Originally Posted by john_tullamarine
Sometimes we mod folks tear our hair out trying to tread that fine line between too much interference (stifling debate to the point of overt censorship) and seeing some folk get too excited (too far beyond the reasonable bounds of polite discussion).
The only alternative to getting the balance wrong on most occasions .. is going fishing, I guess. Consequence of being a fallible human. |
Originally Posted by bubbers44
(Post 8075056)
I, along with a lot of other pilots on this thread, believe overiding an autopilot or autothrottle not doing what you want it to do is improper and should never be done on an Airbus because of Airbus policy.
Said document is here: http://www.airbus.com/fileadmin/medi..._SOP_SEQ02.pdf and the relevant section is at the bottom of page 7. If you read it in context, all it says is that a pilot should not try to override AP or A/THR by manipulating the controls without first explicitly using the disconnect button. Note that it also says (emphasis mine): If doubt exists regarding the aircraft flight path or speed control, the flight crew should not try to reprogram the automated systems. The flight crew should use Selected Guidance or hand flying together with the use of navaids raw data, until time and conditions permit a reprogramming of the AP/FD or FMS. |
" You, sir, and this forum, deserve at least a handful of “atta-boys” for the kinds of information exchange you provide to all of us – and there’s probably no way to measure the value that has produced."
yessir, very well said, AR, +1 |
Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
I doff my cap to you for a thoughtful, well-reasoned and insightful post.
One thing I remember from the time was a BBC Horizon documentary that stated a significant number of that FO's colleagues on AA's A300 fleet had transferred to Boeing types because they believed whole-heartedly in the "weak tail" scenario. Such actions speak to camaraderie and loyalty and they are no doubt noble, even if the evidence points elsewhere. But if we are to be rational about things then we must follow the evidence, even if we don't like where it may lead. Heaven knows I've been accused enough times of "defending" or "protecting" Airbus when sticking to the evidence is all I've been doing. At the end of the day, even with the speculation over why the FO may have handled the rudder the way he appeared to, there is no arguing with the fact that the vertical stab did not fail until the forces on it exceeded the load limit by a factor of 2.2 times, exceeding the Ultimate load reserve by a factor of 1.47 times. |
Quote:
Hey John – this forum, and by extension, YOU, do(es), and have done, what most here would describe as a magnificent job of reviewing the posts and allowing the development of what develops. ...You, sir, and this forum, deserve at least a handful of “atta-boys” for the kinds of information exchange you provide to all of us – and there’s probably no way to measure the value that has produced. Hear, hear... Thanks for articulating those sentiments much better than I for one could have done, AirRabbit. Something as close to the truth as fallible humans can aspire to will out... eventually. |
Originally Posted by AirRabbit
(Post 8075086)
You, sir, and this forum, deserve at least a handful of “atta-boys” for the kinds of information exchange you provide to all of us...
And on a more personal note, I should thank the mods for being lenient to an enthusiast with scant qualifications, who as a result has learned more than he ever could hope to have done any other way. Not to mention making the acquaintance of several stellar pilots, engineers and people in the process. |
Guys .. enough, already ... lest I get an undeserved swelled head.
However, this forum is too important for the folks who use it to let it swing too far either way .. better we maintain a reasonably polite but vigorous and spirited debating platform for whatever topics arise. We all have the potential to learn from PPRuNe. I have a small insight into the IDs of some of the posters. If you or I were to seek their advice on a commercial consultancy basis (and many of them are highly regarded Industry Consultants), we would be paying a small fortune for what we are getting here as freebies. That never ceases to amaze me. |
Air - Their report will say the pilots shouldn't use too much rudder...but what isn't in the report is that Airbus has quietly inspected, fixed, and stiffened up all the tails. Or did Airbus stiffen every Airbus tail ever built? When did they do this? What was the 'fix'? |
Hear, hear for and to those who quite rightly have applauded JT. A gentleman much experienced aviation wise, and does the greatest of jobs riding herd on this community of cats. Helo guy myself, know nought of big iron, but through these august pages have had the privalege of correspondance with proffesionals who have worked and flown on aircraft mere mortals can only dream about. All spilling errors tablet induced.
|
The NTSB Accident Report on AA 587, paragraph 1.18.10 Airbus Technical Note, states:
On April 8, 2004, Airbus issued a technical note, titled “AAL 587 – Pedals Force Analysis,” that provided Airbus’ estimate of the rudder pedal forces during the seconds before the vertical stabilizer separated from the airplane. Airbus used FDR data for rudder pedal position, estimates of rudder position, estimates of yaw damper position, and ground test data to derive the pedal force estimate. The technical note indicated that, during the accident sequence, the forces applied by the first officer to the rudder pedals were much higher than the forces required to reach the rudder travel limit for 240 knots. Airbus found that the highest force applied by the pilot during the accident sequence was about 140 pounds but that the pedal force required to reach the rudder travel limit during that time was about 30 pounds. The note further indicated that the rudder control cable was stretched each time that the rudder travel limit was contacted. |
Originally Posted by Air Rabbit #135
… remain ignorant of the facts …
@Clandestino
Originally Posted by roulishollandais
What we learned first, Critical situation
• We don't have the same definition of "critical [situation]" :mad: |
Quote from dutchroll:
Despite reading PPRuNe and our august posters, I am still ignorant of the exact text of FAA's Va old and new definitions. You and me both! |
@Chris, Roulis
I think you will find what you are looking for in posts #21 and 23 of the "Va Maneuvring" thread. This involves subtle distinctions between "Maneuvring speed" and "Design Maneuvring speed". I suspect this was the origin of this thread, but Teldorserious hasn't confirmed that despite repeated requests. |
Va is defined in FAR 25.335, last changed with Amdt. 25-91 Eff. 7/29/97. The change was made to harmonize FAR and JAR.
|
Va is defined in FAR 25.335, last changed with Amdt. 25-91 Eff. 7/29/97. The change was made to harmonize FAR and JAR. |
Originally Posted by roulishollandais
Quote:
Originally Posted by Air Rabbit #135 … remain ignorant of the facts … Despite reading PPRuNe and our august posters, I am still ignorant of the exact text of FAA's Va old and new definitions Is it Defence secrecy? |
Originally Posted by Owain Glyndwr
(Post 8073032)
When AA587 lost its fin it also lost all hydraulics since it was supplied by all three systems. Consequently there was no aerodynamic control of any sort available...
I'm pretty sure that because the aircraft was already in a sideslip, the resultant loss of opposing force from the rudder/stabiliser would have caused what amounted to an unrecoverable flat spin within a fraction of a second, would it not? |
@AirRabbit
If you go back to the OP you will find it querying FAA changes to "Va" after the Airbus deal If you check out the posts I cited earlier you will find that the FAA made changes to the definition of the latter, not to Va used as a design speed. Consequently I think that referring RH and CS to the latest definition of manoeuvre design speed won't help them - hence my reference to an earlier PPRuNe discussion. @ Dozy Not so much time to drain the systems Dozy, just that if the pipes are open to the atmosphere the working pressure drops to zero, so the remaining control surfaces will flop all over the place under whatever aerodynamic hinge moments they might experience. I don't think we know anything about the subsequent gyrations and I would certainly not like to attempt any prediction - they were nowhere near stall when if happened so I don't see why it should develop an almost instantaneous flat spin - in fact a aircraft that size will not do anything much in a fraction of a second. |
Owain,
Thanks, I just couldn't find the thread you referred to. |
Originally Posted by Owain Glyndwr
(Post 8076361)
I don't think we know anything about the subsequent gyrations and I would certainly not like to attempt any prediction - they were nowhere near stall when if happened so I don't see why it should develop an almost instantaneous flat spin - in fact a aircraft that size will not do anything much in a fraction of a second.
|
All times are GMT. The time now is 20:41. |
Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.