much sinkrate catch you out at minimum speed and it's all over, Red Rover ... (nearly 40 years ago, now).



Did I mention something about line pilot folks not replicating TP performance landing ? Performance takeoff we reasonably can match but not landing ...

I remember when that MD-80 landing occurred - I worked with a couple people who had previously worked at Douglas/MacDac, and still knew people there. Supposedly, after the tail came off, they rushed the aircraft into to a hanger and closed the door before anyone could get any photos. Didn't work, the next weeks Av Week cover photo was a beautiful shot from about 5 o'clock showing the missing tail and various cables and wiring dangling from the rear bulkhead :}
If I recall correctly, it was an FAA pilot flying and it was intended to be a 'high sink rate' landing - the target sink rate being something like 6 ft./sec., actual sink rate was about twice that :eek:

Hello,

Yes, I was discusing the "60% LDA" (Literally)
It was my all point.
Why don't they change the wording?

Anyways, thanks for all the interesting info

That's not how I remembered it, so I looked it up to be sure. The MD pilot was in the left seat and was flying the airplane when this event occurred. Report number NTSB-AAR-82-2, page 2. The 720 fpm sink rate in the final descent was as intended, but he was supposed to flare to an acceptable touchdown sink rate and apparently failed to initiate an aggressive enough pitch up to reduce the descent rate before touchdown.

Am I confusing the pilot part with the incident a couple months later when they spun the MD-80 off the runway (memory says they were doing a landing with some simulated hydraulic failure)? That one wouldn't have been so bad except that they brought in a crane to lift the aircraft back on the runway - but the crane broke and fell on the aircraft essentially cutting it in half :ugh:

The MD-80 ended up being a good aircraft, but one could have been forgiven for believing the program was cursed during the flight test program :rolleyes:

Yes, I was discusing the 60% LDA

An LDA reference is plain wrong. That's an aerodrome runway number. LDR is the aircraft number.

he was supposed to flare to an acceptable touchdown sink rate

Which is why TPs are far braver than we mere mortals and do heaps of homework to minimise their probability of dying on the job.

Low speed/low energy/high drag state just is one too much of a big, big flare management risk .. which, of course, is why we don't do them on the line.

Am I confusing the pilot part with the incident a couple months later when they spun the MD-80 off the runway

Yep. The sink rate mishap was at Edwards, the hydraulics off mishap at Yuma (and one of the reasons we generally wait until the nosewheel is on the ground before pulling the buckets ..)

Some references

Boy, but does the system sing the TP's praises when he/she gets it right .. but crucifies him/her when he/she screws up. A bit like ordinary line mortal pilot accidents, I guess ...

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...ts/AAR8202.pdf
http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online...s/AAR81-16.pdf