Links between AF and DGAC
 

Air France pilots are working as experts toward the DGAC threw the official OCV and the official Jury des Examens du Personnel Navigant Professionnel.
Air France has his own official Medical Center too.
The Air France autority above the supposed independant BEA is better hidden, but appears occasionaly. I.E. in the Ste Odile crash the AIR INTER pilots used AIR FRANCE approach charts (Melting of Air Inter/ Air France had already started) without "FAF" !!!!!Take time to reread the report, you find no recommandation to add the FAF position missing on ...ALL the AF's approach charts!!!! But AF modified very quickly ALL his approach charts (ATLAS/AIR FRANCE) adding the FAFs' positions.
In the Ste Odile crash missing FAF allowed descent at the 15% (ground) rate from 3660 Ft - D9 Nm to STR until the STR VOR altitude 1340 Ft.... threw the BLOSS , with CFIT at 2620 Ft reported by the BEA without that analysis).
The official chart had the FAF position (7NM to STR) : AF drawed their own charts, not applying the ICAO rules (known as PROMIN in the French law.
Dozy, Do you need other examples of the DGAC dependance toward Air France?

Did any of those action break regulations though?

I don't see how any of them are illustrative of "dependence", just insufficiently rigorous practice at the time, which was presumably changed.

More to the point, all this was long before AF447, so I don't see the connection!

Really? The report states that he obtained his PPL in 1974, then joined AF as cabin crew from 1976 to 1982, during which time he was clearly engaged in a career path towards flight crew as he obtained his qualifications during the same period. His career with the airlines began flying Caravelles for Air Inter - a type (and airline, for that matter) not known for being automation-heavy. Reading between the lines it looks to me like Dubois always intended to be a pilot, and joined AF as cabin crew to assist his career potential.

I'd like to know the source of your info there, because it doesn't tally with what I'm reading.

That's a bit of an assumption - again, I'd be interested in your source, because dear old Google is failing me, and the report doesn't mention Bonin ever being CC.

That may well be the case, but again I put to you that it's a bit of a stretch to claim a correlation. For one thing it was a technically difficult approach due to the weather (not to mention that the crew were fatigued, and the charts for YYZ did not include landing distances), and also I can think of several similar incidents off the top of my head (AA1420, QF1, SWA1248) in which the crews were not former FAs.

Pilot development failure
 

Training is the foundation but experience is the walls and roof.

The FO and SO on AF447 were sponsored fast track JAR "integrated" students
Who had minimal time on hand flown machines then straight intoFBW automated Airbus 320s before burning thousands of hours on autopilot in the a330/340.

Even the big JAR/EASA "integrated" and MPL schools admit 80% of these students are scared of flying in light aircraft, scared of stalling and more interested in a lifestyle than aeronautics.

At the time of AF447 disaster I met one cadet on a six month flexi crew co tract with a uk airline. They did not understand why they shouldn't climb too early at high weights nor what Mach buffet was.

Add in the stupid stall recovery taught for min height loss instead of angle of attack reduction BEFORE adding power on FAR25/EASA25 machines and very poor simulator stall replication plus Airbus myth about TOGA and angle of attack protection and you have such a sad waste of life.

@Winnerhofer:

Admittedly the OCR/translation tools at my disposal are crude, but I can't find a reference in that letter to either Dubois or Bonin being former cabin crew.

Furthermore, as far as I can tell the source seems to be something of an inveterate writer of letters on various subjects - all the others I've found seeming to be unrelated to aviation.

First point - I don't know of F/O Robert's history, but I do know that F/O Bonin was an accomplished sailplane (glider on this side of the pond) pilot. You can't push buttons to fly one of those, and to say the least to fly gliders well requires a very thorough knowledge of aspects of flight, including energy management and stall avoidance.

Second point - With due respect it's a bad idea to get FBW and automation confused or conjoined. They are two very distinct concepts with very different roles.

Bonin was not one of these - see above re: gliders.

As the original thread discussed, what you are describing is not a stall *recovery* procedure but a stall *avoidance* procedure. The industry as a whole shifted focus in recurrent airline training to avoidance rather than recovery - meaning that there were pilots whose last stall recovery procedure was flown as part of their PPL exam.

In the wake of AF447, both Boeing and Airbus worked together to develop new procedures and training materials to bring recovery back into the picture.

I'm a little unsure what you mean by "Airbus myth about TOGA and angle of attack protection". Could you elaborate?

Teach process, and results speak for themselves. A much underappreciated point. Tip of the cap for you raising it.

Hmm... Do you not think that process has its place? I agree that it shouldn't be the be-all and end-all, but I've heard far too many pilots interviewed after successful recovery from an incident saying words to the effect of "things went south really fast... and then the training kicked in" to dismiss it entirely. Going back to procedures when the situation threatens to overwhelm your cognitive functions can be a very useful thing, and when applied correctly can seem to be a lifesaver.

In the case of AF447, it seems likely that no procedure was ever followed from AP disconnect onwards, and the unfortunate PF remained overwhelmed from start to finish.

The media have focused on the PF being the least experienced flight crew member in terms of hours, and that seems to have led to an assumption in some quarters that he went straight into the RHS of an Airbus and did practically nothing but program the automatics and fly the occasional take off and approach. This is not true - while the lack of high-altitude manual handling training definitely didn't help, the PF - as I said above - was a sailplane pilot, and apparently qualified to a high degree in that regard. There is no "Otto" or "George" in a sailplane, and if you stall the wing in one you'd better get the nose down, because there is no TOGA setting to power out of it.

I'm still rather concerned that the "inexperienced PF" angle is getting more play than the "startle effect" one.

I think that whatever experience Bonin had with flying gliders .. does nothing when a qualification and experience of flying an Airbus ... or any other jumbo
Between a glider and Airbus .. this is the day and night .. and certainly when it comes to maneuvering as to avoid a stall or worse .. get out
How many "laws" have a glider ?

One, and it's "get the nose down".

A thought on training; but not related to any operator, crew, or individual.
I sense that some First Officers might not be sufficiently exposed to critical aspects during training, either due to insufficient instructor emphasis, or not really taking a keen interest in these aspects because of the belief that they will not be exposed to such situations in their current role.
The underlying theme is that critical and targeted refresher training is predominantly for Captains only – they are there to command and take control. Thus First Officers are only required to jump through the hoop - an operator’s perspective, or - this doesn’t concern me as a ‘less than fully engaged’ individual (lacking motivation).

If this is so, an accident investigation could interpreted this as poor or insufficient training, without the basic standard of training being found unacceptable. Also, a First Officer, if ‘in command’ at the time, might find an unexpected critical situation much more surprising (startle) than might be assumed, due to the lack embedded knowledge from training weakness / attitude.

We should expect the worst when a constructor will build a FBW glider :bored:

Did you read anywhere which was the experience of Bonin as sailorplane pilot and recent experience ? Had he the time and opportunity to maintain his skills ?

Do often sailorplane pilots stall without visibility with PFD, unfamiliar alt2B jumping in the third's man seat and oscillating the plane on roll axis and autotrim working without observability in silence ?

Aerobatics gesture culture loss replaced by SOPs culture rejected wise definition of "basics" and was cutting some physical degrees of freedom usable to judgement, decision and piloting.

I remember that sad year -1979- in France when DGAC started to stop and sell their Zlins and bought the C310 to allow Mr. Debiesse responsible of " Formation" to visit the instruction centers with the NEW METHOD and find... fresh meat... he said he needed some times a day... A insurance specialist traveled often with him for her business.
True and incredible : training instructors learned to build paper planes instead to fly in all positions...
I was not alone to see that starting corruption of the whole aviation french civilian system, and I have been sometimes asked to close my eyes and to accept to work with people of that system ( I always refused and I had to pay the price of that refusal)

One year later the ATPL theoric exams traffic started and stayed unpunished forever M.Arondel president of exams Board and later Moureaux, Gourguechon, etc. Ten years later the "A320 not stalling" mantra was accepted like a dogm of the "Dereglementation" religion. Entering in an airliner cockpit you lost outside all your knowledge (aerodynamics, aerobatics, maths, experience) and you were requested to forget any question. These who refused were called dynosaurs and to extend that in a New age french aviation culture they started the "cadets'" system using the prestigious name but not quality of the US Cadets where the older french pilots learnt to fly after WWII. Airbus was requested to build new concepts for these fresh meat pilots. The only improvement I have seen in that system change was the decreasing number of drunk pilots in airline cockpits...

Problem is, how can you be sure that your A330 is about to stall, when the speed tape is gone? The aircraft had very convincing evidence for the approaching stall (increasing AoA), but had no means to convey it to the pilots in an equally convincing manner.

@noske:

I'd say the rattling "cricket" noise and the voice blaring "STALL-STALL" should have been a clue...

Roulanhollandias
Like your post but france wouldn't be the only lot who had a similar arrogant outlook.
Was on the first course that forsaked the chipmunk and aerobatics for a PA 28.
The odd hours that I flew one was a waste as my instructor was too frightened to fly aeros.
Shame to think that AF pilots aren't allowed a glass of plonk with their crew meal though ;)

Problem with alcohol is that some persons are quickly addict after drinking only a bit wine, and get unable to chose the apropriate moment, quantity and quality to taste wine or stronger alchool things (never in flight or time before flight, of course, as ruled by airline and health discipine).

Dozy, will you please read my post again. You utterly missed my point.

"Teach process" was a direct follow on to the post I replied to, and is shorthahd for training, which is what you rely on when you need it.

You seem to forget that I spent some time as a flight instructor, and at a higher level later on in my career working on pilot training, training methods, and traning systems. Sorry to use brevity there, it seems to have gone over your head.

:ugh:

@Dozy: The fact remains that the pilots either didn't believe the stall warning or didn't even perceive it at all. Which caused BEA to recommend (4.2.2)...
And I'd say that some kind of instrument for PNF to point at and say "tu vas décrocher, tu vois? il faut descendre" would have been a great help.

Indeed in the CVR ... it's only a synthetic voice for the word "stall"
Never one of the 3 pilots will pronounce the word "stall"
Is this alarm is often a false alarm on this type of aircraft?
Is that during their careers .. these pilots have had to make the experience of several false alarms?
The phenomenon of "tunneling" may be excluded ... for 3 with the same phenomenon at the same time for the same event is difficult to understand
Mystery stand ......

I didn't forget, sir - and I don't want to argue with you. Maybe it was my bad for misunderstanding, but the previous post to which you replied referred to "the stupid stall recovery [being] taught", which you actually underlined in your quote. Therefore it appeared to me that you were saying that "teach[ing] process" was a *bad* thing. Apologies if I got it wrong.

@noske - The mega-thread went on a lot about AoA indicators and mechanical stick shakers in the same way - but how does that help the other 5 "pulling up into stall" accidents when they all had shakers?

Also, I don't think the PF was pulling up because he consciously thought it was the right thing to do - I think he was flailing around because he'd become spooked (which I also believe was the case for several of the other incidents). The gauges present definitely seem to have told the PNF that something was up, but he didn't seem to have confidence enough to take charge.