Who have "vested" interests ( or who benefit ) with ( to spread ) version "A" ?

@Conf_iture
Otelli is not a proof!
re:Ste Odile : Otelli did just forget to say that
1. on the official IAC (instrument approach card) the mountain BLOSS was enlowerd from 2710 FT to 2500 (the airbus was found af 2620 FT!)
2.on the Air France approach chart (non official, not ICAO conform...) the indication "FAF" was missing ,doing mandatory to maintain 3660 FT QNH to 7 NM to STR VOR! (the aircraft has been found at 8.2 NM)
3.obstacles protection for VOR/DME TACAN approach was 15 per cent ground slope for ICAO,French,civilian or military regulations what the aircraft was doing (220 KT, 3300FT/min...

BEA lied "better" : the Lawyers and Judge could just not understand their slang and BEA said nothing about the 15 per cent rule!

Experts of the Court explained the law to the Judge (d'instruction) with Icao texts in english and not official French text (existing) (The Judge Guichard had learned latin and greek, and "english was not his cup of tea"...

Really Reader's Digest is better than Otelli's books

CONF iture, jcjeant;

I don't wish to divert the thread into yet another rabbit trail but from your comments I don't think you know much about media, especially American media.

Your responses tell me that you are too closely focussed on your particular issues with the BEA and Airbus and quasi-conspiratorial theories to permit a broadly-based understanding of media.

Regardless gentlemen, the debate concerning cockpit video has been done to death even at PPRuNe. My thought was, instead of providing the go-to for the PPRuNe discussion for slats11, I provided some of the well-known and accepted reasons why cockpit video is likely a non-starter, only some of which relate to the issues surrounding media.

Don't be offended, it's just the cut and thrust of discussion :-).

For what it's worth, I think the BEA have been very impartial and
thorough, not only in the analysis of what happened, but also the
recommendations, of which there are many and in a subtle way,
point fingers of responsibility in several directions. The fact that they
are not even more explicit is most likely for legal reasons, but there
is definately an air of almost irritation in parts.

This is the series of threads that refuses to die and now that the
final report has been issued, might it be a good idea to analyse
the recommendations in terms of what they are really saying ?...

Sorry for not been sufficiently clear in my previous post.

I understand the debate and genuine concerns about this. There is a need to balance competing interests, and this means that legitimate concerns must be addressed.

I was not suggestion that video be routinely recorded and made available for internal company review.

For example:
1. It could be triggered by certain parameters, but would not be routinely recorded. This would be different to the routine CVR.
2. If it was too difficult to activate selectively, then an option would be that the video would be routinely erased by the pilots at the end of the flight.
3. Video should not be used for other purposes such as performance management. There are other mechanisms for this.
4. The video should not be easily accessible. It could be stored on a recorder like the CVR and FDR, and only accessed by the appropriate investigative body in event of an incident.

However, I don't believe this suggestion should be automatically rejected out of hand.

Like it or not, there will now often be video recorded of anything abnormal. If there is an engine failure or a fire, or a diversion, or if the oxygen masks deploy, or if the cabin crew are seen to react abnormally, there will be plenty of video captured by the passengers. On previous occasion, this has been emailed to friends and the media as the plane landed.

Seen against this background, the view that there never be video recording of the cockpit seems a little.......quaint.

I've already said my piece on this, .....and I'll repeat it. Everybody in this Godforsaken business eventually hides behind the law that places final responsibility in the pilots hands. It's easier to escape responsibility when you can blame the dead guys.

TTex600
Your comment is paradoxical
Indeed .. if Airbus had presented the information loss of speed in such a way that it is comprehensible in 1 second (and not polluted by other information cascade) the dead pilots of AF447 can be the only responsible for the accident
But as noted by RR NDB. this is not the case and therefore .. one can not blame 100% the pilots ... and it's appears to in filigree (read between the lines :) ) in the recommendations of the BEA

Recognition of the problem from the git would NOT place blame entirely on the crew. One still has deferred, fubared, and AD-d Pitots, an ill understood protocol for mitigation, Altrnate Law that likewise did not arrive and be identified, utter lack of associated hands on high altitude flight, etc. ......

Yet the same tired and tiresome parrotted script. Pilots effed it. Beeyess.....

I do recognize honesty in the report, and I applaud it for the spread of their findings of responsibility.

Progress, but an opportunity to actually reach the goal of unbiased curatives wasted again.

This thread feels a lot less like the Alamo lately, Tex...But Santana still has too many troops.

So, what is this supposed to mean? Is it the BEA and all the other accident investigating bodies that participated in the AF447 investigation muffed it by not issuing a perfect report in your view? I just don't see your logic at all...

US media are not different from any others : They tend to concentrate in the hands of fewer. And monopoly is not the best tool for questioning, is it ?
But let's pretend I don't know for a moment.

AF447 autotrims in the stall.
Is it desirable to autotrim in the stall ?
I can understand someone like DozyWannabe would find any 'good' reason for the BEA to not address the subject, he has no experience, but you have a lot.
Please, would you explain, as you know how to do it, why it is not desirable ?

Or is it a 'quasi-conspiratorial' attitude to question why the BEA is just ignoring the fact.

Those who want to make sure it is all on the dead pilots shoulders in a way we don't question anything else.
More read and accept le figaro than scrutinize a BEA report.

Where would go your vote A-B-C-D ... and why ?

Causal, non causal, fault tolerance and graceful degradation
 

I´ll repeat: It is VERY EASY to diagnose UAS before the garbage coming from the Pitot´s destroy the confidence of the crew in the machine.

And it seems airbus SAS had no competence (an absurd approach imho) to implement a better solution. Delegate was natural. Easy, no investment.

And it would be easy, later to blame dead guys.

But,

If the man-machine interface (a good one, assertively) presented a clear indication the history certainly would* be completely different.

Who would ignore or not believe an alarm (garbage coming from the sensors) AND resulting anomalies like degradation.

I insist, F-GZCP had:

1) A ridiculous design WRT UAS (no redundancy)

2) An absurd man-machine interface behavior aggravating a "minor" issue (a brief probes "cold")

Result:

A critical and dangerous System. And the POB of F-GZCP paid it.


(*) Specially if training was developed to this scenario. BTW a very simple training.

I´m sorry the way i put. It´s sad. IMO the accident was designed by Airbus SAS. The victims were the operator (with some % of responsability, obviously) and all POB.

The crew errors (all, like CRM, etc.) occurred after two very serious design issues.

Technically speaking i repeat: It is very easy to detect the UAS onset. And even to (automatically) disable the subsystems in order to not process garbage and feed it to non properly trained pilots.

Therefore the effective System (plane+crew) could benefit from a non causal approach: It´s output could occur before it´s input. Why? Because after UAS detection you block the garbage to contaminate the System. A System with several other problems as the recommendations suggest.

From the outset .. I will remove the possibility B
Indeed .. these books are a financial income of Otelli
A change on his part (if discovered) cast discredit on his work and his future as a writer would be seriously compromised
Would he take this risk ?
Remaining possibilities A and C
A = a leak that can only come from someone with direct access to the CVR (BEA- Airbus-AF- or other body accredited with the BEA for this survey)
I think the leak coming from A can be a modified version as the person responsible for this leak is not likely to be discovered easily (I suspect that the leak was not directly transmitted to Otelly .. but instead .. via a journalist .. for benefit of french protection law for journalists sources IMHO)
If Otelli is tortured :) for give the name of his source and he give a journalist name .. it's the end of enquiry cause the sources of journalists can't be revealed
The possibility C can be envisaged . .. but unlikely because BEA knowed what was in Otelli book before release of final report (and do not forget the other accredited parties) and because if it's a inquiry about the BEA .. it will be soon discovered if the BEA published a script who does not match the CVR oral recording
This is why I think it's A the most possible option
This option benefit to Airbus principally ....

That is a bit simplistic, ehh?

It only autotrims into a stall if:
1) A serious degradation of systems occurs (Alternate Law 2). (This is by definition a clearly exceptional case) and
2) The pilots continuously (for quite some time) point the Nose of the Airliner where it abso-f$&§ing-lutely (I saw this one in another thread and liked it so much I had to borrow it :O) doesn't belong.

Indeed as a behaviour itself it is not really particularly desirable but this should normally really not be a problem. Why it became a problem in this tragic case is one of the reasons that this thread is doing so well 3 years after the incident. It is simply mysterious and shouldn't have been expected to happen to an experienced Crew. Yet it has.

replaced by post #962 :}

Confiture, if one tries to program the robot to once again interfere with the flying of the aircraft for that exceptional case, the risks that the code in question causes a serial or unrelated error is non trivial, when you are discussing what is being done to over ride a pilot's input to Flight Controls!

In the case of Alt Law 2, it appears that A330 control logic allows for the chance that the robot is wrong, since it already notes some odd signals or sums already, on the way to degradation. That's a conservative approach, and one to my liking.

When degraded already, if the stall warning goes off, but the pilot makes "input x" in certain modes, the robot will apparently concede that most likely, the pilot knows best since it knows something it uses for control is wrong already.

I am more comfortable with that than the alternative, even though every so often the pilot is wandering off the reservation.

That's part of why airline transport aircraft have two pilots.
Redundancy of wetwear has proven to be of value for some decades. :ok: Saved my bacon more than once, in a different environment.

Feel bad about some of the discussion here lately regarding personal views and BEA/AF conspirancy stuff, etc.

I like the discussion of stall entry/prevention training and such. IMHO, it is needed in the "heavy" pilot community, especially those that never routinely few at the "edge" of the envelope or beyond. Don't know how to do it in the sim, but the AF447 tapes show us a decent data point, including what "not to do" when the airspeed is deemed invalid by HAL. The sim trainers should exploit this data.

All of you know by now my feelings about use of AoA for both the flight control laws and the displays. 'nuff said.

The alerts and warnings and chimes and such seem too much to this old pilot. Seems that the most pressing problem should get the most attention. Also seems all the cosmic flight director stuff should simply present something that was last in existance when things went FUBAR with the airspeed sensors and their inputs to HAL. Personal preference is a simple attitude command or nothing at all.

I am also concerned with the aircraft commander briefing to the pilots in the two seats. I did not hear/read a clear delegation of authority. I an also disappointed that the guy with the most experience did not exert his seniority ASAP. Not that all more experienced pilots are better, but this case may have had a different outcome. We shall never know.

Hi,

Gums
I think that from this moment we can say that the experience and authority of the commander are no longer in the cockpit

PNF
2 h 12 min 12,9 We’re pulling
2 h 12 min 14,4
What do you think
about it what do you
think what do we
need to do?

Captain
2 h 12 min 15,5
There I don’t know
there it’s going down

I only flew one 5 day trip to Sao Paulo with a 3 pilot crew and it was only the fact the two FO's were outstanding pilots that made me feel comfortable taking my break.
Once in a while I felt I could not leave the cockpit for a Lav break so made sure it wasn't required because I didn't trust the other guy to handle a problem. I probably wouldn't have left the cockpit with these two guys flying. Neither one seemed qualified to be doing their job.

jcjeant,

Greetings, Sir. You have quoted the Captain, Marc Dubois....

"There I don’t know,
there it’s going down...."

PNF Robert has asked the Captain essentially a specific question about a specific problem, what is that problem?

I believe the problem was getting the Nose down. We all complain about the PF: Why does he pull back so much...? So do the two non flying pilots address the chronic Nose up in this exchange? I think, yes.

Are they merely preoccupied with the Pitch, not knowing Cedric is pulling? Or do they know he pulls for some other reason? Without question they know their problem is Stall, the two unmistakable cues cannot be avoided, Nose Up, and descent.

The message is clear: unto their demise, two pilots cannot figure out why the Nose is Up. If it is because they do not know Bonin pulls, then at least in this aircraft, the method of death is a SideStick that is not visible to other than the one pilot using it.

Solution? For any aircraft that may crash in this manner, the SideStick must be relocated. The problem will be how to identify which aircraft might die this way?
And then reconfigure the sticks. That will be complex, is there an easier way to prevent this stick arrangement from killing more people?

What a dilemma....