Ian W
The real underlying error I believe is that what has been inadvertently taught to the younger pilots is 'always trust the automation' which is completely the opposite to the more 'experienced' who NEVER fully trust automation. I do not agree with that statement of yours. Automation if it is not reliable would not have been installed. But a professional pilot has the responsibility to monitor that it is working and experience has nothing to do with it. In SFO experienced pilot was under check and they dropped speed by 30 KTS on approach even the check pilot did not notice it. Thirty three years ago same thing was done this time in A320 in Bangalore India. Thickness of the Log book can hide inadequacies that can develop over a period of time and due to the heavy log book you may not get critically assessed in your refreshers. An important point some pilots are missing out is that whether with automation or without, pilot's scan does not change. In manual flight you scan and make the changes, with auto pilot you scan to ensure it is doing it. This needs to be emphasized in training and not build a mistrust with automation. Mistrust builds fear. How would you do a CAT3 approach if you didn't trust the system? Also you have made some outrageous statements about airbus protections and alternate law etc. clearly indicating that you know very little about them. An automation that is untrustworthy would not have been installed similarly when automation reaches the perfection that it will not need a monitor the pilot,won't he be replaced? |
A question that may have already been answered, and if so, I apologize.
I am not an Airbus pilot, but have some familiarity. I have been informed that there is a display of checklists after a system failure, is this correct? If so, in the case of AF 447, did the system display a checklist or a procedure in any manner following the UAS situation? If not, is there any circumstance when it would? Finally, if it does display such a checklist or procedure, does it advise to turn the FD's off, as most UAS checklists do as a first step? If not, are there circumstances it would display that? Thank you. |
EXCELLENT LINK ! Thank you Winnerhofer.
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Originally Posted by roulishollandais
(Post 8857395)
EXCELLENT LINK ! Thank you Winnerhofer.
Shame, as he was doing quite well up to that point... |
seagull967;
1. I have been informed that there is a display of checklists after a system failure, is this correct? 2. If so, in the case of AF 447, did the system display a checklist or a procedure in any manner following the UAS situation? If there is immediate risk to the aircraft, (ie., near to the ground right after takeoff), the memorized drill requires that the autopilot/flight director & autothrust be disconnected, a pitch attitude of 15° be established with TO/GA thrust set, and when at circuit height or minimum safe altitude, to troubleshoot the problem. If at/above higher altitudes, a 5° pitch is set and thrust is placed in the "CLB" detent. In either case, once the memorized items are accomplished by the pilot-not-flying, the paper checklist from the QRH - Quick Reference Handbook - is read and actioned and the aircraft secured for continued flight. 3. If not, is there any circumstance when it would? Finally, if it does display such a checklist or procedure, does it advise to turn the FD's off, as most UAS checklists do as a first step? 4. If not, are there circumstances it would display that? |
Rio by another name
Only if you don't read the report.
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EXCELLENT PART:
And of course if the pilot is unfamiliar with stall recovery and inputs the natural (and absolutely wrong) control back command the situation gets even worse. |
Particularly like the comment on XL-888, the author has clearly discovered and entirely new species of Airbus law - direct law, but with auto-trim and C*. Either that or he hasn't read the XL report or doesn't understand what direct law is, or both. Too bad they didn't drop a wing early on and convert some of that pitch up into turn.:( Really too bad they didn't consider the consequences of what might happen if their checks did not go as planned. :{ Didn't even have a minimum airspeed stopping point!!!! |
With regard to the F-GLZU incident of July 2011, it is interesting to see how long it took PF to mentally re-engage with the aircraft.
If t=0 is the time that the overspeed started, here is how it went down: t=3 seconds, PNF reflexively disengaged AP and pitched up t=8 seconds PF extended the speedbrakes t=13 seconds PF retracted the speedbrakes t=24 seconds PF adjusted his Nav Display ?? t=53 seconds PF surprised to be at FL380 t=1 minute 18 seconds, PF trying to control aircraft thru AP t=1 minute 42 seconds, PF aware of A/P disengage and at that point appears to be properly engaged with the aircraft. If this is typical for long range cruise operations, then there is a major problem with the man-machine interface!:mad: At least in this case, the aircraft remained in Normal Law. |
@ MACHINBIRD:
If this is typical for long range cruise operations, then there is a major problem with the man-machine interface t=3 seconds, PNF reflexively disengaged AP and pitched up t=8 seconds PF extended the speedbrakes t=13 seconds PF retracted the speedbrakes and the lack of CRM after audible warnings accompanied with MW then there is a major problem with the MEN. |
Originally Posted by A33Zab
IMO if after these actions BOTH pilots lacks the monitoring of their instruments(Altitude, Airspeed+trend, V/S, Attitude, FMA)
and the lack of CRM after audible warnings accompanied with MW then there is a major problem with the MEN. It is humanly impossible to maintain full mental involvement in the flight process while a computer carries out the real work. After a period of time, the mind drifts elsewhere, despite the best of intentions. The interface needs to more fully involve the pilots in the flight process. There is no reason that the pilots could not actually fly the aircraft while the computer looks ahead for a possible altitude bust and performs the instructor function to improve pilot skill. How that is best done is up to the software development folks, but I am willing to bet there is a solution.:ok: Might want to swap the PF/PNF functions every 15 minutes or so however. |
Originally Posted by vilas
(Post 8838043)
Earlier stall recovery procedure was based on approach to stall but after a few accidents in the US where the thrust increase prevented the pilot from lowering the nose FAA asked for a review of the procedure.
Originally Posted by AAIB Bulletin 6/2009
The stall recovery techniques recommended
in the manufacturer’s Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM) were not fully applied.
Originally Posted by gums
(Post 8838313)
PLZ convince me that the 'bus control law for pitch is primarily programmed for an attitude versus a gee.
It's the place in manuals where "needs to know" meets "unable to understand". If Aırbus wrote "maintains vertical flightpath" instead of "maintains 1G corrected for pitch up to 33 deg bank", already high number of confused manual readers would increase even more. So why did Airbus made the system that is so difficult to describe? To make it simple to operate! It works just like the conventional controls with nose following control displacement unless you: hit the protection, stall the aeroplane or have your flight controls disabled. I still haven't found a pilot that would have problems learning or unlearning the sidestick.
Originally Posted by gums
(Post 8838313)
lack of indications that the jet has reached trim l;imits or AoA limits
Originally Posted by gums
(Post 8838313)
My comment about continuing a climb with stick in "neutral" stands.
Originally Posted by TC-DCA
(Post 8838624)
So by saying " would try to maintain constant vertical flightpath " we can translate it to try to maintain a pitch the aircraft trim back, true ?
Originally Posted by TC-DCA
(Post 8838693)
I just spoke with an EZY pilot and he told me that there will be normally not a pitch up during a stall in alt. Law and that it´s an requirement of certification by EASA (cs-25) that no abnormal nose up pitching will occur in a stall ?
Originally Posted by His Dudeness
(Post 8839316)
whilst that is true I don´t see the same thing happening on an airplane with 2 interconnected sticks...when the bloody column hits your stomach, you get the message that the other dude is holding it back...
Originally Posted by Sailvi767
(Post 8839318)
It is worth noting that a Delta Crew encountered the same situation as the AF crew in a 330 on a Pacific flight.
Originally Posted by Uplinker
(Post 8839373)
I fly Airbus A330. A lot of what the French captain apparently says is interesting and certainly food for thought - I don't see it as BS, perhaps someone could enlighten me
Originally Posted by Harry G Frankfurt
It is impossible for someone to lie unless he thinks he knows the truth. Producing
bull**** requires no such conviction. A person who lies is thereby responding to the truth, and he is to that extent respectful of it. When an honest man speaks, he says only what he believes to be true; and for the liar, it is correspondingly indispensable that he considers his statements to be false. For the bull****ter, however, all these bets are off: he is neither on the side of the true nor on the side of the false. His eye is not on the facts at all, as the eyes of the honest man and of the liar are, except insofar as they may be pertinent to his interest in getting away with what he says. He does not care whether the things he says describe reality correctly. He just picks them out, or makes them up, to suit his purpose. FD's are bars helping the pilot to follow his trajectory. There is a loss of altitude, however marginal this loss ( 350 to 350 ft ) this point is crucial in the understanding of the sequence of events as it explains the crew first move is to pitch up in order to regain the lost altitude (BEA p.179) Joysticks only function is to send inputs to the computer management system which either accepts them or rejects them (Hence the motto that airbuses cannot stall) 45'' after the alarms rang, there have been alternate actions to pitch up and down by the crew Need more?
Originally Posted by Derfred
(Post 8840143)
If Airbus pilots are not trained to regard the aircraft's attitude indicator as their primary instrument, then we have a problem.
Originally Posted by karnc
When the Bus is messed up, your conventional pilot skill can't help much because when you pull the stick, the plane may not respond by raising up the pitch.
Originally Posted by karnc
I am a sim instructor
Originally Posted by PJ2
Fly-by-wire is something like CWS, (Control Wheel Steering) in a Boeing, (but for very different reasons!).
Originally Posted by Microburst2002
DIRECT LAW handling characteristics are NOT like a conventional airplane's, no matter what Airbus claims.
Originally Posted by Mıcroburst2002
Sidesticks give no clue of airspeed, like conventional airplane yokes do
Originally Posted by Microburst2002
DIRECT law is a very degraded control law (not at all like a reversion to conventional control system). You could never certify an airplane with such system.
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It is humanly impossible to maintain full mental involvement in the flight process while a computer carries out the real work. After a period of time, the mind drifts elsewhere, despite the best of intentions. |
Clandestino;
Slight difference being CWS is attitude hold, Airbus is flightpath hold. |
Originally Posted by A33Zab
If even the ATTENTION GETHERS cannot get the attention they require and get them out of 'slumber' mode then I am afraid there is no hope.
To give priority to a PA over essential stuff is not the best idea ... but how to label a concept that allows a crew to manipulate his flight control command for 6 seconds and as far as 3/4 to stop without being clearly visible to the other crew ? |
CONF iture:
but how to label a concept that allows a crew to manipulate his flight control command for 6 seconds and as far as 3/4 to stop without being clearly visible to the other crew ? FCTM 09 Jan 2007: VMO/MMO EXCEEDANCE . Before re-engaging the AP, smoothly establish a shallower pitch attitude.In turbulence, during climb, cruise or descent, the aircraft may slightly exceed VMO/MMO with the autopilot (AP) engaged. To prevent such an exceedance, adapt speed or Mach target. If severe turbulence is known or forecasted, consider the use of turbulence speed. If the current speed is close to the VMO (maximum operating speed), monitor the speed trend symbol on the PFD. If the speed trend reaches, or slightly exceeds, the VMO limit: . Use the FCU immediately to select a lower speed target. If the speed trend significantly exceeds the VMO red band, without high speed protection activation: . Select a lower target speed on the FCU and, if the aircraft continues to accelerate, consider disconnecting the AP. If the aircraft accelerates above VMO with the AP engaged, the AP will disengage on reaching the high speed protection. The high speed protection will apply a been superseded by the overspeed aural warning.
nose-up order up to 1.75 g, in addition to pilot input during VMO recovery. Therefore, make a smooth pitch correction in order to recover proper speed. Speedbrakes may be used in case of high speed exceedance, but the flight crew should be aware of pitch influence. In addition, speedbrakes will be used with caution, close to the ceiling. High Speed Protection may also result in activation of the angle of attack protection. In all events, check the AP engagement status, and re-engage it when appropriate. It may have tripped and the associated aural warning may have |
Originally Posted by A33Zab
Now that's a good excuse
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Originally Posted by Machinbird
(Post 8858947)
I think the sarcasm here is a bit harsh. The XL A320 got its stabilizer trim setting in Normal Law (with defective AOA operation). Then at the moment of stall, airflow assymetry caused an ADR problem that dropped them into Direct Law. The aircraft pitched up uncontrollably (without manually running trim down) and finally entered Abnormal Attitude Law when it was too late and the nose too high to recover in the altitude available.
Nor is the trim up a C* or bus issue - it will happen exactly the same on a conventional, depending on AP mode, if speed is allowed to decay. I think XL is closer to G-THOF (a 737, thats how much C* has to do with it) than to AF447 - both crews had difficulty recovering due to being out of trim, both crews omitted to trim, G-THOF ended better only because they reduced thrust to get elevator authority back. If XL (and G-THOF) illustrate any design flaw it is with underslung engines, not C* - but in my opinion every design decision has compromises, no design is perfect in every scenario, and what it really illustrates is the perils of trying to recover a pitch upset by adding thrust when your thrust line is below COG. |
Amber to Red.
The ECAM message AP OFF that comes on after pushing the take-over button is coloured red not amber, as in the report.
A very well written report that brings out many good points and traps. |
Originally Posted by Clandestino
(Post 8859210)
For the umpteenth time: it is :mad: not! It holds the flightpath! Not :mad: pitch or :mad::mad: G! It's the place in manuals where "needs to know" meets "unable to understand". If Aırbus wrote "maintains vertical flightpath" instead of "maintains 1G corrected for pitch up to 33 deg bank", already high number of confused manual readers would increase even more.
So why did Airbus made the system that is so difficult to describe? To make it simple to operate! AoA limits? There is cue on speed display, aural stall warning and strong natural pre-stall buffet. HTBJ chapter on stick pusher provides enlightenment on how aeroplanes behaving badly were certified way before Airbus. Meanwhile, there was another sad case of holding the controls fully up till ground impact in Mali. It is also worth noting that out of 36 cases of unreliable airspeeds on 330/340 that preceeded AF447 and were listed in interim 2, 6 happened to AF crews. No damage, no injuries. It might explain initial climb but not why then the level was severely busted or why climb even after PNF prompts to go down, thence BS. FAA disagrees. Maybe your congressman can do something about it? |
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