gps spoofing - researchers feed false gps signals into a ships navigation system
only marginally relevant for aviation since aircraft usually don't rely solely on gps, nevertheless an interesting academic "proof of concept". the same could be done to an aircraft gps receiver, or any insecure communication (ADSB and TCAS comes to my mind)
UT Austin Researchers Spoof Superyacht at Sea - Cockrell School of Engineering The team’s counterfeit signals slowly overpowered the authentic GPS signals until they ultimately obtained control of the ship’s navigation system. Unlike GPS signal blocking or jamming, spoofing triggers no alarms on the ship’s navigation equipment. To the ship’s GPS devices, the team’s false signals were indistinguishable from authentic signals, allowing the spoofing attack to happen covertly. Once control of the ship’s navigation system was gained, the team’s strategy was to coerce the ship onto a new course using subtle maneuvers that positioned the yacht a few degrees off its original course. Once a location discrepancy was reported by the ship’s navigation system, the crew initiated a course correction. In reality, each course correction was setting the ship slightly off its course line. Inside the yacht’s command room, an electronic chart showed its progress along a fixed line, but in its wake there was a pronounced curve showing that the ship had turned. “The ship actually turned and we could all feel it, but the chart display and the crew saw only a straight line,” Humphreys said. |
I discussed this problem with some Army chums about 20 years ago, and the problem of GPS cripples slowly losing the art of land navigation. I also had this discussion for some years in re aviation navigation tasks and training for same.
GPS cripples will remain with us. If this spoofing deal spreads, then maybe people will need to relearn how to read a map. When it comes to automobile drivers and using GPS versus map ... heh, it's almost funny. |
only marginally relevant for aviation since aircraft usually don't rely solely on gps If this spoofing deal spreads, then maybe people will need to relearn how to read a map. |
.. just when I've finally got on top of my TomTom in the car ...
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In the early days of gps there were quite a few ugly blunders because of map datum (coordinate system) mismatch, as well as outdated, or just inaccurate maps. The seeming pinpoint accuracy of gps seduced people to blindly believe "it tells me exactly where I am on this map". Cf false glide slopes. All of this is well known, and has been ironed out with good processes and checks. I don't think false GPS data will ever be a real problem, even less with the advent of Glonass and Galileo, but theoretically it's possible. @lonewolf, I love technology, but the "gps cripples", as you put it, who can't be bothered to look out of the window, are still a scary thought.
only marginally relevant for aviation since aircraft usually don't rely solely on gps |
"only marginally relevant for aviation since aircraft usually don't rely solely on gps" The team leader of the GPS spoofing experiment said: ""Celestial navigation through a sextant would be their only option as far as I know.." It seems likely a 213-foot superyacht would have other navigation systems such as marine inertial nav, and possibly even a radio direction finder. I'd be interested in whether the marine GPS they spoofed had WAAS enabled. For aviation, a key reason for WAAS is integrity monitoring (say during an instrument approach). Did they manage to spoof this also, or just turned it off to make it easier? Or do high-end marine GPS nav systems (even on superyachts) not have integrity monitoring like aviation systems? In both aviation and ocean-going marine navigation, backup and redundancy are important issues. I find it hard to believe a 213-foot superyacht, festooned with radomes, would use GPS as the sole navigation source with no other backup available. |
Google meaconing. Used extensively during the Cold War and allegedly recently as well.
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marine inertial nav, and possibly even a radio direction finder |
DepTraj
only marginally relevant for aviation since aircraft usually don't rely solely on gps, nevertheless an interesting academic "proof of concept". the same could be done to an aircraft gps receiver, or any insecure communication (ADSB and TCAS comes to my mind) Already trials of ground based augmentation systems at Newark have been abandoned due to truck mounted GPS jammers (not spoofers). This will be a bigger problem than people are willing to currently accept. |
but in its wake there was a pronounced curve showing that the ship had turned "Bl**dy hell, gyro's gone!" says he, dashing off to bridge. It was only then that Bas noticed banana shaped wake :) |
"actual, real life usage of radio direction finders on ships is as common as bubble sextants on aircraft these days. as for inertial nav, yes, gyros etc still exist and are in use (unlike the RDF in the closet)" Since this was a superyacht, I assume the RDF (if existent) would simply be one of many raw data sources inc'l WAAS/GLONASS-augmented GPS and INS which would be sensor-fused on a bridge display like this: http://www.raytheon-anschuetz.com/ty...64450ac8f0.jpg Even this turnkey Garmin 8500 has both WAAS-augmented GPS and GLONASS sensor input: https://buy.garmin.com/en-US/US/on-t...rod110007.html I assume to spoof that would require spoofing GPS, WAAS, and GLONASS simultaneously. |
OK465
You may think it is "baloney" perhaps you need to be better informed. Government briefing on GPS jamming at Newark GPS.gov: Presentation from WSTS '12 |
Newark was a peculiar incident due to the close proximity of the freeways and the truckers using jammers.
It was not the GPS signals that were jammed, it was the GBAS signal. The GBAS GPS antennae were all located in a line, and this is fraught with error, they should have been triangulated, and as far apart as possible. A correct installation would have solved this problem. |
And the FCC has just issued a $31,875 fine to the person who was using a GPS jammer in his work truck (that was parked by KEWR) to interfere with the GPS device that his employer had installed in the truck to track its whereabouts.
See http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Rele...C-13-106A1.pdf |
Ian W notes that, "The reliance on GPS comes with the ADS-B and ADS-C position reports which are almost totally reliant on GPS". In fact ADS-C reports are derived from the FMS which uses INS data updated by GPS. This should flag up any significant variation between the INS and GPS positions and not send an erroneous report based on faulty GPS data. AFAIK!
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Always fun to come here and read this stuff.
Anyone in here that actually flies planes, that actually has read FAA mandated literature required for operating GPS units will know that the Military, which runs the GPS sats, purposely degrades the signal for security reasons. Ergo, if you have an IQ above 90, 80 being retarded, with some modicum of independent thinking skills, not completely a robot, or purposelly culled to just punch buttons and take orders, would deduce that if the military can degrade the accuracy on purpose, someone else could as well. The concept that 'no one relies soley on GPS' signals is another PRUNE chestnut, where as overwater flights, GPS stand alone approaches where non GPS nav signals are not possible, ect, are just that, solely relying on GPS signals. And yes, if you actually had an instrument rating, you would know this. So yes, someone spoofing GPS signals is a problem, though probably not as much of a problem as continuing to putting idiots in the cockpit. Carry on. |
Anyone in here that actually flies planes, that actually has read FAA mandated literature required for operating GPS units will know that the Military, which runs the GPS sats, purposely degrades the signal for security reasons. |
Anyone in here that actually flies planes |
I discussed this problem with some Army chums about 20 years ago, and the problem of GPS cripples slowly losing the art of land navigation. I also had this discussion for some years in re aviation navigation tasks and training for same. |
FrequentSLF
Ian W notes that, "The reliance on GPS comes with the ADS-B and ADS-C position reports which are almost totally reliant on GPS". In fact ADS-C reports are derived from the FMS which uses INS data updated by GPS. This should flag up any significant variation between the INS and GPS positions and not send an erroneous report based on faulty GPS data. AFAIK! |
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