6G on a FBW?
 

To answer your question:
Even in ALT LAW 2, Pitch Control is identical to ALT LAW 1 where flight law is a Load Factor demand law, similar to Normal Law, with limited pitch rate feedback and gains, depending on speed configuration.

Low Speed and High Speed Stability is available but with Pitch Attitude Protection Lost.
There is no Bank Angle Protection.
And,
In case of 2 ADR failure, there is No Low Speed Stability;
In case of 3 ADR failure, there is No High Speed Stability.

I therefore would tend to suggest that one could only pull 2,5 G's except if, due to other associated failures, the aircraft would change to Direct Law and Pitch Inputs would be then directly commanded by the pilots.

In other words, only in Direct Law, pilots are allowed to pull more than 2,5 G's...

To answer mine:
IMHO, this means also, that due to High and Low Speed Stabilization (where the aircraft gives inputs to the flight controls to prevent stalling it [and therefore, spin it]) and also to the fact that AoA data is provided to BUSS - Back Up Speed Scale, via the IR part of the ADIRU, in order to enter a stall the aircraft would have to have changed to Direct Law.

FCOM Abnormal Procedures tells us that even in a situation where two IR's or 3 ADR's are lost, Flight Controls Laws would still be ALT LAW 2.
This leads to me thinking that Human Factors may have played a role in the outcome of this accident. Pure speculation I must concede, as most of the argumentation I've seen in this thread.
Easy to accept that, in the middle of the stressing Unreliable Airspeed Indication troubleshooting, the (unprotected/unguarded) IR's were disconnected by mistake (in step of ADR's) in an attempt to display Backup Speed Tape...the rest one can guess. That's much easier, for me, to accept that, than a total failure of aircraft systems, tail fin or brake apart in several pieces.

Ready (and maybe deserving) to be flamed, now...

P.S.- Here's a partial transcript of Airbus Publication: SAFETY FIRST of Dec 2007 written by Joelle Barthe (Flight Operations Engineer, Airbus Industrie)

(my bolding)

It is incredible the amount of imagination caused in people minds by this vertical stabilizer wreckage recovered. One wonder if they are realizing that if the hydraulic system was cripled for whatever reason, and it will be in any case of structural damage implying the rudder, the maintenance computer won't simply address a four minute string of unreliable speed related problems...

On the other hand, when two different materials are assembled together, each one with singularly different resistance and deformation behavior, it is not very hard to understand that a separation will very likely result once a critical level of acceleration is applied.

Recovered wreckage
 

I have tried to search but with 155 pages....

What physical evidence there is, compared to other 'flat spin accidents' pointed out here, seems to show a surprising lack of 'component' as opposed to 'structural' damage (eg the VS separated at the root but little other crumpling, the weak galley structure with right angle joints still intact and pristine trays, the section of wall/bulkhead with jump seats, the control surface with a longtitudinal tear), also no clear (in these views) witness marks of secondary impacts with other translating objects.

Has anyone posted a view of the a/c showing the likely position of the recovered parts on the airframe and were all these recovered in the same general patch of ocean ?

Also worth bearing in mind that the sea wasn't flat: initial impact forces may have been concentrated on certain parts of the structure.

If this has been done over a thousand times here I know what to expect:\

Are you sure the aircraft has to be in Direct Law to stall. My undrestanding of the alt law low speed stabilisation term is that it only introduces a modest nose down term to resist inadvertent stalling but that there was no absolute alpha protection as there is in Normal Law.

What law was controlling the flight test A330 when it stalled and crashed?

AOA - IR
 

Which explains the Qantas incident.

P.S. - Who knows whether they (AF447) went back to normal law or not...

EDITING: The AoA is normally provided by the ADRs - The "BUSS" provides it through IR as a backup. So the doubt remains as to the role of a defective IR in the "standard" AoA output

Pulkovo Aviation Enterprise Flight 612 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


Marco

It is a spin when one wing is stalled more than the other. The rotation results from the less-stalled wing providing more lift than the other.

A stall occurs when both wings stop flying about equally. Recovery occurs if the cg is ahead of the C/L, center of lift, as the nose will drop, and flying speed is regained.

If the cg is behind the C/L of stalled wings, the nose will not drop, and the plane will not regain flying speed. This is a flat spin. It does not require rotation. As above, for rotation there has to be a partly unstalled wing. Per Wiki, the flat spin angle of attack will be between 65 and 90 degrees, which means there could be some forward speed.

Modern airliners are intentionally flown at aft cg near the safe limit. A load shift will put the cg behind the C/L, and this has happened countless times, usually with cargo.

GB

???
 

Big threat... many opinions.. just tell me where is the original preliminary report please.
Thanks

Have to agree with petermcleland in the post above, it is absolutely imperative the Brazilians furnish the BEA with the findings of the post mortems or that a further post mortem takes place following the release of the bodies.
There has been enough historical data I am sure to correlate the type of injuries and cause of death with a particular scenario, or at least to help in discounting other theories, which could be invaluable until more concrete data (hopefully) becomes available from further wreckage recovered, or with some chance the recorders.
Any idea why the Brazilian authorities wouldn't make this info available to the BEA as soon as the work had been completed ? , strange indeed :confused:

Lithium battery life
 

Originally posted by Takata

This is because of the properties of the lithium battery, I think. The nominal voltage stays the same for the specified 30 days and then some, but once the voltage starts to drop, the drop is rather dramatic and therefore the beacon stops sending any acoustic output at some point, rather sooner than later.

Extended battery life would not be too difficult to achieve. Another 200 grams of additional weight perhaps. Peanuts, really.

Right, I already corrected it, thanks.:\

Graybeard:
The aircraft was under Normal Law, but crashed because due to an earlier selection of an altitude of 2000' (if I remember correctly, they had been flying circuits before that Take-Off) the aircraft "grabbed" ALT* mode during a simulated engine failure after V1, and was allowed to stall. (Protections are not active during ALT* transition modes).

Battery life
 

Hi,

http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/37905...tery-life.html

Bye.

Humble Pie
 

My apologies for wading in to the discussion a while ago, highlighting similarities in the condition of bodies with previous mid-air accidents.

I've been put in my place by the recent report, and realised that whilst I (like the rest of you) am very concerned and interested in what happened that night, I am not close to the investigation, I am not privvy to all the available information, and as such I really shouldn't have 'waded in' with yet another peice of conjecture.

I was impressed with the honesty and detail of the prelim report, and I now have full confidence that the experts are doing their very best. Let's leave them to do their jobs.

In the mean-time I think we're just going to need some patience.

Phil Gollin - FDR/CVR search & recovery
 

I don't know about the status of the search, or about the 'true' battery life of the devices. Other people have commented on these issues. I used to work in the hydrographic survey industry, so I can comment on finding AF447 in the event that the pingers aren't detected.

A quick look on Google Earth at the seafloor in the region of the accident shows that it's pretty rugged. This means that finding the wreckage using the usual methods (sidescan sonar) might be tricky - boulders, cliffs, etc all give shadows which can look like wreckage, or the wreckage return can be hidden in those shadows. If you spent enough money doing surveys in all directions (so that the shadows are cast in different directions in each survey), and were scrupulous about investigating all potential contacts and databasing them ... eventually you would be 99% certain to find it. How long would it take & how much money? Could be 'a long time' and 'a lot'. I don't know the size of the search area, so I couldn't begin to estimate, but certainly tens of millions of dollars, and hundreds if it goes on for very long. You'd need deepwater ROVs to video each contact, and the day rates for the vessels which deploy those are very high (like $250k per day, IIRC).

If the wreckage is largely in one place, which may be the implication of the BEA report, it would seem sensible to continue searching. If it had fragmented in flight, chances of finding specific individual pieces (e.g. FDR, CVR) would be pretty poor. (I mean: you could spend $1bn and not find the CVR & FDR; so you would have to make a judgement up front as to whether it's worth doing the search, based on whether you think the debris field will be localized or scattered over tens of square miles).

I guess some people would have a view on whether it's in the interests of the French gov't to try very hard to find the wreckage. (I don't believe that sort of thing for a second, myself ... maybe I'm just naive).

The Role of Auto-trim?
 

The one very real way in which you can complicate your recovery from a loss of control (spin or whatever) is to have the autopilot surreptitiously auto-trim in as much back-trim as possible. However the pilot doesn't need to organize that, the autopilot will do that all by itself, quite unnoticed by the pilot - as the speed erodes. That pitfall of an autopilot disguised contrary control force is why medium size turboprop airliners are required to be handflown in heavy icing conditions. The phenomenon of autopilot kickout immediately followed by autorotation (i.e. a spin) has been the undoing of many an inattentive crew - after a short period of ice accumulation. We have the recent examples of the DHC8-400 in the US and the Turkish 737 at Amsterdam to emphasize the stealthy suckertrap of auto-trim.

But what was happening to the THS (trimmable horizontal stabilizer) and auto-trim aboard AF447 when the pitot malfunction occurred? Could that pitot icing indication glitch have emulated the icing performance loss scenario? Can the pitot's induced false speed reading predicate the auto-trim's response? Can the auto-trim then be well out of whack nose-up and yet the autopilot still soak up the "stick"-load in order to maintain the stipulated altitude?

If this was in fact (or could've been) the case, what would have happened when autopilot, auto-thrust and (presumably) auto-trim dropped out? How difficult (or improbable) would recovery be if the autopilot kicked out due to it holding greater than a kick-out threshold force of forward elevator?

I imagine a pitch-up into a stall and a wing-drop flick into autorotation would likely be an instant development. Would the pilot, now in manual control and Alternate Law, have any clue as to what was happening? - such that he could correct the out-of-trim configuration and regain control?

Or is it more likely that the combination of unaccustomed manual flight at high altitude, sudden IMC, Alternate Law and roll/pitch/yaw could mask the
back-trim and leave the pilot totally flummoxed?... You only need scant seconds of very nose-low to exceed VNe. And of course we're disregarding here what could have happened to one or both engines thrust during that pitch-up - which may have provided the asymmetry for spin entry.

I've got first hand experience of what happens to a JP5A (Jet Provost) pilot subjected to loads of elevator back-trim when handed over to for spin recovery. They were always non-plussed. The learning experience exceeded the syllabus for spinning but similar to inspin and outspin aileron's effects, it was a worthwhile exercise to file away in instant recall.

Is this statement still operative once the speed input to the ADIRS is wholly corrupted? The aerodynamics of a pitch-up at high altitude would trump that law - methinks.

More food for thought. Think centrifugal force in a large aircraft spin. Even if it wasn't a flat spin to begin with, anybody/anything loose in the cabin will migrate towards the rear, pushing the CofG even further AFT. Even with baffles, this might also be the case for some of the fuel. Any thrust left on the engines will also tend to flatten the spin. Any heavily back-trimmed aircraft will tend to want to remain in a flat spin, particularly as the thrust increases with height loss (for any given set throttle lever position).
.

calcs ?
 

A330 length: 58m

radius of spin circle: 29m

circumference: 2piR (pi =~ 3.14etc) =~ 2 * 3.14 * 29 = 182.12 m

182.12/4 (a 'complete' spin each 4s) = 45.53m/s (the tail is running along the path of the circumference)

45.53m/s = 45.53m * 3600/h =~ 164km/h

aprox. 100mph

:ok:

augustusjeremy

4 seconds per rotation = ~175'/sec.

175 feet/sec. = ~10,500'/minute = ~ 115 mph.

115 mph with an axis w/o horizontal velocity.

With horizontal velocity, add for lead, subtract for lag.

The wing tip or tail could have a velocity through air approaching 200mph.

momentum
 

Yes...

I am not an aerodynamicist but maybe the momentum exerted by the vertical stabilizer in this context in such a large (long) aircraft explains why they're harder to put into a flat spin.

It would depend on the center of rotation/gravity/mass, I believe

force
 

centrifugal force = speed squared divided by r. So 45*45/30 -ish, getting on for 7g.