I for one don't know - this is an aviation forum, not a legal forum.

Speaking for myself, I have grave reservations with the practice of treating every aviation accident as a criminal case regardless of circumstance, as seems to be the norm on the continent (and has happened here with similarly uncomfortable results).

What is certainly true is that the technical investigation and report by the BEA had no significant bearing on the outcome of the prosecution, and indeed the report practically handed Capt. Asseline a lifeline by pointing out the airline's slapdash approach to flight preparation and briefing. Why his legal team failed to take advantage of this remains baffling to me.

@DozyW

I agree with you entirely on the criminalization of accidents.

The potential problem I see with the legal investigations into accidents in some places - Italy especially comes to mind - is that there's no parallel to the English inquest process. If there's a death, then the legal investigation into the circumstances involves the same sort of prosecutors who'd eventually be involved in filing charges against suspects.

The professional accident investigation could thus potentially be hindered and disrupted. It could make it difficult to get people to testify freely, since there's a clearer lingering threat of prosecution in the process. If inquiries into the causes and facts proceed before and without relevance to potential prosecutions, then I suspect there's more chance of getting to the bottom of the circumstances, and reducing the opportunities for repeats.

In France, that's exactly what the BEA are charged with. They will, as I said, take the primary evidence and secondary evidence from all parties involved and attempt to make sense of it from a purely technical and operational standpoint. Their remit, as with most civil service agencies charged with aviation incident investigation (including our AAIB), forbids them from explicitly apportioning responsibility. That is left to the criminal and civil judicial apparatus.

Investigators may testify during the legal proceedings, but their testimony is strictly limited to the content of the report.

Most of the myths that grew up around this case are a result of deliberate obfuscation on the part of legal representatives via press briefings in particular. This is why a lot of commonly understood aspects are in fact incorrect.

Quote from roulishollandais:
"Is it usual to see such mistakes punished by nine months firm jail?"

Probably not in the UK, and AFAIK not in other Anglophone countries, but "usual" is not a word that can easily be applied to this accident. I know nothing of the judicial process that led to the sentence.

I tried my best to base my assessment as much as possible on my interpretation of the published DFDR, rather than the narrative of the reports, and have yet to finish reading the captain's account. If the published DFDR is good - and so far I haven't read anything that proves otherwise - I doubt that the three main errors I describe will need much amendment. They are harder on the crew than the BEA report, which - in the tradition of air accident findings - carefully avoided direct criticism.

My opinion is that no one should be imprisoned unless (s)he is found guilty of a criminal act, and I see nothing to suggest that at Habsheim. There were misjudgments that led to fatalities, and a degree of negligence may have been involved. But as long as sane pilots are sitting lawfully at the sharp end of an aircraft, it is difficult for a prosecutor to demonstrate a casual disregard for the safety of passengers and crew.

To pick up on Dozy Wannabe's point, the tendency in some countries to prosecute personnel who are responsible for the safe conduct of flights, and who are thought to have made errors of commission or omission, positively discourages self-reporting of an error that might cause an accident next time. On the other hand, there can be no authority without responsibility. So the captain must ultimately carry the can, but what sanction should be imposed when he drops it?

The reality is that, even when exonerated from any blame for a big, publicised accident, more often than not aspects of a captain's performance will be questioned overtly or covertly within the airline, effectively ruining his or her career. And, if the situation becomes intolerable, the very fact of having been in the public eye will frighten-off any prospective employer.

There may be worse punishments than nine months at the president's pleasure. Nowadays, senior politicians seem to redeem themselves from their indiscretions in a year or two. Pilots don't.

Chris Scott, Hi,


This may have been a display which had been practiced a number of times successfully, probably along a "standard R/W" somewhere. To have to alter the R/W on "short finals", to fly over the grass R/W at Habsheim, whilst still at Flight Idle, probably meant a loss of some of the intended or planned altitude.


The practice flights would not have had trees, I would suppose... Nor a requirement to alter to a parallel R/W when low. So just IF there had been a slow build up of thrust, or even a failure of one engine (and THIS DID NOT HAPPEN at Habsheim) an adequate climb at V2 ought to be enough ... If there were no trees along the extended centre line...


I can only guess that almost any other transport aircraft, if it attempted to follow the same trajectory, would have ended in a similar result.

@DW,

I fully agree about France: BEA matches the role of AAIB/NTSB.

In Italy though, the investigating magistrate seems to sometimes need to impound wreckage and potentially disrupt the equivalent of BEA.

Of course, there's a step from having a vigorous ongoing judicial process to interfering with the dedicated crash investigation. And, the criminalization is subject to the choices of the magistrate in question.

Quote from Linktrained:
To have to alter the R/W on "short finals", to fly over the grass R/W at Habsheim, whilst still at Flight Idle, probably meant a loss of some of the intended or planned altitude.

Why would the a/c have to lose height when the PF was trying to reduce speed? And on an A320, the FBW specifically counteracts the tendency of an a/c to lose height in a turn.

I should have used the phrase "potential energy ..." again.


And I had forgotten/neglected to think, of THAT feature of A320's FBW.


I'm sorry.

After " Flight Idle " had been selected the aircraft was rather like a slightly under-powered glider, at least until TOGA was selected ( perhaps too late ).

Yesterday I saw Air Crash Investigation about this accident. It was the 1st time I'd seen it. I am not an Airbus pilot, but Boeing hydraulics. From those in the know was the TV program accurate? It did include many new aspects that I had not heard before. It also seems the captain is still trying to clear his name from blame.
Regarding the choice & change of RWY, it stated that the only data given by AF was from the tarmac RW02, but on arrival they saw the crowd aligned along RW34 and so deviated at the last moment causing them to be high and hence at idle thrust.
It did quote the captain as calling for A/T disconnect at low level. Why would he do that? It did confirm the brief was for a flypast >100' but they descended and for a moment were <30'. This is quite obvious from the video.

But back to the question: was the program accurate?

Some of the dramatisation was a little contrived (the 'pilot or plane' briefing in particular, especially given that the final report considered the airline's practices to be a significant factor). It had to condense and skip through some aspects of the case faster than others, but to the best of my knowledge it is a fairly accurate summary. Regarding the A/THR disconnect (which apparently did not happen as briefed), there is a possibility it was called for and not subsequently performed due to task saturation from the last-minute approach change.

A/THR disconnect (in fact disabling of A/THR by holding the disconnect buttons down) is required for the manoeuvre as briefed (i.e. at or above 100ft RA), because otherwise Alpha Floor would activate and the aircraft would climb out. In this case apparently the disabling of A/THR did not occur, but Alpha Floor was instead inhibited by the aircraft remaining below 100ft RA.

The programme interviewed my old Software Engineering Professor (Dr. Peter Mellor), and I believe it was the last interview he did as he sadly passed away before the programme aired.

Regarding the archive interview with Ray Davis regarding time discrepancy, page 16 of this document (Airbus's 1995 follow-up report):

http://www.crashdehabsheim.net/Rapport%20Airbus.pdf

provides a reasonable response. In addition, I should point out that Capt. Davis was an excellent and thorough investigator and this should not be considered a mark against him, he was simply inexperienced with digital recorders, having retired before their introduction.

Quote from RAT 5:
"From those in the know was the TV program accurate? [...]
"Regarding the choice & change of RWY, it stated that the only data given by AF was from the tarmac RW02, but on arrival they saw the crowd aligned along RW34 and so deviated at the last moment causing them to be high and hence at idle thrust."

I haven't seen the documentary, but that argument doesn't make much sense to me.

Approaching from the south, the direct distance to the threshold of Rwy 02 would have been several hundred metres LESS than to the thresholds of the grass strips 34L and 34R, which are several hundred metres further north.

According to the CVR, the first pilot positively to identify the airfield was the PF (captain) at about 1244:00, just as the PNF was busy initiating his first R/T call to Habsheim. At 1244:01, the PF announced (in French): "There's the field. It's there... you have it, eh?"

That was 98 seconds before first impact. The published DFDR print-out starts 4 seconds later, at 1244:05, with a time-frame notated as TGEN 240 seconds. (The last uncorrupted time frame is TGEN 334 seconds, and is considered to be the point of first impact with the trees on the north boundary of the airfield, defined as "t". So TGEN 240 is t -94 seconds.)

Habsheim ATC did not suggest that they fly along Rwy 34, and it seems doubtful that the crowd line along it would have been visible at this point.

At t -94, IAS and GS were 202 kt, passing height just over 1000 ft above the airfield elevation, and position about 3.5 nm SSE of the Rwy 02 threshold on a HDG of 336 (probably magnetic, but variation was only 2W). Had they decided at that point to position for Rwy 02, a rapid swerve to the left would have been necessary, shortly followed by a right turn to line up. That would have only increased the track distance-to-run to about 4 nm, a negligible difference from going direct to the thresholds of the grass strips.

In either straight-in scenario, there simply was not enough distance to get the height and speed off in accordance with the game plan. They needed an orbit or, preferably, a close circuit of the airfield while they slowed down and configured for the flypast.

In the event, they continued more or less straight towards the airfield, perhaps assessing the situation. There were no significant heading changes until t -50, with a 5-degree left turn; and t -25, when the a/c started a gentle right turn of about 15 deg on to its final heading of about 345 for the flypast of Rwy 34.

My interpretation of the DFDR suggests that the a/c was still descending as it passed over the threshold of Rwy 02. At t -13 it levelled off, at 60 ft baro on the QFE, just before the threshold of the shorter grass strip 34R. IAS was 132 kt - still more than 15 kt above the planned display speed. Hence the maintenance of idle thrust.

Agreed, but given their fast-and-high state, wouldn't those turns have provided at least some opportunity to slow down and thus manage the descent more precisely, whereas a straight-in to the 34 grass strip make slowing down and managing altitude precisely more difficult?

There is no dispute that the original AF briefing assumed (as did Capt. Asseline) 02 would be the runway they would be using. As to precisely what time they realised that it was in fact 34, there is no clear evidence.

DW
In France (as in many other countries) you (pilot .. driver .. company .. employer .. etc ..) can be tried on charges of "responsibility to have killed or injured people without premeditation and intent to kill or injure"
It is a charge quite normal when victims are the result of an accident or an event involving injury death of people
The choice of the appropriate court of justice (correctionelle or assises) will be primarily on the fact of presence or abscence of premeditation and intent
The difference between "assises" (jury) or "correctionelle" (no jury) is the penalty
This judgment is required (always) to determine who will be compensated and by who !

Thanks, Chris.

Way I see it as well, with more to add.

Fer chrissakes, if you are trying to impress the folks watching, least you could do was to have made a few practice runs ahead of time. Sheesh. And then there's "pride".

Abandoning the planned power and altitude parameters by improvising also disturbs me deeply.

Despite practice, there's always a way to screw up. Witness the Thuderbird crash at Mountain Home ten years ago. Those folks have one or two practice missions before the main show. And then the nugget uses a bad altimeter setting and doesn't realize that it looks different than practice! Says on radio, "don't think I'm gonna make it". No kidding, dude.

As far as the law goes, in the U.S., any of the slf folks could file a civil lawsuit re: negligence. No criminal actions possible.

Looking at the airfield layout, it's unlikely they'd have felt they needed to. Based on the track as indicated on page 19/37 of the 1995 report and the location of the control tower at Habsheim, it would have appeared to the controllers that the A320 was already more-or-less lined up with the strip.

@gums : Legal matters regarding aviation accidents in the UK usually remain in the civil arena, though there has been the odd exception - one of which had a particularly tragic ending. That incident also demonstrated why regulators tend to make poor incident investigators.

Far from it ... The cockpit action and dialogue are especially rubbish and even don't fit the official version.
On the other hand, all the interviews are of interest.

1. What make you state it's 95 ... ?
2. You don't need experience with digital recorders to read a listing.
3. And what make you state he did not have experience with DFDR ?
4. BTW when did he retire from the AAIB ?

If no hiding why the BEA did not put a link for the English translation of the accident Final Report that Airbus is quoting ?
Tell me more about Annexe VII ... now you're getting interesting ...

Habsheim was 25 years ago but still some of the lessons are there to be learned by newbies (as well as by one 86 year old !)


As a trainee at Hamble in 1949 we heard only a limited amount of the information about some of the many more frequent accidents which occurred. ( Someone had taken off in a Tudor with some of the external controls locked... But was able to land... Because he was brilliant... or exceptionally lucky ?)


The York was my first large aircraft, and it was based on the Lanchester bomber but with a different fuselage. Of the 259 built there were recorded 87 " hull losses" in the twenty years of service. In too many cases, if the pilot(s) were killed, the accident could be attributed to PILOT ERROR, without really trying to find what were the factors which contributed. An early study by David Beaty was called "The Human Factors in Aircraft Accidents".


The technology, radio communication and navigation aids together with their reliability and redundancies are now built in to an aircraft at relatively small cost in terms of weight.


A round trip from Stansted- Keflavik- Gander- N/S -Bermuda- Kingston- 2 N/S- Bermuda-Gander -N/S -Stansted took 52 hours flying, using about 10400 gallons of 100 octane petrol to carry 36 troops, each way. (Capt, F/O, N/O, R/O, G/E and Sss). Astro and weather ships for fixes, no LORAN, or ILS. ( We had SBA !)



Today might be different !

It was quite clear during Asselline/Mazières Habsheim trial, that some would have preferd they be dead instead asking questions about the A320 design and working that day. Asseline said it to the Court. Hipocrisy could be seen from some too.

Here's a link for you (ha ha): Commission of Inquiry Into the Accident on 26 June 1988 at Mulhouse-Habsheim ... - France. Ministry of Equipment, Housing, Transport and the Sea - Google Books

More seriously: I find it also frustrating to know that an English translation of the report was made, but was never published on the web. But I wouldn't call that malice, just laziness. The BEA seem to underestimate the continued worldwide interest in this particular report.

Good one. @Dozy: Page 23 in the report has a list of annexes, including "7. Corrélation DFDR-CVR", which never actually appears anywhere in the PDF. That is indeed a bit strange, but looks like an honest mistake to me. For some reason, the "Rapport final (additif)" (starting at page 55) consists of odd-numbered pages only, with blank pages in between. So annexe 7 may just have been on one of those even-numbered pages.

That should be easy to verify with a printed copy of the Journal Officiel, volume 1990. (A brief search across libraries in Germany, for example, already seems to indicate seven such copies.) Did anyone ever bother? :8

I don't think it was - I suspect that's Airbus's own translation. They certainly have no shortage of multilingual people working for them!

That's weird, on this PDF (the one I've been using):
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/1988/f-kc...f-kc880626.pdf

Annexe VII starts, clearly headed, on page 36.

Possibly there's an earlier version doing the rounds where some hapless intern loaded the scanning hopper incorrectly?

Who? I love all this daft conspiracy talk, but spit it out - who do you think would have preferred them dead?

Well, that's the same PDF that I've got, downloaded from the same location.

And you're right, it clearly says "Annexe VII", on the first page of the DFDR listing. But then, on page 45, halfway through the DFDR data, there is "Annexe VIII". :confused:

That is weird. That cannot be what they had intended, and it certainly does not match the table of appendices. But at least it would explain why the real appendix 7 (supposedly describing the CVR/DFDR synchronization) failed to get published.

Regarding the English version, all I know is that Asseline, in a rant about what he only calls "the Béchet report", complains that this piece of crap was even translated into English and then distributed among potential Airbus customers worldwide. Or something like that. Oh well.

Nope - look closely. The formatting of the data is different between Annexes 7 and 8. I suspect Annexe 7 is the *output used to synchronise* the complete DFDR data params (in Annexe 8) with the CVR.

Annexes/Appendices are usually used for supporting data, not narrative. An overview of how the flight data recorder was retrieved is in the BEA report, and an even more detailed description is in the Airbus "Executive Summary" report, along with the inadvertent error made by Capt. Davis in reading the output. Notably, the ACI programme got this wrong too - it was not ATC's discrepancy with the CVR, it was a misinterpretation of the DFDR. Capt. Davis seems to have treated the DFDR's transmit/receive flag as referring to the call from ATC (which would be almost 5 seconds adrift from the ATC recording and unacceptable). In fact the DFDR does not flag incoming, only outgoing transmissions, and the DFDR referred to the crew's response (just shy of 1 second adrift from the ATC timestamp, and within the margin of error).

All this and more is in the Airbus document - I don't understand why CONF is asking me to repeat tons of it.

Capt. Davis appeared in the Black Box series which was broadcast in 1996 and was listed as a former AAIB investigator. The UK TV programme about Asseline in which Capt. Davis attempted to decipher the recordings was broadcast in about 1989/1990 if I recall correctly. The last document I can find referring to his being active with AAIB was his work on the Air India bombing in 1985.

Well, if we disregard Capt. Asseline's somewhat salty language, that it was translated into English for Airbus cutomers' perusal could imply that the translation was performed by Airbus (and therefore unofficial).

Incidentally, according to Béchet himself in the ACI/Mayday programme, Capt. Asseline was initially very co-operative. It was only when it appeared the investigation was disproving his claims that the aircraft malfunctioned that he turned so savagely on them.

Noske and Dozy,

Whoever did that PDF made a real pig's-ear of l'assemblage, as the page numbers of the Annexes are clearly not even close to being sequential. However, some of the missing ones in "Additif" could be because the drawings/photos might have been one-sided, and the copier didn't even notice (s)he'd copied the blank sides.

Then there's the original itself...

The contents of several of the Annexes do not correspond to the index. The chaos includes the fact that (as you say, Noske) Annexe VII is listed in the index as "Correlation...", presumably a narrative justification of the method used to synchronise the timings of CVR, DFDR, Basel ATC, and Habsheim ATC. It is missing from that PDF.

Instead, the first 3 "Tomes" of the DFDR print-out are erroneously headed Appendix VII, and Tomes 4 - 6 (correctly) as Appendix VIII.

Quote from DozyW:
"The formatting of the data is different between Annexes 7 and 8. I suspect Annexe 7 is the *output used to synchronise* the complete DFDR data params (in Annexe 8) with the CVR."

I think not. In fact the most valuable point of correlation between DFDR and CVR probably occurs at TGEN 266 in Tome 5, which (as HN39 pointed out some time ago) is defined in the Airbus 1991 report as being 1244:31 GMT. That point (and hopefully at least one other) would have been used to insert a time stamp on the CVR transcript, as the CVR does not record any time stamp of its own, but (fortunately) runs at a steady speed. The correlation is the DFDR's discrete of the co-pilot's brief transmission on VHF1 (see also the CVR). So Tome 5 is essential in the correlation process.

BTW, I wasn't aware that Ray Davis, formerly of the AIB/AAIB, was a pilot, as you seem to be implying. At Farnborough in the 1980s, he was known simply as Ray Davis.

He referred to himself as a "Trident man" during his interview for Black Box, which I suppose doesn't necessarily mean he was a pilot, but given that and the the fact the AAIB has always had a habit of hiring line pilots I thought it was a reasonable assumption. If I was incorrect, my apologies.

Regarding the PDF, it looks like the "additif" section consisted of double-sided pages, and either a blank page was left in situ on the side with the even numbered pages, or the scanner was incorrectly set up. This only seems to apply to that section however.

EDIT : Ouch - it looks like another scan hopper mistake was made in the original report Annexes - the pages between 26 and 32 seem to have been loaded initially in reverse, then almost random order. It does return to sequential order after that and no pages appear to be missing.

As I do regarding Mr. Davis above, we all need to be careful when "presuming" things about which we lack firm supporting evidence - I guess the only way to confirm the status of Annexe VII (which I'm still not convinced is erroneous) would be to write to the BEA themselves and ask.

In the html version of the Journal Officiel de la Republique Tomes 1 through 6 are in Appendix VIII, but Appendix no.7 is still missing.

French aviation considers they don't have to respect the Law.

I will repost the link provided by noske:
About the correlation, the plain text of the report explains how the CVR was exploited (§1.11.1.1):
But no explanation of how CVR and DFDR were correlated; there is OTOH a mention saying it was good (§ 1.11.2):

The HTML version is an unofficial transcription though, so it's probably a transcription error.

roulishollandais - This is getting a bit tiresome. The truth is that in all likelihood it is Capt. Asseline who is mistaken about there being a conspiracy/cover-up. He'd have probably realised this himself had certain parties not convinced him to pursue the angle for their own interests.

AZR - As HN39/Chris Scott pointed out earlier, in the Airbus supplementary report, page 17/33 the example given uses two VHF 1 transmissions to synchronise the timings:

Other events may have been used earlier in the sequence though.

The co-pilot's VHF 1 transmission at 1244:31 (TGEN 266) is particularly good, IMO, because it is so brief and easily defined: "Recu."

They probably needed another as close to TGEN 000 as possible, in which case there should be a good opportunity at the beginning of the T/O. The CVR transcript shows "Ca roule 296 Q" (probably spoken as "Ca roule deux-cent quatre-vingt-seize quebec"?) with a retro time-stamp of 1240:44, which presumably coincides with a DFDR discrete starting at about TGEN 039.

Brief, knee-jerk acknowledgements are unlikely to be preceded by a pause with the Tx key already open. Transmissions requiring thought might be.

However, what the CVR transcript does not reveal is that (IIRC) the CVR has separate channels for each pilot's Tx, and each pilot's Rx, as well as the area microphone. Therefore, I would expect the co-pilot's Tx channel to pick up the sound of the transmit key being opened and closed. If so, the CVR keying event would be well within the one-second accuracy provided by the DFDR discretes.

Quote from HN39:
"In the html version of the Journal Officiel de la Republique Tomes 1 through 6 are in Appendix VIII, but Appendix no.7 is still missing."

Yes, the HTML version is so much better. Apart from the missing Annexe VIII, the only gripes are the lack of page numbering, and the Habsheim airfield plate being just as blurred as the PDF. The shambolic "Additif" section is not needed. I'm wondering if the PDF might have been created from an early draft of the Report.

Quote from Dozy Wannabe:
"Agreed, but given their fast-and-high state, wouldn't those turns [to adjust track for Rwy 02] have provided at least some opportunity to slow down and thus manage the descent more precisely, whereas a straight-in to the 34 grass strip make slowing down and managing altitude precisely more difficult?"

As I wrote, there was little scope to increase the track distance from 3.5 nm. A sharp S-turn starting at 200 kts would have been impossible. So, for reasons I have already explained, the switch of runway made no significant difference. Ultimately, the essence of a descent for a direct approach is energy management, particularly on a jet, and energy was too high throughout.

The A320 was/is a conventional, medium-sized jet, perhaps marginally more slippery than a B737. The FBW computerisation makes no difference whatsoever to the mechanics of manoeuvrability or descent management. Ideally (and with a degree of hindsight), the PF should not have accelerated to 200 kt in transit. Having sensibly retained the T/O flap setting of 1+F, he could have maintained 'S' speed (about 182 kt at that weight). In need of drag, the L/G could have been extended about 10 seconds earlier, as soon as the field was in sight, and Flaps 2 simultaneously. But their workload was high, and continuing straight in (rather than joining the airfield circuit) was one of the decisions that they may have been pondering in the years since.

Dozy (re: #433) Thanks :) Grouches may point (and be right) that it's still missing in the "official" report (at least in the PDF version). I suggest the idea to go to a library to check a (really) official paper copy would do, for those interested.
(and remember: don't feed...)

Yes, that sounds right for a native :)

Chaos is the appropriate designation, engineered chaos. Confusion all the way. They don't want you to have it easy and simple.

• Annexe 5 - Every single transmission between Basel ATC and ACF296Q has a timestamp but no FDR listing is provided for the period.
• Annexe 5 - Only a few transmission between Habsheim ATC and ACF296Q have a timestamp for the precise period a FDR listing is published.

Everything is done to NOT properly correlate ATC CVR FDR for the all flight.
No wonder Annexe 7 there is none.
But take a part of Annexe 8 to label it 7 ... why not.

Linktrained,
"Habsheim was 25 years ago but still some of the lessons are there to be learned by newbies (as well as by one 86 year old !)"

Yes, it's said that when you stop learning, it's time to stop. Some of us are still learning, even though we already did...

"Today might be different !"

A little, but the basics are the same - only people's perceptions and expectations have changed. The air remains as fickle and fascinating as ever.
Check your PMs?

rudderrudderrat


Quote
It appears to me that the aircraft was deliberately flown below 50 RA with the speed allowed to wash off, apparently waiting for Alpha Floor to "save the day". Unquote


I think that was precisely it. Everyone seems to have missed it - no mention from Chris Scott about it either.


He forgot below 100 feet.


He most likely applied full back press on the stick, waiting, as you said for Alpha Floor to kick in - it did not, aircraft THOUGHT IT WAS LANDING - too.


No alpha floor, no toga to boot. = No noisy climb out.


Had he have done all the above at >100` RA then we would not be having this thread.

He was flown below 50 RA when he was over some unexpected trees BEFORE the runway.
That has been pointed by the expert Max Venet at the trial,. He asked too to cut these trees computing with a patented Venet software the path (one addition or one substraction for each tree ($$$$...).
But these trees were unknown from the pilots who previewed to fly over the other runway. I studied the VAL chart and discovered that the grass ruway was already illegal for light single engine airclub planes... Today that runway no more exists...
Question is : did Asseline DELIBERATELY ovefly these seldom trees? Really I don't think it.

le Bosquet
 

It wasn't missed. It was rebutted because *taking Alpha Floor out of the equation was a central aspect of the manoeuvre being performed*. That the action to do so (holding down A/THR disconnect) was erroneously omitted - probably as a result of task saturation - doesn't alter the fact that the Captain should not have been expecting Alpha Floor at any point.

Regarding the online version of the report, I made the following observations:

1. Looking at the PDF properties, the online PDF version was created on the 10th June 2008 and last modified (presumably uploaded) on the 12th
2. The PDF Producer field lists "Acrobat Distiller 8" for Windows. Acrobat Distiller is usually used for converting existing digital documents in the PostScript format to PDF
3. This therefore implies that the document was scanned some time before it was converted for the web. It's entirely possible that the original PostScript file was scanned years prior to conversion and uploading
4. A random sampling of documents from the site of a similar vintage shows that the conversion and upload was performed in bulk batches
5. The same random sampling indicates that the documents of similar vintage are of similar fidelity to the Habsheim report, including a similar number of scanning errors
6. It should also be noted that (for example) online NTSB reports of a similar vintage are of similar fidelity, being image-centric PDFs and equally troublesome to extract textual data from electronically

The BEA's search form indicates that there are currently 2,256 individual documents in their web-accessible archive. It seems reasonable to infer that to proof-read and correct each of these documents individually would be a mammoth task in terms of man-hours and expense. That the accessible reports from the NTSB and UK AAIB of a similar vintage are also of a similar quality indicates that these archives are supplied "as-is", and some scanning/conversion errors are to be expected.

Furthermore, the appendices/"annexes" of such reports are intended for use only as reference data for the reports themselves. They are not intended for use as the basis of amateur investigations, nor should their content be criticised by amateur investigators for being unable to suit their specific needs.

It must be borne in mind that when this version of the report was published in April 1990, the web existed only as a paper proposal at CERN. The report itself is obviously aimed purely at the print medium, and the CVR transcript could be condensed via word processing in a way that the DFDR output could not. That the DFDR output included in the appendices deals with the immediate precursors of the accident sequence only, and earlier analysis is provided in the narrative makes sense if one takes this into account.

There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that this particular report, either in general or with specific regard to the archival version available online, was intentionally rendered difficult to interpret - it is simply an artifact of its time.

@roulishollandais - in addition to Chris Scott's answer above, it's worth reiterating that overflying the copse of trees made no difference to the behaviour of the aircraft.

Alpha-Floor inhibition
 

I'd say that's probably unlikely, given that such intent would have constituted a deliberate breach of AF's rules regarding display flights - specifically a "hard deck" of 100ft. Notwithstanding the somewhat contradictory DGAC rule specifying 500ft, Asseline would have rightly expected to be hung out to dry if it could be proven he intended to go any lower than the regs allowed for.

Regarding competency, I think it would have been impossible for a pilot to be selected for that role without being a very competent hand-flyer, and you're right about his holding the altitude fairly stable. However on this occasion it was his decision-making that fell short - a consequence of which was substandard thrust and speed management.

As you've said before, there was ample opportunity to circle, descend and then achieve a more stable short final - I believe that the old "press-on-itis" psychology had a hand in their not doing so.

From the "light" peanut gallery @ Doze and Chris....

Yep, Doze, "pride" gets in the way one or two times, but usually only once. Our aviation mistress is harsh in that regard.

The "press on" attitude may apply in combat, but otherwise it is not a smart thing regardless of how good your "hands" are. I know about the combat reference from one mission, but I digress.

Let's face it, the dude had a poor setup and tried to "save" it. In any other plane at that time, he would likely have stalled and crashed right in front of everybody there. The "magic" protections and limiters can only do so much, and flying at the "limits" when carrying SLF and such is not very "professional" to this old pilot.