I can't answer your question because I don't know. What I do know is that asking for the raw data (which no agency has ever done with a DFDR that records that much information) isn't going to help, because the interpretation of that data is going to be an open goal for accusations of bias from both sides' legal representation, and the scope for misinterpretation of that data is going to be huge.

It smacks to me of playing to the gallery, with the intent of insinuating the notion that the report is incomplete and motives suspicious among those who haven't followed things closely up until now.

What makes little sense to me about this push is that the report as it stands states that while the aircraft was mishandled by the crew, this can be attributed -at least in part - to insufficient training on the part of the airline. The airline seemingly did not disseminate Airbus's UAS bulletins effectively, nor did it follow up on whether the message was received by its crews - it also elected to spread the maintenance schedule where the pitot tubes were to be replaced over time. Airbus allowed that, and the report highlights aspects of the aircraft's design which could be considered unhelpful in a situation of this nature.

Now I'm no legal expert, but it seems to me that these aspects of the report give grounds for the families to pursue legal damages and recompense against Air France, Airbus and the authorities already - so why would they need more than that?

You think????!!!!! One thing that has kept airline safety so high is that the pilots in the front don't want to die either.

Passengers wanting increasingly unrealistically cheap flights is one cause of the lowering of pilot standards and training, which is arguably one cause of this crash.

Flying in a plane is often cheaper than the equivalent train journey. How can that be economically possible? Think about it for one second. Think about where savings need to be made to make flying a jetliner, operating in three dimensions cheaper than a train, operating in one dimension???



(Before the trolls get out of their pits - I do realise that no trains go from South America to Europe !)

While I agree with you in general, I think this statement is at best debatable. The rise of the "lo-co"s, and the attempt to compete with them on price, didn't really take effect until well after the trend was noticeable. As PJ2 refers to, a far more plausible correlation can be drawn with the transition within airline management away from those who were "airline" people through and through towards a more generalised "MBA" style of management, which did not take into account the unique aspects of the sector.

Well, quite. Arguably one of the reasons France's Air Inter ran into difficulties was having to compete with the TGV.

http://i.imgur.com/3v6qZJw.jpg

When they want .. they can :ok:

@jcj:

I said "with that amount of information". That FDR stored nothing like the amount of data that the DFDR on AF447 did.

As I said, the report as it stands questions the standards of Air France, Airbus and the regulator - isn't that enough for the families and their legal representatives to make a case?

Just having a new procedure in the books does not mean that the pilots know (and understand!) it.

General comment, ie not directed at this mishap specifically.

For us to accept such a statement is to accept that the standard of professionalism amongst working pilots has plummeted to an utterly abysmal level.

A bog standard pilot would be expected to know his relevant Type books. If there exists confusion, that would be referred to the operator's specialists and, if necessary to get some action, the relevant pilot union or regulatory agency. Sometimes one has to stand up and be counted, especially in respect of aircraft commanders.

Then again, the environment may have changed since I was in the sharp end ..

On the contrary, full data is the best way to cut the bs - Find something else.

The one who lost a loved one is looking for the full story, the real one, not a 'recompense' ... Once again, you're way out dozy.

Don't be afraid of amount of data .. they are still enough paper and ink on earth to print it .....

And we need a monks lifetime to decode the 300+ mandatory parameters into a readable format for the ones who cannot read the - RAW - 12 bit Harvard BiPhase Code.

A33Zab,

Good point. Just to add - from Interim Report #2, para. 1.11:

Yes, I think it probably has John; Beyond all recognition.

It does not cover it in a way I fully understand...
So what is this saying? They did not train it, because they were trained on the A320 where this is not part of the exercise, and then did not train it when changing to the A330 because it is the same for both models?
If all 3 have been trained on the A330, why is there the A320 and the type rating remark?
And all 3 did train UAS procedure once in normal law and at low altitude only?
Could have all been worded a little clearer...

What's in the report *is* the real story. Unless you know different - please enlighten us with what you think happened. Seriously - you've believed in non-existent conspiracies on the part of the French establishment to protect Airbus for so long that you've lost the plot when it comes to separating reality from fantasy.

Call these guys, pretty sure they can do something about it.
Flight data visualization & animation software: CEFA FAS

The last 10 minutes should do just fine.

Full story is in Full data - Why you guys are afraid to see those full data produced to ALL concerned parties is a mystery ... ?
You dozy consider other manufacturers have protected their product but never on earth Airbus would do so.
What is so special about Airbus ?
In which fantasy do YOU live in ?

Look at the site - the product is for FOQA and pilot training use, even the makers, CEFA themselves don't consider it up to use as a fully-blown forensic tool

It's not a case of being afraid, it's a case of what's there already being enough to go on. As I said on the Yemenia thread a short while ago, someone with sufficient time and inclination could transcribe the low-res plots of the AF447 report back into a table and run that through FAS, but it won't tell anyone anything they don't already know.

I said manufacturers did that *in the past* - it invariably made them look foolish when proved wrong, and in the case of McDonnell-Douglas effectively ruined their reputation.

In any matter, with the A330 there's nothing to protect - it's already a success.

Well .. if this is a success .. all must be made for keep it as a succes ...
That's the goal of all manufacturers .. even toys manufacturers !

@jcj:

That's just it - there's no way to reverse that success at this point. According to Wikipedia they've built 984 of the things, with an order backlog of a further 262. It's a proven and reliable platform, and with the design revisions that came out of this accident investigation it'll be even safer.

By the time those 262 airframes are delivered into service, it's likely that Airbus will begin to wind the programme down in favour of the A350 (about which they've made a big deal regarding a more hands-on control philosophy).

While I remain convinced that the controversy regarding the A320 in the late '80s was at the very least more scuttlebutt than fact, the idea that Airbus might try to protect their investment - being unproven technology (on the line) - at least seemed plausible in a logical sense. Nowadays, with the technology proven, the FBW types having recouped their R&D costs several times over and with Airbus being one of the two largest players in the civil airliner market, the idea makes no sense whatsoever.

Full data
 

Would there be some proprietary reason for hiding raw data. This might prevent competitors reverse engineering systems?
Personally i can't think of what harm sharing the raw data would cause.
Hearing the full CVR from beginning not just 20mins or whatever would help in understanding the tone and context of the flight deck e.g. briefings, interaction, relationship. Presumably BEA has heard and judged it to not be relevant.
No one can be sure what all of the instruments show and which item is being pointed at by crew. Therefore the report suggests video equipment recording.
Improvement needed in all areas: pilot skill, regulator, training, airline, manufacturer, CRM, culture. The system failed tragically that night.
Still no clear answer to basic faults why PF pull up repeatedly and why PM sees this and repeatedly requests fix but does not aggressively assert control. Very sad and frustrating incident.

No - the DFDR is simply recording parameters and cannot reveal anything of that nature. In any case nothing's being "hidden" - it's just that publishing/handling the sheer amount of data is impractical.

THREAD FRAYING.
 

There's so much on this accident on the forum, apologies for asking what may have been explained already.

1) Have the FTLs under which the crew were working been eliminated as a possible contributary cause of this HF accident? Were they really well rested etc before reporting for duty?

2) Dozy mentions the dissemination of info to crews or its possible failure. After a quarter of a century in airline flying, I've watched with alarm the onset of totally electronic means of promulgating knowledge to our profession.

There was nothing to beat actually having to insert a page in a manual for drawing ones attention to the latest hot news/SOP/Safety Warning. Now I fear the really important stuff is getting lost in the maelstrom of bumph which regularly hits the screen, so much of it because ANYONE with connection to Flight Ops can push out chaff at the touch of a button.

In the days when it had to be composed, proof-read and sent to the printing company FOR A COST, it seems there was less trash to wade through than in our supposedly paperless environment.

Answers on a postcard please.......................................? :ugh: