Interesting. My A320 FCOM says:

"LATERAL CONTROL
When the aircraft flying in pitch alternate law, lateral control follows the roll direct law associated with yaw alternate or mechanical.

ROLL DIRECT LAW
Refer to Direct Law."

The fact that rudder produces a roll (despite the side stick is not centred) suggests to me that it is not commanding a roll rate in ALT Law.

It is quite simple, and said before.

In high AOA and especially in the stall region the aileron is the wrong control surface for roll control.

If you like, use any aircraft model to get a picture from following description.

When PF wanted to raise the right low wing with a left SS input, the downgoing aileron on the right wing produced a lot of drag, thus inducing a yawing momentum to the right (into the low wing).

Normally the upgoing spoiler on the left wing would not only help in roll, but would produce drag as well and thus reduce the yawing moment, but under such high AOA the spoiler is blanked out, does not assist in roll and produces not enough drag to prevent the yaw. Sideslip protection was not available, and manual rudder not used.

The induced yaw into the right (low) wing increased the sweep back in relation to the relative wind and thus decreased the available lift on this wing, where on the opposite wing the sweep in relation to the relative wind decreased, thus increasing the lift.

Why did the bank not incrase beyond the 40° (like going into a spiral dive) but oscilated between some left bank and lot of right bank? I don´t know for sure, but it might have something to do with the dutch roll dampening function:

Thus left SS input without rudder input produced exactly the opposite what the PF intended to achieve.

One more comment concerning the stall behaviour. It looks like most pilots expect violent maneuvers of the aircraft in a stalled situation, heavy g variations, fast nose position transitions like bank pitch and yaw changes or what so ever. I expierienced the stall violent at the point of departure, but after those initial unpredictable movements nearly stable, but just not logic responsive to the flight controls. AF447 departed and behaved similar, and in combination with a different expectation might also have led the crew to take a stalled situation not into consideration.

You have it nailed, BOAC.

I have a hard time blaming the crew for 100% of the problem when I see the current training regimen and emphasis upon HAL to "protect" you and the 200 SLF's you are responsible for getting home.

The reversion sequence of the 'bus and its loss of "protections" all along the way disturbs me to this day. Seems the crews are thinking "Normal", and have been "trained" thru hundreds of hours in "Normal" law and "normal" flight conditions. Then when things go Tango Uniform, we see confusion and poor cockpit resource management and..... Also remember that some of us here didn't have the CRM problem, nor could we take a nap someplace aft and hit the bathroom or...

I also have a problem with the warnings and chimes and criteria for them in the 'bus. Many of the flight control functions revert to back-up modes according to loss of speed or whatever. Where should the pilot hang his hat? What's working? And let's forget all the "protections", shall we. I do not advocate a reversion to "direct" law unless there are multiple catastrophic failures of sensors or mechanical systems. It would seem to this old, dumb pilot that we use whatever the jet and/or HAL can give us with clearly defined limits that can be understood by the pilots. For example, who gives a rat's about bank angle limits once outta "Normal" law? Why have two max roll rate limits once reverting from "Normal" to ALT1 and then ALT2 and then "unusual attitude" and then..... Get my point?

Guess/hope the whole affair will result in better crew training, but I would still like to see at least a few concessions by the 'bus folks concerning the reversion sequences, warnings, etc.

gums,
Beware that Direct Law on the bus is nothing worse than any conventional aircraft.
It has also the huge advantage to prevent the risk of any protection to kick in on false information.
It puts back the trim duty on pilot's shoulders and would have prevented AF447 to autotrim full up under STALL warning.

A great point, CONF.

With the FBW systems, there are usually "gains" that depend upon dynamic pressure, and I would prefer as a pilot to still have something I could count on. So in the dinosaur FBW I flew we had "standby gains" when the air data went south. Two values - one gear down, one gear up. Sure, if we flying at the speed of stink, the jet was sensitive. Gear down was about the same as normal.

I have yet to see the charts of the 'bus stick commands versus gee or roll rate.

For example, here's mine for roll command:

http://i120.photobucket.com/albums/o...s/roll_cmd.jpg

Now this is just the "command", and the actual control surface deflection could be 2 deg or 25 deg. So non-FBW folks may not completely understand the implementation.

As I understand it, the 'bus "direct" law is just the same as most all planes with 100% hydraulic control wheels/sticks and zero force feedback from the control surfaces. BFD, Been that way for most jets since the 1960's.

I would still like to see some of the control laws on a "block diagram" and I'll try to have one of mine scanned so all can see the inputs to each surface and the commanded movements using the stick.

No Conf iture
The fact that the PNF would ask a question shows that he was paying attention. I take it you have gotten your instrument rating? If so, you will recall that you are trained to trust your instruments not your unreliable estimate of what a slanted piece of metal may be doing or your sense of 'feel'. How someone perceives the same event can vary enormously especially under stressful conditions. Rely on the instrumentation (altimeter and artificial horizon) not on your eyes.
The yoke would not have made a blind bit of difference in this case. One can be sure that the PNF would have done nothing except summon the captain. If you take a look at the various reports you can see he perceived a problem but did nothing. Why would the yoke have made any difference to this lack of action? Remember he could see what was happening from his instruments. Do not get led astray by red herrings about yokes or otherwise. Your comments on the sidestick introduce a side issue which is totally irrelevant. The number of Airbuses fitted with sidesticks flying safely demonstrates this.

Oh my.
I can't believe we're debating again what flight law they were in. :ugh:

@CONF - "Dozy didn't answer" because he was out at work, so he can continue to pay for the privilege of joining in these delightful discussions. There have been too many LOC accidents in yoke-equipped airliners for the argument that it would have made a difference to stick, and we've already been round that hamster wheel more than once.

@gums - Your aerodynamic knowledge is beyond question, but both Alternate 1 & 2 are "roll direct" [Correction - Alt 2 is roll direct, yay early morning!]. The crews may be "trained in Normal", but in the sim there wasn't that much difference between Normal and Alternate roll handling. It was more sensitive outside the stall, but it took me all of a few seconds to get used to. Also, it looks like the trim is a red herring and the aircraft can be recovered in approximately 5,000ft on sidestick alone *even with full nose-up trim wound in*.

However - in the sim, the TRE noticed that I was trying aileron in the stall sequence and told me to use rudder instead. On this occasion he was standing over the pedestal having just wound the trim on and he could obviously see what I was doing in order to tell me not to do it.

This discussion isn't going anywhere until people start listening to each other and not just making assumptions based on their own prejudice against a specific design. I've never ignored anyone on this forum in my life until Lyman, and if I keep hearing "HAL" used to describe the Airbus system, those that use it are likely to join him.

The visual contact with the PF's SS, the seeing of where the SS is at any given point of time, would have given to both PNF and Captain, the immediate, DIRECT, unaltered information of what the PF is doing.

Inferring the positions of the SS from instruments or anything else is INDIRECT information. When the instruments are not reliable it can be lethal.

Of course it would, and not because it's a yoke. Ultimately, it's not about the "yoke" versus "SS", it's about the "SS" problem, which is its positioning in the A330, that can impact an exact, immediate, and precise visual perception of the actions on it.

As I've mentioned it in the past, and will do it again, that using INDIRECT versus DIRECT information, is an elementary system design issue that is known to create problems, where ever is present in any application where immediate and accurate perception of information is critical, one of which happens to be a passenger A/C cockpit.

You're doing very well with your presence on this Forum. Ironically, the quality of the service brought to Airbus does not depend on how blindly one sticks to his mission.

@airtren

You and Lyman are sounding even more like you're one and the same - so what am I, a "servant of Airbus" or a "fanatical toady"? For the record I neither work for Airbus nor any of their clients or suppliers. I think modern aviation on a technical level is nothing short of a bloody marvel whether the aircraft come from either side of the Atlantic.

I prefer to think of myself as a neutral party with an inbuilt dislike of bullsh*t and preference for evidence and experimentation over hearsay. I was privileged enough to take part in one experimental session and I'm just telling you what I learned and observed. The response from those determined to hold on to the "AIRBUS BAD" philosophy was to bring control columns up *yet again*, with no evidence that they would make a difference.

So how do you do that now ... you need the Braille !?

As a politician you twist the question not to address it and then invoke 'the hamster wheel'.

No sir, it has already been addressed - by people far more worthy of addressing it than me - in several places on the previous threads, hence the reference to the hamster wheel.

I also found it mildly amusing that my lack of an immediate answer was used as an indication that I did not have one, especially given the fact that a few months ago I left you an open goal to shoot at on another thread to talk about your specialist subject - namely Habsheim - and yet you never replied.

In short, I can't help but suspect that the anti-Airbus brigade "ain't got nuthin'" - to coin a phrase - to go on here, and are simply resorting to calling out their stock phrases.

This may be a premature pronouncement. In Dozy's case, the trim came promptly back down with nose down stick. If I understand CONF's experience, it did not.

On AF447, it seems to have stayed solidly at its highest value. Was there long enough nose down to get it even moving a bit if it was working? Did the airspeed have to become valid before it would be enabled? Was some interlock stopping it?

According to this Stalled AF447 did not switch to abnormal attitude law
BEA says abnormal attitude law, which could have stopped autotrim, wasn't entered.
Maybe an artifact of the way the sim was forced into alternate in confiture's case ?

The A330 simulation referred to by that poster involved a full forward SS input but 'the nose did not come down'.

If the SS input did not change the existing dynamic, why would there be a requirement for the autotrim to change even in ALT2?

Autotrim is a 'TRIM' function for dynamic pressure changes which would alter the existing 'G'/longitudinal command and doesn't 'necessarily' follow the direction of SS movement unless the SS has some effect on the existing flight conditions.

These are two very different simulations, neither of which can positively be confirmed as representing either aircraft faithfully. Both posters may well want to monitor the SD FLT/CNTL page the next time they get a chance to do this.

The other side of the coin is that one or both of the simulations MAY actually represent the aircraft characteristics and certainly will up to the point that actual stall flight data was accumulated and incorporated in the simulator flight package. Beyond that, well there are a number of posters here that are sure they know what will occur...

There is (to me) a lack of technical discussion of the TRIM operation prior to its travel to NU stop at (near) the top of climb. The accepted wisdom is at 3 degrees NU (-3), the THS stopped moving. The rest of the climb was not followed (augmented, commanded) by TRIM.

It is said that it stopped because the elevators had requisite authority to change PITCH w/o the slab. This infers a data point at which the THS inhibits, leaving to the stick, commands that do not "require" THS follow.

This implies (to me), a computer generated point at which "maneuvering" is left to elevators alone. This is inconsistent (at least to me) with AB philosophy, even in ALTLAW2.

Had the TRIM continued, would we see less mayonnaise, and more stability in the climb to 38k? Was PF "hunting"? I think he was, and though that may be improper, I certainly see how that could happen. Afterall, we know he lost SA with PITCH/POWER from the git, with his intitial input.

The THS was articulating to, (and through) handoff to manual flight, why did it stop? It moved as the PF was ordering a climb, what was different about his initial input from the regime that prompted the FC to stop the THS in the zoom? Again, his initial input caused STALLWARN, so it wasn't for lack of emphasis, or authority, that the airframe sensed the lack of a need for continued THS?

What separates PITCH command (NOT LAW), in auto from PITCH command in ALTLAW2? In the time it takes (took), to climb 3k feet, the PF became accustomed to elevators/results? I realize there is room here for slandering the crew, but it seems to me, the computer was little help in the transition.

I'm looking for an honest answer to an honest question, not flames or politics.

I strongly believe that sentence. If you worked for Airbus, you would have been long ago silenced, in a way or another, as I know the perception of de-service to Airbus, and dislike of your type of defense.
Your not recognizing the difference between DIRECT and INDIRECT information transfer combined with the advertising of a software engineering background is again, as it was in past posts of yours a clear indication of BS.
As far as I am concerned the BEA report information on the Airbus simulation of the AF 447 case is sufficient, and any simulation on a non-A330 may be a valuable personal experience, but cannot bring true scientific value - it's rather a source of more speculation, and self-serving argumentation.

You may pretend to be, or would like to think as "neutral", but it's so obvious were you stand. Your personal attacks, ....
the "anti-Airbus brigade" obsession, and your self assigned mission of defending Airbus at any cost, even those elements that are scientifically indefensible, for anyone that is a professional, and wrongly extrapolating faults with certain few Airbus elements, as being applied to the entire Airbus design, is a good indication of the type of alignment you're driven by.

Can anyone provide any verifiable source for this statement? If we were to believe it then right now thousands of FBW Airbi currently airborne are operating with considerable wastage of valuable information in a multi crew operation.

Probably wouldn't make a lot off difference in the accident sequence but it would make a whole lot in analysis phase: with independent sidesticks, there is no doubt who made which controls input.

Not true, see Interim #3, page 42.

Clandestino.

Additonally, with Yokes, the temptation to concurrently provide input to the controls on both sides is alleviated.

Your thoughts?

I wasn't the one who obliquely described me as a "fanatical toady" - I've said nothing personal to anyone who hadn't already got personal with me.

It's not an obsession, it's just the way of things - whenever the subject comes up, the same 3 or 4 posters always materialise and cast the same aspersions they always do - rarely if ever bringing anything new to the discussion.

I'd love to see the post where I assigned myself that mission, because it must have been someone else using my handle - unless of course you're making it up. And I'd also love to know what you find "scientifically indefensible" about the design.

I'm just here to make sure that press-induced falsehoods about the design, including but not limited to it being "designed to take pilots out of the loop", "the first step in replacing pilots", "designed by managers and computer nerds without pilot input" and "reliant on the French Government covering up the real reasons for accidents" meet with robust and evidence-supported rebuttal. Any or all of which are not only substantively untrue, but also defamatory against the hard work of all the teams that have worked on it over the years, some of whom are no longer with us.

In this case, aside from the pitot tube issues (which are serious, and Airbus/AF have some 'splaining to do there...), it's looking increasingly likely that there were no hardware (or indeed software) faults involved in the crash of AF447. All the talk of sidestick vs. yoke and FBW vs. conventional control are therefore nothing more than a distraction from the issues at hand. Laying the blame for insufficient training at Airbus's door because management got the wrong idea about what automation means is also a false attribution. If it was Boeing getting the stick I'd be just as annoyed about it.

It's not about the manufacturer and it's not about defending modern automated aircraft in the slightest, it's about demanding a degree of factual basis behind the discussion rather than a bunch of tired old cliches that have been doing the rounds since 1988.

Dozy,
Given -

• the history of the pitot issues in Interim #1,
• the recommendations in the area of certification in Interim #2,
• the existence of UAS procedures in AF and AB manuals,
• that DFDR and CVR have hardly added anything to this issue,

do you expect anymore 'splaining in the final report, or are you perhaps referring to the judicial proceedings?

Clandestino
Well .. it's not always wastage of valuable information
We must take in account the airbus FBW laws and autopilot
We have indeed a multicrew .. in fact (normal crew manning) 3 members .. 2 humans and the additional crew member .. the AP computer-FBW system entity
In normal law ... it's no wastage (human crew members hands are out of SS)
In other laws (or when a human crew member put hand on SS) it can be a wastage of valuable information

I'm sure the final report will condense what's in the interim publications, and maybe something will come out of the judicial proceedings, but primarily I was just trying to make it obvious that I believe that mistakes were made, although it probably followed the letter of the law at the time, and this is all with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight.

In short, I'm not trying to "defend" or "protect" Airbus indiscriminately, I am and always have been simply trying to keep the discussion to the matters at hand and not get sidetracked by the same old kvetching.

The Red Herrings become a shoal. Direct v Indirect input now. Instruments, AirTren, instruments are the key. They are not fooled by panic, tension, stress or any of the other factors which so much mess up human perception. They can be relied on to give an accurate reading of a situation provided you remember your training and cockpit drills. No need to look at the yoke or whatever, look at your instruments. One can be sure that BEA know who was making the inputs - a yoke is not needed for that. As for the flight crew they also knew so where does the yoke help? A yoke is a piece of equipment to transmit inputs to the aircraft it is not a magical cure all to save lives. It performs its function like sidesticks do and some pilots prefer it. This is human nature not everyone likes the same thing. But it is not superior in any way to a sidestick.
Conf iture - what on earth are you talking about?

Do not hide Dozy.
No reply in sight ... but put your own thoughts using your own words.

Habsheim ?
AF447 has its own thread.
Habsheim should also ...

Correct.
Usually more relevant in take off and landing phases but AF447 demonstrates how it can also be true at FL350.

Because the sidestick provides control of elevators and THS to achieve a load factor proportional to stick deflection.

Something to do for sure ... what would be your assumption or presumption for the elevators position with stick full fwd ?

2 PNF knew the PF was making inputs - Did they know which inputs he was making ?

Yes by looking at the instruments. An input produces a certain pattern on your instruments and you can understand what your aircraft is doing. The seated PNF could see the zoom climb from his instruments. He even mentioned this. The captain also could see the instruments when he entered the cockpit.

An input produces a certain pattern on your instruments
 

Would you explain yourself in relation to the timeframe starting from 02:12:45?

Stick was full left, aircraft was banked to the right, how do you know by instruments, what kind of inputs are made by the guy in the dark 1 meter away?

... or 02:11:55 when the pitch is 10 deg below horizon ... where is the stick Old Carthusian ... !?

Control stick inputs, instruments, laws
 

Once again, I have to go with Retired.

If I am not the pilot in control, then simply looking at the instruments does not provide the best feedback required to maintain control or get the beast going where you wish. It is true that having a mechanically coupled wheel/stick would help the "other guy" understand what was happening, but the jet involved did not have that feature. Retired pointed out that the "other guy" did not know exactly what the control inputs were and finally advised to use some rudder to pick up the low wing.

I realize that I do not have 20,000 hours as some here. But I prolly had as many takeoffs and landings with my measly 4,000 hours, none of which had a co-pilot to help/monitor. I also had to solo pilots from a "chase" aircraft on their first hop, as we had no family models. So not feeling their control inputs was very familiar to me. 'nuff of that.

Rely on the instruments? Hell, the tragedy started when the instruments became unreliable!! BEAM ME UP! So would you trust the speed and air data after the A/P disconnected and then the PF states we're in alternate law? Then we have stall warnings and other chimes.

Those that have not flown FBW still need to realize that even in the Airbus "direct" law, the computers still modify the control surface deflections and deflection rates. To wit from FCOM manual I have:

- "In all configurations elevator deflection varies as a function of aircraft C.G."

- Roll rate commands are limited in ALT 2 depending upon gains and configuration". 20 - 25 deg/sec compared to 15 deg/sec in "normal". So roll is not a direct movement of the ailerons/spoilers WRT to stick inputs.

Finally, this old curmudgeon is not anti-Airbus. I crowed about the A320 with partners of mine on our first flight in one of them. Asked them to look at the ailerons and spoilers moving to keep bank angle constant even in mild turbulence. Small movements not possible with the older systems. I gained a lot of respect for the GD folks that did the Viper system after a few minutes flying the beast. I gained more after my leading edge flap failure ( see my bio on my profile).

I simply feel that there are too many protections that are different between all the reversion laws. For example, why the change in roll rates? Why keep changing things when air data is deemed unreliable by HAL ( had to get that in for Doze, heh heh) versus switching to a simple standby gains vale or all the gains and such? And the beat goes on...

And then there's the issue, a big one, of crew training for worst case scenarios, and that may be a major recommendation of the accident board, IMHO.

Gotta go, and I only have a basic B.S. in the academic arena, but prolly a PhD in the real world school.

@Franzl, CONF:

The precise position of the stick is considerably less important than being able to work out that the stick is not where it should be. Once that is ascertained, then the only logical recourse is "I have control".

This isn't a trainer, where the junior pilot follows through his senior's movements - this is line flying, and if your colleague is not successfully controlling the aircraft into a recovery, then they have no business continuing to do so.

Also, CONF - if you use the Search function - my username plus the keyword "yoke", you have instant access to everything I've ever said on the matter, including conversations with you. I'm not going to be your monkey by rehashing it again.

O.C.
Only partially correct I think. Up until the stall, the instruments did tell the story of what the inputs were.

After the stall, the aircraft began to act perversely in roll and pitch, and at that point, the control inputs were masked by the aircraft's gyrations.

This must have been immensely confusing to both the PF and PNF.:ooh:

So consider me as being yours as such search has been done for awhile now ... but nowhere could be spot a comment how my statement "Sidestick is a sure way to waste valuable information in a multi crew operation" could be erroneous.

Retired F4
Both the PF and PNF have displays with the same instrumentation on them. Your artificial horizon will tell you if the plane is climbing or banking. You derive your rate of climb (or descent) or descent from your altimeter. Your bank rate from your rate of turn indicator. These are reliable and accurate instruments. They are not affected by UAS. Anyone who doesn't rely on their instruments ends up in a dangerous situation.

The danger of one taking himself waaay tooooo seriously is the exhibiting of ridiculous patronizing attitudes.

The "enhancements" of the next versions/generations speak and will speak by themselves.

Your very recent posts, like many in the past, on the SS topic are another crude example of your ignoring factual elements, and not producing any countering factual elements, at a "n" iteration.

It does not really matter if it's caused by a lack of comprehension, a lack of technical expertise, or ill intentioned tactics. The predominant appearance of spreading a smoke screen over a few problems is counter productive not only for those very few problems, but the entire Airbus technology, as it reflects badly on the many things that are good.

No.

It's not Direct or Indirect Input.

It is perhaps too abstract, and a terminology that is not part of your profession.

It is Direct versus Indirect Information Transfer.

If B is interested in information about A, it can have a Direct information exchange from A to B, which is not altered by any intermediate agent.

An Indirect information exchange involves one or more intermediate agents - let's say C, D, E, F, G. Each intermediate agents transform, translate, or process the information as part of the transfer. C, D, E, F, and G transforming, translating, or processing, is introducing distortions, and errors. Consequently, when the information arrives to B from A, via C, D, E, F, and G, it can be distorted or altered significantly.

No.

The KEY is the visual contact, the visual perception.

In case of a blinding attack, the instruments are not good at anything.

The panic, tension, stress, are affecting the visual perception.

Instruments can be inaccurate, can be fooled. They show data collected by sensors, processed by sensor data processing units, and as such they can be fooled by malfunction of sensors, by margin of errors in the processing algorithms, etc... This was the case with the AF447 out of specs AOA.

See also Machinbird's post.

You're missing the point, you're missing the difference between Direct and Indirect Information Transfer.

The direct visual contact of the PNF with the PF's SS, yoke, or whatever other control mechanism is in the cockpit, is a Direct Information Transfer - from A (SS of PF) to B (PNF).

The reading of instruments, is Indirect Information Transfer - from A to B, via C, D, E, F, G etc.... , because, the instruments don't show directly the PF actions on the SS, but rather the effects of the PF's SS actions onto the deflective surfaces, along with effects onto the A/C attitude, A/C speed, etc,... (which combine other controls, like throttle, trim, etc...) Information about those effects is collected by the A/C sensors, each sensor with its margin of errors, and passed to the sensor data processing units, and so on, (with each sensor data processing algorithm having its own margin of errors).....

Finally, the PNF reading the instruments need to make a mental translation of the instrument readings into PF SS actions. For accuracy,
the PNF need to exclude the effects of the PF actions on Throttle, or trim, or others... That is in fact impossible....

As you can see - if you're willing to - the Indirect Information Transfer is not only so convoluted, that by now, we've probably forgot that the PNF was just interested in the PF's actions onto the SS,.... but it is introducing the effects of other controls than the SS, which is impossible to determine only from a reading of the instruments......:ugh:

CONF:

With the SS full forward, I would expect the elevators to be full leading edge up for a simulator full nose down command, and be displayed as such on the SD.

One then would in general expect the nose of the simulator to follow this command. Why it didn't in the 330 and evidently did in the 320 is what's at issue.

As far as SS commanded proportional 'G' and the THS, what was the 'G' indication in the Flight Data block during the full nose down SS command prior to manual re-trim?

:)

I am afraid you misunderstand the situation - it is not about information transfer it is about information interpretation. How you judge the information you receive is the important factor. A yoke does not add any advantage because the interpreter of the position may well differ in where he sees the position of the yoke and the threat or otherwise it represents. If you think of visual perception as reliable I would point out that an instrument is a much more likely to be read reliably than the position of a yoke.
Now I assume you are not a pilot otherwise I would not need to explain this. At night without any visual references it is easy to become disoriented. This is where the aircraft instruments come into play. Running off separate reliable mechanical or electronic inputs they give an accurate and measured stream of information which a trained pilot can use to fly an aircraft safely. If one instrument does prove to be unreliable then there is enough redundancy in the others to enable the pilot to fly the aircraft smoothly. It is important to remember that the instruments are not an indirect transfer but a reliable indicator of the state of the aircraft at the time. Over many years instruments have been refined so that they are more accurate than human perception.
Of course to use your instruments requires training and cockpit discipline. The mode of input for control directives is actually irrelevant and comes down to preference. Your direct v indirect information transfer is one of the shoal of red herrings. It falls at the hurdle of interpretation. There is clear evidence that the PNF was aware what was happening with the aircraft. How was this - he couldn't see the sidestick but he could see the instruments and they gave him the information he needed. His actions and later perceptions were not sufficient but this does not alter the fact that he knew there was something wrong very rapidly. The PF does not seem to have looked at his instruments at all and this is a clear training failure for which the airline must also be held responsible.
You also owe Dozy an apology - of the non-pilots he is perhaps the one who has understood the dynamics of the accident clearly. It was human generated in a situation which was clearly survivable if the crew had been adequate.