The trick to recovering from a stall is to first recognize being in a stall, or entering one.
That critical step never seems to have been reached. :uhoh: |
Originally Posted by Northbeach
(Post 6750898)
...powerful corporations and even nations have a vested interest in the outcome. It doesn't matter whether it is Boeing or Airbus; European Union or the United States.
But we're not - the A330 is already a successful airliner. It has been flying for 20 years, recouped it's costs years ago and has been proven to be as safe as pretty much any contemporary airliner you care to name, safer than the previous generation to a noticeable degree - and a large majority of the pilots who fly it speak very highly of it. In terms of legal responsibility, Airbus are already partially in the frame because of the pitot tube issues - there's no question that they will shoulder some responsibility so there's nothing to be gained by hiding anything at this point. IMO the reason that the data in the report cannot be entirely unexpurgated is not because of any nefarious desire to protect any of the players involved, because the French government is going to be on the hook to pay out either way. It is because the report should only deal with the factors relevant to the conduct of the flight - which this book seems to contravene. There is nothing to be gained scientifically or in terms of aircraft safety by publishing lurid details of how confused and scared the crew were in those last few minutes, and I think even those trying to argue for the release of raw FDR data would agree with me there. |
MCP wazzer's
There's no mystery to any of this. The current generation of pilots being churned out can't actually fly, or will they ever be able to .They have had no practice or will they ever get any.
|
Originally Posted by DC-ATE
(Post 6751385)
Don't know about this particular type of aircraft, but recovery from a deep stall is possible [from 10000 feet above ground] in a 737-200. Been there, done that !! No problem.
|
Believe it or not, Dozy, the conditions for 447 do not mitigate their performance. One knows, or one doesn't. DC-ATE is right. Good bad or indifferent, it shouldn't make any difference. To try to soften their foulup is a wheeze. If the conditions were sudden onset, or out of the ordinary, fine, some slack.
None is given. Eyes wide open, no room to hide. No excuses. Stick to Computers. |
Don't know about this particular type of aircraft, but recovery from a deep stall is possible [from 10000 feet above ground] in a 737-200. Been there, done that !! No problem. Is the Boeing 737 subject to true deep stalls? |
IMO, the last few seconds of the CVR doesn't impact the 'why' or 'how' of this accident and is therefore irrelevant to the investigation outcome. Below 4000ft. they were obviously scared and in a state of panic. What would interest me is the time from departure to AP cutoff (dependent on length of the CVR which was reported to be over two hours in Interim Report #3) to answer the following questions:
1) During the early portion of the flight, were standard procedures followed including the mandated checklists, challenge/reply etc? 2) Did they follow all rules/regulations concerning a Sterile Cockpit (or would those apply to an Air France flight outside the U.S.)? 3) How did they use CRM in the early stages of the flight versus the abomination we see in the transcripts of the last 4 minutes? 4) Complete discussions on weather, route diversions, radar etc. 5) Any abnormal 'glitches' with the aircraft earlier in the flight. 6) Leadership by the Captain including delegation of responsibilities and if there was a professional environment in the cockpit or just a laissez-faire attitude. 7) Did the PF have any trouble remembering standard checklists early in the flight? This is the one place I feel BEA isn't being totally forthcoming. They know these things are vital to the investigation but have refused to put the transcripts from early in the flight into the record. IMO, when you are dealing with an accident where the obvious cause is pilot error caused by poor training, the performance of those pilots earlier in the flight is VERY relevant. |
DozyWannabe- Were you trans-oceanic in night IMC in the middle of patches of turbulence? ------------- Loose rivets- Is the Boeing 737 subject to true deep stalls? |
looking for the cause(s) of the cabin confusion
From reading the available transcripts I get the feeling that the software played a role in disorienting the pilots.
My understanding is that as the pilots approached zero forward air speed, there was an audible alarm, but once the pilots achieved something near zero forward air speed the stall warning was silenced. From then on, the warning was inverted. Pushing forward on the stick (and causing the plane to recover some air speed) caused the stall warnings to sound again. Pull back, the warnings are silenced. Was this a contributing cause of the cabin confusion? |
That slips to the side of the question. Is the B 737 subject to true deep stalls?
You see, were dealing with an aircraft that was mushing down, probably not due to some tendency to enter a true deep stall, but because man or machine (computer) was holding it into something resembling a deep stall. I've slogged away at this question since the threads (plural) started. They have I think, been ignored, and the same reverence to deeps stalls keeps reappearing. |
Hi,
DW There is nothing to be gained scientifically or in terms of aircraft safety by publishing lurid details of how confused and scared the crew were in those last few minutes, and I think even those trying to argue for the release of raw FDR data would agree with me there. The full transcript is very important Every word and every action counts, not just fragments of the 4 minutes Moreover, the BEA is certainly a very busy analyzing (the panel human factors) the entire transcript (or at least the entire record available) They will also certainly lead survey (if the BEA is serious investigation office) for the time schedule of the crew during the stop over in Brazil All this as the result of an image of the state of mind .. rest and the seriousness of this crew The last 4 minutes of the CVR show the result of the expertise of these pilots This expertise has been acquired not a minute before disconnection of the AP We must go back very far to examine the past of those pilots .. and then .. hours before the flight and flight hours after the departure of Rio are very important |
@PuraVidaTransport:
The Interim Report No. 3 summarises the conduct of the flight and the crew perfectly adequately by the standards of any modern accident investigation report I've read. In short, it states that nothing out of the ordinary was observed during the earlier portion of the flight with either the crew or the aircraft. No-one bar the crew entered the flight deck, nothing untoward happened with the aircraft. The only question mark over CRM concerns the apparent lack of specific role delegation when the Captain summoned the PNF in order to take his rest period, and the implication seems to have been that the Captain left the PF (junior F/O) in charge. This may or may not have affected the PNF's decision making during the accident sequence, but to me his apparent concern with getting the Captain back ASAP indicates that he felt his options were limited. Weather was clearly being discussed prior to the PNF's arrival (which is included in the BEA's transcript) and continued to be discussed with the PNF present prior to the accident sequence. Because nothing out of the ordinary happened prior to the accident sequence, it is unlikely that the PF would have had trouble recalling memory items, as they are both rote and routine. Emergency memory items are a completely different case. |
Well, I've made my feelings clear. The psychology has to be dissected, just as a pathologist would dissect a cadaver - no part left unopened just because it might offend someone.
had trouble recalling memory items, as they are both rote and routine. Emergency memory items are a completely different case. |
Night, IMC stall training? :eek:
Where do we find such men? (737 Max AOA with the column held full aft in a stall is somewhere around 17 degrees. FPV (if selected) never leaves the PFD pitch scale, however the HUD (if so equipped) FPV will drop to the bottom of the HUD FOV and be 'ghosted'.) |
OK465- Night, IMC stall training? But.....we digress. |
Originally Posted by Loose rivets
(Post 6751592)
Well, I've made my feelings clear. The psychology has to be dissected, just as a pathologist would dissect a cadaver - no part left unopened just because it might offend someone.
The BEA have effectively said not to expect a final report until the middle of next year at the earliest, which suggests to me that they are indeed taking it very seriously. I'm not sure if people have got into their heads the idea that the investigation and release of material stops with the release of the last interim report, given some of what I'm reading here... I don't know how long rote and routine checklist would have applied. the flying was fairly routine, though getting demanding, by the time checklists would have become appropriate, I think the slew of confusing data would have made them next to worthless. They needed to be calling on some sound airmanship in the relatively early stages. |
Night, IMC stall training in ICING conditions. :eek::eek:
17 degrees AOA is not a "deep stall" nor a persistent one. Are you referring to a "full" stall as opposed to "deep stall"? |
Well, IMHO, it was a DEEP stall.
|
Dozy
My point was IF the PF had any problems with those well-used checklists, even a momentary lapse in responding, it would indicate to me he had problems with remembering checklists, especially emergency procedures which he rarely, if ever, used. I'm having trouble finding where the BEA said everything was normal or that no one besides the crew entered the cockpit. I did find, in the Interim report 3 where the cockpit door was opened and closed several times and had been left open for "some time on several occasions" (page 25, English version). This one example goes to the core of my previous argument. I may be wrong, but I doubt opening the cockpit door "several times" and the having "it stayed open for some time on several occasions" is standard procedure for Air France these days. This one small notation from the BEA tells me the pilots were not following standard procedures with regard to the security of the cockpit door so what other procedures did they ignore. Without the CVR transcript release, we may not know. My questions in this regard come from the Colgan 3407 investigation where the earlier parts of the CVR were instumental in establishing a cause, not just what happened in the last few minutes. I too think that once the Final Report is ready, many of these questions will be answered but a release of the first part of the CVR shouldn't harm anyone or the memory of the pilots as it should have been just 'another day at the office' for them. |
They were an average crew on an average day. Maybe even above "average" when you consider their experience and the fact that they continued to try to understand the problem and regain control all the way down. Its not like it was just one pilot who couldn't figure it out; it was a sample of three.
Statistically then it is likely that most of the posters on this forum, thrown into the exact same circumstances, would also end up in the ocean. And I include myself in that, hand flying skills and all.. |
I think that software developer in post 50 not only brings us back to a major causal factor, but also explains it in a perfectly understandable way that for me makes it potentially the most important factor in the accident.
The stall warner was "inverted" or you could say reversed. Surely having a reversed/inverted stall warning in a night stall situation with unreliable indications will generate the same potentialy fatal conclusion as discovering (or in fact not discovering) that you have reversed aeliron controls as you correct a roll tendency at 200ft on departure ?? |
How do Airbus crew train stall recovery?
Generally speaking. |
Hi all
Had a conversation with an AI FE. He told me about a test flight last summer. 3 test pilots, an air asia 330 And a flight test program. Vmc day light over the Jay of Biscaye in a dedicated flight test area. This guys reconfigured the lad in alternate 2, stable fl 350, zoomed to fl380, entered a Stall. It developed into a deep Stall. No information about ths position though. Eventually, they recovered at ...6000ft... As the elevator authority was lost, deep Stall, they found themselves powerless using standard techniques to recover from it. A rudder input induced a spin which Led to a dive And our test pilots recovered This tricky Stall. These guys reported that they felt the end was near... I hope the live feed he witnessed that day Will be Made available for all pilots to learn from guys who were prepared And trained for that event. |
We are getting a bit confused here between 'full stall' and 'deep stall' I think, and in the case of 447 it was being held in a (amazingly stable) full stall (not a 'deep stall') by THS setting and elevator, although I don't think any research has been done (for obvious reasons) on the longitudinal stability of the 330 in those conditions and it may be that there is an unexpected aerodynamic strong nose-up moment (Edit: I have just seen Lyo's frightening post regarding loss of elevator function, so yes, it looks as if could be described as a 'deep stall'). Regarding min recovery height, it is simply enough to do the sums, and I chucked my hat in the ring way back to say that I thought 20k would be the last point for recovery without hitting the water. This simply based on a descent rate of 10k a minute (2 minutes to impact) and a required pitch change of something like 40-50 degrees nose down, taking a few seconds (which would drastically increase the 10k down) reducing the remaining time, and then add the altitude required to transition from that descent to level flight without pulling the wings off or entering a manoeuvre stall. All subjective, of course - I have no desire to check my estimate.
DC-ATE - are you saying you were in a 'deep stall' (whatever you think that is) with 10kfpm down at 10k in IMC? Sounds like some really smart flying there to achieve that. I think I would have taken control a little earlier and called for a psychologist to meet the a/c on arrival. |
What a former Airbus test pilot had to say the other day...
I am not an Airbus pilot.
When I attended a seminar on the topic of loss of control incidents and accidents, which was held by EASA in Cologne last week, there was a lot of discussion about these issues and pilot training in general. It has been agreed, that stall training has to be revised and that merely 'powering yourself out of it' isn't enough. Modern simulators do not replicate all aspects of aircraft behaviour 100% realistically, but they are considered to be close enough to the 'real thing' and also: they are the best we have. Pilots should receive more training doing hands-on flying at all altitudes and in all configurations of their aeroplane. Mr. C. Lelaie, a former Airbus test pilot and a well known capacity in the community, told me that the A330 is entirely controllable at all flight levels and in all modes or laws the airplane has to offer. I know it must sound easy to somehow with Mr. Lelaie's background, but point he (and others, representing Boeing, NASA, the FAA, simulator providers and so on) was trying to make: scenarios like these should be practiced during training from time to time... Interesting point made by someone from Lufthansa CityLine: SIM time is precious. Why not practicing system malfunctions in simpler cockpit procedure trainers rather than expensive full-motion flight simulators, thus leaving more time for manual flying of the aircraft? |
Originally Posted by DC-ATE
(Post 6751567)
recovery from a deep stall is possible [from 10000 feet above ground] in a 737-200. Been there, done that !! No problem.
Originally Posted by DC-ATE
(Post 6751567)
Well, we weren't trans-oceanic, but it was night, solid IMC.
|
Originally Posted by rmac
(Post 6751824)
I think that software developer in post 50 not only brings us back to a major causal factor, but also explains it in a perfectly understandable way that for me makes it potentially the most important factor in the accident.
The stall warner was "inverted" or you could say reversed... The reason the SW stopped sounding was because EAS (I think) was below 60kts. Not many flights encounter that kind of speed in mid-air. |
Punkalouver
I wouldn't be too quick to criticise 'DC-ATE'. I suspect if he'd been on 447, things might have turned out better. :rolleyes: It was basic flying skill (lack of) that did for AF447. Whatever people say about 'ye olde dinosaur' pilots, they do have certain advantages over the children of the magenta line. |
rmac agree that the stall warning 'inversion' that occurred in this accident was likely a significant contributor to the confusion on the flight deck in the later part of the descent.
My understanding is that although the aircraft remained stalled throughout its descent, the stall warning ceased because the forward airspeed was too low to allow valid AOA measurement. Is there a flaw in this logic? Surely an aircraft is always stalled if it is in the air and has a forward airspeed so low that AOA cannot be measured, whatever the AOA. Why would you program the stall warning to stop under these conditions? Related to the absent stall warning and the confusion it may have created; to what extent does the group feel that, absent reliable airspeed indications, the crew assumed that with engines at full thrust throughout the descent and no stall warning, it was not possible to be or remain stalled? |
BOAC- DC-ATE - are you saying you were in a 'deep stall' (whatever you think that is) with 10kfpm down at 10k in IMC? punkalouver- What amazes me is that you appear to have still not figured out how incredibly poor airmanship you had on that night. In fact you talk like you think you are a good pilot. |
I love all the stories we keep hearing of a 'deep' stall and the notion that AF447 was being held in the stall by the THS and elevators. People, get this out of your heads.
Please go look at report #3 and the traces. At about 2:11:45, N1 was greatly reduced and the nose fell through with the pitch angle falling from 15 degrees nose up to 10 degrees nose down in about 10 seconds. The THS was at max nose up and the PF had full back stick yet the nose still fell through. Also notice, the airspeeds became valid and the stall warning sounded. The aircraft gained sufficient speed and the PF inputs and THS raised the nose ten degrees to a pitch of 0. However, as speed fell off, the nose again fell to 10 degrees nose down. Recovery at this point was not only possible but easily accomplished IF the pilots had recognized the REAL problem. If you doubt this, look later in the flight at 2:14:10 when N1 was again reduced with the THS in full nose up and BOTH pilots pulling back on the sidestick. Again, the nose fell through from almost 20 degrees up to 5 down. Granted, by this time recovery was not possible. If it was the THS and pilot inputs holding the nose up, please show me the proof. And all these stories of 'deep stall' and losing elevator authority etc... Please give me a link not just the story because looking at the AF447 traces, appears to me all you have to do to reduce pitch angle is reduce N1. In addition, commercial aircraft must have positive longitudinal stability which means the nose is going to fall through no matter what the flight controls are trying to do at a certain speed/angle of attack as long as the center of gravity is within the prescribed limits. However, with the power of the engines today and being under-wing, with full N1, you can get a situation like we see in AF447. |
With all the learned (and others) discuisions about stalls, deep or otherwise, the point has been missed that when the airspeed became unreliable, the PF seems to have started at once to hold the stick back.
Until the event started, everything was normal: the aircraft was in trim, straight and level, and all was calm. Perhaps too calm for a relatively inexperienced, but no doubt keen to prove himself, young man, who may even been in a slight doze - not an unusual thing to happen, as I well remember from experience (thank goodness for an alert navigator who was always pernickety about heading). Where calm analysis was needed, the PF started to thrash the stick about ("stirring the mayonnaise"), having probably never heard the adage (or its French equivalent) "Don't just do something, sit there", not forgetting the rider "but not for too long". Precipate actions started the whole sorry chain of events going. From experience again, it's very, very hard when friends and "mates" foul up, and on occasions I had to protest strongly when an Inquiry seemed to be about to jump to conclusions, because drawing the right conclusions is the only way for lessons to be learned. That's why I trust the BEA and its thorough methodology to "get it right" and why I haven't posted on this thread before (and for the last time). |
Originally Posted by PuraVidaTransport
(Post 6752374)
The THS was at max nose up and the PF had full back stick yet the nose still fell through.
I can't help but think this conversation is off topic (which is the book and accompanying Daily Heil article), and properly belongs in the Tech Log thread however. @BarbiesBoyfriend - saying that poor airmanship on the part of the F/Os at the controls is all there is to it is a very narrow viewpoint. The net needs to be cast wider - firstly to take into account the poor CRM on the part of the Captain in failing to explicitly assign roles to the crew dring the relief phase and finally to take into account the industry-wide misuse of automation to cut back on manual handling training. A side issue relates to the methods relating to the pitot tube repair/replacement schedule and whether more could have been done on the part of the regulator and manufacturer there. |
Originally Posted by The Shadow
You really cannot blame the crew.
They experienced (i.e. quietly slipped into) a pitch-up (and thrust-) induced, and very insidious, deep-stall entry at high altitude - a straight unapparent and unremarkable entry into a very high descent rate, featuring a quite misleading and almost normal pitch attitude.
Originally Posted by bubbers44
I know they were new pilots but why couldn't they figure out what was happening to them? pulling back for 3 and a half minutes goes against all of our survival instincts.
Not understanding the relation between pitch control and stalling, consequently pulling no-matter-what, was identified as cause of stall related accidents by Wolfgang Langewiesche as early as 1944. There's old aeronautical cliche: to go up, pull the stick back. To go down, pull stick back further. Still applicable.
Originally Posted by Burnswannabe
even given erroneous readouts, the pilots should have had enough overall awareness of there situation that a stall should have been self evident.
Originally Posted by Burnswannabe
the current fear that manual flying skills will atrophy as systems take more of a role appears to be valid.
Originally Posted by Burnswannabe
there is now doubt that increased automation has improved safety but the major accidents I can think of recently, in the western world, have been in spite of automation or directly/indirectly caused by it.
Originally Posted by Burnswannabe
Perhaps we need, as an industry and as a fraternity, to invest more in operator input at the design stage.
Originally Posted by Burnswannabe
It is oh so easy to sit in the sim expecting trouble but it is rare in life to find ourselves outside of the norms
Originally Posted by Burnswannabe
I am certainly not suggesting we go back to fully manual control systems
Originally Posted by Burnswannabe
I suggest that we all need to spend more time in the sim being surprised as opposed to just knocking out the stats, even if this means more expense.
Originally Posted by Intruder
What would have happened if the pilots just took their hands off the stick altogether.
Originally Posted by Intruder
What would the computer have done?
Originally Posted by Croqueteer
With a traditional column if it is back past a certain point the wing is stalled, and it is pretty obvious that the a/c is being held in a stall, ie the stick position gives a idea of attitude.
Originally Posted by 4468
He doesn't even know it's possible to stall an A320 in normal law.
Originally Posted by in my last airline
The way forward is for an externally delivered LPC (regulator) every 3 yrs covering all the normal items plus any number of potential items. Let's get back to 'hard, firm and fair' training and checking.
Originally Posted by wet vee two
How often have you all practiced unusual attitude/unreliable airspeed scenarios?
Originally Posted by wet vee two
The size of a modern flight deck, the eyes have a long distance to travel across all instruments
Originally Posted by DiamondBob
What did the other crews do when their pitots were blocked? Supposedly this occurred 32 times on A330s and A340s before AF 447, but I've never seen any accounts as to how this was handled in those situations.
Originally Posted by Ashling
The crew failed to recover the aircraft because they failed to diagnose why they were out of control. They died not knowing what had gone wrong. To me its surreal that they could not recognise the stall
Originally Posted by Ashling
but it would seem that the situation was beyond their training, experience and competence. How could they be allowed to be in command of a commercial jet in that environment when they didn't possess the skills required to cope when it all went wrong?
Originally Posted by HPSOV L
They were an average crew on an average day. Maybe even above "average" when you consider their experience and the fact that they continued to try to understand the problem and regain control all the way down.
Originally Posted by HPSOV L
Statistically then it is likely that most of the posters on this forum, thrown into the exact same circumstances, would also end up in the ocean. And I include myself in that, hand flying skills and all..
Originally Posted by ManAdaSystem
How do Airbus crew train stall recovery?
Originally Posted by lyo
Had a conversation with an AI FE. He told me about a test flight last summer.
References, please! Even if you have to shoot me after you tell me.
Originally Posted by BOAC
We are getting a bit confused here between 'full stall' and 'deep stall' I think, and in the case of 447 it was being held in a (amazingly stable) full stall (not a 'deep stall') by THS setting and elevator
Originally Posted by BOAC
I have just seen Lyo's frightening post regarding loss of elevator function, so yes, it looks as if could be described as a 'deep stall'
Originally Posted by BarbiesBoyfriend
Whatever people say about 'ye olde dinosaur' pilots, they do have certain advantages over the children of the magenta line.
|
I usually just read these threads and remain silent because "it's better to keep your mouth shut and be thought stupid, than open your mouth and remove all doubt", but I keep reading something that must be addressed.
Stall recovery vs. "approach to stall" recovery. Actual pilots can now skip to the last paragraph. To those of you not studied in stall training above the private/commercial level, we DON'T train nor practice "stalls" at the ATP (US) level. We train for "approach to stall". Pilots of my generation fully understand that you must reduce the angle of attack - lower the nose - to unstall the wing. We also know that the ATP (an instrument rating) requires that we recover from an approach to stall with minimum altitude loss. In an approach to stall, the wing never stops producing lift. When the system senses the onset of a stall, it provides warning; warning that if followed will result in preventing the stall and avoiding altitude loss. This is simply due to the type of aircraft we fly in the air transport business (those being transport category birds that are certified to give proper stall warning), and to the rules which apply to those aircraft and their airline operation. Airline pilots fly transport category certified aircraft and train to instrument procedure standards, a situation that demands that approaches to stalls are dealt with by increasing power ( to recover from the low speed condition) and maintaining altitude (to prevent hitting the ground if the approach to stall happened near the ground - as in an instrument approach). Those of you who continue to stress your disbelief that the pilots didn't dump the nose need to recognize that the pilots were not trained to do so. They were trained to follow their instruments and use a specific procedure to deal with the situation. The AF447 pilots were faced with instruments that couldn't be trusted and a situation for which they had never trained. In the Airbus I fly, the only concrete information I can see from my seat is the horizon in front of the windscreens. EVERYTHING else is computer/electronically generated. Please remember that when you question the actions of three pilots who were faced with: dark skies, thunderstorms, unreliable instruments, turbulence, no visible external cues, myriad ongoing nuisance warnings, .............. This was NOT an accident caused by a single factor!(IMHO) The final finding will likely indict everything from aircraft systems and philosophy to government oversight to airline training philosophy. In the mean time, let's not waste the opportunity to change things for the better by taking the easy way out and blaming the dead guys. |
The only addition to the STALL discussion is that these guys were NOT treated to the standard airframe cues of STALL. Did they hear the actual STALL WARN? Did they feel vibration, loss of noise of airstream, etc?
Later, out of energy and PITCHED up, there was no NOSE drop, and prior, there had been no BUFFET, a clue to imminent loss of lift. What were the feel cues? What about this STALL entry was so unlike what might have reasonably been expected in Vanilla Stall? Further, what about this entry hypnotized all three into functionally eliminating STALL from the list of possible failures? It is not complicated. Yet it continues to be passionately discussed. In the Flight environment of the instant, one only has instruments with which to troubleshoot. Before making judgments, it would be best to more fully understand the instruments, and those that failed. And try not to be seduced into a post mortem of the part of the flight that is selling newspapers, and is virtually bankrupt of lessons, and ultimate justice. |
Originally Posted by DW
I can't help but think this conversation is off topic (which is the book and accompanying Daily Heil article), and properly belongs in the Tech Log thread however.
|
Hi all Had a conversation with an AI FE. He told me about a test flight last summer. 3 test pilots, an air asia 330 And a flight test program. Vmc day light over the Jay of Biscaye in a dedicated flight test area. This guys reconfigured the lad in alternate 2, stable fl 350, zoomed to fl380, entered a Stall. It developed into a deep Stall. No information about ths position though. Eventually, they recovered at ...6000ft... As the elevator authority was lost, deep Stall, they found themselves powerless using standard techniques to recover from it. A rudder input induced a spin which Led to a dive And our test pilots recovered This tricky Stall. These guys reported that they felt the end was near... I hope the live feed he witnessed that day Will be Made available for all pilots to learn from guys who were prepared And trained for that event. |
@TTex600
For what it's worth, I'm not a pilot and am well aware of the difference between approach-to-stall procedure and stall procedure. I'm also aware that the ATP training only deals with the former. However I'm pretty sure that stall training itself should be part of the pilot's toolkit before getting anywhere near a jet - i.e. at the PPL level. It looks like airline training was relying on that being somewhere in the background (at the 'riding-a-bike' level) and focusing on the approach-to-stall procedure to the exclusion of stall recovery, and I think all people are suggesting is that in future this might not be such a good idea. Finally, the only instruments that were "untrustworthy" were the ASIs, and any gizmos that relied on them. Crucially, they had a working altimeter, working ADIs and working engine instrumentation - which was more than enough to stabilise the aircraft using pitch and power *if you know how to do it*. Transducers have been used in aircraft instrumentation since the 1970's and are no less reliable than their mechanical forebears. Again, I think this discussion is better suited to the Tech Log thread. |
Agree with DozyWannabe,
Most displays would show the correct indication IF actually only the ASIs were affected. May I add, and raise a question at the same time (maybe already noted somewhere before), what about the VSI readings in front of each pilot? According the A320 manuals (my current aircraft), it is given by both the static ports AND the IRUs, I would imagine the A330 to be wired with the same logic, so even in case of FULL loss or ADR DATA or ADR voted out by the system, the VSI should (was?) still be showing from the IRUs inputs. Despite the apparent confusion, night IMC, probable turbulence at some point, the VSI would have been a good confirmation that the aircraft was going downhill? Of course this is just one aspect and does not pretend to invalidate any findings, I am just curious I have not seen it here. Flex |
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