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Hand on Sidestick
In my airline students are taught to keep their hands on the sidesticks until 10,000ft AGL regardless of whether the AP is ON/OFF. However its just a habit and we have no sources to validate this procedure. I was wondering when do the other Airbus drivers take their hands off the sidestick? (Is it once you’ve engaged AP?) Happy flying! |
Originally Posted by rbhojwani
(Post 10218771)
In my airline we teach students to keep their hands on the sidesticks until 10,000ft AGL regardless of whether the AP is ON/OFF. However its just a habit and we have no sources to validate this procedure. I was wondering when do the other Airbus drivers take their hands off the sidestick? (Is it once you’ve engaged AP?) Happy flying! |
I used to rest my hand on the base plate of the sidestick all the time.
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Minimum height you must have your hand on the side stick during approach is 1000ft. Now you can work backwards. AB is flight path stable aircraft. So when AP goes off it will continue to maintain the flight path. That's true even in alternate law except roll. More problem can be caused by grabbing the stick e.g. AF447(for heaven's sake not again)
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I quite agree. You could say keep it there all flight but what is the point? Having anything near the sidestick during AP operation increases the chance of unintentional disconnects. |
Never flown an Airbus but it seems to be a bad idea in general
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In my airline we teach students to keep their hands on the sidesticks until 10,000ft AGL regardless of whether the AP is ON/OFF. |
Why would you say counter-productive, G'rvt? Genuine question.
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Airbus design philosophy is different it requires use of different sensory organs. Since Thrust levers provide no info about the present thrust it is pointless to keep a hand there. It requires a glance now and then on the N1 needle and the fan opening to confirm increase/decrease in thrust taking place. As long as the hand dealing with the side stick is resting on the hand rest it is good enough unless on the takeoff run. Because flight path stability rarely requires instant inputs. Sometimes habits from other aircraft are carried over to keep oneself in the comfort zone but serve no useful purpose.
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Perhaps non - Airbus pilots may not realise that with the A/P engaged then the side-stick is "locked" in position. It requires a breakout force to disengage the A/P, thus using the PTT switch is catered for. One of the best arguements (in my opinion) for keeping the hand on the S/S during flight critical regimes is to be able to use the non-intuitive side-stick take-over button. This is especially important for the P1 should he intend to intervene. Dual inputs have a nasty habit of spoiling one's day This is one area where the Airbus really does differ from other types and needs a self disciplined approach from crews new to the type.
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Hi FD,
Why would you say counter-productive |
On several occasions in the past, immediate intervention after an AP disengagement has resulted in either a disaster or injured cabin crew and passengers. There is a reason why nowadays we are taught to sit on our hands (literally) and think before rushing into any action. (Ie. attitude/stall I have control, push, roll, thrust, stabilized). An Airbus is not an F16 at Mach2 upside down 50ft over the water. |
The plane flies just fine if you let go of the side stick with the a/p off. |
Originally Posted by rbhojwani
(Post 10218771)
In my airline we teach students to keep their hands on the sidesticks until 10,000ft AGL regardless of whether the AP is ON/OFF. What reason did you thought about when you "invented" this procedure? |
Because we are PILOTS, NOT button pushers! The stick does not have to beheld tightly and it is a natural position for the hand to rest. It does no move like the Boeing yoke so NOT a problem.
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Hands on the controls in readiness to take over, is a good practice. However, up to 10K is too much IMO. I find myself doing it to about 1500 whenever I use the AP. Both up and down.
Never flown an Airbus, and I don't see why this would be different on that type vs. others.
Originally Posted by AQIS Boigu
(Post 10219406)
On several occasions in the past, immediate intervention after an AP disengagement has resulted in either a disaster or injured cabin crew and passengers.
That's kind of a facile observation. It's like saying that having your hands on the steering wheel has resulted in car crashes. Much more meaningfully, it can be said that pilots' failure to be engaged with control of the airplane (engaged mentally, with the AP on, and engaged physically, with the AP off) has caused disasters. |
The Airbus normal fly-by-wire behaviour is pretty much like other types in control wheel steering: it wants to keep flying the last commanded attitude. The problem that I can see is that, with the A/P off the pilot with his hand off the side stick may easily let his attention be diverted to other tasks (as can typically occur with the A/P engaged). As the total energy state and flight path divergence may no longer be appreciated by that pilot his reaction time may be impaired because his CONTROL hand isn't guarding the @##&$#@-$ CONTROL stick. How basic can you get, FFS? |
What exactly are you guarding it from? |
The Airbus normal fly-by-wire behaviour is pretty much like other types in control wheel steering: it wants to keep flying the last commanded attitude |
(Ie. attitude/stall I have control, push, roll, thrust, stabilized). Nose low, excessive bank? How does it go? Attitude, I have control, disengage, push? errrr no, pull?, errrr no, not that either, roll? yeap good idea. OK so now we have to go back a step to push? nope, pull? yeah lets do that. FFS, this training item shows what the standards have become, it's scary! Here is an idea, if an airline finds themselves having to train this why not allocate more sim time to those who need it and get them to a point of instinctive recovery from any attitude? Rhetorical, I know the answer. |
and get them to a point of instinctive recovery from any attitude? |
I have never known an Airbus FBW autopilot to suddenly drop out by itself* nor have I ever seen one do something weird uncommanded - and we had some pretty old Airbuses. In my experience, they are very reliable and dependable. If the autopilot is off then obviously one should be grasping the side stick. However, owing to the fly-by-wire, if one was hand flying in smooth air and needed to scratch one’s nose while the other hand was holding the deployed speed brake, say, nothing untoward will happen if the side stick is left for a couple of seconds. Obviously, if one was hand flying a turbulent approach requiring constant and rapid changes to correct the flight path, then a hand should always stay on the side stick. If the autopilot is on, there is no need although it is a sensible precaution during an autoland or turbulence - one is controlling the flight from the FCU or the FMGS - and the side-stick is locked in neutral anyway. Holding a locked side stick until FL100 seems unnecessary to me. *It did drop out when the iPad and its mount fell off the window onto the locked side stick ! :) |
I have never known an Airbus FBW autopilot to suddenly drop out by itself* |
Originally Posted by Uplinker
(Post 10220552)
I have never known an Airbus FBW autopilot to suddenly drop out by itself* nor have I ever seen one do something weird uncommanded - and we had some pretty old Airbuses. In my experience, they are very reliable and dependable. If the autopilot is off then obviously one should be grasping the side stick. However, owing to the fly-by-wire, if one was hand flying in smooth air and needed to scratch one’s nose while the other hand was holding the deployed speed brake, say, nothing untoward will happen if the side stick is left for a couple of seconds. Obviously, if one was hand flying a turbulent approach requiring constant and rapid changes to correct the flight path, then a hand should always stay on the side stick. If the autopilot is on, there is no need although it is a sensible precaution during an autoland or turbulence - one is controlling the flight from the FCU or the FMGS - and the side-stick is locked in neutral anyway. Holding a locked side stick until FL100 seems unnecessary to me. *It did drop out when the iPad and its mount fell off the window onto the locked side stick ! :) The A330 commander's report Both aircraft were in clear air as the A330 was slowly overtaking the A340 below it. The A330 commander stated that his aircraft was slightly to the right of the A340 and almost abeam it when he saw the A340's wings start to flex. At about that time he felt a bump, which he described as similar to entering a mountain wave. Five to ten seconds later there was another bump during which the A330's altimeter reading descreased by 200 feet. Immediately thereafter, the A330 commander heard a TCAS "climb climb" warning and he noted that the A340 TCAS symbol had changed colour to red on his navigation display. He looked out and down at the A340 which was some 200 to 300 feet to his left in a nose-up attitude and climbing steeply. The A340 passed through the A330's level before the commander had time to react to the TCAS warning and the TCAS was still issuing a "climb" instruction for a short while after the A340 had climbed above the A330. The commander continued to minor the A340 visually and on TCAS. It appeared to reach an apogee above FL380 although by this time it had fallen behind the A330. Nevertheless, it was still laterally quite close to the A330's track so the commander altered course to the right to make space for the A340 to descend back to FL 360. After a short discussion with the A340 crew on VHF radio, the A330 commander broadcast a warning of severe turbulence on the common VHF frequency and then reported both the turbulence and the aircraft proximity (AIRPROX) occurrence to Shanwick on HF Radio. there were no injuries on board the A330 although there were spillages in the cabin. The A340 commander's report At FL 360 the A340 was 1000 feet below the maximum cruising level displayed on the Flight Management and Guidance System (FMGS). The commander was expecting a turbulence encounter around 59°N 20°W and when the aircraft first entered light turbulence he made a cabin announcement and switched on the seat belt signs. Shortly before the AIRPROX event he experienced moderate turbulence and noticed outside air temperature changes. Suddenly the aircraft began to climb, the Master Warning sounded and the autopilot self-disengaged as the aircraft exceeded the speed limit of 0.86 Mach |
No time at the moment to read that report, but as soon as the turbulence / wake turbulence began, I would have covered the side stick and the thrust levers, (i.e loosely held them in case either dropped out or action was required). Ditto if flight conditions suddenly changed :ok: @ vilas, yes it is possible, I am just saying it is very unlikely in smooth air and not a reason to hold a locked side stick all the time. The Airbus 320/330 is a very reliable machine in my experience - other types are perhaps less so. |
Uplinker,
we are on the same side. but as soon as the turbulence / wake turbulence began, I would have covered the side stick and the thrust levers, (i.e loosely held them in case either dropped out or action was required) |
You guys are holding on too tight! :)
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Ice cold. No mistakes.
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