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Originally Posted by aterpster
(Post 10272083)
Not doubting he said that. But, he was pulling that assumption out of his ass.
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Originally Posted by Vessbot
(Post 10272088)
I don't see that. A commercial aircraft needs to be safely and reliably operated by the least competent pilot on the seniority list, wouldn't you agree?
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No matter who is hired, by definition someone has to be the least competent. Your position is the same as "our amps go to 11." It's one louder, you see...
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KenV You might want to google “window of circadian low” or maybe any study into the effects of fatigue. A competent pilot who hasn’t slept because he/she has operated a flight at the limits of allowable FDP might be a tad sleepy. Of course I’m drifting in Human Factors here. Tut tut. Let’s hark bark to the good old days when no one screwed up. You know before the “children of the magenta line”. |
Not incompetent as such, but do we have to design for the "99 percentile bad" pilot, which may not be far removed from incompetent... Sadly, in many cases this means making the system "less good" than we otherwise could if we didn't need to account for a sub-par pilot.
Another part of the problem is pilots switching between aircraft makes. There is a certain logic to the way Boeing systems work - and it doesn't change all that much between the various Boeing models. Fly Boeings your whole life and it all makes perfect sense. Airbus has a certain logic as well that is pretty consistent between the various model, and it makes sense to the people who have only flown Airbus. But the Boeing logic is different than the Airbus logic. Which one you think is better is largely dependent on which one you 'grew up with', both work, but they are not completely compatible with each other. It's sort of like driving on the right or on the left - both work, both have people that think their way is better. I grew up driving on the right - it's what comes natural to me. I've driven on the left for many thousands of accident free miles when in other county's (mainly the UK and Australia) - it's takes more attention and is hence more fatiguing - but it's not all that bad so long as things don't go seriously wrong. But I also know and fear that, faced with an emergency situation where I need to take split second action, my instinct will be to 'go right' - which if I'm driving on the left could be the exactly wrong thing to do. While it has gotten little discussion here, I'm firmly of the belief that Asiana was in no small part due to the pilot transitioning from Airbus to Boeing and that's why the aircraft systems didn't behave the way he expected. |
Originally Posted by KRviator
(Post 10270126)
Respectfully, I think you've both missed the point. I guess you would both argue that AF447 was solely the result of the crew, rather than the fact they lost the airspeed in the first place...
Yes, the crew screwed up (in both AMS and AF447...), in a massive way. I am not disputing that fact at all, nor trying to absolve them of that claim. But... Amsterdam was not, in itself, the fault of mode confusion, or automation dependency. The crew recognised the decaying speed, and that the throttles retarded automatically. They then pushed them up, and believed (and this is where their lack of systems understanding failed them) they would stay there - and through lack of basic airmanship, let the speed decay to a point where the accident was inevitable. Consider the case of Scandinavian 751. Engine surge on the initial climb, pilot does the right thing and reduces power. But the autothrottle restored power on the engine, resulting in dual engine failure and the ensuing crash. The pilot knew nothing about that 'feature', nor did the airline. Is it still their fault for not noticing the increasing power? The moral of the story is, pilots screwup certainly. But rarely does that, in itself, cause an accident and it is fatally simplistic to simply lay the blame for a prang at the feet of the crew. AF 447, the only instrument that failed was airspeed, and only for the first minute. The second officer kept pulling back even after being told not to by the FO. The FO never took control when he clearly should have. For the record, I hate the Airbus design, you really can’t see what your colleague is doing. AMS, the throttle moved back RIGHT AFTER THE FO MOVED THEM UP, the training captain should have recognized the automation wasn’t going to work. I haven’t read the whole report on SAS, but it sounds similar, he pulled power, power came back up, he did nothing. As pilots we are the last line of defense against all the deficiencies in airplane design, SOPs, rules, ATC errors, etc.. does that mean we are always the problem? No, but we need to be able to recognize, react and recover when something goes wrong. Failing to do so will get you killed, and criticized on pprune afterwards. |
Originally Posted by FlightDetent
(Post 10271687)
tdracer, that's probably not worded to describe precisely the SFO accident. Anyhow the energy level was tricky. Intercepting a standard 3 deg profile from above, with a rather low-and-close geometrical intersection point is a beast. Your mind is firmly set that you are hot and high, so you WANT idle thrust....
and then ... In fact, as you intercept the G/S, heaven forbid the AP or pilot pulling up to capture it - oh wait, there is no other way - the A/C if still with idle thrust is in a SEVERE low energy state. Add to that a bit more pull to recover the duck-under (no matter A/P or human) and you have a 7n7 with a 6-8 degree DOWN trajectory vector, full landing flap with L/G down and 5 deg NU pitch to recover the profile and it is an extremely high drag configuration. The inertia is massive. If not anticipated it all happens very fast and the recovery N1 is in the low 80s. Feel free to ask how I know. Another trap is how un-common it is. These days especially long-haul it is ILS to ILS and stable-coupled from 15 NM. And guys get about 2 landings a month each. The chances of recognizing not only that the situation is wrong, but how quickly and deeply bad it is about to become are practically nil. And then you are left with the reactions. Why theirs came late is elementary HF. In this respect both AMS 737 and SFO 777 wouldn't have happened if it was not for the intercept from above to begin with, I am quite convinced. |
Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs
(Post 10271770)
I was being sarcastic. That diatribe from Switchbait is one of the bigger loads of nonsense I have read.
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Hans, I was arcing up about this dinosaur attitude that you're pilots and pilots should be able to cope if, for example, the ATS doesn't wake up. I wonder what their attitude is to GPWS and TCAS; enhancements in technology to save dumb pilots. Or are they different to a fundamentally flawed ATS design that will catch out dumb pilots?
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Excuse my interruption but here are a few other bits and pieces of studies and incidents for the Original Poster:
Carry on... |
Is it my imagination or is it reasonable to presume that some of the pilots posting here don't have one hand on the control column and one hand on the throttles at all stages of the approach, including autolands? Just the way some posts have been written perhaps.
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Originally Posted by hans brinker
(Post 10270064)
The only reason we still have pilots is for when **** hits the fan, anything else can be automated. Yes. But ironically due to the near-ubiquitous normal-case automation, these pilots have lost the ability to fly competently and confidently in normal situations... much less when the **** hits the fan. The only way for a pilot to justify his existence is to maintain that ability. Without that, we're already riding in drones. The FO pushed the throttle up, let go, it went back to idle, and for the next 100 seconds all 3 of them sat there while the thrust was at idle, and the speed dropped to 83kts, 40kts below Vref. |
Originally Posted by parabellum
(Post 10272637)
Is it my imagination or is it reasonable to presume that some of the pilots posting here don't have one hand on the control column and one hand on the throttles at all stages of the approach, including autolands? Just the way some posts have been written perhaps.
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Originally Posted by parabellum
(Post 10272637)
Is it my imagination or is it reasonable to presume that some of the pilots posting here don't have one hand on the control column and one hand on the throttles at all stages of the approach, including autolands? Just the way some posts have been written perhaps.
I'd just assumed that was trained as SOP for Boeing aircraft. Also part of the reason why I think the PF being a recent transfer from Airbus was a contributing factor on Asiana at SFO. |
Originally Posted by tdracer
(Post 10282198)
Also part of the reason why I think the PF being a recent transfer from Airbus was a contributing factor on Asiana at SFO.
Same as the Emirates crew that attempted the idle thrust goaround in Dubai. |
tdracer
You are spot on.
The non flying hand belongs on the TL ( minus V1 to ca 400 feet on T/o) for tactile feedback. Very important on the 738 when trying to slow down on a tailwind approach and or a steeper then 3` glide when heavy. Now for the Asiana: First Q: " How many pilots does it take to trash an aircraft?" A "Usually 3, One being an instructor and or super senior" I am on my first zigar and second coffee , so not quite awake this balmy Sunday morning, so my numbers might be wrong from memory: The Captain Candidate had 8000 hrs and ALL on A320 and they were sitting him direct into the LH seat to command a 777. He had less then 3000hrs command. That is pure madness from the Company and the local CAA, me thinks. THE direct cause of the accident. As mentioned before if THIS was a challenging approach , what about the one Murphy had lined up the first week after line release , on that dark and stormy night , with the toilet on fire! A systemic fail from the company with at least two marginal crew with that a lack of self preservation. Blame Boeing! Why not, they should not have sold it to them in the first place? Regards Cpt B |
MyBad, just checked the NTSB report.
He had 9700hrs total since 1993 and plenty of 737 and some 747 time. A320 command for the last little while. Still not a good idea as it turned out! |
Any bets on whether they habitually kept their hand on the throttles? No one has their hand on the thrust levers, so if Boeing don't consider it important then it's unlikely to be of relevance to this incident. |
Boeing is hardly going to put in it's FCTM "keep your hands on the throttles"! :rolleyes:
From the same company that designed the ATS to stay dormant while the aeroplane crashed due to slow speed... |
Originally Posted by Fursty Ferret
(Post 10282716)
There's a good video on YouTube from the flight deck showing the 787 taking part in an air display. No one has their hand on the thrust levers, so if Boeing don't consider it important then it's unlikely to be of relevance to this incident. But fast forward to the end to see where his hand is during a phase of flight with a higher "relevance to this incident." |
Originally Posted by BluSdUp
(Post 10282579)
You are spot on.
The non flying hand belongs on the TL ( minus V1 to ca 400 feet on T/o) for tactile feedback. Very important on the 738 when trying to slow down on a tailwind approach and or a steeper then 3` glide when heavy. Now for the Asiana: First Q: " How many pilots does it take to trash an aircraft?" A "Usually 3, One being an instructor and or super senior" I am on my first zigar and second coffee , so not quite awake this balmy Sunday morning, so my numbers might be wrong from memory: The Captain Candidate had 8000 hrs and ALL on A320 and they were sitting him direct into the LH seat to command a 777. He had less then 3000hrs command. That is pure madness from the Company and the local CAA, me thinks. THE direct cause of the accident. As mentioned before if THIS was a challenging approach , what about the one Murphy had lined up the first week after line release , on that dark and stormy night , with the toilet on fire! A systemic fail from the company with at least two marginal crew with that a lack of self preservation. Blame Boeing! Why not, they should not have sold it to them in the first place? Regards Cpt B The instructor on the other hand must be extra vigilant and add to his normal PM duties the instructional inputs. This requires ability and capability to be done to very high standards simultaneously and takes time to develop for every single instructor keeping in mind that PM duties and, more than ever, Capt responsibilities will always have the priority over everything else, in other words You don't end up upside down because You are trying to let the trainee understand. |
Originally Posted by sonicbum
(Post 10282738)
Sorry but, in my opinion, this is total nonsense. The root cause of this specific accident was mainly a lack of understanding of AFDS modes and selections from the PF associated to an incorrect GS from above capture procedure and marginal adherence to company SOPs, very poor PM duties from the instructor and poor assertiveness from the 3rd pilot. PIC time on the A320 is completely irrelevant. When a trainee undergoes a new type rating he/she must work hard to clear his mind of whatever procedure he was doing on the previous type and put maximum effort in system knowledge and operations of the new type, with the advantage like in this specific instance that the trainee is within the same operator so he/she can only focus on the technical aspect of the training.
The instructor on the other hand must be extra vigilant and add to his normal PM duties the instructional inputs. This requires ability and capability to be done to very high standards simultaneously and takes time to develop for every single instructor keeping in mind that PM duties and, more than ever, Capt responsibilities will always have the priority over everything else, in other words You don't end up upside down because You are trying to let the trainee understand. |
Originally Posted by Vessbot
(Post 10282784)
It's an odd bit of reasoning to conclude from "must work hard to [avoid X]" where X is a factor that could contribute to an accident in a new type, that X is "completely irrelevant." If it's so irrelevant, then what's the bother working hard over it?
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Originally Posted by sonicbum
(Post 10282793)
Sorry but I really do not understand what You are talking about.
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Originally Posted by Vessbot
(Post 10282795)
You said that the pilot's previous experience in another type is "completely irrelevant," but in the next sentence said that he "must work hard to clear his mind of" that experience. Both of those cannot be true.
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Originally Posted by sonicbum
(Post 10282802)
I did not say that "pilot's previous experience in another type is completely irrelevant," but "PIC time on the A320 is completely irrelevant". That should clear up Your uncertainty.
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Originally Posted by Vessbot
(Post 10282806)
It doesn't. "PIC time" is just a more specific way of describing his previous experience in that type. Maybe you're talking about his SIC time then? Or combination of PIC and SIC time? Anyway, who cares about all the exact particulars. Do you agree or disagree that his habits formed over a substantial amount of experience with the different type might have contributed in his on-the-spot mode confusion?
That is pure madness from the Company and the local CAA, me thinks. THE direct cause of the accident." Now in my opinion, in the context of this accident, this has nothing to do for the reasons already mentioned before.
Originally Posted by Vessbot
(Post 10282806)
Do you agree or disagree that his habits formed over a substantial amount of experience with the different type might have contributed in his on-the-spot mode confusion?
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Un-learning for better word.
Having done a few 1000 hrs of type rating courses and some line training I would say one of the biggest problem SOME experienced pilots have is forgetting about the " Other" aircraft , when they get stressed.
Had an experienced ATR captain try to use the steering tiller on a xwind T/o during linetraining on a Do328 TP out of Fornebu Oslo. Fortunately it did not work, would have been catastrophic. Also had some good fun in the 737 sim watching experienced Airbus, Fokker, MD80 and Dornier pilots try to find the TOGA button on a go around. Also going direct Long Haul captain from a different SH manufacturer is not a good idea, I think! |
Originally Posted by BluSdUp
(Post 10282866)
Having done a few 1000 hrs of type rating courses and some line training I would say one of the biggest problem SOME experienced pilots have is forgetting about the " Other" aircraft , when they get stressed.
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Thanks Vessbot.
Sonicbum. So, I concentrate on the Big Picture, always. Details are fun, but boring when after all its just a big Piper Seneca with reeeeealy slow engines on it if left at idle on short final. Eh! ? |
Originally Posted by BluSdUp
(Post 10282948)
Thanks Vessbot.
Sonicbum. So, I concentrate on the Big Picture, always. Details are fun, but boring when after all its just a big Piper Seneca with reeeeealy slow engines on it if left at idle on short final. Eh! ? Previously You have written : "The Captain Candidate had 8000 hrs and ALL on A320 and they were sitting him direct into the LH seat to command a 777. He had less then 3000hrs command. That is pure madness from the Company and the local CAA, me thinks. THE direct cause of the accident." This is not about the big picture, it is -IMHO- simply heading in the wrong direction. The big picture is paramount, we are all happy about that, but during investigations we must focus also on the details, understand why things went the way they did and prevent it from happening again by using the proper countermeasures. |
Both the big picture and the details are equally important to focus on. I think accident investigation boards are better at identifying the details, which are more tangible and more easily describable. Such as some logic trap in this or that combination of submodes, or a seldom-encountered interaction of A and B systems... things that can be pointed to and shown that happened in a particular moment on the flight. And these can be (and should be) fixed so as not to contribute in a future accident.
But why the pilot acted or failed to act in a particular way? That's fuzzier and harder to identify. It has to do with trends, habits, and mental states. It's harder to identify as happening at X moment in time and setting off the chain of events Y and Z. And that could mean it's left out of the accident report, even though it may be just as much (or even more of a) contributor to the accident than the easily pointed out details from the last paragraph. It's identified not for X moment in time by the accident investigator, but over many flights (or decades of flights) by conscious pilots, instructors, etc., especially when they can see these trends and changes spanning over long periods of time, or over different sectors of the industry, as they observe habits and inclinations. The thing is, no matter how carefully we cinch up every identified hole in the logic traps and system interactions (i.e., the details) a new unforeseen one is always liable to show itself in the future and be best (or only) curable by a flight crew with a grip on the big picture (i.e., the airplane is going THIS WAY, and I'm simply gonna make it go THAT WAY, with the readiness and ease of an instructor saying "I have the controls" to a pre-solo student) |
Accident reports are variable in quality, but are generally improving. Very seldom do we see the term 'root cause' used and some investigation agencies have gone away from using the term 'cause' altogether. Accident reports should never apportion blame, so you should never see "the cause of the accident was the pilot doing xxxxx " wriiten. Investigation of human factors is changing for the better too, particularly in the field of human/machine interfaces. I have recently qualified as an accident investigator and the main emphasis on my course was human factors. Based on the premise that people don't go out to do a bad job (if they did then this becomes sabotage and a deliberate act - therefore not an accident), the investigator has to try and understand why an action made sense to the operator at the time. The factors which lead up to an accident are numerous and varied - and never simple. One basic statement such as "The pilot didn't understand the auto-thrust modes" is neither accurate or helpful. You have to look at the reasons why they were misunderstood.
It's a fascinating subject and those who wish to understand this topic more could do no better than to read 'The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error' by Sidney Dekker. It's not an expensive book, and will change your opinion on human actions, and may well change the way you act as an operator yourself. It's a 'must read' for accident investigators. |
Originally Posted by Vessbot
(Post 10270790)
A big problem is that "the automated systems are more competent than the pilot" is largely a true statement. From what I've seen in general, I would place more stock in the automation saving the pilot, than the other way around.
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Originally Posted by Vessbot
(Post 10283235)
Both the big picture and the details are equally important to focus on. I think accident investigation boards are better at identifying the details, which are more tangible and more easily describable. Such as some logic trap in this or that combination of submodes, or a seldom-encountered interaction of A and B systems... things that can be pointed to and shown that happened in a particular moment on the flight. And these can be (and should be) fixed so as not to contribute in a future accident.
But why the pilot acted or failed to act in a particular way? That's fuzzier and harder to identify. It has to do with trends, habits, and mental states. It's harder to identify as happening at X moment in time and setting off the chain of events Y and Z. And that could mean it's left out of the accident report, even though it may be just as much (or even more of a) contributor to the accident than the easily pointed out details from the last paragraph. It's identified not for X moment in time by the accident investigator, but over many flights (or decades of flights) by conscious pilots, instructors, etc., especially when they can see these trends and changes spanning over long periods of time, or over different sectors of the industry, as they observe habits and inclinations. The thing is, no matter how carefully we cinch up every identified hole in the logic traps and system interactions (i.e., the details) a new unforeseen one is always liable to show itself in the future and be best (or only) curable by a flight crew with a grip on the big picture (i.e., the airplane is going THIS WAY, and I'm simply gonna make it go THAT WAY, with the readiness and ease of an instructor saying "I have the controls" to a pre-solo student) |
Originally Posted by sonicbum
(Post 10283475)
Vessbot, I may be wrong, but by reading most of Your posts it does not really seem that You are an active professional pilot otherwise You would -to a certain extent- be familiar with the logics of, to name a few, pilot core competencies, performance indicators, observed behavioural markers and threat & errors management. These are, amongst others, bread and butter for instructors & examiners and definitely a familiar environment for line pilots as well as the core foundation of incident/accident investigations.
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Also had some good fun in the 737 sim watching experienced Airbus, Fokker, MD80 and Dornier pilots try to find the TOGA button on a go around. |
A37575
Nope
Every single one disconnected the AT (via their old TOGA button) Shoved the TL up and pulled the stick back so hard the AP let go! Passenger comfort was temporarily suspended, and I hung on for dear life. By the time they left my sim ,they were all cured of " The Other Aircraft". Minus one crew i refused to recommend for test.But that is a story for another day. |
It may be a little thought provoking to think about the issues from the side of the aircraft systems designers. It is very expensive to meet an assurance level at DAL A and also automate the handling of every conceivable circumstance and failure and perhaps create some heuristic approach for failures and circumstances that are not foreseen. So instead, the approach has been for the automatics to 'gracefully' :p degrade and hand the bag of bolts to the flight crew. The flight crew are expected to be able to manually recover in the degraded/alternate state from any of the potential issues that the automatics cannot. Unfortunately, as instances quoted in this thread attest to, on some occasions the flight crew are not up to picking up the pieces when the aircraft systems peremptorily hand them control and simultaneously enter some degraded mode/alternate law. Indeed, just the complexity of managing the aircraft in its degraded mode/alternate law is sufficiently challenging for some crews.
Then there is the imaginative (mis)use of capabilities that the analysts, software designer and the certification testers did not expect: the systems equivalent of using a fire-extinguisher to hold open a fire door :}. Users will always do this with systems and they own them, but the capability that they are fulfilling with a particular function was unintended or perhaps being used outside its intended purpose, and consequently can lead to unintended consequences and exhibit 'features' that can/will catch out the unwary. The crews that the analysts designed for 15 or 20 years ago when the design was finalized are now taking pensions (and commenting on here) and the expected capabilities and awareness of the aircraft are completely different now than they were. A lot more thought needs to be given to the human factors of the systems what was useful in the old days may be an irritant now and vice versa. |
It may be a little thought provoking to think about the issues from the side of the aircraft systems designers. It is very expensive to meet an assurance level at DAL A and also automate the handling of every conceivable circumstance and failure and perhaps create some heuristic approach for failures and circumstances that are not foreseen. So instead, the approach has been for the automatics to 'gracefully' :p degrade and hand the bag of bolts to the flight crew. The flight crew are expected to be able to manually recover in the degraded/alternate state from any of the potential issues that the automatics cannot. Unfortunately, as instances quoted in this thread attest to, on some occasions the flight crew are not up to picking up the pieces when the aircraft systems peremptorily hand them control and simultaneously enter some degraded mode/alternate law. Indeed, just the complexity of managing the aircraft in its degraded mode/alternate law is sufficiently challenging for some crews. Excellent stuff Ian, best description I have heard. You have made the case for much more 'traditional' flying experience that will allow natural reactions to the unusual to develop before being let loose on an Airbus or similar. Unfortunately the aircraft has been sold as so easy to operate even a 250 hour pilot straight from flight school can fly it and ever cost conscious managements have fallen for it, the AF447 loss simply didn't penetrate the armour of the financially driven, be they a manufacturer, an operator or the flying school. Old ways are not always bad ways anymore than the new ways are the right ways. Possibly time for the regulators to step in to scrub the Multi Engine Licence and insist on 1500 hours of GA or 1500 hours of mixed GA and light twin turbo first officer experience, anything to develop the natural reactions to an aircraft with the potential to fall out of the sky if not attended to properly? |
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