Wrong again, pedantically speaking.

High speed stability can be available in ALT2.

(You're welcome in advance.)

CHRASTRISTICS OF A GOOD PILOT....
 

HELLO.

HAPPY NEW YEAR MY DEAR FRIENDS.

i have a simple question....

What do you think about chrastristics of a good pilot?!

who is a good pilot in todays aviation?and what items do you think a pilot

should have to flying safe?!

- what is the relationship between technology and pilots ability in future ......

OF makes a general speech or lecture
 

In response to very little, I am moved to post my overall take on all this. I am continually surprised at the polarization of views about this horrible crash. That is, the tendency by some to be in one of two camps, i.e., either the pilots were incompetent or the airplane was at fault. (I realize that not all of you feel that way.) Somebody once said that a measure of intelligence is one's ability to hold more than one opposing ideas in his/her head. Such is the case here.

I firmly believe that all of the below are true, except for one thing that has yet to be determined, item 3*:

1. The pilots were not competent to hand-fly in difficult conditions at cruise, probably caused the upset, and were not trained properly to recover, by Air France or anyone else.
2. The pilots were not capable for some reason (see point #3) of ascertaining their situation.
3.* (My own speculation) I am not necessarily buying-into the idea that PF had proper indications. The evidence on that is very unclear (of course there is no recording of his instrument readings). There is anecdotal evidence that either view could be true (from recorded conversations that may or may not be complete). I'm also puzzled by the complete acceptance of the contention that Bonin made all of these crazy inputs. I've seen NO discussion of the methods of recording his input data. What if the plane did it? Do we really know??? Are the stick sensors coupled directly to the stick?
4. It is "obvious" to me that, despite protestations of many excellent pilots right here in this forum, the Airbus control design, both software and hardware (SSs), is less "foolproof" than it could be. To say that "it's good enough if the pilot is good enough" is simply not good enough. 228 people and their loved ones would disagree with that attitude. While Rutan's comments struck me as being way off-base ("computer nerds"), I certainly agree with him about the "hidden" SSs being an insane idea.

I hope that the final BEA report will be utterly honest about ALL of the issues, but I'm not optimistic. I also hope I've successfully summed-up the issues.

Clandestino wrote:
I read Clandestino's comment as sarcastic. (?)

Large images
 

jcjeant - many thanks and much appreciated!

There is no evidence that the RH PFD or ND displayed erroneous information, apart from the air data derived information.

Had there been any significant discrepancy between the LH and RH displays an error message to that effect would have been generated. There is no record of any such messages.

The sidestick is mechanically connected to the transducers that transmits its position to the flight control system. The recorded position of the sidestick is just that.

Reply to Herr Spinkleman
 

As far as I'm concerned, PF's actions are evidence.

OK, that is convincing, thanks.

Good info, then I can put that doubt to rest!

I am so relieved.

Just a small point: +17.9 ANU was reached at 2h11min07, about 10 seconds after the airplane stalled. More seriously: Perhaps 'believed' is not the right description, maybe his memorization of the UAS 'drill' did not go past the first line. Much has been written about the first seconds following A/P disconnect and the confusion and incomprehension that followed the stall, but in comparison very little about the stall itself. By 2h10min40 the PF had mastered the lateral control problem, his speed (F/O airdata on 3) still erroneous, the PNF had told him "watch your speed, you're climbing, go back down", in the next 10 seconds the PF had responded by reducing the pitch attitude to 6 degrees and the RoC to 1100 fpm. Why on earth did he start pulling again at that point?

Mr/Ms Destino would have to confirm that.

This is possibly why the Flight Director commands were still an issue as of Interim #3.

Spinkleman again
 

Gee, thanks so much for your sarcasm. :*

I asked the question because, in thousands of posts, it hadn't been mentioned once, until now.

Having followed these AF447 threads for a while it is abundantly clear that repetition is the fuel that keeps them going.

Anything and everything have been discussed and dissected numerous times before. There seems to be a collective suffering of alzheimers where everything have to be rediscovered after 5 or 10 pages of posts.

Your queries about displays and sidestick have, I am quite sure, been discussed several times before with the inclusion of detailed schematics and drawings.

I quite agree. It is indeed frustrating; however, some of these posters were not here in the beginning of the thread(s). I was.

But...
I have been here from the beginning, read all of the posts and studied all the diagrams, and there's nothing wrong with my memory. The diagram of the sidestick was quite interesting, but, and you force me to repeat myself, the source of the SS input data has NOT ever been discussed. Not once. I invite you to prove me wrong, since I'm now annoyed.

I made no "query" about the PF's instruments, only stated that what he saw is unknown, despite your reasoning that if they had disagreed, the error would have been noted (new info for me). Numerous ppl here have mentioned this concern. It is a fact that we do not know what Bonin saw on his screens.

Go take a happy pill or something. Where is the "rude" icon? :hmm:

to Iceman50:

1. I flew he MD11, the 330 and the T7
2. I was not talking about shakers or pushers. I was talking about the other stick repeating the input.
3. Military aircraft are per design unstable, so fbw is vital. Not so airliners, they are supposed to be stable and flyable in direct law or similar, meaning without computer aided stability.

1. A red button would not be dangerous, otherwise there would not be the bulletin instructing how to get to direct law by prim/sec switching. It would be on the contrary less complicated!
2. As for being more dangerous leading to major incidents: Just look at the irony you're raising. The pilot is supposed to be the last resort, even switching off all automatics to save the day. Now you're implicating that such a function is inherently dangerous! Either the last resort and responsible is the pilot, then he needs FULL authority, or he needs to be protected by the system not to screw up. But then let the system sign the log and the flight plan.

You can't have it both ways!!

I guess this is the fundamental philosophical dissent I am pointing at.
I can accept pilots liking the design. I don't, and by not liking it, I try to point out why, flak accepted.

Been away from the AF447 threads for some months and feeling a bit overwhelmed with all the posts since... I would need to update an outdated article on the subject; could someone please make a short recap (even just pointers) on the latest established facts with possible sources (roughly since discovery of hull). Thanks

AF 447. Significant events. Chronology
 

Here it is. French language : http://henrimarnetcornus.20minutes-b.../635609811.pdf

Caygill
 

Be careful of SPA83. You asked for established facts. He's offering you a fair dose of opinion. I didn't say biased, you make up your own mind.

SPA83 "forgets" to mention that the PF caused the stall, yet accuses the BEA of lying.

oganfreak
 

Does it matter what the PF had on his screens. Nowhere in the report is there a mention of electrical failure. So at all times PF had a standby horizon and compass and two perfectly functioning engines, and control of the flying surfaces in Alt law.
Should be enough for two experienced pilots to avoid a stall.
Not flown the Airbus but on all the jets I have flown we had a memory item for attitude and power settings for loss of airspeed indications. Presumably the same in this airline?

At that time, he is not pulling that much, he's pushing as well, not as much, but still.
One minute later at time 2.11.40 there is no ambiguity anymore, it is all for nose up now. It seems to match with the time the airplane is passing through the initial 350 Flight Level as most probably still indicated in the altitude window of the FCU. Is the PF simply following the FD commands ... ?