A319 have this problems all the time, and I have seen some A320's also with this issue.

Following unofficial procedures seem to resolve this issue 90% of the time.

1. Reset the ATHR on the FCU, simple OFF / ON
2. Increase the Vapp 2 - 3 kts if seen creeping down towards Vls
3. If neither work, pull selected speed, consider going for managed Speed during final few hundred feet of the approach.

4. If all these above fails, go manual thrust, normally the ATHR reset on the FCU works

Zenj
Use of ATHR requires 5kts. addition to VLS. Why is that? Obviously it is because the system will let speed go 5kts. less sometime. It is not an issue. It doesn't happen in normal circumstances but when atmospheric conditions are demanding. For stronger winds there is addition from 5kts to 15kts at pilot's discretion. I do share John Smith's confidence in A320 ATHR and GS MINI.
truckflayer's suggestions: First, Non standard method of reengaging ATHR seems harmless enough but I do not know if it really works. Second and third not a good one because it negates GS MINI. Fourth one going manual thrust should be done before 1000ft according to Airbus.
RAT5 There is nothing intuitive for humans in the air. The correct word is habitual from earlier aircraft. Habits can be unlearned or learned. I am sure Airbus designers knew all those points you mention. There is no point fathoming airbus while flying a Boeing non FBW. If you were to fly an airbus for a living you will do it as efficiently as anything else you flew. As the US airways pilot Eric Parks on his airbusdriver.net says "Welcome to Airbus! all resistance is futile,you will be assimilated, "

These 3 pages alone tell the real AT HF interface story
 

After having flown, tested, or evaluated all four big jet manufacturer's types in some of the most stressful conditions or configurations experienced within the flight envelope, and some times in ranges beyond the edges, ...for nearly four decades, ... these three pages of comments alone, addressing this simple question, ...provide a "telling story" regarding the suitability and characteristics of the modern Bus non-moving throttle design. In that regard, these three pages of comments alone are all that's needed, to begin to draw conclusions about the real story, of both the suitability, strengths, and weakness of that particular pilot-aircraft thrust/speed interface. It should be as simple as either AT ON, or alternately push forward for more thrust, and pull back for less, as needed, ...if the AT isn't doing what you expect or need. Even the issue of electing to disconnect the AT, or not, is secondary.

This Airbus thread is squawking 7500.

I have to say in some way i do agree with 7478ti. After switching to the airbus i sometimes missed the in-between way of dealing with slow or non-behaving autothrust on boeings. If it is to fast pull it back a bit and then let it continue on its own, or push it forward somewhat and then let it continue on its own.

On the bus i have to disconnect it completely, after i have to sync the thrust levers to the current thrust level first. It is somewhat more cumbersome. Interestingly enough 99% of us do fly (nearly) always in manual thrust when in manual flight as a result of that. In fact, some have to do the odd autothrust on approach to keep current in this kind of operation. It is just much easier to fly manually in manual thrust, but that is of course my personal opinion. Even manual thrust in automatic flight sometimes works better than both in automatic.

Zenj,

Regardless of whether you're legit or not, I don't think this is a place to learn much of anything anymore (I'm not sure it ever was). This is cheap entertainment, sometimes even pretty good entertainment.

The german philosophy (in LH and others) is to disconnect the A/THR every time disconnect the AP. No matter what Airbus says. I kind of like that.

The problem here is that we don't have freaking options when we face that situation!

The A/THR is not doing the job? Disconnect… No, wait! It is too late to disconnect already, So… What the f*** do we do??

Answer: Go around.
That is what it all comes to: go f****n around. No other options. So in this regard, it is clear that the autothrolle system of Boeing is superior. It gives more control. I have to admit it.

On the 319 it is nearly a "standard procedure" to add 2 -3 kts extra on the Vapp, as it does not hold it's speed. Does not matter even if in fairly calm conditions! It will even fluctuate/flicker below Vls if nothing is done. I personally prefer NOT to sit and wait and see what might happen or how low it might go, as I am not paid to be an Airbus test pilot!

The ATHR disconnect in the FCU does work, it goes momentarily into THR LOCK until engaged again.

I never saw this problem on the A320 with IAE engines, but I did see it also on the A320 "sharklets" with CFM engines.

No idea if any connection between this, just my observation.

I don't see why so many people get het up about non-moving thrust levers. If A/THR engaged, you don't move them, if in manual THR, you do move them. This the same principle in both both Boeings and Airbuses.
Bottom line: Monitor A/T response; if this doesn't work, use manual thrust.

The two or three most significant & well-known accidents/incidents I can think of where crew failed to monitor approach speed, and assumed the A/THR was working when it wasn't, were all Boeings. So what does that say about the benefits on moving thrust levers? (Asiana @ SFO, Turkish at AMS, Thomson at BOH, 2009)

Agree with GL. Airbus FBW A/THR does encourage a proper instrument scan.

Ref GL and (Asiana @ SFO, Turkish at AMS, Thomson at BOH, 2009)

True... any airplane can be improved, even the T7 ...and any FCOM or FCTM or pilot qualification program can better cover more of those 1x10E-4 or less probable situations that we often see "once a week", ...it's just that some airplanes can benefit much more from improvement due to chronic weaknesses than others.

It would take many more than three pages here, and citing a mere three examples, to comprehensively address this "non-Moving throttle" and AP/AT disconnect subject. An entire FAA report was dedicated to subjects like this (back in 1996), and it still stands. In fact, hardly anything has changed on this non-moving throttle issue since those very first discussions with advocates like Gordon Corps, PB, and B Zed, ...on the troubling HF aspects of this subject, that began at least in the early 80s. I still vividly remember those meetings, and the predictions of the inevitability of this entire discussion.

Jun 18, 1996 - Federal Aviation Administration. "The Interfaces Between Flightcrews and Modern Flight Deck Systems".

Guys: there have been various opinions voiced here about the ATHR systems and some of their idiosyncrasies. Some have outlined their weaknesses and slightly inconvenient characteristics. I've expressed my thoughts on complicated non-moving ATHR systems. An attempt to reinvent the wheel. But, a further observation; guys have suggested 'work arounds', 'tips & tricks' to bypass the basic design and overcome the unwelcome quirks. If that is the case then surely it says that the original design is not correct and should be re-done? It's not healthy to have a weak system design and allow random crews to devise their own working solutions, while others follow the manufacturer's ideas and fall into the lurking traps.

Hi RAT 5,
British Airways Airbus A320 Pilots' Autothrust Survey
"BA concludes that from a Flight Operations perspective a future system should consider providing movement between the idle and climb power positions, whilst retaining the A320 thrust setting and engagement “detents” technique."
Steve Last & Martin Alder.

We've been waiting since 1991 - so don't hold your breath!

Might very well work better
 

That BA based pilot suggestion might very well work better (i.e., less bad), particularly if the FHA, FMEA, and SSA was carefully done, and the conclusions supported that change... good comments by both RAT 5 and Goldenrivett!

But I also concur... "Don't hold your breath!". I've been dealing with Busses and waiting for that change of heart, and philosophy, since at least the first A300B2K in the US back in the 70s, ...and then later waiting, since at least those 1982 conceptual discussions, for a better thrust solution, and sidestick interconnection solution, and soft limit solution, ...since well before the first AutoBus even flew !

[Also see the other pPrune parallel thread, about recent A320 speed mgt issues]

I wonder if the faults/short-comings being exposed can be traced back to the operational design philosophy. A B732, even 733/4/5 were designed to be sturdy workhorses and could fly into some inhospitable tiny places and also the large cosy nests of major hubs. They, later models, even had LNAV/VNAV and could autoland. I wonder if the AB's FBW started life with a clean sheet of paper and were envisaged to be flown into major hubs with autopilot + auto throttle down an ILS to minima and then the human intervened; or autoland. It was designed to be an automatic pilot monitored a/c from immediately after takeoff to immediately before landing. It was route tested as such. OK, it had to jump through the various certification processes for VMCA/G stalls etc. but largely it was operated via automatics.
Then it was sold outside its design nest and replaced many of the older simple Boeings on routes outside major hubs. Adventures arrivals into nasty weather/winds Greek islands: tiny mountainous terrain infested airfields, all of which involved human intervention long before "immediately before landing". Mk.1 eyeball arrivals with hand on stick. Scare Blu!
Those with much more experience of AB's, and perhaps those with experience on both AB & Boeing, will inform us which is the easier/better to land in nasty gusty X-winds. Speaking to easyjet friends who flew both, it was common to want AB on smooth days and Boeing on nasty ones. What is the consensus? They should both be able to do both adequately. But having seen some videos of PIO on short finals the side stick brigade seem to have it much harder to keep the bucking bronco under control and not be spat out of the saddle.
There was a significant difference in B737 family & B767 on nasty days. The control column was much calmer in the larger a/c. B733 was stirring the pot; B767 more gentle inputs. How is it from A319 - A330/340/even 380. I suspect the large super whale might treat mother nature with some disdain, or is it still a handful? It will be interesting to hear, after many years of line experience, just how the revolution has succeeded, or not. In the early days of AB FBW, on Prune, there was an ongoing debate of the B757 v A320. There were definitely 2 camps. How now?

I feel sorry for you lot having never flown the E195 which has the best AT system ever.
:p

Hey RAT, that is interesting, there might be a lot of truth in what you suggest, I don't know.

For what it's worth, my two penn'orth is that in my experience, Airbus is very poorly taught. They are so keen to get us into the air and learn how to do ECAM, that basic handling stuff is really glossed over, and in my case was not properly taught at all. All that was said about the side stick were really stupid things such as "pretend it's a docker's dick and don't touch it unless you have to", or "only hold it at the top" or "only hold it at the base", and other such useless comments which did nothing to actually explain how to use it. We have never been taught or shown how to do turbulent approaches in the SIM or for real. PIO's on FBW Airbus are therefore mostly a result of poor training in my view. I eventually taught myself how to use the side stick correctly - after watching a video of a Tornado pilot. Years later I explained how to use the side stick to a TRE who had trained me !

The one thing you cannot do in an FBW Airbus is 'follow through' on the controls - i.e feel what inputs the trainer is making - since the sidesticks are not mechanically linked. This is a shame because that is a valuable way to learn to handle a plane.

I have not flown Boeing apart from in the SIM, and my previous types were non auto thrust. However, from a handling point of view I did fly the BAe146, and many was the time I could feel myself overiding the servo tab controls and hitting the mechanical stops on the control surfaces when I needed to reverse control direction as I flew a turbulent approach. I have never needed to do this on an Airbus - well of course it's hydraulic not servo tabs - and you just centre the stick when your input starts having an effect. So I probably find the Airbus easier than the dear old 146. The Airbus side stick needs a different method and the knowledge that the FBW is helping you and doing some of the work for you.

I have flown A320/321/330, and their response is similar thanks to FBW, but the 330 is obviously much larger, has more inertia and is less upset by the atmosphere, like any large aircraft.

The idea of a hybrid system of having moving thrust levers from Idle to CLB and then detents for MCT and TOGA is interesting. Of course we must bear in mind that even moving thrust levers are the input, not the output of the system - which can only be seen on the N1/EPR gauges, so a scan of the engine instruments is still required. You can select the engine instruments onto your ND in the A330 which makes the scan easier on short thermally finals if the A/THR is being lazy', though it is not SOP.

Very real differences
 

RAT. Excellent comment.

I cannot speak to the 380 at all (no experience with it)... , but after at least three decades of dealing with both, for all the other AutoBusses and their comparable Seattle products through the superwhale and plastic jet, there are very real differences in both philosophy, as well as control system design (as well as FMS/FMF). These lead to meaningful differences in performance in difficult WX conditions reference limits, margins, phase margin, gain margin, and vulnerability to PIO/APC. With firsthand experience in the most difficult of conditions, there were days where I'd be quite comfortable operating with one, and wouldn't even consider anything but parking it, or a diversion if airborne, with the other.

As to the subsequent E195 AT comment by CM... note that an AT alone, ...without an also excellent RNP, GLS, and a capable FMS/FMF is pretty useless. No E195 can yet even come close to touching a Cat III LAND3 while handling an unexpected a 40kt gusting XW, with an engine shutdown, or RNP .1 into or out of PAJN, NZQN, CYLW, or ZULS with a first E/O, or lightning strike electrical bus shed... and never will, at least not with their current Piper Apache 1950s vintage systems and flight control architecture, and primitive FMS.

Simple fact is Airbus FBW is a different philosophy. It is completely different from the trainer aircrafts a pilot learns his craft on. It is not only thrust but vector stable behaviour also is different than what you get to learn during your transition to commercial pilot. It all started in 1988 and the order book of airbus in 2015 is pretty impressive. That shows this philosophy is here to stay and is successful. It may not be technically and commercially possible to mix and match different concepts and commercial success obviates any need for that. Humans will always like and dislike things. It is a good topic for discussion but non airbus pilots or who detest it's concept should not hijack every topic airbus pilots are discussing towards their favourite past time of airbus bashing. Because it defeats the purpose of the original post. Start a new thread by all means. Also the opponents add nothing new and keep chewing the same bones.

Pilots still move between types...
 

With all due respect sir, pilots still routinely need to move between types, and they deserve to know the truth about what they're seeing, and why. That knowledge void, and those kinds of HF interface differences, was a main cause of the A300 accident at Nagoya decades ago, and that directly led to the 1996 FAA/Industry HF team Report (see below).

On 26 April 1994, the Airbus A300B4-622R was completing a routine flight and approach, when, just before landing at Nagoya Airport, the First Officer inadvertently pressed the Takeoff/Go-around button (also known as a TO/GA) which raises the throttle position to the same as take offs and go-arounds.

"The Interfaces Between Flightcrews and Modern Flight Deck Systems"
June 18, 1996

Well I'm pretty sure the discussion was about AT behaviour. The Embraer still beats the others hands down at that but it must be useless because it can't CAT III auto land OEI in a 40kt crosswind (what can?).

I'm also reasonably certain that when I was doing GNSS only approaches on it the RNP/ANP was probably quite small.

The 767 has excellent control authority (notably in roll), and rarely needs coarse inputs to keep it on the straight and narrow. For me, the problem with the A330/340 (can't comment on the other Buses) is the amount of lag in the flight control system. You simply don't have the sense of a direct and immediate connection with the controls. Again, this is most obvious in roll. When everything's smooth there's no problem, but it makes things a bit busy and unpleasant in the rough stuff. I can live with the non-moving thrust levers, but the autothrust system is slow to react and then applies excessively large inputs. This means it does things for which a human pilot would deserve a smack over the knuckles with a ruler (e.g. idle thrust at 150' due to a few excess knots).

With all due respect sir, pilots still routinely need to move between types, and they deserve to know the truth about what they're seeing, and why

There was a friend who flew with Air Belgium many tears ago. There he flew a mix of B734 & A320 in the same week. That sounds a handful. Is it possible today under EASA? It seems fraught with 'an incident waitting to happen.'

Answer to CM's question
 

CM, the answer to your question is that many can, and it has been demonstrated many times. The big jets are typically tested well beyond the values shown in the AFM or FCOM to be sure they are robust, and that they exhibit no adverse behavior in the event that conditions are unexpectedly or unknowingly somewhat worse than the values published for routine use. In fact if you look closely at these AFMs and FCOMs for some types, you will note that the autoflight limitations posted clearly additionally state the qualifier "when landing minimums are based on their use". So that in many instances, where reported visibilities are reported as above Cat III minima, but actual conditions are nonetheless equivalent to Cat III, such as in a driving rainstorm, or blowing snow, or even with a landing landing into a blinding sunset with bright reflections off the runway, these AL systems are beneficially and effectively used as an aid, sometimes in wind and gust conditions even beyond the value cited above.

As to the relative performance of the AT in the latest modern big jets, have you even used those systems in stressful conditions, to be able to make a relative comparison of their performance???

Regarding your comment about RNP and ANP, you noted capability during GNSS "SA OFF" operation, during normal ops, as for a GNSS approach. But this is hardly any indication at all of the suitability of your aircraft for RNP capability, which deals with containment in normal, rare normal, and non-normal ops. So even if the equivalent of ANP or EPE for your jet on a GNSS straight in approach was reasonable, that in no way addresses or assures its LNAV and VNAV ability to deal with RNP containment or useful RNP capability, especially at the lower RNP values down to RNP .1. It also says nothing of the overall AFDS and related system's ability to safely fly the necessary paths for departure, for RNP based RF Legs during approach, or for RNP paths on an E/O MAP approach initiated from the TDZ. To do so, the FMS/FMS and related systems like the redundant IRUs, standby electrical system, AP and FD, and map displays, in combination need to be demonstrated to be capable to achieve the specified robust normal, rare-normal, as well as non-normal performance, in designated conditions, including having adequate FTE for all the designated control modes to be used. In short, to date, there is no evidence so far that the jet you mention has or can demonstrate any of this, even for RNP procedures that have now been in beneficial and safe use globally now, dating back to before 1994. Perhaps you could jumpseat on a flight someday in a real RNP capable aircraft, into NZQN, PAJN, or CYLW or equivalent, and see this RNP capability used first hand, to better see how much more significant capability other jets now have, and why AT performance alone is only a limited part of an overall aircraft's operational capability, regardless of how good the AT might be? Which is just one more reason why this Vapp thread is quite important and significant, to those who are legitimately trying to understand and deal with these important questions and issues.

:zzz:

What a lot of waffle. The answer to your question is yes, currently and in the past.

I'm interested in your definition of "real RNP capable". It seems like an odd statement seeing as the Embraer has a better ANP performance than the NG I currently fly. Have you ever operated the Embraer to allow you to make your comparisons? :rolleyes:

@CM reference your questions
 

Sir, ANP level alone matters little, as long as it's less than the needed RNP with adequate FTE margin (e.g., the reason for having features like NPS), and is predicted to stay less than RNP for any relevant non-normal conditions. Instead, it is the low RNP capability that really matters for an aircraft, and having it able to support RNP based LNAV and VNAV suitably, for any leg type combination needed, including for RF legs down low, while fully satisfying all the rare-normal, and non normal conditions that must be addressed in the FHA and FMEA. Yes, I am intimately familiar with that particular autoflight system, including even for the pending E2 design, and have seen no evidence whatsoever that so far it is capable, or will be capable of safely flying the real RNP procedures that I cited earlier, even for normal operations, let alone for rare-normal, or non-normal operations down to the TDZ and back out, even in the event of a first E/O, and first Nav failure, or any relevant system failure, such as a lightening strike bus trip back to stby power, while maintaining RNP capability (per relevant criteria such as in AC120-29A, which was the basis for RNP approvals for aircraft and airlines now doing [real] RNP).

The point about ANP is that the ANP of the Embraer is accurate enough to carry out GNSS only, RNAV and VNAV/LNAV approaches and it has done so for years which, obviously, means it meets the relevant RNP. You're unaware of this?

Wizard, but that was not the question.

Still, the AT system is more intuitive and better in an operating environment than both the two types mentioned above.

@CM ...Not so
 

CM,... Not so. The fact that a system may have an ANP adequate to fly a "GNSS only" approach means absolutely NOTHING in an RNP world. ANP must always be less than, and be predicted to stay less than, the specified level of RNP (even for non-normals) for the specific RNP based procedure to be flown, with adequate FTE margin. Further, your assertion about "RNAV approaches with LNAV and VNAV minima" has nothing whatsoever to do with RNP based RNAV procedures (e.g., NZQN RNAV(RNP) RWY23). This discussion relates purely to those kinds of RNP based procedures, and is a subject for which no current BizAv based avionic system, as typically used in any RJ presently flying, comes anywhere close to meeting RNP.1 capability, for the leg types and configurations of the RNP based approaches noted, or duplicating the key capability needed to address rare normal and non-normal conditions for those procedures, as I cited earlier. I'm not aware of ANY RJ currently capably of flying RNP based procedures at low RNP values near or at RNP .1, such as needed at NZQN or PAJN, let alone for meeting the VEB related to the vertical RNPs associated with those procedures. In fact from what I've seen in recent months for design specifications for AFDS and FMS system improvements in the RJ fleets, and for even a few new designs in development in that class, this full equivalent RNP capability that has been flying in the big jets for years isn't likely to happen at any time soon in the RJ fleet, in even the intermediate future. Further, even the basic fundamental avionics architecture is weak in some of these RJ designs, potentially even permanently precluding beneficially combining use of modes for LAND 3 using GLS, also with low RNP capability.

Would the last person please turn out the lights when they leave.

I think what you're saying is that because the Embraer is not approved, but is capable, of RNP 0.1 then the AT system is useless.

Right.

Which RNP .1???
 

Sir, ...You say your RJ is "Capable of RNP .1". But Which RNP .1??? Straight-in??? It isn't adequate to just have some measure of accuracy under normal conditions, to fly some limited brief LNAV "straight-in" segment and claim RNP.1 capability. Instead, you need to be able to fly ALL the LEG TYPE combinations needed at RNP .1 (which there is NO evidence yet that any RJ can meet), ...meeting both the lateral and vertical RNP requirement based constraints, including for speeds, and later RTAs.

Further, this discussion isn't esoteric.

In fact, it is a core issue and key to any successful and economic and capable future evolution of the entire global ATS system. Unless these RNP based trajectories can be appropriately flown 3D and later 4D, with relevant speed and eventually RTA, NET, and NLT constraints, using many if not most procedures with LNAV and VNAV RNP based RF legs at low RNP, then there is no hope of economically and successfully solving NextGen or SESAR.

This is the fundamental reason why RJs are now causing such enormous pain in the entire present ATS system, and for ANSP ATS system evolution globally. Because no known RJs so far can safely, reliably, and with redundancy fly these kinds of accurate RNP based procedures, and especially not with evolving RTA elements. That is why coordinating mutually exclusive efficient RNP based flight paths into, and out of places like KSEA, KSFO, KORD, and KMDY, and KLAX, and KDFW, and KLGA and KJFK and KEWR is so terribly (and unnecessarily) difficult.

Bottom line is that no known RJs can yet do this. AT performance inherently relate to lateral and vertical profiles, and that interaction matters. And until RJs can do Real RNP at the needed low values, then successfully and economically solving and evolving ATS, at any affordable cost to users, and with the needed capacity increases, and ability to address WX deviation flexibility, is virtually hopeless.

As to "lights out", ...understanding why all this matters, may be key to your future operator and employment survival, let alone safety, ...in particular for those who may be following this thread, and who are not already retired...

Q.E.D.

Ozymandias gave you the absolute correct answer.
Adv the Throttles as needed just forward of CLB detent till back on VAPP, then return them back to CLMB detent and everything "managed again"


Or pull the Speed knob and increase speed to "selected" for the auto-thrust to increase THR to the new selected speed.
You can also disconnect the ATHR, and be careful you are clear with that procedure or it may bite you.
Airbuses are not dead busses, they tend to scare pilots which are not proficient on the stated procedures in the FCOM/FCTM.
I have flown both 320 & 767 and like the both, they are just different and the airbus is less forgiving on "sloppy pilots" period.

Huh? Numerous business jets today are fully certified for RNP 0.1 approaches (including those with curved segments). E.g., Gulfstreams equipped with Honeywell Primus, Bombardier Global series (with Rockwell Collins), and Cessna Citations (Garmin) all include full RNP 0.1 approach capability available as options. Some, like Cessna, include RNP 0.3 as a standard feature.

So it's not a technology issue but whether or not specific customers require (and is willing to pay) for the capability. The reality is that new business jet avionics tend to be superior than your typical airline fleet avionics.

In Europe, trial RNP curved approaches were conducted on a CRJ-1000NG operated by Air Nostrum.

Since you mentioned PAJN, note that Horizon has been flying curved RNP 0.1 approaches there on their Q400s, mere turbo-props!

And in any case the refreshed regional jets coming up (Embraer E2, Bombardier CSeries, etc) are all orderable with RNP 0.1 as options.

With no AT!

Those examples have significant use constraints or limitiatons
 

Not all RNP .1 is equal. Those aircraft types and procedure examples you cited come with significant RNP related procedure operating constraints or limitations. I can cite specific examples, having tried and failed to make some of those systems work for both OEMs or operators. Even the excellent work done by Horizon (led by Perry S and Steve B... ) on their Q400s, to make an otherwise seriously deficient box at least try to mimic real RNP, to some extent, and partially work, is only very primitively successful. For example, NONE of those types or avionic systems have yet demonstrated capability for suitably flying any of the kinds of real RNP procedures that I cited earlier, such as at NZQN, etc. A few of them are reportedly going to potentially try, with still "in the future" attempts to be modified to evolved versions of those avionic systems, but NONE currently can yet can perform these cited RNP procedures adequately. Just because they have a magazine ad promoted PR label, claiming RNP capability, or even "RNP .1", doesn't necessarily mean they actually can safely fly any of these real RNP based procedures, and particularly not when addressing the needed rare-normal or non-normal conditions. In fact a few OEMs are now getting a rude awakening by purchasing some of those systems for their new types thinking they're getting comparable systems to the big jets, only to find those BizAv related systems have serious RNP related shortfalls, to actually be able to do the job, even if they advertise RNP capability.

You've lost all credibility with your post there, 7478ti. :*

There are dozens of business jet operators today flying RNP AR on a regular basis.

In the US, Part 91 and 135 operators with LOA are authorized to fly all published FAA RNP AR procedures down to RNP 0.1 limits depending on the aircraft's capabilities. Every single one of them, as the authorization is not "per approach".

Unless you're suggesting FAA RNP AR approaches are not "real" RNP. :ugh:

Quite a bit off the track here. As far as i know a subsidiary of ours was certified to fly the curved RNP AR approaches into Innsbruck and Salzburg with their E190, same as we did with our 737-700s. Whereas our A320 fleet is still not certified for anything below RNP 0.3 and is not RNP AR capable. Not no mention that the autoland crosswind limit on our newest just delivered A321 is still only 20 kts, which is even less than our 10 year old 737s who can do 25kts in fail operational approaches.

Quite honestly, the E-Jets are pretty nifty with their autoland capable autoflight system, even more so if equipped with the dual HUD setup.

Remember not all RNP 0.1 is equal. I suspect your curved approach won't be curvy enough to satisfy 7478ti. ;)

Frightened!
 

That anyone is even having this discussion is frightening. :eek:

Know Your Airplane!
 

1. Learn how to Hand-Fly your airplane.
2. Pay attention to the instruments AND the visuals.
3. If you need to go faster, PUSH a little;
4. If you need to go slower, PULL a little.
5. Practice a few times and you can learn how to Hand-Fly almost anything.:ugh: