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-   -   AF447 final crew conversation - Thread No. 1 (https://www.pprune.org/tech-log/466259-af447-final-crew-conversation-thread-no-1-a.html)

Lyman 28th Oct 2011 19:02

Nothing. What makes you think he did not? Seat #2 had no belts attached at impact, why do people assume Captain did not take RHS? Or, for that matter his own seat, #1? How does any of the dialogue disqualify such a supposition?

Hamburt Spinkleman 28th Oct 2011 19:05


Originally Posted by SLFinAZ
The CVR has multiple mentions of urgent "requests" to get the nose down.

Not really. There are commands to "go back down" while the aircraft is climbing. After the altitude has peaked the concern shifts towards keeping the wings level.

At no time is there any direct mention of pitch attitude or expressed concern about the pitch attitude.

Aileron Drag 28th Oct 2011 19:25


At the end of the day the Captains decision to place the least qualified officer on the flight deck "in command" was the critical hole in the cheese (in combination with the CRM deficiencies that precluded the PM from assuming control).
It doesn't matter a damn who the guy nominated as his replacement i/c.

With an aircraft approaching the ITCZ, and with two F/Os of limited nouse, there is no way that captain should have left the flight deck.

Many times have I been in a similar position. I would say, "Oh, I'm not tired, I'll chill out here....", or some such.

I would only ever leave the flight deck if there was at least one 'hairy old SFO' there, and even then ONLY if there were ZERO tech or wx problems.

This captain must have been barking mad to have left the flight deck for his 'rest' whilst the wx radar was a mass of red and purple.

Lyman 28th Oct 2011 19:28

Of the several salient FAILS, Aileron Drag, that might be Numero Uno.

+1

BUT, not just to bird dog the FOs. It was the ship that needed tending, also. It may even have been too much for all three. We know that because it was too much for all three at the end. Unless one can pinpoint the transition from sweet to bitchy, the answers are in flow.

imho.

mbar 28th Oct 2011 19:28


At no time is there any direct mention of pitch attitude or expressed concern about the pitch attitude.
But there is. Almost at the end.

Aileron Drag 28th Oct 2011 19:37

Lyman, you're right, but if the captain had never left the flight deck, he probably would have prevented the initial pitch up, and would have been 'oriented' as to the developing problem.

Hamburt Spinkleman 28th Oct 2011 19:43


Originally Posted by Lyman
What makes you think he did not?

The CVR transcript makes it clear that he did not. It is quite remarkable what can be learned if the available data is relied upon rather than guesswork.

mbar, yes at the very end the Captain does mention pitch and commands a specific pitch attitude. However, neither the PF or the PM does despite there being at least 20 major pitch changes of 10 degrees or more with pitch varying between approx -10 to +20 in the 4:30 minutes that elapses from A/P disconnection to impact.

Lyman 28th Oct 2011 20:06

Well, there would have been a relief seat switch anyways, but if the Captain had remained, he still has the chronic problem of the invisible stick, and the PF's screen snafus? Would not PF have been PF anyway?

You're on the money. Had he been in the middle seat, just for a while, I think 447 lands in Paris. He would not have tolerated the confusion and the improper division of skills/responsibilities. That he left as though the challenges were ho-hum was incredibly shortsighted. imo.

Herr Spinkleman: The PF's screen was not recorded, and his apparent confusion suggests he did not have full panel, PLUS, the PNF "I will give you ATT". Why do that, if he had PITCH? Why the stick work that suggests he could not suss PITCH?

iceman50 29th Oct 2011 05:04

Lyman

For goodness sake give it up! You contradict yourself continually and come up with all these weird and wonderful theories that have no basis in fact. If the PF had NO attitude indicator and STILL kept control then he would have been criminally negligent, there is NO reason nor indication that the PF did NOT have a working PFD.

Razoray 29th Oct 2011 05:59

Slickster:

I find it very difficult to believe that any pilot of my 737 would sit there, for three minutes, with the yoke in his stomach, the stick shaker rattling, and the altimeter unwinding. Boeings have their faults, and all automation has its traps, but this accident does nothing to quell my Luddite fears of Airbus.
I am not buying this theory. Yes I believe that a pilot on your 737 wouldn't do this. But I do not think this relates to AF447.
The PF was confused and he clearly states that he had been pulling back for over 3 minutes. It is hard to believe neither the Captain nor the PM had any idea of these actions and didn't try to correct them. Pulling back a yoke or pulling back a side-stick equal the same action...pulling back! I cant blame the aircraft for this.
Either the PM or the Captain should have clearly directed the PF on what to do, or taken the controls the second the sh#*t started hitting the fan...I would expect this type of response on any type of flight deck.

fireflybob 29th Oct 2011 06:29


Either the PM or the Captain should have clearly directed the PF on what to do, or taken the controls the second the sh#*t started hitting the fan...I would expect this type of response on any type of flight deck.
Razorray, good point - have we got too carried away with all the touchy-feely crm stuff? Logic surely says the more experienced FO who was in the seat he was used to should have taken over.

worrier 29th Oct 2011 08:22

"Razorray, good point - have we got too carried away with all the touchy-feely crm stuff? Logic surely says the more experienced FO who was in the seat he was used to should have taken over."

Its been reported that the PF (Bonin, the least experienced) was in the right seat and the PNF (Robert) in the left. Apparently Robert was woken up and then he swapped with Dubois while Bonin stayed in his seat. Presumably Dubois gave Bonin authority because he provided continuity when the crew changed.

Razoray 29th Oct 2011 08:34


Its been reported that the PF (Bonin, the least experienced) was in the right seat and the PNF (Robert) in the left. Apparently Robert was woken up and then he swapped with Dubois while Bonin stayed in his seat. Presumably Dubois gave Bonin authority because he provided continuity when the crew changed.
Apparently it was Dubois worst executive decision ever. I could see letting Bonin Fly if Dubois stayed in the cockpit, but with weather approaching he should have handed the controls to the most experienced pilot.
Continuity? Who needs continuity...the A330 was flying itself...right :confused:

Class_Y 29th Oct 2011 09:45

A lot of speculation. A lot of good guesses. A lot of confusion - not within the flight deck - but within this thread. :)

What are we going to do about it? Right. Let's try to get things together and wrap it up in a reasonable way. How? Take a look at the end of each and every AAR an there are the most important sentences:

Probable Cause

The [PPRuNe jury] determines that the probable cause of this accident was

- the pilot flying's inappropriate response to ... which led to aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover.
- Contributing to the accident were...

Who want's to give it a try?

Volunteers step forward!

Zorin_75 29th Oct 2011 10:20


The [PPRuNe jury] determines
There's an investigation going on, and a lot still not on the table yet, so what's wrong with waiting for the actual accident report?

Class_Y 29th Oct 2011 10:28

Nothing at all. It is just a proposal for having a more structured discussion after more than 500 postings...

Zorin_75 29th Oct 2011 11:13


after more than 500 postings...
Good one. I'm sure I've missed a few smaller threads, but there have been at least 28600 posts here on that subject so far...

Class_Y 29th Oct 2011 11:43

All the more time to put it all in a nutshell...

There are many very good postings all around the whole forum. They are bits and pieces of a broader picture. So why not use this source of "collective intelligence" to have a structured approach to these questions:

- What was the leading cause of the accident?
- What factors were just contributing to it?

...by interpreting what we know so far...

It would be quite interesting to compare the structured opinion of the forum to the final AAR.

CONF iture 29th Oct 2011 12:18


Originally Posted by Razoray
Pulling back a yoke or pulling back a side-stick equal the same action...pulling back!

HUGE difference :
  • One is fully obvious to all in the flightdeck.
  • The other is simply unvisible to all PNF.

Razoray 29th Oct 2011 12:19

Class Y,


It would be quite interesting to compare the structured opinion of the forum to the final AAR.
We know what happened. The only question is why did the PF pull back the stick. Right now no one knows the answer, and we may never know....:ugh:


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