- we've been round in so many circles here I am obviously getting dizzy (just like dat OOZ bird).

I thought PNF was 'Relief Captain'? To save me looking back, GC- you are saying PF(RHS) was?

BOAC,

If its like my previous company the Acting PIC (relief Capt) could only act in that role if they were sat in their trained seat. i.e f/o will be APIC & PF in the RHS.

Whatever his licenses say, 228 people think that this pilot was unqualified.

I do strongly believe that the AB interface was a contributory factor, but a pilot well-trained in all phases of hand-flying would likely have saved the day.

As for seating protocol, when one is about to die, WHO CARES???

(Just adding a new factor to argue about. ;)

Gerard C and BOAC:

I seem to recall that there was a segment of CVR that showed Commander Dubois asking PF FO Bonin if he was qualified to fly as PIC, to which Bonin said yes. IIRC all that, Dubois then told Bonin in RHS that he was in charge.

I can’t find the CVR transcript portion with that in, but if I’m wrong no doubt somebody will correct me.

ChrisN;

The following is the first para on page 73 of BEA's Interim Report No.3 :-

I will always ask (until the BEA final report) why this partcular point was not specified in the interim report N°1 page 17 (report published BEFORE the FDR-CVR recovery) ?

MM43, thanks. That was probably what I was recalling.

Captplaystation: "Some on here seem to have problems with that & think" all crew should be capable of flying" / "crew must respect the rest allocation to be rested for arrival" etc.
I don't think this situation was one where respecting anyones sensibilities was of any importance, the most senior guy (who is payed to be in charge/paid to ensure safety) should have taken a hold of the damn thing. . . on the 2nd point, the arrival, & how rested you feel for it,is of little relevance, if, in the meantime, you dump the ship in the ocean."
-----------------
Thanks for that, I find it convincing. I had felt that the Captain probably didn't have the time and information to take a front seat and assume command but it seems that many experienced pilots here take a different view.

Certainly as pilots we are all trained to analyze and deal with unusual attitudes in a few seconds, under the hood at the very least. I've never had to deal with an unusual attitude in clag but I hope I'd benefit from my training, even as an humble 172 IR pilot.

Good discussion.

I don't know if it has been discussed but could someone tell me what kind of seat-of-the-pants sensation the pilots were experiencing with a 10,000fpm descent? Were they in a "steady-state" of some kind with no sensations?

I know this is probably a matter of physics.

Furthermore, it would seem that there was very little wind noise on the flight deck given the lack of forward speed. Another vital clue missed?

Once stabilized in the 10,000 fpm descent, they were experiencing ~1 g. Since the aircraft was generating much less lift with the wings and much more drag with the fuselage (a form of lift since their velocity vector was pointed very downward) the direction of the 1 g would be biased off toward the direction of any bank, but because the aircraft was still generating some lift with the wings, the 1 g vector did not point to the center of the earth. So 60 degrees of bank may have felt like ~25 degrees of lean.

There was a leaked statement regarding noise level in the cockpit. Apparently the airflow around the cockpit was very tubulent and generated significant airstream noise. Probably the genesis of PF's comment about having some "crazy speed".

very interesting. So after an initial sense of falling (after they reached their crazy 7,000fpm climb to FL375 and then dropped at -10,00fpm) with the inflexion attributed perhaps to turbulence, I take it to mean that there were no sensations?

And the captain could walk back from his rest bunk and into the cockpit while all this was going on?

Pretty incredible.

maajam
 

I think you have that a touch wrong.

The 7000 ft/min climb followed by a 10,000 ft/min descent, plus turbulence, would have had me out of the bunk like a shot.

Of course once established in the 1g environment of a 10.000 ft/min descent I would easily walk to the flight deck.

Then I would try to understand what was happening - not easy having just woken up with probably less than 2 mins to impact (correct me if I am wrong).

Interesting post. If you look at the FDR output, any conscious pilot would surely have been aware of the remarkable accelerations associated with the zoom climb and initial descent. If the Captain was awake you would hope he would have taken this awareness with him into the cockpit.

If he was indeed aware, it's a great pity a certain explanation didn't occur to him (or so it seems from the CVR) - at least to the extent of making specific inquiries and taking the obvious actions to save the ship if necessary. The generous interpretation is that he was utterly naive about events preceding his entry into the cockpit. What if anything do we know about his state of consciousness at climb initiation?

Indeed you can be wrong
He never woken up as he certainly never hit his bunk and sleep
He had aboard his girlfriend and be sure (it is a human behavior) he paid visit to here after retiring from the flight deck.
Just to check the time gap between captain live and return to flight deck (it's in the preliminary report N°3 of BEA)

I think if he had been capt. for as long as he had been, sensations of climb and turbulence don't disturb you. Not even the sensation of descent -- it seems.

Didn't the pilot's keep asking where he was and whether he was coming or not?!

maajam wrote:
Ummmm.............
Because the airplane was at an assigned FL level that was limited by the air temp, the Captain had every right to expect the plane to stay at that level. And this was not a gentle adjustment, it was a "zoom climb."

If, as was just posted, he was in the cabin visiting with his girlfriend (first time I have read that), then it's obvious that he would not have heard the flight deck's summons in the rest area. Therefore, I can speculate that he most certainly did return to the FD because of the bottom dropping out.

Since at terminal velocity they felt ~1g, can the NU attitude have given them the sensation of acceleration? If it did, they totally disregarded what the instruments were telling them or the displays must have been faulty.

"....the displays must have been faulty."

May I suggest that faulty or not, by the time the stall was established the displays were so covered with multicoloured scrolling, flashing and changing alert-messages that it was hard to decipher anything at all, let alone the attitude indicator?

The independent sidesticks (fine for normal flight) were the last nail in the coffin.

???

Doesn't the A330 EADI have those red "chevrons" (if that is the correct word) pointing the way to lower/raise the nose?

Mac the Knife

Sorry, but wrong the "attitude indicator" would still be fully visible, there are some messages on the PFD, but not scrolling ECAM's.

I thought this issue had been cleared long time ago.

In june 2009(*), AF's SOP specified that the FO flying from the right seat was PF AND "relief captain" during captain's rest.

Unfortunately, you do not get a copy/translation of this part of AF OPS manual in BEA's report.

You can see from the CVR extract that the captain asked Bonin if he had an ATPL licence to confirm that this FO was qualified to do the job (PF + "relief captain" from the right seat) as per SOPs.

BEA has done a great job, so far, except for two misleading comments : For one very good reason : it is impossible to determine any kind of rigid "task-sharing" in the briefing room prior to departure.
Any pilot knows that.

Worse :

Quote:

---

The Captain’s departure was made without him leaving any clear operational instructions, in particular on the role of each of the two copilots. The absence of any formalised working framework for a crew made up of two copilots may have led to the non-optimal task-sharing observed between them.

---

The two FOs did not need any "instruction" since "the role of each of the two copilots" is (was) clearly specified in the company's SOP and NO exception is (was) possible. In june 2009(*), FOs were NOT trained to fly from the left seat and WERE trained to perform all "captain" duties from the right seat.

Hence, IMHO, the reluctance of the PNF to take over the controls from his "captain".

(*) : all this has been changed in the aftermath of the crash.

Thanks, Gerard - I did say I was 'confused' and I have caught up now.:)

You are welcome, BOAC.

Maajam,
I certainly wasn't implying that the Captain would have been "disturbed" by sensations of climbing or descending, only expressing the hope that he would have thought about their potential significance when called to the cockpit in this emergency very soon after experiencing them.

Anyway it's a minor point and one we can only speculate on since we know nothing about his state of mind before re-entering the cockpit.

GerardC
.. can you comment (or explain) the difference concerning Bonin certifications (licenses etc ..) in preliminary BEA reports N°1 and N°3 ?

Aside from having your ears "pop" as the pressure increases from, what is it, 8,000 feet altitude to sea level, if you're falling straight down, I'm not sure what would give you a clue aside from the altimeter.

This was a dark and stormy night, so remember external cues were non-existent.

I've always heard it called the "baby barometer" when infants wail on descent, as they are far less able to equalize the pressure differential in their ears as pressure increases.

This is why flight attendants used to hand out gum for children to chew ,which helps open the air channels, hence reduce pressure / pain / wailing, or at least let a child suck on something, be it a teething ring or momma's breast (discretely).

I don't think that anyone should read this thread anymore unless they have themselves locked in the dark in the cupboard under the stairs at 03.00, with their wife banging constantly on the outside, and occasionally opening it and shining a bright strobe light in their face, as they look at an adjacent iPad showing a picture of an A-300 instrument display.

Then try to read, and respond, coherently and accurately.

That's not to necessarily excuse this crew, but to try and realise some of the conditions that they were working under - maybe ?

YorkshireTyke:

Perhaps you have some emotional investment in this terrible crash.

Plain and simple, they couldn't handle a stall of their own making. Seems like a trend in the industry these days.

aterpster

The suggestion to be locked under the stairs is, of course, farcical, but it was first mooted to me many years ago by a retiring Captain, who said that he was going to do something like that every now and again in his retirement, with the occasional snack meal thrown in on a tray, so that he would never forget the terrible conditions that he had, at times, had to work under!

One of my early instructors expressed the opinion that one became 50% less intelligent as soon as the wheels left the ground, I thought he was being terribly rude about an early attempt at re-flight planning to a diversion, but over the years I learned what he was on about, under stress, and with everything apparently falling apart, there are times when the brain seizes up, and the Simulator can't think of everything during training.

I think there is little doubt now as to what happened, but do we know WHY ?

The technical investigation is over, but is is not time to now start the CRM, Human Factors, investigation into what made them act in the way they did ?

The Monday Morning Quarterbacks have the benefit of working in their air conditioned lounge, with subdued lighting, and soft music, maybe a beer or two at hand, a privilege denied that crew working during normal sleeping time, at night, in and out of the ITZ - we're told. Try doing it locked in a cupboard, as I suggested.

Apologies if this point of view has already been covered, I have neither the time nor the energy to trawl through the whole thread again !

Cheers.

There was nothing "plain and simple" about this accident. It doesn't require an "emotional investment" to hold that view, either.

:=

"Seems like a trend in the industry these days. "

Having read this thread from the start, this is, without a doubt, one of the scariest comments I've read thus far! :eek:

I believe that the flight crews forward planning carried out in Rio was not as it should have been.
Having seen the weather forecast for the flight and the problems that could be encountered flying in this area, a much clearer command and control structure should have been emphasized by the Captain of the aircraft. Especially concerning Command & Control of the aeroplane when he was absent from the Flightdeck.
Which brings me to another major issue I have, all the flight deck crew knew they were flying into weather problems. If they also knew that aircraft ahead of them had made course and altitude alterations to go round these serious weather issues, why was the same decision not made by this crew?

A lot of the problems here as far as I am concerned come down to poor forward planning and management by an experienced Captain in Air France.

The biggest problem for this captain was knowing when to let these two rookies take command of his aircraft without him babysitting them.

Sorry I do not work for BEA and I have no idea why Bonin's licence details were omitted in BEA report N°1.

IMHO, if something was wrong with Bonin's licence :
1 ) Bonin would NOT have told his captain that he was qualified to operate as "relief captain" ;
2 ) I have no doubt that BEA would already have raised the issue.
(We are now TWO and a half years after the crash ! Don't you think two and a half years are more than enough to double check all these licence details ?).

IMHO again, it is high time to put an end to this "urban legend", now.
For whatever reason Bonin's licence details were omitted in BEA's #1 report.
These details were mentioned in BEA's #3 report.
Full stop.

With respect, it doesn't actually matter too much, whether he held an ATPL/FATPL/CPL . . . Hell, even a PPL.

What assuredly mattered, was that, when handed the aircraft by the autopilot, following the instrument "wobblies," to handfly, he A- zoom climbed several FL's above the cleared one B - stalled C - failed to recognise he had & therefore D - failed to initiate any recovery action,& indeed continued with quite contrary control inputs.
Having read the other thread, a long way back, about instrument failure/false overspeed indications & uncommanded climb by the "wonder-plane", to counter this , perhaps uncharitable summary, & being something of a "Frog/Airbus conspiracy believer", I am willing to be disproved (indeed more willing than most)
In the absence of that, I have to say his performance was below that expected of a PPL student,never mind a PPL, so (the variety of) his licence? "frankly my dear, I don't give a damn"

Rookie? Babysit? Take command of his aircraft?! What planet do you live on? :ugh: In today's real world both pilots are equally qualified to fly the aeroplane the main difference being that one has to sign the paperwork. To assume only the Captain is truly capable of aviating is to ask for another AirBlue crash (next thread down) where it was actually the FO that could fly and the Captain that killed them all.

The crash itself was not caused by flying through the storm or the the Captain going to sleep, it was caused by two qualified pilots not recognising a stall. As playstation says any person qualified to fly any aeroplane should recognise a stall, one doesn't have to be a Captain.

GerardC
Just to put an end .. it's to not forget that is was the BEA that created this "urban legend"
No foot note (in the report N°3 ..as the BEA like so much) to explain the omitted detail in the preliminary report N°1

catplaystation
I'm certain that in the judicial process the lawyers will not "give a damn" and this "urban legend" will popup again .. unless it's some BEA foot note in the final report explaining the "printing error"...
It is the work of lawyers and judges to analyze each word printed in all reports submitted to them

I would be interested to know if this flight has been duplicated in the simulator and what reliable flight instruments and standby flight instruments the pilots had available to them to manually fly with on this black over water night flight?
It appears to me the handling pilot might have been told or had demonstrated to him that... in an emergency the Airbus would keep him safe if he applied thrust and pulled the side stick fully rearwards..... he appears to have done exactly this.
The other pilot (correct me please if necessary) does not seem to have taken over side stick priority as the situation got worse...and this raises the point with me just what sort of instrument scan was going on by both of them...and what instruments they had been taught they could absolutely trust in an emergency situation.......if any.
I ask as a Boeing pilot with no Airbus exposure.

Babotica, every airline I have flown with I would agree that the FO's are probably as qualified as the captain. Not in this case. They lost airspeed and the autopilot and immediately pulled the SS into a full stall. They gained 3,000 ft and held full back SS until impact minutes later. That is a fully competent crew? Come on. Without the autopilot they were not competent to fly the airplane as demonstrated clearly in this crash. This was a routine flight until they lost airspeed and autopilot. Then they needed someone who could hand fly by pitch and power until they got the airspeed and autopilot back. Nobody in the cockpit at that time could do that. Sad, isn't it?

In the sim ...
 

... I've flamed out one and then the other, failed the ISIS (standby instruments) and introduced unreliable airspeed on both sides though with different indications. In-flight start not successful and in instances when the crew has become completely confused, the aircraft has stalled and started its descent. The reaction from the more inexperienced has been to pull back on the stick.

This is left to continue until the suggestion is made to push the nose down. Lift is regained and they recover the 'aircraft'. (They then get an engine back etc) ...