Military GPS Jamming trials
A colleague of mine has just returned from a flight from USA West Coast to London. Notamed were GPS Jamming trials out of Yuma I believe.
In the initial cruise they lost all three GPS sources. One was regained after a short time and two were operative eventually before the Atlantic crossing. The third remained U/S to destination. They also lost CPDLC, and various feeds to the co-pilot side instruments which remained the entire flight. Made for a busy and interesting trip! Is this level of jamming normal, as it seems a bit OTT for the safety of civil flights? |
GPS jamming has been happening for months in the eastern Mediterranean. Bloody nuisance.
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Be thankful they only lost CPDLC and some instruments. On some Embraer's loss of GPS can affect the flight controls...I'm led to believe Garmin finally updated the software in the yaw damper to somewhat guard against the loss of GPS affecting it to such an extent early last year.
Originally Posted by The FAA
EMBRAER HAS RECENTLY RECEIVED A REPORT OF GPS 1 AND 2 SIMULTANEOUS SIGNAL LOSS DURING FMS NAVIGATION IN CRUISE FLIGHT FOLLOWED BY A GPS HSI 1 AND 2 FAILURE INDICATION, ATTITUDE AND HEADING REFERENCE SYSTEM (AHRS) 1 AND 2 FAULT AND, AFTER A FEW MINUTES, A STALL WARNING PROTECTION SYSTEM (SWPS) FAULT, VENTRAL RUDDER FAIL, YAW DAMPER FAIL, AUTO PILOT FAIL, AND CAS MESSAGES ASSOCIATED WITH UNEXPECTED ROLLING AND YAWING OSCILLATIONS (DUTCH ROLL) AT HIGH AIRSPEEDS.
Source |
Originally Posted by redsnail
(Post 10287988)
GPS jamming has been happening for months in the eastern Mediterranean. Bloody nuisance.
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Originally Posted by wiggy
(Post 10288298)
Yep, though apart from HAL on our Boeing saying he’s not sure exactly where he is so don’t shoot an RNAV approach we so far at least have been spared the sort of secondary effects described above. |
CPDLC is not really surprising as it relies usually on GPS timestamps, feeds to main instruments are however worrying. The Embraer thing sounds seriously over the top, but that seems like a good indication of interconnected system without sufficient safeguards within those system being able to isolate single source failures in redundant sensors.
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Originally Posted by wiggy
(Post 10288298)
Yep, though apart from HAL on our Boeing saying he’s not sure exactly where he is, so don’t shoot an RNP approach, we so far at least have been spared the sort of secondary effects described above. |
We are shutting down our navaids and installing GLS's. At least they haven't started to purge the ILS's, yet. What could possibly go wrong?
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Originally Posted by CurtainTwitcher
(Post 10288854)
We are shutting down our navaids and installing GLS's. At least they haven't started to purge the ILS's, yet. What could possibly go wrong?
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