I'm scatching my head over that one as well...

-90+270=180 - yes we got that ;-)
 

Thanks to people who pointed out that a 90/270 is a course reversal - that is bleeding obvious to all of us!!! :ugh:

What I had missed, reading N1EPR's tale, was that he overflew the runway first. He mentions descending above the airfield perimeter but that is what you do on a normal approach too. Nor did he give runway headings. It's hard to read such a big block of text, especially when it's fully justified!

Anyway, it was a good read, albeit wildly off topic ;)

If that's the case, then why is it that "the gear" is designed in such a way that it can "break" in any myriad number of ways and leave the aircraft in a flyable state? Or that recurrent training includes scenarios where said systems fail?

Like Clandestino, I have no idea where you got that from - but there's no evidence whatsoever to support that scenario, and a whole load of evidence that refutes it.

Not to mention that even if the shielding were to be defeated - lightning strikes don't "flash" ROMs, all the ADIRUs plus ISIS back-up use data from gyros mounted in the unit and the FDR confirms that at least one attitude reference was working just fine throughout.

Would that be "Douglas strong" like the THY DC-10 where a floor collapse severed all the cables and hydraulic lines? And would this be the same Douglas that swore up-and-down to Capt. Bryce McCormick that it was impossible to lose all hydraulics on the DC-10?

Don't get me wrong, Douglas did make their airframes fairly tough, but they lagged behind badly in the redundancy and survivability stakes going into the jet age. Also, any airliner using direct cable connections can't be much bigger than a DC-6. That means no more widebodies and a rapidly contracting airline industry.

Electronic control connections are much less bulky, easier to route through the more solid sections of the airframe and present a much smaller area prone to damage by debris. An electronic system is also far easier to provide re-routing redundancy if and when such damage occurs.

Different yes, but not more difficult if the current safety record is taken into account. Anyway, pilots have been debating the relative merits and preferences regarding instruments - and altimeters in particular - going back to the E. K. Gann days (specifically the three-needle vs. two-needle plus drum types).

Again, don't get me wrong - Clandestino is absolutely right when he says that unscrupulous management and executives are in some cases cutting stick-and-rudder experience and training too close to the bone. But let's not throw the baby out with the bathwater here - the fact is that these advances have made civil aviation a hell of a lot safer and allowed the industry to grow to a level that was unimaginable even in the '60s. This fact is as simple as it is irrefutable.

As a techie, I'm as prone as anyone to getting the rose-tinted specs out when it comes to remembering the days of bit-flipping on 8- and 16-bit processors versus the highly regimented, abstracted and process-driven methods we use today. I seriously miss the simplicity and the feeling of direct communion with the machine. But if I take those specs off for even a few seconds I realise that I'd be nuts to even attempt what is done these days using those old methods.

from full automation to stalling in direct law on an airbus impossible:suspect:

@PA - The FCOM manuals for Airbus FBW types clearly state that outside of Normal Law, Alpha protections are lost and the aircraft can be stalled. And they always have.

hence the importance of hand flying...all it took was one iced pitot tube...unreliable airspeed is no reason to crash any airplane

Not quite - it took all three.

Specifically at high altitude in that case.

Agreed - but there was a lot more to that accident than overreliance on automation!

regardless of my error....hand flying is imporyant so one can quickly adapt to rapidly chsnging conditions

the most important training is your primary training not your atpl...

And I'm in total agreement with you. But given that, the PF in that case was a highly experienced glider/sailplane pilot and as such probably had more basic stick-and-rudder experience than most of his peers. The training and experience he lacked was specifically on manual handling at high altitude.

As I said, it's a lot more complex than just trotting out the "Children Of The Magenta" meme again...

we are talking IFR

dozy

douglas strong...unlike airbus strong where the vertical tail falls off

douglas strong , you know like all the DC8's that are still flying...and DC3s, and the DC4s which are fire bombers.

how many 707s and comets are still in use (not military)? not many

I stand by what I said...and cables that work hydraulics work just fine in really big planes.

comet...metal fatigue

737 pop top?

yeah...I'll take douglas...esp single digit dougs

@PA - IFR/VFR isn't the issue - the difference is how a swept-wing jet handles at cruise as opposed to at low altitude.

If you want to take a DC-10 up and subject the vertical stab to 1.8x ultimate design load to prove that point, then be my guest - just please understand why I won't be standing anywhere in the vicinity.

Not pressurised in the case of the latter two. And the venerable VC-10 has been flying in RAF service for about as long as the DC-8.

Well - to be fair most remaining 707 airframes have been requisitioned by the military for spares and the Nimrods were set to fly another 30 years before our current government decided to scrap them in favour of buying second-hand Rivet Joints.

Fine, but I respectfully disagree.

Only the first model - and the VC-10 and BAC 1-11 that followed had fuselages machined from aluminium billets - there have been none tougher either before or since.

Specific to the way Aloha used them - if they'd used DC-9s the same would have happened.

Fine, but given the choice, I wouldn't.

Anyway, as fun as this willy-waving is, it's somewhat beside the point. The undeniable truth is that even with the myriad problems facing the industry, it is statistically far safer than it was when DC airliners ruled the sky. I agree with you that there needs to be more attention paid to handflying skills by the industry, but to blame technological advances for this state of affairs is putting the cart before the horse.

IMC vs VMC is a huge difference!

I flew that Aloha 737 over 100 hrs I am sure before Aloha got it from us. Mostly over FL330. We had an incident where the crew got low landing at ONT and hit high voltage power lines and diverted to LAX. The power lines caught their landing gear causing faults that caused an overun. Reinforcement to the belly of that ac might have kept the aircraft intact with the upper skin torn off.
I always trusted Boeing aircraft so stayed with them for 25years with no major problems and about 16,000 hrs in Boeing aircraft. I flew the MD80 for a bit also.

dozy...now I know you are wrong...the DC9 had something the 737 didn't have...take a look at the upper fuselage and the finger like metal...then look it up.

heh.

I know - but *in that case* the more problematic lack of experience was high-altitude manual handling, where the aircraft's response in the 3 axes will be far more sensitive due to the lower-density air. That crew's only manual handling experience was takeoff to a couple of thousand feet and approach/landing.

Possibly, but if the corrosion had occurred either before or at the apex of the finger lap, then you might have had a scenario which was the same or worse, due to pressure buildup along the finger laps that were holding.

mainly it's about reduced aerodynamic damping...mean one must be gentle with the flight controls...in IMC...at night in turbulence....there are six axes

Sure. Or, (as in the case of AF447) leave the controls alone* and monitor aircraft behaviour until such time as a correction needs to be made.

* - but cover them and be prepared to use them

I have never flown an Airbus...but I don't think that that is the procedure for unreliable ASI.

with no AP the plane will enter a spiral dive without manual intervention