Thanks … and I have gone back to the thread and the posts you referenced – and interestingly in my dim memory, I vaguely recall the discussions that took place in my circle of colleagues when all that occurred … and even with those discussions I don’t think that any of us had that proverbial “light bulb” experience – because even with deciphering each individual word – there were still some areas that, at least to most of us, seemed contradictory or at least argumentative.

However, after all that, even with whatever level of understanding any of us may have had (even full understanding) with respect to what the revised regulation would have required or allowed, there is still the issue of not only control reversals, but multiple reversals, most of which were to the control limits, that would throw out all of the attempts to understand any logic or generate any sympathy for any such lack of intelligent understanding of those re-written rules. I still come back to not understanding why that pilot chose such wholly different control applications for what was essentially the same encounter twice.

Re Regulations and, hence, in this case, what Va might have meant from time to time ...

FAA current and superseded regs can be tracked down from here.

Always one has to keep in mind that the regs should not be read in isolation but in conjunction with relevant ACs.

Tracking down superseded ACs can be a bit of a pain, unfortunately.

Va definitions
 

@john_tullamarine, Owain Glyndwr, AirRabbit, Hazelnuts39, OK465, others...
Thank you very much to all : a big step has been done . I have much to read now before continuing to try to compare two definitions of Va. Strange but useful thread starting with a not so easy question as it seems. THANKS AGAIN! :):):)

Edit : add Short extract :
Code of Federal Regulations

Sec. 25.335

Part 25 AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES Subpart C--Structure Flight Maneuver and Gust Conditions

Sec. 25.335

Design airspeeds.

The selected design airspeeds are equivalent airspeeds (EAS). Estimated values of and must be conservative. (a) Design cruising speed, V C . For V C ,the following apply: (1) The minimum value of V C must be sufficiently greater than V B to provide for inadvertent speed increases likely to occur as a result of severe atmospheric turbulence. [(2) Except as provided in Sec. 25.335(d)(2), V C may not be less than V B + 1.32 U REF (with U REF as specified in Sec. 25.341(a)(5)(i)). However V C need not exceed the maximum speed in level flight at maximum continuous power for the corresponding altitude.] (3) At altitudes where V D is limited by Mach number, V C may be limited to a selected Mach number. (b) Design dive speed, V D . V D must be selected so that V C / M C is not greater than 0.8 V D / M D ,or so that the minimum speed margin between V C / M C and V D / M D is the greater of the following values: (1) From an initial condition of stabilized flight at V C / M C ,the airplane is upset,flown for 20 seconds along a flight path 7.5° below the initial path, and then pulled up at a load factor of 1.5g (0.5g acceleration increment). The speed increase occurring in this maneuver may be calculated if reliable or conservative aerodynamic data is issued. Power as specified in Sec. 25.174(b)(1)(iv) is assumed until the pullup is initiated, at which time power reduction and the use of pilot controlled drag devices may be assumed. [(2) The minimum speed margin must be enough to provide for atmospheric variations (such as horizontal gusts, and penetration of jet streams and cold fronts) and for instrument errors and airframe production variations. These factors may be considered on a probability basis. The margin at altitude where M C is limited by compressibility effects must not be less than 0.07M unless a lower margin is determined using a rational analysis that includes the effects of any automatic systems. In any case, the margin may not be reduced to less than 0.05M.] (c) Design maneuvering speed, V A . For V A ,the following apply:

(1) V A may not be less than where--(i) n is the limit positive maneuvering load factor at V C ; and (ii) is the stalling speed with flaps retracted. (2) V A and V S must be evaluated at the design weight and altitude under consideration. (3) V A need not be more than V C or the speed at which the positive C Nmax curve intersects the positive maneuver load factor line, whichever is less. (d) Design speed for maximum gust intensity, V B . (1)

Vb ≥Vs1 [ 1 + Kg. Uref. Vc. a / 498 w ] ^ ½

where--V S1 = the 1-g stalling speed based on C NAmax with the flaps retracted at the particular weight under consideration; V C = design cruise speed (knots equivalent airspeed); U REF = the reference gust velocity (feet per second equivalent airspeed) from Sec. 25.341(a)(5)(i); w = average wing loading (pounds per square foot) at the particular weight under consideration.

Kg = .88 Mu / 5.3 + Mu
Mu = 2w / r.c.a.g

r = density of air (slugs/ft ); c = mean geometric chord of the wing (feet); g = acceleration due to gravity (ft/sec ); a = slope of the airplane normal force coefficient curve, C NA per radian; (2) At altitudes where V C is limited by Mach number--(i) V B may be chosen to provide an optimum margin between low and high speed buffet boundaries; and (ii) V B need not be greater than V C . (e) Design flap speeds, V F .. For V F ,the following apply: (1) The design flap speed for each flap position (established in accordance with Sec. 25.697(a)) must be sufficiently greater than the operating speed recommended for the corresponding stage of flight (including balked landings) to allow for probable variations in control of airspeed and for transition from one flap position to another. (2) If an automatic flap positioning or load limiting device is used, the speeds and corresponding flap positions programmed or allowed by the device may be used. (3) V F may not be less than--(i) 1.6 ,with the flaps in takeoff position at maximum takeoff weight; (ii) 1.8 ,with the flaps in approach position at maximum landing weight; and (iii) 1.8 with the flaps in landing position at maximum landing weight. (f) Design drag device speeds, V DD . The selected design speed for each drag device must be sufficiently greater than the speed recommended for the operation of the device to allow for probable variations in speed control. For drag devices intended for use in high speed descents, V DD may not be less than V D . When an automatic drag device positioning or load limiting means is used, the speeds and corresponding drag device positions programmed or allowed by the automatic means must be used for design.

Amdt. 25-91, Eff. 7/29/97

Well I am not buying it that airliners are so weak that some pilot or terrorist could intentionaly wiggle the tail loose. If that is the case, something is wrong with the hydros or the tail or the sensors or limiters that allow such actions.

Maybe the solution is to take the hydros out of it, make it all cranks and levers. If the pilot wants to put some rudder in, make him work for it, fight those aerodynamic forces, just like the rest of us in smaller planes that can't even imagine having enough legs to knock a tail off.

How about calling Boeing and Airbus and explaining YOUR theory to them? They disagree. Whip out your crayons and show them where they're wrong.

If anyone else is hearing a faint buzzing noise, like an angry wasp banging against a window - I'd recommend ignoring it.

Misd - No one except a few peeps on PPRUNE believe that wiggling the tail will crash a plane, any more then three pilots over the Atlantic can't fly straight and level.

misd-again

Didn't you mean finger paints?

With respect to superseded ACs.

Online Digital Special Collections Library

This site appears to have many and is apparently not affected by the US government shutdown. It was not easy to find, however.

Teldorserious,

Pedal forces of up to 140 lbs ... Just wiggling the tail, eh?

Thanks JT for the link to historical aviation requirements.

On December 31, the requirement that specifies the design tail loads in the yaw maneuver (currently FAR 25.351, formerly CAR Part 04 section 4b.215) will celebrate its 60th birthday!

.. and thank you to David Bass from us all for his gem.

Oh, the love.

And Boeing, and Airbus, and the NTSB, and the FAA.

But in the internet world? Yup, it's a fraud. Good catch by you.

Now which a/c models did Airbus 'fix' the tails on? How? When?

I'm just waiting for some one to realise that wiggling the stick to and fro above a certain speed makes the wings fall off. Wonder what his solution may be?

Just a thought...

Maybe what we should do is ask Teldor(no-one-really-believes-she-is)serious to take a Cessna 152 out for a trip around the traffic pattern and, on the downwind leg, do what was done on the 2nd vortex encounter on AA587. Is there anyone here who believes she will do it?

I don't think even that's necessary. One way to think about it is that following Delta191 at DFW, the NTSB commissioned a study that involved deliberately driving a 737 through microbursts in order to collect data - a risky prospect. After Roselawn, they flew an ATR-72 behind a tanker spraying chilled water over the wings to study the ice ridge build-up behind the de-icing boots - an incredibly risky prospect.

And yet they never even entertained the idea of going up in an A300 or B767 and repeating the rudder pedal movements they saw on the AA587 FDR. That should speak volumes to a dispassionate observer.

Actually, I heard that they actually did discuss doing just that, but when the proposal was made in front of an audience of all the Airbus and Boeing test pilots, all five of the pilots who volunteered (all the rest scrambled out of the auditorium quickly) agreed only to man the ground based photo record cameras.

NTSB Press Release
National Transportation Safety Board
Office of Public Affairs
________________________________________
NTSB SAYS PILOT'S EXCESSIVE RUDDER PEDAL INPUTS LED TO CRASH OF AMERICAN FLIGHT 587; AIRBUS RUDDER SYSTEM DESIGN & ELEMENTS OF AIRLINE'S PILOT TRAINING PROGRAM CONTRIBUTED

OCTOBER 26, 2004

Washington, D.C. - American Airlines flight 587 crashed into a Queens neighborhood because the plane's vertical stabilizer separated in flight as a result of aerodynamic loads that were created by the first officer's unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs after the aircraft encountered wake turbulence, according to a final report adopted by the National Transportation Safety Board today. The Board said that contributing to the crash were characteristics of the airplane's rudder system design and elements of the airline's pilot training program.

At about 9:16 a.m. on November 12, 2001, flight 587, an Airbus A300-605R (N14053), crashed in Belle Harbor, New York shortly after taking off from John F. Kennedy International Airport on a flight to Santo Domingo. All 260 people aboard the plane died, as did five persons on the ground. This is the second deadliest aviation accident in American history.

The aircraft's vertical stabilizer and rudder were found in Jamaica Bay, about a mile from the main wreckage site. The engines, which also separated from the aircraft seconds before ground impact, were found several blocks from the wreckage site. The Safety Board found that the first officer, who was the flying pilot, inappropriately manipulated the rudder back and forth several times after the airplane encountered the wake vortex of a preceding Boeing 747 for the second time. The aerodynamic loads placed on the vertical stabilizer due to the sideslip that resulted from the rudder movements were beyond the ultimate design strength of the vertical stabilizer. (Simply stated, sideslip is a measure of the "sideways" motion of the airplane through the air.)

The Board found that the composite material used in constructing the vertical stabilizer was not a factor in the accident because the tail failed well beyond its certificated and design limits.

The Safety Board said that, although other pilots provided generally positive comments about the first officer's abilities, two pilots noted incidents that showed that he had a tendency to overreact to wake turbulence encounters. His use of the rudder was not an appropriate response to the turbulence, which in itself provided no danger to the stability of the aircraft, the Board found.

The Board said that American Airlines' Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program contributed to the accident by providing an unrealistic and exaggerated view of the effects of wake turbulence on heavy transport-category aircraft. In addition, the Board found that because of its high sensitivity, the A300-600 rudder control system is susceptible to potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at higher speeds. In particular, the Board concluded that, before the crash of flight 587, pilots were not being adequately trained on what effect rudder pedal inputs have on the A300- 600 at high airspeeds, and how the airplane's rudder travel limiter system operates.

The Safety Board's airplane performance study showed that the high loads that eventually overstressed the vertical stabilizer were solely the result of the pilot's rudder pedal inputs and were not associated with the wake turbulence. In fact, had the first officer stopped making inputs at any time before the vertical stabilizer failed, the natural stability of the aircraft would have returned the sideslip angle to near 0 degrees, and the accident would not have happened. (The Board estimated that the sideslip angle at the time the vertical stabilizer separated was between 10 and 12.5 degrees.)

The NTSB issued eight recommendations in today's report. Among the seven sent to the Federal Aviation Administration were those calling for adopting certification standards for rudder pedal sensitivity, modifying the A300- 600 and A310 rudder control systems to increase protection from potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at high speeds (a similar recommendation was issued to the French equivalent of the FAA, the DGAC), and publishing guidance for airline pilot training programs to avoid the kind of negative training found in American Airlines' upset recovery training.

Because this crash occurred two months after the September 11 terrorist attacks, there was initial concern that it might have been the result of an intentional criminal act. The Board found no such evidence, nor did any law enforcement agencies provide evidence that the accident may have stemmed from criminal conduct. The Board said that witnesses who reported observing the airplane on fire were most likely observing misting fuel released from broken fuel lines, a fire from the initial release of fuel or the effects of engine compressor surges.

A summary of the Board's report may be found under "Publications" on the agency's website at NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board. The full report will appear on the website in about four weeks.

NTSB Office of Public Affairs: (202) 314-6100

the NTSB is full of humans...humans make mistakes...we have our opinions based on years of whatever we have been doing

my opinion is the airbus 300 series is a piece of shirt

remember that the FAA certified the A300

it also certified the training program used by American Airlines

it also certified the copilot


if they made a mistake somewhere, they could have made a mistake anywhere.

some engineering types are so concerned with elegance in engineering that they forget real life

Yeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeah! Clutching. At. Straws. Sevenstrokeroll. Flown the A300 much have you?

(I am sure glad for long layovers … it allows me to read and think)

So, Mr flarepilot, I understand you acknowledge that humans sometimes make mistakes, and since the NTSB consists of human investigators and researchers, it is your opinion that the NTSB made a series of human mistakes in their conclusions in this instance. Right? Is it possible that the NTSB members have opinions based on their years of doing what they do, or not? You seem to be quite critical of their “final report.” It is clear that the NTSB recognizes that the FAA certified the A300, and that the FAA certified the copilot, and that the FAA certified the AA training program … were those mistakes as well? Was it a mistake made by the NTSB that they made those recognitions … or did the NTSB make a mistake by not recognizing the FAA made those mistakes in certification? Is that a double negative? This is sure hard to figure out ... isn't it? Humans making decisions, when they know they're fallable - other humans not recognizing that fallability when it occurs and reulting in mistaking additional errors as having been good decisions, and then they, themselves, make mistakes in using those positions to answer questions they have about other actions which they observed. Of course, they may have misinterpreted what they thought that they had observed, when what really happened is known only to those who actually completed the actions based on what they knew (or only thought?) was the correct decision to make based on what they knew about the surrounding circumstances - presuming of course, what they saw was actually what they perceived has happened and are not misjudging what they think they saw. OK, I think I've got it now. :ugh:

So, what organization certified you? You are certificated, aren’t you? Was it the FAA? Did whomever it was who certified you, make the same kind of mistake? Who determines when something is true or a mistake … you? If not you, who is it? The FAA? The NTSB? Some news anchor on TV? Do we all operate in our own little world – carefully protecting ourselves from all the “other” humans who are out there making mistake after mistake – do we all have to look out for ourselves – at all times – in all things? Can we trust anyone? About anything? Forget the evidence … accept only opinions based on years of doing something … right? Of course, no one has ever known of anyone ever doing anything wrong for a long period of time … right? Sure, that’s it. :ugh:

Well, thanks … I’m sure that there are a lot of us here who are as firmly entrenched in opinions as opposed to facts as you are – and I guess we just have to acknowledge that everyone has his/her own opinion … just like they have various body parts. Enjoy! :rolleyes:

dear mr bunny boy...or aka air rabbit

yes the FAA certificated me...many times

evidence...how many times in modern history has additional evidence come to light years later?

call back in 20 years or so. and you fly the A300 all you want...I'll fly something else...made in the USA most likely.

and all the cute emoticons just add to your heft with all your book learnin'

but planes aren't supposed to fall apart and if they do, you have to warn the pilot ...but no warning...hmmmmm

and if there was a warning in some obscure engineering text...great, but someone forgot to tell the pilot.

I"ve flown with engineering types who had commercial or atp lic. get em talking and they would fly right into the side of a mountain or stall the plane...I've seen it.

Let's take the NTSB report, word for word, and cull for what is being said. Word for word. I just cut and pasted...

NTSB Press Release
National Transportation Safety Board
Office of Public Affairs
________________________________________
NTSB SAYS PILOT'S EXCESSIVE RUDDER PEDAL INPUTS LED TO CRASH OF AMERICAN FLIGHT 587; AIRBUS RUDDER SYSTEM DESIGN & ELEMENTS OF AIRLINE'S PILOT TRAINING PROGRAM CONTRIBUTED

OCTOBER 26, 2004

Washington, D.C. - American Airlines flight 587 crashed into a Queens neighborhood because the plane's vertical stabilizer separated in flight as a result of aerodynamic loads that were created by the first officer's unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs after the aircraft encountered wake turbulence, according to a final report adopted by the National Transportation Safety Board today. The Board said that contributing to the crash were characteristics of the airplane's rudder system design and elements of the airline's pilot training program.

At about 9:16 a.m. on November 12, 2001, flight 587, an Airbus A300-605R (N14053), crashed in Belle Harbor, New York shortly after taking off from John F. Kennedy International Airport on a flight to Santo Domingo. All 260 people aboard the plane died, as did five persons on the ground. This is the second deadliest aviation accident in American history.

The aircraft's vertical stabilizer and rudder were found in Jamaica Bay, about a mile from the main wreckage site. The engines, which also separated from the aircraft seconds before ground impact, were found several blocks from the wreckage site. The Safety Board found that the first officer, who was the flying pilot, inappropriately manipulated the rudder back and forth several times after the airplane encountered the wake vortex of a preceding Boeing 747 for the second time. due to The aerodynamic loads placed on the vertical stabilizer he sideslip that resulted from the rudder movements were beyond the ultimate design strength of the vertical stabilizer. (Simply stated, sideslip is a measure of the "sideways" motion of the airplane through the air.)

The Board found that the composite material used in constructing the vertical stabilizer was not a factor in the accident because the tail failed well beyond its certificated and design limits.

The Safety Board said that, although other pilots provided generally positive comments about the first officer's abilities, two pilots noted incidents that showed that he had a tendency to overreact to wake turbulence encounters. His use of the rudder was not an appropriate response to the turbulence, which in itself provided no danger to the stability of the aircraft, the Board found.

The Board said that American Airlines' Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program contributed to the accident by providing an unrealistic and exaggerated view of the effects of wake turbulence on heavy transport-category aircraft. In addition, the Board found that because of its high sensitivity, the A300-600 rudder control system is susceptible to potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at higher speeds. In particular, the Board concluded that, before the crash of flight 587, pilots were not being adequately trained on what effect rudder pedal inputs have on the A300- 600 at high airspeeds, and how the airplane's rudder travel limiter system operates.

The Safety Board's airplane performance study showed that the high loads that eventually overstressed the vertical stabilizer were solely the result of the pilot's rudder pedal inputs and were not associated with the wake turbulence. In fact, had the first officer stopped making inputs at any time before the vertical stabilizer failed, the natural stability of the aircraft would have returned the sideslip angle to near 0 degrees, and the accident would not have happened. (The Board estimated that the sideslip angle at the time the vertical stabilizer separated was between 10 and 12.5 degrees.)

The NTSB issued eight recommendations in today's report. Among the seven sent to the Federal Aviation Administration were those calling for adopting certification standards for rudder pedal sensitivity, modifying the A300- 600 and A310 rudder control systems to increase protection from potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at high speeds (a similar recommendation was issued to the French equivalent of the FAA, the DGAC), and publishing guidance for airline pilot training programs to avoid the kind of negative training found in American Airlines' upset recovery training.

Because this crash occurred two months after the September 11 terrorist attacks, there was initial concern that it might have been the result of an intentional criminal act. The Board found no such evidence, nor did any law enforcement agencies provide evidence that the accident may have stemmed from criminal conduct. The Board said that witnesses who reported observing the airplane on fire were most likely observing misting fuel released from broken fuel lines, a fire from the initial release of fuel or the effects of engine compressor surges.

A summary of the Board's report may be found under "Publications" on the agency's website at NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board. The full report will appear on the website in about four weeks.

I don't think that the A300 is a bad airplane... one DHL survived a SAM attack and was controllable enough to fly on engine power as a sole means of control...to me that says something about that plane...the flight controls aren't designed to take the stress of rapid large flight control oscillations. In the case of the VS the torque moment is tremendous well above certification...

As an aside Vp which is Va based upon stall is Vs*(nlimit)^0.5 but since stall speed increases with weight the actual maneuver speed is not a constant
An accelerated stall above Vp would impart a force that is above the limit load

"the NTSB is full of humans...humans make mistakes...we have our opinions based on years of whatever we have been doing"

Yes Flarepilot, humans do make mistakes so it's just possible that the FO made a mistake.

NTSB I presume consists of more than one person so a "human mistake" is more likely to be picked up by them than a human mistake would be picked up in the dynamic cockpit of an airliner.

"I"ve flown with engineering types who had commercial or atp lic. get em talking and they would fly right into the side of a mountain or stall the plane...I've seen it."

Flarepilot: Your comment above is interesting and I wonder if you could clarify the following:

1. When you were flying with "engineering types" how did you survive flying into a mountain?

2. If you observed a plane flying into a mountain, how did you know that the pilot flying was an"engineering type"?

3. If you are unable to answer 1 or 2 above, might it not be better to delete "I've seen it" and replace it with something along the lines of "That is what I suspect would happen"

As a simple soul am trying to understand your reasoning and sadly failing to do so. Therefore am hoping that your reply to the above three points will for me clarify your position.

I had an FO when flying the B727 that over controlled every landing with PIO's.

I flew with him years later in the B757 and he was the ace of the base. He was smooth and way ahead of the airplane. I still think the captain who complained about his rudder usage got too much input to the NTSB. Everyone goes through a learning process going to a new airplane. I know, I didn't fly the A300 because I didn't trust it like a Boeing. Had no problems because they are so straight forward to fly. The extra pay wasn't worth it for me.

forgive me nick thomas I was speaking in pilot slang...I realize that we are separated by a common language but I am assuming (possibly incorrectly) that my fellow pilots are the ones reading this forum.

I watched engineers who were so interested in talking about the engineering of the plane (while they were pilot handling) that they lost track of their airspeed and approached the stall (aerodynamic stall that is) and I had to remind them TO KEEP THEIR SPEED UP; (up , meaning in a safe range)>

And while they were under the hood (simulating instrument flight) they were speaking of engineering so much that they LOST SITUATIONAL AWARENESS and turned the wrong way on the BACK COURSE OF A LOCALIZER and were proceeding in the direction of a LARGE FRICKING MOUNTAIN RANGE...I again spoke up correcting their error.

I do hope this clarifies...we don't speak as if we are talking to the Queen...we speak like we are talking to fellow PILOTS.

NO, they weren't allowed to hit the mountain or stall the plane...I stopped them. Again, speaking in a manner that a pilot who has flown for many years might speak to a fellow pilot of similar background.


May I translate anything else for you?

And yes, maybe the first officer did crash the plane...but it is my opinion the plane failed the crew, the crew didn't fail the plane.

It is odd how so many people live in denial of reality.

One poster refuses to believe that a vertical stabilizer can be broken off an airplane despite engineering evidence that this is exactly what can happen and why we now have warning not to make certain inputs on certain aircraft.

Others refuse to believe that a pilot made repetitive inputs on his rudder pedals despite direct evidence of it having been done as recorded on an FDR. Excuses such as yaw damper are thrown about despite that being impossible.

All of which reminds me of the Egyptair investigation and more recently the Ethiopian crash in Beirut. Fortunately for us in the west, we have a much smaller percentage of believers in theories that fly in the face of the obvious.

There may be other factors to consider such as how light a force is required on the pedals to get full deflection but that doesn't change the other evidence.

FlarePilot

pilot how did the plane fail them when the were doing a maneuver outside of certification? I think their training in wake encounter recovery failed them i feel bad for the flight crew and I don't really blame them as the copilot was simply doing what he was taught ...

Flarepilot

Thank you for your prompt reply.

I understand why you assume you are speaking to pilots.

I am of course not a commercial pilot yet I have a keen interest in aviation as I have in many other fields.

As an Architect I am interested in the design and construction of aeroplanes. In keeping up with aviation design I have learnt many things that are useful in my practise of Architecture.

I have found that keeping an open mind and not judging things on face value has also been helpful in my Architectural development.

animus...if the pilot knew the plane would fall apart if he did, "X" then he would not have done, "X".

But the authority that certified the plane, pilots, airline and training didn't bother to make sure the pilot knew that "X" would cause the plane to fail.

so I don't blame the pilot...at worst I blame the system equally along the way...

NICK THOMAS...an architect...that's great. You might really enjoy reading, "Sliderule" by Nevil Shute (norway).

As a matter of fact, you might gain keen insight into my views about airplane structure by reading, or viewing the movie version of, "NO HIGHWAY" (sometimes known as "NO HIGHWAY IN THE SKY). Hope you do both.

You might even recognize the keen defense of the pilot in this book and how it does turn out to be the FREAKING AIRPLANE and not the pilot.

Do read them both and get back to me.

Flarepilot I believe that general ignorance of operating strength limitations is very widespread...this is something that should be covered in primary training...obviously the FO didn't understand that because he was not taught. In fact my belief is that there was a systemic failure...more emphasis needs to be placed on operating strength limitations in general, there are lots of pilots who don't understand the limitations simply because they were never taught...the fact that the FAA approved such a syllabus is appalling and therefore I agree that the FAA should shoulder some of the blame. When Bob Hoover reverses his side slips back and forth he's going very slow he doesn't break the plane because he understands the limits

It is well understood by the engineering pilots around that there is a great problem with pilot education when it comes to what the certification animal does as contrasted with the line flight standards animal.

Fact of life and it is going to be a long while, if ever, before the typical pilot's knowledge base is lifted to the point where he/she has a basic idea of certification stuff.

.. which is why this Forum is so important. We have a bunch of very well credentialled

(a) line, training, check pilots

(b) TPs and FTEs

(c) certification, design, test engineers, aerodynamicists etc

(d) many anciliary specialists in airports and a host of other disciplines

The problem is that, sometimes, it can be difficult to sort the wheat from the chaff when posters are anonymous but that's a small problem overall as the more experienced folks offer comments (not always as subtle as might be desirable) which provide clues ...

In my "line" experience, there is a common belief that the standards have fairly wide margins and using some of that margin is OK. Without certification or performance engineering experience, many don't comprehend how limited those margins are and how easily one can go from inside the envelope to way outside of it.

If our A300 going out of control with yaw damper movements at 140 knots into MIA had happened at 250 knots would the VS had departed? Probably. I still stand with the FO that he didn't cause it no matter what NTSB came up with.

pugilist animus


if you believe what you wrote, what is the problem of putting a placcard in front of the pilot saying: don't wiggle the rudder back and forth too much or the plane will fall apart...or any language you like to express this?


I have placcards right now telling me gear speeds, flap speeds and not to do a CAT II Ils if the equipment isn't working.

of course a placard that says the plane will fall apart will likely be bad for public relations

One would have to placard all airplanes...it's better that the placard be in the pilots mind just as stall recovery should be.

pugilist

then how about control limiters to make sure pilots don't over control?

and a placard is pretty cheap insurance until all pilots have been trained.

Flare even with rudder ratio limiting the certification standards do not cover large control reversals... placarding would simply be a bandaide on a gunshot wound...why not placard stall recovery also? Only education can militate against a repeat of AA 587