I don't remember that, and did not find it in the BEA report. Where did you see that?

HN39:

I am not referring to the BEA report, but on the continuing series of threads on this crash.

Some pages back, there was the A340/A330 incident where was discussed "a near miss" where one plane did a bit of a zoom climb. Also, when I went back to some of PJ2's older posts, I found something he'd dug out of another report. That is what I put in qoutes in the post where I address Takata and PJ2.

EDIT: here is what caught my eye.
The post was PJ2 responding to you:

HN39;
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/44963...ml#post6435101

To be clear, PJ2 took the position during that element of the discussion that the aircraft was stable, (see the part of the post where he addressed takata before he addressed you).

If you think I have misinterpreted this, or I am making too far of an intuitive leap, please advise.

What I gathered from the 340/330 near miss was that an uncommanded pitch input was made, and the pilots got it sorted out in a few thousand feet, and returned to flying on altitude and airpseed, and arrived at destination. What made that interesting was that another aircraft saw it. As I understand it, the report was initially more concerned with the "near miss" than perhaps anomalies in flight control inputs.

The other incidents discussed, which included uncommanded flight control inputs, altitude excursions, and various upsets that the pilots recovered from have been part and parcel to this discussion at various times. Air Carriebe and Qantas were two of them.

If my synthesis is turning out a stew, instead of a cake, please advise.

Lonewolf_50;

The discussion I had with PJ2 was about an A340 AIRPROX incident due to turbulence, which activated High-AoA protection. It was not an UAS incident, and it has afaik no connection to AF447. The BEA analysis of 13 UAS incidents does not contain any reference to an uncommanded pitch-up, nor does the table in app.7 . The report states:

Thank you, sorry for having crossed my own wires on that. :O

Appreciate your clearing that up.

Lonewolf_50

The airprox report is summarized in this post

http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/44963...ml#post6434021

and the UK AAIB report can now be found complete with appendices at

Air Accidents Investigation: Airbus A330 C-GGWD and Airbus A340 TC-JDN

That will undoubtedly be the crux of the matter - the aviate, navigate and communicate chain became broken.:sad:

mm43

Hi mm. I am not sure what you are saying here......

"...That will undoubtedly be the crux of the matter - the aviate, navigate and communicate chain became broken.http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/sr...y_dog_eyes.gif"

"ne comprends pas" means one thing, "ne...riens" another. This snippet, if accurate, says so much. It is a closure, a juncture of CRM. The flight is being re-set in the view of at least one pilot. I think the comment is within the boundaries of "Aviate," alone, not comms or Nav. No one would get to this point re: the mundane. Not even atrocious and frightening weather weather. The airplane is an unknown to him here, and shows a frustrated pilot partially into a situation with which he is greatly uncomfortable, and has no experience of. This moment is the initial onset of upset, or the immediate prelude. Again, if accurate, a year's worth of speculation coalesces into epiphane for all of us connected in any way with this tragedy. They are speaking to us.

bearfoil

My oblique reference was related to matters discussed many thousands of posts ago, and I don't intend to elaborate further.

respectfully, mm, no sir. takata's statement that you qouted is not correct, insofar as what the intention of an alert is, nor the context he claims.

The conclusion you drew from it at odds with what appears to have happened: things had boiled down to aviate alone, which became (for whatever reason) an overhelming task. Task saturation isn't a pretty sight.

EDIT: never mind, I see what you were getting at.

Well, I've been reading this for a while. It's been quite interesting, including the C vs. Ada fights and the veiled reference to flying the Skyraider.
That expert report table with the 36/43 incidents is pretty impressive, as is the note that nearly two-thirds of the events were reported after AF447 (although most of them occurred beforehand).
Isn't the industry standard one catastrophic failure ever 30 or so incidents?
One of the "take-aways" from this discussion could be that, regardless of whether FBW plays a role in this accident, what it does do is increase the criticality of a certain piece of equipment, and it did so based on underreported reliability data (even if the Thales AA was a particularly bad design, from this data every pitot tube should suffer from underreported failures).
Or, in other terms: in-service reliability figures are scientifically worthless.
The "responsibility/authority" distinction is at least superficially appealing. Another way to put it is that if a system design routinely drops a load in the operator's lap, the designers cannot expect more than 29 out of 30 operators to make the right decision. On the other side, at least 20 out of 30 operators are going to do everything they can not to be #30.
And the Swiss cheese analogy has its charms too, if only because the next slice is more likely to have the same holes as the previous one than not.

please carry on.

sound familiar? It ain't the bus at fault it is sadly human limitation as to how much can be processed at any given moment when everything is going wrong.

Aeroperu 603

HN39, I knew I remember something about a pitchup ...
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/3...ml#post4966826
It was a guess by one of the posters here based on something in an A330 (not the A340 in the AIRPROX event)
Of other interest ...

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/3...ml#post4967466

One thing I have noticed, or missed, is that with all these 'leaks' and speculations, there is no mention of why AF447 flew into the CBs, and appeared to make a last minute adjustment to their course. I wonder if that will be revealed tomorrow?
Also with all the past accidents involving pitot tube, gung-ho pilots, flying into storms, computer failures, isn't it time for manufacturers to produce aircraft and softwares that can prevent the constant repetition of these accidents?

Wasn't going to look at any more "leaks" but that sounded just too interesting - thanks for the link.

To me the most interesting thing is not what it says, but that it appears to completely contradict the earlier leaks. If the crew did everything by the book and still ended up in irrecoverable stall, then (IMHO) it can't possibly be true that the aircraft is exonerated and the crew at fault.

At least one set of leaks is therefore wrong - and always possibly both. Roll on tomorrow.

Lonewolf_50;

If the reference is to QF72; it pitched down uncommanded approx 10 degrees (from +2.5 to - 8), then during recovery in response to pilot sidestick command 7 deg up to approx -1 degree.

Regards,
HN39

CogSim, the last line of your recognizing icing posting prompted an "Oh goodie!" from me - in a very sarcastic tone.

"Under some icing conditions, even a 3-minute exposure can substantially affect the handling of the aircraft."

Riiiiight - and who knows what the handling feels like when the computer has been flying? And then the computer, where all this handling data lived as bits and bytes, flips the pilot the bird and says he has the stick. No WONDER pilots get confused when things pickle. They don't have critical data and there may be no good way to transfer that critical data to the pilot in time.

If pilots are going to be expected to take over when things get tough they should be far more involved in the routine flight of the plane so they have this feel. That phrase proves this to me.

{o.o}

sensor_validation, I get the impression that one of the best improvements for a pitot would be some form of airflow measurement out of the drain hole. If either the probe or the hole ices the airflow through will diminish. With a moniker like yours that's a design challenge for you. Measure the existence of airflow without increasing the chances of the probe icing.

{^_^}

From about two years ago, from poster snaproll3480
HN39

Thanks for the detail, HazelNuts, yet again I doff my cap.

In re the pitch down versus pitch up.

With the above airspeed limits in mind, how benign do you think an unexpected ten degree nose down pitch is while on IMC, and possibly in turbulent air, with those limits considered?

NOTE: this is not a declaration nor an assertion that such is what happened with AF 447, but an inquiry regarding, as a pilot, your tolerance for a sudden ten degree nose down event. The closest thing like it from my own experience was a runaway nose trim event (which was a bugger, but manageable) but that was not on a FBW aircraft, so my personal points of reference are vague at best.
I will refer to AMF's comments on upset response from about the time AF 447 went down, which sentiment seems to not be confined to him.
Also something that caught my eye ... http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/3...ml#post4972892

Regards

LW50

JD-EE
That is actually a very astute idea to validate a pitot tube's proper functioning.:ok:
Properly designed, that measurement could be done with a hot wire anemometer.
Basically, if there is flow, it is likely to be a valid measurement.
No flow, and the measurement is invalid.
We still have the problem of what to do when the reading is invalid on multiple sensors.

I had thougth about that as well. If the automation in cruise effectively makes flying the a/c like watching paint dry, it would be human nature to become a little complacent and perhaps even produce a tendency to fall asleep. No blame in that either, as the sort of people who are of the required personality to do the job are easily bored with routine.

Anyway, enough. With the air crackling and pregnant in anticipation of the next report, let's not forget what the whole exercise is about: Finding the truth, whatever colour it may turn out to be...

Regards,

Chris