The nose wheel is still operated by the pedals however the authority of the pedals in relation to the nose wheel is reduced. All other items you mentioned are operated by the other hand. Check out that other video posted above. That is (In my opinion) the correct procedure. If there was any kind of a crosswind the controls would (should) have been used to counter the cross wind. ALL of them. By the way the control movements in the 73 may seem excessive (I don't really think so) but they were no way even close the the other captain flying the F100 or the AB. Again my opinion. BTW this is not ATPL stuff, this is basic C150 technique. Forgive me please in hijacking the thread.

Fitter 2:

Throttles/brakes/spoilers are controlled with the other hand. The yoke needs strong forward pressure in some airplanes to assure the nose stays down at higher speeds and places enough load on the nose wheel so limited rudder pedal steering steering of the nose wheel is effective. In a strong crosswind the ailerons have to be used to counter a strong crosswind until the aircraft has slowed down.

In a small airplane ailerons are used even to taxi in strong wind conditions.

I am not sure why these videos (interesting though they are) are being shown with reference to the AF mayo comments. I think we all know that inputs at slow speeds on finals are different and have different results than inputs at Mach .8 at fl350! Just sayin...

If they were indeed doing "their best" as you say, don't you think that it is a little disquieting that 3 qualified experienced pilots "doing their best" still managed to lose control of ( & fail to regain control of) a modern wide bodied transport @38,000ft, & subsequently remain in a stalled state until impact with the ocean, due to what initially appears to be mere loss of airspeed indications.
Most of what is written on this thread is in the vein of incredulous disbelief that this could have happened.

"There but for the grace of God" & all that, so probably worthy of a bit of dissection, even if a percentage of it is misguided & posted by some individuals who probably don't have much knowledge to add. But that is internet discussion forums Eh ? I remind you that reading them is also optional for you, if you don't like what you see.

That was the core of PF's (Bonin's) initial control problem that night, that and the fact that his initial lateral control correction was far too large.

In the clag and at night, the only feedback he had was PFD movement and 'seat of the pants'. By the time he saw movement on the PFD, the roll rate was significant. Since he was now in Alt 2 law, neutralizing the stick did not stop the roll rate (It was now a 'conventional' aircraft in roll response with somewhat higher responsiveness to stick input.) He had to then make a corresponding opposing control motion to stop the roll.

When you consider the lags that naturally occur in the display, in the human response to that display, in the controls themselves as they are ordered to a new position, and in the airframe attitude as it responds to the control inputs, you have a classical aircraft control stability situation. It can become unstable if certain parameters are exceeded. This is the basis of an earlier comment I made on an initial roll PIO looking like a real possibility based on my examination of the roll data. If you will remember, the third AF447 BEA report simulations addressed the pitch axis performance only and left the lateral channel to later.
A number of years ago, the USN Training command introduced a new visual simulator enhancement to their existing A-4 Skyhawk simulators. I was fortunate to have the opportunity to try out the new simulator variant (Mid '70s). The visual display took its cues from the simulator and navigated around a data base representing the local training area. Because computers of that day were relatively slow, there was a perceptible delay (~ 0.3 seconds) in updating aircraft attitude in the display. The delay was especially visible along the roll axis. This delay was vaguely disquieting while flying visually from the external references. One of the features was the ability to fly formation with another simulated aircraft. This did not work well.

When I attempted to fly formation, the lag cause an over response (visual result delayed) which caused me to apply a strong opposing control input (visual result delayed) which caused me to continue to respond in a manner that caused the oscillation to rapidly build.

The loss of roll stability was abrupt and was caused by my change in control strategy (higher gain) as I began to fly formation. After ~4 half cycles of oscillation I switched to the attitude indicator and the oscillation stopped. For those non-flyers reading, the situation was akin to tripping over something, beginning to fall, and looking desperately for something solid to hold onto.:eek:

It would be interesting to hear from others that have experience PIO in any of its many forms. It would also be interesting learn how much lag there is in updating the PFD display in the A330.

Machin(e)bird: :)

Here's the info from AC-25-11A, Electronic Flight Deck Displays:

from page 47,

In practicality there is not even a remotely discernible lag in relation to actual aircraft response on modern PFD's or HUD's.

I flew the old 'Vital 4' visual system on the A-7 simulator in the mid 70's, probably equivalent to your A-4 sim visual. Those were so bad, many people would develop a persistent dizziness bordering on nausea for hours at a time after the session. Our rule was you could not fly the actual aircraft on the same day after completing a simulator training period. :eek:

(I think if you grabbed hold of an Airbus SS you'd be somewhat underwhelmed by the roll responsiveness in roll direct, even at altitude. But indeed no doubt this can be a relative thing depending on background and training.)

Thank you OK465, that is useful data.:ok:
By itself, the display lag should not enable an oscillation. About what I was expecting.
I would personally expect somewhat ponderous response compared with the tactical aircraft and smaller transports that I've flown.

In Bonin's case, he had insufficient time to appreciate he was no longer in Normal law when he made his initial roll correction. I can see how an assumption of being in Normal law could set him up for a roll PIO in Alt 2 law. (His initial input would be 'open loop'.)

Just because an aircraft is quite large is no reason to discount PIO. They PIO quite nicely judging from the record, particularly along the roll axis.

A330, if hand "fistively" flown on approach has a tendency to pio. It is even worse at high altitude. You have to fly it gently & accurately. Then it is quite nice to fly in either normal,alternate & direct law.:ok:

IcePack, how come you know but Bonin (and maybe Robert) didn’t?

I’m not sniping at you or them, just pursuing a line I have before – should Bonin have had more training in hand flying, how could such training include high mach and altitude, did you explore this somehow on your own or has training changed, how much latitude is there for hand flying in line flying, etc.

Isn't that phrase actually a rude French euphemism for....well, something else which is totally unconnected with flying?

AF are anxious to prove that the accident was caused by something other than their poorly-trained pilots who clearly didn't understand the basics of flight. But try as they might, unlike their Concorde accident, this time they won't be able to.

Machinebird;

Thought I'd say hi.

Yes, you're correct. No input = no output in terms of pitch and roll. However, the controls themselves will be moving, albeit in tiny deflections, to maintain the last ordered bank angle and pitch attitude.

Not sure what is meant by "pulsing", but what is required to fly the Airbus series well and smoothly is a gentle, steady pressure...a "squeezing" of the stick in the desired direction, keeping in mind that ailerons and elevators are also moving to maintain the last ordered attitudes even while that attitude is changing as per stick orders...this is especially the case in turbulence*.

In Normal Law the sidestick is a roll-rate request in roll and a 'g'-loading request in pitch. In Alt II Law the autoflight system is in Roll Direct Law, or WYSIWYG Law... ;-) and the control deflection is proportional to the stick deflection, (and therefore one must be very gentle with the airplane especially at cruise altitudes). Pitch remains in a modified 'g' (load factor demand) law but,

"...with limited pitch rate feedback and gains, depending on speed and configuration."

The roll is sensitive in Direct Law and, with mis-handling, (or more bluntly, ham-fistedness), prone to PIO but I hasten to add that it is readily controllable, (positive, not neutral stability). Letting go the stick would be a good first response to any PIO in roll, (I understand the slight right roll of 8deg, but it is inexperience that induces the PIO, not the airplane. In fact, (and it has been discussed ad nauseum), there was no need to pitch the airplane up at all and roll control was/is straightforward).

The pilot who videoed himself flying the A320 should be embarrassed in demonstrating his atrocious "technique" to the world. The key is tiny movements, always, even on approach. Pushing the stick around like that would get a reviewed-standard on any sim ride as that means one doesn't understand fbw or the Airbus autoflight system very well.

On response, OK465's post highlights what I would have to say about displays and airplane response...neither are significant issues.

Yes. And over-controlling (leading to PIO) is easy to do but equally easy to stop. To mm43's comment, ". . . one has to wonder whether it is the visual search for reaction clues, rather than real SS feedback that leads to the "stirring" technique. ", it could be, if one is using outside (VMC) references, but not in my experience either in the aircraft or the sim in terms of the response of the PFD.


The fairly rapid response of the A330 in Roll Direct doesn't (or shouldn't!) lead to a loss of control but with inexperience and/or lack of training in actual hand-flying it can be momentarily disconcerting. Icepack is essentially saying the same things.

Someone asked about hand-flying experience... Typically, international crews get around 3 to 5 hours of hand-flying experience and perhaps 25 landings on average per year**. Domestic work will get substantially more...about 65 to 90 landings a month and much more hand-flying...difficult to estimate how much.

*When/if one has the opportunity to take a look at some flight data traces for an approach on a windy day, one can see how "calmly" the Airbus autoflight system moves the controls..."just enough" to maintain pitch and roll attitudes. The traces are very interesting once the autopilot is disconnected. The amplitude and frequency of the aileron (and even the spoiler) traces increase, the elevator less so, but higher than with the autopilot engaged. There, a lag in response (because the airplane is such a large mass), tends to make one believe that the airplane isn't responding to one's SS orders, so one 'gives more'...(done it...doesn't work!), and then over-controlling does become a bit of an issue if one isn't careful.

**Long-haul flying schedules yields about six flight legs per month, possibly eight or nine at the most. Split between two, possibly three pilots (depending upon whether the third is another F/O or is an RP who only sits up front during cruise), that gives about 3 takeoffs and landings per month per pilot.

Each takeoff is hand-flown but the autoflight is engaged pretty quickly after takeoff especially where departure routes are complex. Climb, cruise, descent and approach phases are typically on autoflight with the autopilot being disconnected around 400' AGL, sometimes a bit sooner, though usually not much later.

The takeoff and approach/landing phases are hand-flown for around 2 to 5 minutes at takeoff and about 30" to 1 minute on the approach and landing. At the very most, airline pilots flying long-haul may get 6 to 8 minutes of low-level hand-flying per leg.

Three legs per month means perhaps 20 minutes of hand-flying, or about 200 minutes (just over 3 hours) per year of handling the flight controls.

Again for domestic the opportunities are vastly greater and more difficult to estimate but my guess would be around 80 to 100hrs of actual hand-flying per year for busy domestic schedules.

Hand-flying is rarely given/taught/provided for in recurrent simulator sessions which is a shame because it is the only real opportunity to try one's hand especially with Level D simulators providing the opportunity to practise visual approaches.

This is a fun video...


...of a Brazilian Airbus 320, but I've never seen so much stick-pulsing in my life, short of extreme formation flying.

Even in gusty conditions (like here, apparently)?

chrisN, all aircraft i've flown i always want to see how they handle at altitude so i don't get a big surprise one day. I think everyone should hand fly a 2000 ft level change at 38000 ft +every now and again.
Sim's are no use as they handle the same at 5000 ft as they do at 41000 ft. which actually i find criminal, as the authorities don't insist the algorithms being programed. Also these days the snitch box (QAR) will tell on you for taking the automatics out at height, but luckily I fly for a decent airline that will turn a blind eye to the ah hem the tech log knocking the auto pilot off. As for Bonnin, i do not wish to talk ill of the dead but i expect he had none or very very little stick time at high altitude.

You're not allowed to do that in RVSM.

I know ! read my ah hem bit:rolleyes:

Crosswinds while flying 2,500 feet over Rio? And if that's a crosswind landing, it the most stable, dead-nuts straight down the centerline, wings-level one I've ever seen...

CVR !
 

They are so many strange things in this upset, that we really cannot judge the situation without the ORAL CVR : The first question to be answered is why the BEA refuses absolutely to give it.

RVSM
 

Hello Penko,

In RVSM you are required to fly on automatic altitude KEEPING.

However, when you climb or descend, you are not KEEPING altitude, so there is no regulatory objection to hand flying climbs and descents in RVSM!

I would change your simulator manufacturer and/or change the tech pilots/engineers your company sends out to the vendor for factory acceptance testing.

In addition, if possible, change your monitoring authorities for good measure. :E

@ OK465
" [...] change your simulator manufacturer [...] the tech pilots/engineers your company sends [...] for factory acceptance testing. http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/sr...ilies/evil.gif, [...] your monitoring authorities"


I totaly agree with you !

IcePack, thanks.

Just as I suspected (and feared). I wonder if AF and others will change that now?

Hand Flying
 

What are the odds of requesting a block altitude and getting it like we used to do in the military? Wouldn't need to do it very long. Even 10 minutes worth would be significant.

Perhaps with a little planning, you can get your hand flying time in that way.

@ penko
 

Are you allowed to dive in the ocean ? Just train ! :}

Icepack;

Re, "Sim's are no use as they handle the same at 5000 ft as they do at 41000 ft. which actually i find criminal, as the authorities don't insist the algorithms being programed. "

Are you certain of this? There are areas in which simulators do not have data (behaviour at/during the stall, discussed in earlier threads and verified with CAE) but I would have thought that in Level D sims at least, aircraft behaviour at high altitudes vice low altitudes would have been easily reproduced and even required. Just one example..., one may pull hard on the controls, (here, the side stick), and may approach or even exceed the stall AoA in thinner air while at 5000ft that likely isn' t the case. I would think that would have to be reproduced accurately.

Sims are for checkrides. Not for high altitude training. We don't train for high altitude because it isn't required and most pilots can figure it out without a simulator. Most of us push forward in a stall so high altitude training isn't required.

In 1991 the FAA published a list of requirements for Level A, B, C and D simulators.

The following extract on aerodynamic modeling implies the Level D simulator must replicate the airframe real-life performance through the full range of ALT and MACH values.

Hi PJ2, Thank you for confirming my understanding of 'Bus roll control response, and refuting my understanding that a pulsing technique was the norm with the Airbus. I guess a lot of these videos by Airbus crew are demonstrating an incorrect technique in hand flying. Looks like there is need for improvement.
The BEA third interim report data clearly indicates that Bonin set up a roll oscillation (or rather a series of them) immediately upon taking control. He did not stop making inputs to regain control, but instead accelerated his inputs to "get ahead" of the oscillation which he eventually did. This is the period that the aircraft started going for the Moon. It is likely that a pilot encountering roll PIO would face an extremely high workload during the oscillations and would also have his faith in the correct functioning of the controls shaken.

It seems clear that he had not received training in manual flight at altitude in either Normal or Alt 2 law, but also, he had not been properly trained to recognize/avoid and stop a PIO. (Or a stall for that matter.:mad:)

How many present line pilots have received any formal training with regard to PIO causes and correction? There may be yet more lessons we need to take away from the AF447 accident.

That makes logical sense mm43, thank you.

Hello Machinbird.

From my recurrent training and experience in the A330 Level D sim, roll oscillations weren't difficult to control even if one kept at it (waggling the stick) for a period of time instead of freezing the stick/wheel and making one opposing input, (as Davies suggested in HtBJ) to halt the pattern.

Such side-to-side action (there is a graph on one of the threads showing the exact input/pathway of the stick), on the stick does not lead to a pitch-up although a change in pitch attitude may incidently occur and if so it, pitch, is very controllable.

The airplane is sensitive but not that sensitive so as to lose control either in pitch or roll. Such "inadvertent" inputs are not, and were not "dramatic". They lead neither easily nor rapidly to a continuous pitch up to the stall nor would such sensitivities keep it there, at a 16deg pitch attitude.

That there was PIO there is little doubt but it is efficiently controllable and does not lead to a loss of control without other factors intervening in pilot awareness and recovery efforts. Up until the continuous NU inputs and the rapid loss of energy and perhaps even near the apogee, the data does not indicate a complete (irrecoverable) loss of control.

Having flown many other types, I strongly suspect this is the same with other transport aircraft such as the B767, B777 and so on. The Airborne Express DC8 accident has been mentioned numerous times.

Similarities to N827AX
 

Hi,

The Airborne Express DC8 accident has been mentioned numerous times.

That there was PIO there is little doubt...

Probabily contributing to the behavior of PF that constantly tried to "feel" the plane applying large inputs. In a complex "flying System" designed for smooth and careful SS inputs in a very difficult environment (inside and outside the cockpit)

The apps training site linked in the previous post led me to this fascinating article on the topic of upset training.
AeroSafety World: Guidelines in Upset Recovery Training | APS Emergency Maneuver Training

A thorough reading of it gives me utter sympathy for the pilots of AF447, who clearly were not properly trained to get out of that situation. The recovery protocols previously taught were described as "outmoded."

Triple redundant subheated AS probes prone to fail SIMULTANEOUSLY
 

were not properly trained

Or simply NOT TRAINED at all for the situation.

Remember the 30+ UAS previous incidents.

:E

Murphy law never fail and frequently we are warned in advance.

Airbus SAS had opportunity to tackle the serious issue with the aircraft operators.

And in the end, again, PILOT ERROR very probably will be the conclusion. :}

I was just thumbing through my copy of "Aviation Safety and Pilot Control" by the National Research Council. There were an interesting couple of paragraphs that I will quote:
Time marches on and technology improves, but I suspect that the ability of simulators to reliably simulate PIO characteristics still lags.:suspect:

At what point pilots should become responsible (plus the plane, cargo and innocent passengers) for a potentially life and death inherent condition of their chosen careers? At what point is being a pilot a routine and mundane (meaning: common; ordinary; banal; unimaginative) truck driving job (no disrespect to truck driving mind you)? Assuming a pilot gets training to avoid stalls during takeoffs and landings, how long before they should start wondering what to do when a stall happens during cruising altitude? When does a pilot should realize that he/she is front row in case something goes terribly wrong?

If we pick a class of 50 pupils and they all pass finals, are we really believing that all fifty came out equally? With absolutely the same level of knowledge and understanding? Do we close the school if we find out that the truth is less than fifty?

Why did the captain of the AF447 asked the younger copilot if his papers as a pilot were on the system that night? :suspect:

It's weird.. indeed ...
Even the Taxi in UK have this on their car :
http://i.imgur.com/NvtsF.jpg

Why not put same label for the pilots license on the aircraft door ?
So the passengers (and incidentally the crew) will know who is in charge aboard :)

It might point out that:

Dubois never flew with Bonin before and it appears the Captain was not impressed with the copilot performance during the first four hours of the flight. Bonin kept nagging the Captain to go higher to avoid the storm by going over it even when the instrument showed 36,000' was the Max at the time only. Due to weight still. Also, ATC communications with Senegal for any altitude change request was not available due to the distance (temp black out). But 1,000' higher wouldn't had done a lot of difference anyhow.

When Robert sat on the left seat the first thing he did was to adjust the weather radar which looks to me, Dubois conducted the flight in a straight line to Bordeaux kind of set of mind. Dubois had Cape Verde, Canary Islands, Portugal and Spain to choose from to compensate for any lack of fuel in the worst case scenario. Better to be late than to be dead, right? That night little things started adding up fast.

Bad all around it.

VGCM66
False ....
In the first BEA report you can read: (Page 15/128)
Dubois know Bonin (and Robert)
Never tell never :)

The sentence should have read:

"It looks like Dubois never flew with Bonin before and it appears the Captain was not..."

as per my intention when I wrote it. One flight in or even round trip wouldn't have been enough. Just reading between the lines of the report as everybody else. Good catch though, thanks. BTW, Dubois could have known Robert at any rate but I didn't get the same impression with Bonin while reading the report. Maybe they all did knew each other from before. Probably also the flight into Brazil was in day light, big difference.

Something seems to be badly amiss with AF rostering etc if a Captain does not know before he leaves Paris/Rio what his crew qualifications for 'rest relief' are? What if the co-pilot had said 'No I am not qualified' as they passed FL350 off the coast?

I am not sure that this is really a Flight rostering issue. Are Air France not obliged by law to inform the Captain of a departing flight of the full qualifications of the other subordinates flying with him in as part of his flight team.
The point raised above is absolutely frightening, the Captain should have all these details available to him prior to briefing his Flight Crew on their flying duties on the forthcoming leg of their flight.
Reference the question that was asked of Bonin on the flight deck. It would have been a far more appropriate question to be asked at the pre-flight briefing in Rio de Janeiro.