Hi,

Fixed link:
Crash de Perpignan : malhonnêteté, passivité. : Les dossiers noirs du transport aérien

Merci jcjeant et Merci HMC.

Just a post to support the questions CONFiture has asked. It is inexcusable to "EDIT" information that is available, purely to protect any Corporate interests, imo. I especially object to the BEA's attempt to propagandize in pursuit of laying blame on the pilots. Their mission is NOT to affix BLAME!

bear

Actually, you're reacting to a TRANSLATION of the official report, which of course is in French. That states...
That last word is the one whose translation has you so riled. A transliteration would be "perceiving" and I think a good translation which would preserve the sense of the original would be...

without the crew being aware of it

This would be a more neutral phrasing in English and is I think more consistent with the French.

I don't think the choice of the English word was calculated to cast blame - translating a technical document such as this is not easy, since it requires a degree of technical and linguistic skill which few people have. Note, for example, the use of the term "blocked" instead of "jammed" or "frozen" which would probably be the preferred terms an anglophone engineer might use for the condition.

MFS

A disagreement, here. My French is most suspect. Your substitution of a new word falls short in my opinion, of establishing a mistake in translation as the source of "rile".

Whether aware, or "made aware", there is no public information that pilots did indeed "miss" anything whatever. I am guessing here, but I believe it is most difficult to Prove a Negative. On the CVR (my assumption only) is there a communication such as, "Je ne comprends pas le visage de "ECAM"? Or, "I think we have missed an important Prompt?"

"Sans que l'equipage de....." perceive? My own opinion is that this means "Without the (or such) ability to be aware" It is even worse in French than CONFiture has proposed, imo.

I rely on an American niece whose phD is in French linguistics. She was most helpful in providing an accurate meaning of "En Ligne de Vol", for example. It is a common trait of not only the French, but many others, whose ultimate refuge is "YOU" 'do not understand', an attempt at evading responsibilty for a "misunderstanding", when the intent is otherwise most clear. I am not saying this is exactly what has happened here, but the possibility is yet to be debunked. Another, and softer and lenient definition might be "Without the awareness of the crew (l'equipage: "team".)"

best regards,

bear

Given the crew self appointed themselves as test pilots, and set out to test the AoA systems, then one would have thought they would look at and understand the effective AoA displays on each of their PFDs... and had they done so then they would "have been informed" they were not working.

I flew 2 legs in an A319 today, and not sure how differently I would have flown or acted had I been made aware that 1 or more AoA probes were frozen. They are not really used, although they are visible, in normal line ops - they are there for safety "features".

I am not saying the Airbus is perfect, far from it. But when people act, either by themselves or by inappropriate tasking, with such disregard for the basic rules of aviation, should the aeroplane really be designed to protect them from whatever they (try to) do? The designers have enough trouble trying to protect crews from the hazards they might encounter in line operations.

Also witness the posters on the QF thread discrediting the A380 for "producing 58 ECAM messages". Where do you draw the line?

NoD

Hi,

Dictionary Information: Definition Perceive - Description Meaning Thesaurus

Another consequence of not "perceiving"
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/3...ml#post6068839
http://henrimarnetcornus.20minutes-b...1930142838.pdf

Translation
 

As far as I can understand english,

"To perceive something" or "to notice something" are very good translations of the french verb "percevoir".

"To notice" seems however better in the context : to see and become conscious of ...

Il the aoa (wrong) value was indeed displayed, the information was "in sight", but the crew didn't become conscious that it was wrong, showing steady small aoa at the time effective aoa should was increasing while they were slowing down, checking stall related protections. AoA indication is in itself a protection ... And they failed to notice that that protection didn't display a value coherent with the slow speed.

All three crew members? Not cross-checking available information?

CONF iture
Unfortunately, the third guy realized the aircraft had entered Direct Law, but I perceive that his announcement, "We are in manual", may have been the wrong words to use in the multi-lingual cockpit.

Bis47
AoA indication is always available, but not normally used in everyday "line ops". The fact that the erroneous AoA position wasn't noted, was essentially because the consequences of what they were proposing to do hadn't been raised, and therefore nor had the relevance of the AoA.


mm43

I would see it differently : For him, the test was proceeding normally, the trim stopped as it was supposed to but he didn't know it was actually for another reason, then, some 20 seconds later, he demonstrated some impatience : "stick forward ... alpha floor we're in manual" possibly thinking the pilot was not applying the requested steps to exit alpha floor.
With a fully visible control column, it would have been obvious to all that the PF was already pushing on it ...
He did not mention the trim either, it would have been a wonderful call "trim, trim it forward" or "manual trim" ... is it a indication he didn't see the PFD message ... ?

Maybe you would respond to a GPWS warning the 737’s way … and not put your trust and life in the hands of a sick system.

AoA data are not visible on the PFDs.

My knowledge of the systems is woefully insufficient, I have been satisfied thus far with the "cyclical" nature of the discussion. For what it is worth, CONF iture's position has been clear from the outset, as he once again frames the essence of this entire thread. When will the AB adherents entertain this most obvious flaw in the ointment?

just sayin'

One thing that has always bothered me in this accident sequence is the role of the 3rd pilot. He did not re-brief the low speed checks immediately before the maneuver but he apparently held the checklist. This was one of the more complex maneuvers in the sequence. This oversight basically forced the AC into a box checking role. On a normal 2 person cockpit, the PNF would be holding the checklist and briefing the steps as you go (Including the expected limits and recording the results).

If I recall the accident report correctly, The NZ 3rd pilot had to agree not to disclose the checklist to 3rd parties and to hold Airbus harmless for any use of the checklist before he could receive a copy. Was this at the root of his reluctance to share?
Am I missing something here?