AF
 

Les français sont souvent arrogants.
The French are often arrogant.
Des pilotes français se sont crus injustement très forts ..
Some French pilots wrongly considered themselves as being TopGuns.
Généraliser leur incompétence est stupide!
To generalise their incompetence is stupid.
L'erreur relaté sur le Tel-Aviv a été décrite sur toutes les compagnies mondiales sur tous les avions mais plus sur les Airbus (problème du mini-manche).
The incident regarding Tel-Aviv has happened to all carriers on all aircraft but afflicts Airbus more because of the problematic S/S.

I think the F/O is 27 years old with 500hrs on type... The french did it again... does not surprise me:D

Herr Winnerhoffer
Auf Englisch, bitte. ;)

Here is what I gather from your post. My French is nearly non existent.

The French are arrogant.
French pilots are good (at something I didn't quite parse). Generalization about incompetence is stupid.
The problem at Tel Aviv has to do with companies, and Airbus machines. (I am sure I lost something in that)
The forums in the internet are at a low level.

We certainly agree on that last part. :ok:

Do you think that it's time to invade through Sedan, yet again, and set them straight Herr Winnerhofer? :} :E

Dear Mr NordicMan:
Let us perhaps praise our French friends for their most excellent protection freatures in the Airbus, which seem to have helped the pilots avoid a mess, and thus allow them another chance after that unsettling Go Around event.

More appalling monitoring from the captain than appalling CRM. If you don't follow the flight directors, turn them of. Understandable from the 200 hours on type FO, unless he had previous Airbus experience.

On any aeroplane when in a similar FLCH/Level Change/Speed with Pitch mode...

@Lonewolf 50

Wengen is not in Germany. It's in Switzerland. But true : Swiss-Germans are still more pedantic as Germans used to be invasive... :ugh:

Back to the topic : looks as if the computer rightly corrected the "500-hours-on-that-type" FP misbehaviour. Do I get it right ? :8

As I read it in the linked page, the F/O has 500hrs total and 200hrs on type.

Quite right, but what the Tel Aviv AF incident shows is that there are some people flying A320s who still think they have to apply rear 'stick' in a turn, as they would have done in a conventional C152 or Boeing 737…. you don't, the stick is in effect a flight path command, if you want to continuously increase the flight path angle, then keep pulling, otherwise, one small input and leave it mostly to itself.

Another classic case of Automation helmet fire. No smoking hole so in the end the automation did work. However it is poor monitoring by the PM and the Capt. not taking control at a earlier point in the approach, especially given the low experience level of the F/O.

And it is interesting that a visual approach is described as a "indiscriminate" approach? TLV has used this procedure for some time now and flying a visual to the runway should be a relatively easy procedure with the usual good visibility and daylight hours for this flight.

Children of the Magenta
 

I, and others, have posted this before, so apologies to those who have already seen it.

It is long - 25 mins - and it is dated - 16 years - but in my simple fighter pilot mind, should be required viewing by anyone flying with automatics.

Alpha Floor only functions in Normal Law. So, yes.

Just read the full BEA report (in French only at the moment) . It is a bit more complicated that 2 pilots botching an APP. (but it always is )
The second similar incident that occurred 5 days later is also briefly analysed,
The report also mention that AF had received 5 previous ASR on the RNAV Visual APP in TLV prior the 2 incidents.

main points :
The RNAV Visual procedure is unique to TLV and not similar to what is routinely done elesewhere ,especially in USA
This is the only such APP in the AF A320 network.
This perticular visual APP was not included in the SIMs at time incidents .
ATC instruct crews to follow that procedure whereas the actual procedure is "to be on request by pilots"

How ATC is giving those RNAV APP and how they are designed are being investigated.

but also :
The non clear understanding on how A/THR automation works , especially in OPEN DESCENT mode,led the crew to believe that the ATHR would maintain speed .
(De plus, la compréhension insuffisante du fonctionnement de l’A/THR et de
l’importance du suivi des FD en mode OPEN DESCENT a laissé penser à l’équipage que l’A/THR assurerait le maintien de la vitesse.)
In both incidents the BEA indicates that PNF and PF were not monitoring speed .:rolleyes:
No not only a 777 training issue ..

Yes the PF had 500h TT and 200 on type. I suspect one of the MPLs , probably not a CPL ( my remark )

Maybe not, however the following most certainly would be:

How to SPEAK to the other pilot about the state of your/their approach planning.

That when flying visual approaches, ie manual flying, the correct mode is TRK/FPA, FD's off.

How to correctly Go Around.

How PM should take over control: I have control, NOT dual input without pressing the sidestick takeover button.

How to read the FMA's - its one of the basic principals of flying the Airbus.

ALPHA FLOOR - one has to seriously mishandle the aircraft to achieve this. When demonstrating it in the sim, it takes a looonnnngggg time and some gross mishandling to get there.

MPL's - if I have one of these chaps/chapess's in my RHS I am at a heightened sense of monitoring throughout the whole flight. They have NO experience and shouldn't be expected to cope with such an approach without mentoring and guidance. Some are excellent people, some are gung-ho, I know it all types who are more dangerous than they realise.

What the F was the Captain doing??

Automatics & sky gods
 

Two issues seem to be at play in this thread the first is easy to deal with, the second is shrouded in cultural issues that are mostly individual opinion rather than hard fact.

There seems to be a problem with the Airbus machine/ human interface, the aircraft is clearly a very good flying machine but it has become so good that it gives pilots an attitude of followership, when it does something unexpected the usual reaction from the crew is to go heads down and start tapping away on the FMC......... Not to disconnect ALL the automatics and revert to old fashioned manual flying. My second flying lesson was all about Attiude & Power = Performance, perhaps some professional pilots are getting too far away from the basics ?

The French pilot attitude and as some people see it arrogance is unique but not universal, I spent some time based in France working with French cabin crew, they at first appered very distant and it was clear that there was a big authority gradient across the flight deck door that did not help communication. After a while we broke down this authority gradient barrer, it became clear that MOST French pilots do have a very ridged veiw of their place in the system and the place of the cabin crew. From my cultural background I do not see this as helpfull from a flight safety point of veiw and the cabin crew expressed the opinion that as a group of pilots we were much easier to work with.

In twenty five years on the flight deck the only person that I have felt it nessesary to report to the management was a French FO who clearly had swallowed the arrogant sky god attitude whole and uncooked, he was very rude to the cabin crew and when I questioned a clearance he told me that I was wrong and he was correct, it took three requests to check the clearance and then a direct order to get him to check with ATC ! He had I fact made an error and had not understood the clearance........... In the next four hours of flight he said nothing about the incident and after the flight left the Crewroom in a way so as to avoid the de-brief.

As he had walked out of the Crewroom before the de-brief I had no option but to report the matter to my fleet boss...................... Who was French and in CRM terms the polar opposite of the FO.

From what I have seen in aviation good CRM is alive and well in Scandinavia, Northern Europe and the English speaking world but those nations who insist on not speaking the ICAO standard language in professional aviation do for the same cultural reasons find it difficult to accept the concept of CRM.

Where did it go?
 

Where did the Air France approach to stall into Tel-Aviv thread go?:confused:

I'll save the Mods some work (as an early Xmas treat :rolleyes: )

Twas put back into here


http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/52973...e-me-us-5.html

Chris

The moral is: on the A320 NEVER disobey the FD pitch bar in OP DES mode, particularly if you are relying on A/THR to control speed (it won't, because it will be in IDLE mode)."
"After the Bangalore accident, the FMGS logic was modified to switch automatically from OP DES mode to VS mode when the IAS fell much below VLS. (can't remember the figure right now). When the FMGS switches to VS mode, the A/THR mode changes from IDLE to SPD."

Isn't that basic? Open des or des means only pitch will maintain speed. If you are manual and you ignore FDs and drop speed at Vls-2 FDs will go off and managed descent speed will change to select speed and ATHR will change to speed mode to capture that speed. No Chris FDs don't change to VS mode only ATHR changes to speed.

In consequence SEC and FADEC ar not independant. The global shematic show them independant.