@PJ2
What were you used to do with sended ACARS ? Were they all printed in the cockpit ?
Whith the warnings could we listen the printer at 2h10m ?
@ Some AF pilot
What was AF requirement about printing ACARS in the cockpit ?

Quote:

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Originally Posted by PJ2 #1363 thread 9 AF447 16.aug 2012

rh;

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Messages ACARS envoyés à Paris à 2h11m49s (BEA #1)

1.16.2.4 Analyse des messages reçus le 1

@Turbine_D
F-16 SS (from a NASA doc)

Appears correct to me. Agreed.

If you're a troll, you and I aren't the only ones. I personally need the airplane to be safe and controllable. It isn't my aim to find the airframe guilty, and I hope and assume you are motivated in like manner. I do want to completely understand how the PF became "startled" and lost awareness, and I'll admit that his actions ended in disaster. PE answers some, if not most, questions, but IMHO, it doesn't answer all the questions. In that light, I appreciate your continual "nit picking".

I hope I'm not waxing scholarly on anything. (Clandestino will be quick to point out the correctness of this statement). I do consider you to have actually waxed scholarly on many things. Thank You for doing so. I've learned a lot from you and many others on this forum.

Continuous trim motion is not a design given. Being continuously in trim is.

A warning that trim has exceeded a certain value could be of some value, but an indication of continuous (run away, even if by incorrect stick inputs) would be worth more.

I just want to make sure we're not misunderstanding each other here. By "continuous", I don't mean continually moving in one direction, I mean "changing regularly". The way the system works in pitch (as I'm sure you know) in Normal and Alternate is that the pilot (human or auto) commands a flightpath, the elevators move to the required setting to achieve that flightpath, and the autotrim then relieves the elevators. This kind of banal repetitive action is what computers are naturally good at, and because of this the system is constantly correcting itself. Somewhat different from traditional use of trim, but certainly effective.

A warning noise that sounds during "trim in motion" is therefore a bad fit for this design.

A warning predicated on limits would be simpler (less complexity = less chance of error) to implement.

DozyWannabe re Trim Wheel

AF447-Thread No.6, Post#120 by RetiredF4 deals with the same subject, and asks a question at the end, to which there appears to be no documented answer.

@mm43

(My bold)

jcjeant,
Re: F-16 sidestick:
Thanks for the information! :ok:

Lyman;

Thanks for your comments. With equal respect, may I re-iterate what has been a consistent and largely unchallenged theme since the first few days after the recordings were made public last year and stated by the BEA: - that standard cockpit discipline broke down, SOPs were not executed and CRM was essentially non-existent. Taking control of the aircraft and announcing that, is in itself not a sign of continuing required actions but it is a good start. What immediately ensured however was anything but standard or expected.

At the risk of repeating these things for others, the industry's long-term experience and fundamental principles place these qualities at the very top of airline transport operations as conducted by airlines and their pilots. There is no equivocating on this point - recognizing human factors very early on, these principles are in very large measure what has made this industry so safe over the past three decades.

"By the book" is precisely how airliners are flown, regardless of flight regime, emergency or abnormal. The captain is always free to deviate from such principles and standard procedures but there must be very clear reasons for doing so and only after such deviation is communicated to the other pilot(s) so that everyone knows and can assist.

The only exceptions to this process are extreme emergencies and over the years such circumstances have been well thought out and written into the Emergency and Abnormal SOPs, Memory items and QRH checklists. The rejected takeoff, the GPWS response, the stall warning are a few examples. Most other emergencies must be done "with dispatch" but not haste. The rapid depressurization and emergency descent is one such emergency.

Within very narrow boundaries, the processes are the same throughout the industry: First, ensure the stability and control of the aircraft, ensure the flight path is safe and communicate with other crew members your commands and intentions. Then call for the drills, ECAM actions, EICAS drill or abnormal checklist as the case may be. Fly the airplane while the PM does the work; confirm all non-reversible drill or checklist items before actioning.

So serious is this last item considered to be that in many companies, merely lifting a switch-guard on a switch which controls an irreversible change to aircraft systems, (eg generator disconnect, hydraulic pump shut-down), before confirming that switch with the other pilot, usually ends in the ride being assessed as a failure.

While perfection in SOPs and CRM ops cannot be expected especially under time compression or duress, these procedures are in place to ensure that the threat to the aircraft is minimized, that situational awareness is heightened, that crew coordination is enhanced and problem-solving behaviours thereby, and that actions are taken in a measured and therefore hopefully accurate manner.

None of this behaviour is demonstrated in the recordings. This isn't criticizing the crew...it is what it is and you can't put a blush on it. The PF launched on his own without announcing what the problem was, what he was doing and why, nor calling for any drills or ECAM actions. The PM tried to intervene and read the ECAM but made a mess of it while the PF continued his own course of action. When the PM used the take-over button and began flying the airplane the PF took control right back, neither announcing their actions but just doing it.

There are all manner of reasons, some which demand serious enquiry and response concerning why this kind of scenario unfolded as it did vice the expected procedures that airline transport pilots are trained to execute but that does not alter what actually went on in the first 40 seconds or so. The key in this accident is not determining what the THS did or did not do. Finding out why the crew acted as it did is the key to preventing future LOC and CFIT accidents. As I have offered, this is a performance accident.

Example of Emergency or Abnormal event crew response SOPs:

General Guidance - Standard Emergency and Abnormal Procedures

1. Initial Pilot Actions
A crew member detecting an existing or impending emergency or abnormal condition will immediately inform the other crew members.

Aural warnings will be silenced, and the master warning and/or master caution lights re-armed as soon as the cause has been determined.

Crew members should check circuit breakers and test lights when appropriate. Checking circuit breakers and testing lights is normal crew action and is not listed in the procedure unless there is a specific requirement.

2. Memorized Action Drills
The pilot not flying (PM) will complete from memory the items as directed by the AOM/QRH. In flight, before actuating a switch or control that could result in an irreversible action the PM must first indicate the switch or control and receive confirmation from the PF that the switch or control is the correct one.

On departure, the pilot flying (PF) will call for the appropriate drill at a minimum altitude of 400’ AGL, except as directed by the AOM/QRH.

On approach, the pilot flying (PF) will call for the appropriate drill. The drill should be completed by 1,000’ AGL, or as directed by the AOM/QRH.

Notwithstanding the two preceding paragraphs, prudent airmanship and good judgement will always be the guiding factors for the safest course of action.

3. Checklist Procedures
After the memorized drills have been completed and at a convenient time, the PF will call for the Checklist and Function, i.e. “CHECKLIST - ENGINE FIRE.”

The PM will read aloud all items on the applicable checklist and will call the action as it is checked or completed.

Upon completion of a checklist, the crewmember reading will announce “CHECKLIST COMPLETE”.



SHARING WORKLOAD DURING EMERGENCIES AND ABNORMALS

The general task sharing shown below applies to all procedures.

The pilot flying remains pilot flying throughout the procedure.

The PF (pilot flying) is responsible for:
– Thrust levers
– Control of flight path and airspeed
– Aircraft configuration (request configuration change)
– Navigation
– Communications

The PM (pilot monitoring) is responsible for:
– Monitoring and reading aloud the ECAM and checklists
– Performing required actions, or actions requested by the PF, if applicable,
– Using engine master switches, IR and guarded switches, with PF's confirmation.

REQUIRED MEMORY DRILL ITEMS

Pilots are expected to operate and execute their duties accurately and effectively in accordance with airline approved documents. Any deviation must take place only in the interest of safety and only if and when unusual circumstances dictate.

All pilots are expected to understand all policies, procedures, aircraft systems and operational requirements. In cases where these are identified in the AOM as a ‘Drill’, or in cases where these are not identified as such and are of a time-critical nature, the pilot must have the knowledge and apply the procedure without reference to any publication or material.

INITIATION OF EMERGENCY OR ABNORMAL PROCEDURES

Procedures are initiated on the pilot flying's command.

No action is taken (apart from cancelling audio warnings through the MASTER WARN light) until:
– the appropriate flight path is established,
– the aircraft is at least 400 feet above the runway if a failure occurs during take-off, approach or go-around.

In some emergency cases, provided the appropriate flight path is established, the pilot flying may initiate actions before this height.

INITIAL FAILURE INDICATION
When a failure initially occurs, the ECAM should be applied first.

This includes both the procedure and the entire STATUS review. Only after announcing "ECAM ACTIONS COMPLETED" should the PM refer to the corresponding QRH summary.



roullishollandais;

The way this system works is, these ACARS messages are not printed out on board the aircraft at the time they occur. They are transmitted to the airline's maintenance department in real time (timings as per early discussions on these messages), but are held in memory on the aircraft until the aircraft is parked at the gate, at which time a post-flight print-out occurs, which could and likely would include such ACARS messages. I have seen this many times.

Hmm, could we compromise by saying: Upon loss of AP. PF took control and announced it.

The rest of the sentence is highly debatable based on outcome...

May I offer a little good natured input about this trim business.....

"Dave?"

"Yes HAL."

"Are you holding the trim wheel Dave?"

"Why do you ask HAL?"

"Just 'checking' Dave."

"Why HAL?"

"Ah yes I feel it now, you have a very gentle touch Dave."

"Thank you HAL."

"I would ask you to please let go of the trim wheel Dave."

"I can't do that HAL."

"I certainly don't want to have do this Dave, but if you continue to hold that wheel I will CUT OFF your Prims, one Prim at a time."

THS movement does not necessarily require an SS movement, NOR will an SS movement necessarily command THS movement!

"Dave...Dave...what are you doing?"

OK465...during our training, one guy clever with (the really early!) computers rigged up an A340 lesson with, "Daaiiisy, Daaiisy....Give Me Your Answer, Do...I'm half crazy...", etc. Kind of took the edge off the dark, quiet CBT room...

If I may be permitted a nerdy aside, the level of technology in modern FBW airliners is closer to that of ELIZA than HAL... :}

Primitive FBW systems
 

@ Doze and JC:

I beg your pardons, sirs.

The Hornet ( aka YF-17) had a conventional hydraulic control system whereby stick inputs moved valves and the hydraulics moved the control surfaces - same as we had since early 1950's with the F-100, F-101, F-102, F-104, F-105, F-106, F-4, F-111, F-15 and many British and French designs.

Electronic systems "helped" with dampers and such, but the basic control systems were same as those of old.

The Viper was a radical change. Not only was the jet unstable below 0.95 mach, but there were zero mechanical connections to anything hydraulic - no valves, no nothing. Even the gear handle was an electric switch. Only mechanical connection was/is pneumatic bowdown bottle for nose gear and the throttle linkage to an electronic fuel control system ( more electronics) except in BUC ( back up control), when the motor was like the one in the T-33..

To the best of my knowledge, the Hornet still has hydraulic valves that can be controlled by the stick/rudder, with no required FBW inputs when the electrons go FUBAR. The electronics provide some "protections" and such, but just watch a Blue Angel solo pilot yank up at the end of the runway at extreme AoA and pitch rate. That maneuver shows that the FBW is not fully in control. Further, the Hornet is extremely stable in pitch. All my firends that flew the later version as well as the YF-17 say the same thing.

My point is that you can have a great FBW design that can provide "conventional" feel regardless of the aerodynamic stability, or lack thereof, of the platform.

I may be mistaken, but the crew of AF447 learned to fly with basic planes that did not have tons of electronic augmentation or "protections". Kinda like most of us here, ya think? Our cadre in the Viper was very concerned about the newbies that cam right outta pilot training. Turned out that it wsn't a problem. We showed them the limits ("protections") and they did just fine when returning to "conventional" jets. The Viper also had zero cosmic autopilot functions and such. Backup modes were very clear and simple.

all for now....

But "conventional" feel is only a de facto snapshot in time - it doesn't automatically follow that what's considered conventional now will be conventional in a few decades.

The idea that the airliner flight deck layout that grew out of the postwar years is somehow a natural piloting nirvana is rather limiting in scope, and not supported by the evidence at hand.

Conventional now and in the future
 

Good-frigging grief, Doze!

[Editorial comment: Cockpit layout something for another thread, IMHO. My friend was the captain of the Cali disaster, and the stoopid FMS had duplicate designations for a fix. The two of them realized that somethig was awry when the coupled-autopilot turned the wrong way, but continued their descent after correcting their course. Can talk about that tragedy someplace else.]

Conventional "feel" is what airplanes let you know when the pilot or "system" commands a change in flight path or rate of descent or.....

The basic laws of aerodynamics dictate the response of any disturbance from the trimmed condition. Too fast, then jet wants to climb. Too slow, then jet wants to nose over. It's an AoA function unless the FBW system laws get in the way.

As Doze has reminded me in finitum, our primitive FBW system in the Viper was just that - primitive, simple, etc. It also was a mix of AoA and gee command ( uncorrected for pitch attitude). Control law reversion was really simple - if air data went FUBAR, then the "standby gains" were used and the system used one of two values for control surface deflection and some body rates. AoA still ruled. We never had "direct law" unless in the "deep stall". We never had THS, but the jet tried to get to the trimmed gee if we relaxed pressure on the stick. If the trimmed gee got us to the AoA limit, then the thing followed the AoA limit until airspeed was high enough to get back to the gee command.

The biggest thing for we pilots was that the thing "felt" like what we all had flown for years. Slow, then the thing wanted to nose down. Fast, then it wanted to nose up. We had no change in stick force, but relaxing pressure showed you where the jet wanted to go, and holding a stoopid back stick pressure when at a high pitch attitude and slowing down fast resulted in what happened to AF447.

I think we will all agree ..
And on the other hand .. we have the chief pilot of Air France says:
" There was pilots in the cockpit with a maximum skill "
This is indicative of the culture of Air France to not admit that this maximum of "Air France" skill is not enough to cope with such an event of AF447
When we examine the other cases where Air France is involved .. may have thought that those who are out except .. have done with a lot of luck and not by their maximum skill (no respect for memory items or alarms .. etc. ..)

As I understand it, it was the paper map that was in error, listing Rozo (the correct waypoint) as "R", when it should have been "ROZO". What the AA965 crew did was type in "R", which brough up a list of matching waypoints, then simply hit "EXEC" twice, which sent them to the Romeo beacon near Bogota. The correct sequence was "R-O-Z-O-[EXEC]".

Agreed, but the basic tenet of the FBW Airbus design is that flight deck layout and feel should be common to all aircraft across the range, from the A318 to the A380. Traditional "feel" is an obstacle to that goal.

Which is undoubtedly a good thing when you're talking about the first generation of a design. Boeing wisely made the 747 behave like a big Cessna, as it was the first airliner of that size.

But once the concept is proven, it makes sense to bring other parts of the technology a step forward. Based on experiments on a Concorde airframe (which was itself reliant on a primitive analogue FBW) with a spring-driven sidestick, Airbus elected to try the technology in a small narrowbody. The A320 airframe design was as conventional as they come (airliner airframe design having been mostly static for nearly four decades), but progression of the control system technology was the target.

While an ostensibly significant difference in flight deck layout, the design had pilot input from the get-go to make it feel relatively intuitive, and if pilot reaction to the control system had been negative, Airbus would have backtracked. Instead they were toe-to-toe with Boeing within a decade.

So AF thinks it is a good idea to take an airliner at FL350 and pull up 15 degrees if the autopilot fails???? All our American airliners will stall so we don't do that. I guess theirs do too.

Not exactly. "Skill" and "ability to cope with a crisis situation" are two very different traits.

Wow :mad:

You just proved your humanity, or lack thereof. Gums asked for this to be discussed elsewhere. Your obsessed desire to have something to say for every occasion has betrayed you. Sometimes it's just best to leave something alone.:mad:

Sorry Gums

With all due respect, gums did not request that it not be discussed at all, and rather than open up a new thread on a topic that has been discussed many times before, I elected to summarize what I knew here as briefly as I could.

In this case the FMS did not have two waypoints programmed in with the same designator (as gums said), but caused a partial entry to bring up a list which was sorted in alphabetical order - a feature which crews of the time were not trained on. I explicitly stated that the initial error was in the map supplied to the crew, and not the responsibility of the crew themselves.

I've lost friends to accidents and worse, so I'd never knowingly be disrespectful of anyone who'd gone through the same, but in this case there was a factual error in the telling which needed to be explained.

Apologies if I caused any grief or offence.

I flew the same type B757 into Panama City that night, no moon, and my FO was concerned about descending visually and said the highest obstacle from here is a sailboat mast. I flew into Cali a lot after that and they offered me that same south landing and I always declined. Not because it wasn't safe but in respect for the people that lost their lives by the pilots doing it. The R outer marker was the same at Cali and Bogota. They lost situational awareness and flew into the hills from the valley going to Cali. Yes it was their fault but the FMC made it so easy to make the mistake.

bubbers44 - both they and you should never have been given charts marking the outer marker as "R". This was a misprint and the designation should have been "ROZO".

Maybe now it is.

Exactly ...
Chief pilot say:
"This was pilots with maximum skill in the AF447"
But he will (nor AF) never admit that the "ability to cope" with the AF447 was not present
AF maybe train their pilots to have "maximum skill" but seem's they are not trained (or selected) to gain "ability to cope"
Maybe AF count on the 'luck factor" ?
Unfortunately luck is not always there when you need it in
Luck is something that deserves
Amundsen
Victory awaits him,who as everythings in order.
Luck we call it.
Defeats is definitely due for him,who has neglected to take the necessary precautions.
Bad luck we call it.
Three pilots who have no luck gathered by chance in the cockpit of AF447 ?
AF probably (maybe) thought it was not possible ... it is sometimes forgotten that there are some lotto whinners ....

Thank you, Bubs and Tex.

I shall never forgive my buddy for continuing the descent once they realized that the abbreviated FMS entry turned the AP the wrong way, and I have been amazed that anyone survived the "skip hit" on that mountain ( unlike the recent Suhkoi tragedy). Nick's final words are worth reading, and makes me cry. I lost other friends that had no clue about the rising terrain or the deficiency in the Viper auto pilot/FBW laws , 'nuff said on this.....

@ JCJ: "luck" is when preparation meets opportunity.

For many of us, it's "there but for the grace of God were I".

What do you want him to do when the bank is at 8 deg the attitude is 3 deg under a normal cruise attitude the altitude is 400 feet below the assigned FL and all of it under AP control ?

At the first warning, which is for AP disc, the guy grab the stick and follow the up FD command which is still visible for 3 seconds after that disconnection.

Never in that short period he can analyze that the problem is an unreliable airspeed indication. For the 30 previous known events, how many have called "UNRELIABLE SPEED" and applied the memory items ?

The initial action is necessary, what came after was not, the PF did not focus on the attitude and let the attitude to rise to 11 deg at a cruising altitude 10 seconds after AP.
The PM gave valuable indications but did not sufficiently prioritize the monitoring of the PF performance ... ECAM was calling him ...

What if direct law ... 2 ?
 

What direct law does ?
It’s here but I can try to tell more :

As soon as the real speed bleeds, the nose wants to lower, it is a natural protection net.
If nevertheless the pilot wants to pull in order to achieve his targets, the aerodynamic let him know what kind of effort it takes on the sidestick. If mayonnaise there is, every down command will materialize in down elevator deflection.

To stall an aircraft in direct law just takes more effort than in a 1G command and the BEA does not disagree on that.

But let’s pretend the guy goes for full deflection before and during the stall ... and the PNF does not question anything of it …

THS is still at 3 deg and the stall cannot be that developed so the indicated airspeed won’t go below the threshold to silence the stall warning that will still warn when the captain is back. Of course if that captain had the chance to naturally contemplate what kind of input is made by the PF on the flight control commands … that could enormously help him to positively evaluate what’s going on here.

What many here like to call 'graceful degradation' had nothing of graceful during that night.
That law that trim and that sidestick concept worked against that crew that night.

It took about 5 - 6 degrees of NU elevator to stall the airplane. In direct law that would correspond to about 3 degrees (2.8 lbf) of sidestick, vs about 2 degrees (2.1 lbf) in alternate law. Do you really believe the PF would have felt the difference in his erratic movements of the sidestick?

Doze, "skill" among pilots includes the set of "monkey skills" and set of "brain housing group and headwork" skills. Those two subsets are combined to create the larger set of "pilot skills."

I thus find the AF chief pilot's statement of dubious value. (If it has been translated properly).

I don't care how coordinated you are -- if your headwork is poor, brain doesn't work well while flying and you won't be much good at flying since you'll eventually run into something you should not.

Likewise, there are very well equipped (mentally) folks whose eye-hand-foot coordination renders them dangerous. We used to refer to them as "plumbers" back when I was a flight instructor.

Those skill groups come as a set, like the Lone Ranger and Tonto, or like Dolly Parton's left and right breasts.

You don't break up a set.

I'm not arguing that the initial response to the aircraft's (minor) bank (which he rapidly controlled), and the suddenly-lower indicated altitude. I am commenting on SOPs and CRM - I am observing what followed in terms of a crew response which was entirely non-standard, and upon this point we appear to agree. This is an observation, it is neither a judgement nor is it a statement of blame. Those kinds of statements are for others who are not doing flight safety work.

Very nice summary, Wolf-man.

I used to call them "mechanics", but "plumber" works as well.

My friends and I that survived twenty + years flying fighters had the combination of mental abilities, being able to think ahead of the jet, and decent hand-eye coordination. The mental component always seemed to me to be slightly more important than the Chuck Yeager "hands". But being able to fly the plane without thinking allowed folks like me to use what little smarts I had to survive and not become a smoking hole in the desert, or jungle, or a half mile short of the runway.

I soloed many troops that had marginal "hands", but they could think ahead and even if they couldn't hold speed within a knot or descent rate within 50 feet per minute, they were "safe" and effective and survived. 'nuff philosophy for now. But.....

"luck" is when preparation meets opportunity. I didn't see that on the part of the AF crew that dark night.

ACARS Pitot Fault message
 

Thank you for your answer PJ2. I have seen the maintenance messages printed, and we can perfectly understand why the Captain wants to know that the next flight may be delayed due to maintenance :E. Another airline, another Captain. Would an AF Captain know the use of that ACARS printer ?

The interesting thing is: Airbus fans think that the Airbus does allow them to "fly the plane without thinking" and I think that the Airbus requires me to think about flying instead of "flying without thinking". Perhaps more interesting is the fact that the previous pitot clogging incidents resulting in a positive outcome appear to have been "handled" by my kind of "fly without thinking" crews, while the accident crew appears (to me) to be the kind of pilots that think the Airbus allows them to fly without thinking. IOW's, both sides understand the need to "fly without thinking", but we have diametrically opposed views about the Airbus' contribution to that end.

I don't blame an Airbus style of flying pilot for feeling the way he does, I blame the business, training and regulatory environments that lied to him and told him that the Airbus "flys like any other airplane". See Operational Golden Rule #1.

Nothing I've ever previously flown (numerous commuter and transport category turboprops, various models of LearJets, DC9 and stretch DC9) required me, the pilot, to think about which mode the controls were in in order to properly fly the airplane.

Even with that said, I expect to spend the next fifteen years in an Airbus, then retire. I don't fear it, nor have disdain for it - nor do I trust it. I just wish that the books included a few simple statements. For example, "excepting a state when USE MAN PITCH TRIM in announced on the PFD, the SS is the sole allowable input for pitch. In degraded control states, significantly exaggerated pitch inputs may be required to effect the desired change" .
I've observed too many crews (from the jumpseat) and my own First Officers utilize the "slap the stick" method of control. The manuals should clearly indicate that this is undesirable, instead of the current FCTM language that states, "the PF needs to perform minor corrections to the sidestick, if the aircraft deviates from its intended flight path".

Personal experience shows me that smooth pressure applied to the stick results in adequate control. It also keeps my muscle memory trained to control the aircraft in a way that will be effective in aircraft with either (FBW or not) philosophy of aircraft control. The pilot who is trained to make minor corrections AS PER THE FCTM, is IMHO, poorly prepared to deal with situations that require true aircraft control inputs.

Instead of asking again for any Bus pilot to address "slapping" the stick, let me ask you, Tex.....

You say: "I've observed too many crews (from the jumpseat) and my own First Officers utilize the "slap the stick" method of control. The manuals should clearly indicate that this is undesirable, instead of the current FCTM language that states, "the PF needs to perform minor corrections to the sidestick, if the aircraft deviates from its intended flight path". "

I have called it "Quick Stick". 'Mayonnaise' is unsatisfactory, for it implies the action is not based on flying the aircraft....

"Slapping the Stick" works, so, is it similar to what I take it to be? I think it is a method of utilizing the controls such that the Angle of Incidence of the a/c is not affected by the THS. IOW, defeating the Autotrim.

We have seen video of it, I think, was it grity? It strikes me that if this is done to thwart the philosophy of Airbus, there may be a serious problem?

Muchas gracias amigo. Or as they say in Ft. Lauderdale: "Ah Swannee"

I can't say if AF captains know how to do this as I don't know any AF captains but as an A330 captain myself, (retired), on our A330's the printout was automatic after setting the park brake and if there were any maintenance messages printed out along with the entire flight summary (times, fuel, etc) we placed them between the thrust levers for either Mtc's awareness, (they would certainly know how to print these messages), and/or the next crew's awareness. Generally the knowledge is not required of flight crews because there are other means to communicate maintenance issues to the next flight crew, (usually the log book, of which an examination is required by the crew before flight).

That said, if the crew wished to know what the ACARS messages were while in flight, that is easy enough to do by navigating to the appropriate ACARS page summarizing these messages and printing that page. I've forgotten the details but it can be done though it isn't an automatic feature in the circumstances AF447 experienced, nor would there be sufficient time to examine the messages. Also, the "Stall" warning from the FWC is not part of the ACARS message system and would not be in any of the ACARS messages.

Thank you PJ2.
The Pitot fault message was on the ACARS at 02:10... and was missing on the ECAM!
Of course stall is not a ACARS message. But if one of the three pilots had seen that Pitot ACARS message it would have help the crew... to analyse the situation and they would have known immediatly they had to go to the UAS procedure.

Hi,

TTex600
From the jumpseat ....
Interesting real life recount .. so do you suggest that the AF447 captain was able (like you) to see what were making the two other pilots with the SS ? (and was certainly able to see the position of the trim wheels dial)

jc, considering where the AF447 Capt reentered the picture, I doubt that he was looking at SS movement. However, I think it possible had he thought it necessary. I'd guess that he was overwhelmed trying to make sense of ECAM and flight instruments.

Lyman, I think it's just bad technique. I doubt that those who use said technique actually have a real clue about Airbus philosophy, no less have any desire to thwart it. They use it because it basically works in normal situations. A quick hit is all it takes. I prefer softer, more steady pressure; a technique which works as well.