Stone_cold
There is no dispute that one will have to be loyal to his pay cheque. I said it differently in post 32. Procedures may differ but English language is not different. How something that must not be done is to be interpreted as can be done? In Rudder check PNF also follows the movement so it is not same as other controls check and importantly rudder is not FBW. Airlines when chooses a procedure that is against the recommendation of the manufacturer they must at least refer it to them to know there are no other complications.

What do you do if during the aileron check the deflection is just outside the limit? The deflection is too little and on the SD page it does not quite make it all the way up in the box. Suggestions please

Well, I have learnt something. Our company tells us to hold each control demand for 3 seconds to "allow the control surfaces to reach full deflection", which has always seemed a bit nebulous to me, since I can see the full deflection on the SD after about 1 second. They did not tell us that the system performs a self check at full deflection and might therefore flag up a fault if one is found.

For what it's worth, I personally watch the Maltese cross move, then look at the SD and confirm verbally 'full left, full right, neutral' etc, checking also that the Maltese cross and the controls are moving in the same direction. This is not SOP, but given that pilots sometimes just say the words without looking, I personally feel this is a check worth doing. NOTE: I don't use the Maltese cross to confirm full deflection, just the direction of control input.

One only has to watch footage of horrendous, preventable crashes where control locks have not been removed before flight, or a full and free control check has obviously not been done, to realise that a control check is a most vital thing to do before every take-off, and should never be rushed or waived.

Uplinker
If you follow Airbus you will notice they have given the job of detection of improper operation of FLT CTLS only to the PF, PNF only calls what he sees on SD without knowing what is the correct call. The purpose of this is to avoid a conditioned reflex reaction from the PNF. If you take a cue from Maltese Cross or look at PF's hand it is same as PF announcing the side he is moving the stick . It defeats the purpose. But if your company wants it you will have to do it. One should not make personal additions. Three seconds is no more required as after a modification it detects a fault in half a second.

Vilas ,

Not sure which "must " you refer to , but I agree it says the maltese cross must not be used for the check . Maybe english language , but it doesn't say that I can't scan it . I interpret it that I can scan whatever I want , as long as I use the indications on the SD as validation . Denti said he looks outside on the surfaces , and is said to operate for a highly recommended operator , I see nothing wrong either as long as they use the SD for validation .

As you say , don't make up things , so for me Airbus( & my company) says call the FMA and use the SD .

I think if the LH guys had not made up things with the AOA issue , we would have had a different outcome . There is nothing wrong with adding to ones situational awareness whilst staying within the ambit of the SOP's .

I said that they state a particular sequence is mentioned ( for the Rudders) and it may lead some flight departments to follow the same for all surfaces . There is nothing to indicate that because the Rudders are not FBW that a rigid sequence is required or vice versa . You are trying to interpret why ? Why is not in the FCOM/FCTM . It just states left then right .

Genuine question here , do the operators who allow "flexible" flight control checks also randomize the rudders ( LH,Easy )???

Giving the NTO obviously gives technical ( no complications) approval , but my point , if you missed it was ,it still goes against the Manufacturer's recommended SOP's . They do not change Airbus SOP's while issuing an NTO whenever a company applies for one ( I do know the process ) . Which indicates that were an incident to occur , Airbus will state that while they had no technical reasons to object to the application , it was against their recommended practices . LH are strong enough to go with that .

If one has such a great issue mitigating conditioned reflex , then perhaps one doesn't belong on the flight deck as our profession IS largely conditioned ,trained and very repetitive in nature . Yes , all of us do make the odd error , but at the same time , a lot of us "add " things and develop methods outside of the music of the SOP's to keep things safe .

Stone_cold
I understand your views but it is not that simple. You can do anything to save your life, sure like AOA issue but not everything you do in the air qualifies as an emergency. If everybody added a little his own then what is the meaning of SOP. Is every co-pilot supposed to keep track of his captain's habits? If company decides to do is different but every pilot adding his own is quiet another. When a company deviates from airbus SOP it has to keep track of all the modifications that take place because the company procedure may need change accordingly which is really the manufacturer's job. Also you are wrong about conditioned reflex it is very much kept in mind while developing procedures. That is why in Airbus procedure there no 70KTS call in reject take off to prevent the pilot from habitually bringing reverse to idle when RW length is critical. For the same reason pilots are not permitted to fly two different type of aircraft because it led to a fatal accident and some incidents.

For those who think that airlines know what they are doing when they change their procedures:
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/art...d-a320-339110/
This is Jet Star Australia but this incident has happened to three different airlines. So just because it hasn't happened proves nothing. Procedures have to take into consideration human behaviour, airplane design and operating environment.

Hm! Perhaps Merits for Both?
 

Pre-T.O. flight control checks are not unique to Ab/B types; any responsible pilot will examine the full range of control surface motion before TO, to 'feel' for unusual resistance (although the tactile feedback may not be available on all airplanes). In addition to flight deck 'feel,' some operating environments provide a ground observer who can see control surfaces that cannot be seen from the driver's seats. That case argues for the in-order sequence, such that the observer knows what to look for.
I'm not clear about why an operator would want them done in random order, but I'm sure someone will clarify for me.
That pre-departure control checks MUST be done is evidenced by countless losses of otherwise healthy airplanes, large and small, that attempted TO with their physical gust-lock restraints still in place. Clearly, they are preventable accidents. When one reaches Vr with an elevator lock still in place, the options are few and, in some cases of limited value. (Hollering, "Oh :mad:," wont' stop the airplane, nor make it fly properly.)
I guess I'd also add that if the aircraft is CVR equipped, having a reliable record that the control surface checks WERE accomplished with satisfactory results, may help to eliminate some of the "Pilot Error" reports that would be more accurately labeled as "Unknown."
Very much like aircraft maintenance procedures (and countless medical procedures,) if the complete, step-by-step routine is not documented (in this case recorded on the CVR), we correctly assume that It Was Not Done. If you do (whatever procedure is required), record or document it as appropriate for the task. As much a we may dislike having to fly by too many rules that seem to override the individual pilot's in-air rights, that is our world. If you perform a given, you'd better have some way to prove it. At the end of the day, boys and girls, if we expect to keep our certificates and job until mandatory retirement.

Hi vilas, I take your point about not using the maltese cross in case of confirmation bias, and have modified my own method to now look at the SD FIRST and announce the control movement that I see - in accordance with Airbus SOPs - but then I check that the maltese cross agrees in the correct sense. This is a gross error check, in case the Captain does not pick up a wrong call or selection because they are distracted by taxying events.

Interestingly, when the F/O does their 'silent control check', no verbal or visual check is made by the Captain of that process, which is interesting, especially if the take-off is performed by the F/O. How does the Captain know and cross check that the F/Os controls are wired correctly?

Uplinker, the flight control check is role specific not rank specific. Can you ask your question again using the terms PF & PM?

Guys, I don't know why this is becoming so complicated! The only reason for the cross check in the case of the PF's check is because he's looking outside, and not at the screens!

The PM doesn't need to look outside for those few critical seconds that it takes to do the check (under normal circumstances).

During LVO, when Airbus recommends both CMs look outside, the checks must be done with the aircraft stationary!

Simple, no?!

Mcd . Perhaps some companies have a rank specific policy ? Some don't subscribe 100% to AI full PF/PM(PNF) philosophy .

In my company the control checks are rank specific. The captain does the initial control checks, and I, the F/O, announces them, and does the secondary silent checks.

But how does the captain know that my control checks are correct, since I don't announce the checks, and the captain, who is eyes outside taxying cannot see what I am doing??

If I am PF, how can the captain be sure my controls are wired correctly for the take-off?

Uplinker, As PM I guess airbus assumes that you can check them yourself. The CM1/PF doesn't have the luxury of verifying the SP page. Just as the PM can check the gear/flaps up etc., i.e. read & do. Don't know the philosophy behind it, but thinking aloud, seems to be ok as is.

Well, you say that, but it seems odd to me that while I am supposed to carefully double check and verbalise the Captain's controls, they do not check mine at all. It would be a bit embarrassing - to say the least - if I did not notice that my side stick was cross-wired and proceeded to take off as PF.........