ssg,

Presuming that you are flying part 91 and considering that you have safely gotten off the ground without using that terrible concept of reduced thrust, how do you ensure that you will clear all obstacles in your takeoff path or safely follow the SID?

Mutt

Mutt - 2 points.

Once airborne from a V1 cut you always have Max thrust available from the other engine should you need it. Now your mate isn't just going to whack the other thrust lever to the stops right immediately as this is likely to make the control situation worse but on the PFs instruction or after a prompt by the other guy he may well elect to ask for more thrust.

My company uses a Laptop based system to calculate the takeoff perf. for each flight using the conditions at the time and is fitted with a database of all the airfields, runways and obstacles located at the places we fly to and from. This takes all that into account and produces the optimum performance for all the said parameters. Ensuring that all legal climb gradients are met in the event of an engine failure.

However, the Fleet Office assesses each airfield and issues Emergency Turn Procedures for each runway should they require one. This procedure is an IMC procedure that will turn the aircraft away from the high ground in the event of a loss of thrust or any condition that might affect the ability of the aircraft to clear the surrounding terrain. In this case the SID is thrown out of the window! We would be calling MAYDAY and TELLING Atc what we are about to do. i.e. left turn trk 300 then inbound to WAL 084R (in the case of runways 05 at MAN)

These Emergency Turns are issued to the pilots through the Jeppessen plates (company customised) and are repeated in the Take Off performance program on the laptop.

ssg
Fifty-one people died in the Spantax accident at Malaga. If the Captain had continued the take-off, dumped fuel, and landed below MLW they would have been alive that evening, and some of them would still be alive today.
TP

Engine failures (significant loss of thrust) are not statistically related to either reduced thrust or max thrust takeoffs.

The way you use the engine on takeoff (max or reduced thrust) relates to performance deterioration (EGT margin changes over time).

Your go-nogo decison outcome after V1 is likely going to be defined in a few seconds and not something that lends itself to creativity after-the-fact. That's why your training needs to be rigourous and the outcome predictable in the before takeoff briefing.

At least for the plane in you Nick not completely right. Even if you derate your engine you still have the full rated thrust available, you can easily get it by firewalling or just doing a second tick on the TOGA switches.

However if you derate you assume that the thrust available is only the derated thrust and therefore you calculate all performance figures based on that thrust rating. That has some pretty serious implications as of course all control speeds (VMCG/VMCA) are based on less thrust. So you can increase the thrust to full rated thrust, however you might run out of control as the VMCG/A for the derated setting is lower than that for full rated thrust, therefore it is a big nono to increase thrust beyond the max for your derated thrust setting.

With good training that is actually a non-issue, but you have to be aware about it. We do use a mix 737 classic and NGs (and a mixed airbus fleet, 319-330), however we use derate only on the NGs although it is available on the classics as well (FMC is the same). Dunno how they do it on the airbus fleet, but im sure they use at least something similar as well.

Correct me if I am wrong but aren't you are committed to the take off after
V1? and surely if you didn't die trying to stop after V1 wouldn't you get busted and aquire a bad name thoughout the airline industry?

Well here's my 10 penneth worth.

Your take off brief covers what you plan to do in the event of a malfunction during take off. So fly or don't fly according to that brief. If you follow what you have trained and practised you have the best chance of a successfull outcome.

However

What we cater for in those briefings, among other things, is a single engine fire/failure. If you are unfortunate enough to suffer a multiple engine failure you are now outside the scope of your briefing so are not bound by it. Prior to V1 stop and all is well. Above V1 with the loss or significant damage to 2 engines on most occasions we are now talking about making the ensueing crash survivable. Best option here is in my view is to stop if you are still on the runway or just rotated and if fully airborne try to make it to water or flat open ground.

The problem with the above is diagnosing and reacting to the above in time to make the difference. In my 4 jet time I flew with the same crew day in day out and we had a crew SOP which was if someone shouted "multiple" on the flight deck we would stop if we still on the ground even if above V1 as the call meant 2 engines had gone and our preference was to take our chances off the end of the runway.

The Nimrod accidents at St Mawgan (bomb bay fire) and Kinloss (ditching with an uncontained fire) are 2 good examples of how a crew can use their experience to successfully handle an emergency not really catered for by SOP. The Nimrod accident at Kinloss (multiple birdstrike after takeoff) also shows what can happen when you lose 2 out of 4 engines heavyweight just after take off. Again the crew and fire services did a great job in makeing the crash survivable for all but the pilots.

All we can do day to day is cover the basics and hope that if we are unfortunate enough to be caught out by by numbers that our experience and training will help us through.

SSG. I, and I am sure many others here, find the manner of your posts disrespectfull and odious. In particular your assumption that airline crew are by and large unthinking automans is risable and contemptable. Personaly I come from a military background that included operational flying in fast jets, 4 jet, and 7 years of instructing. In the military we were taught to think for ourselves but also the key importance of following procedure and technique so that under pressure you make the right judgements. I have flown with many non mil commercial pilots and have the greatest respect for the vast majority and have learnt a great deal from them that has aided my successfull transition to commerial aviation. The majority are hard working and conscientious and eager to learn and improve. I have met very few unthinking automans. I am sad for you that you were unable to get the jobs you interviewed for but given the evidence of your posting here I am far from surprised. You have attitude/supervisory problem stamped all over you. Perhaps one day you will be ready but not until you learn a bit of humility and respect.

This accident was not a stop after V1 but a re landing on the same runway??
Any thoughts on this one?

Pace

>>A pilot's unorthodox handling of an engine-fire emergency on a plane carrying the Leeds United football team has been backed by air investigators.
They ruled that Captain John Hackett made the right decision immediately to re-land the aircraft rather than climb away and land later.

The Leeds United team was returning from a match at West Ham on 30 March 1998 when they were caught up in the drama on the Emerald Air flight from Stansted Airport.

The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) report concluded it had been sensible for Captain Hackett to take over the controls from his less-experienced co-pilot.

Evacuation drills

Captain Hackett managed to get the Hawker Siddeley 748 turbo-prop aircraft back down on the runway after a fire broke out in the right-hand engine.

All 40 passengers and four crew on the flight escaped safely.

The AAIB report said the crew's actions in getting everyone out of the aircraft without fully completing the evacuation drills were "understandable in view of the severity of the fire".

The accident happened at 2330 GMT when the engine failed just after take-off for Leeds Bradford airport.



Captain Hackett: "Split-second" decision


Co-pilot Garry Lucas, aged 33 at the time, was at the controls when he and Captain Hackett heard a sharp bang.

Chief stewardess Helen Dutton, then also aged 33, told panicking passengers to sit down and advised the pilots that the right engine was on fire.

The AAIB report said that in a situation of this kind normal procedure would be for the pilot at the controls to take the plane into a climb while the other pilot went through an emergency check list.

Then the plane could be positioned to land at the departure airport or at an alternate spot.

But the report added that the sequence of events involving the Leeds plane was not "a classic scenario" and that Captain Hackett had decided to take control and re-land.

Engine fatigue

The AAIB went on: "The decision to re-land had to be made rapidly with the information available to him at that instant.

"This decision was sensible in the circumstances, as was his decision to take control from the competent but far less experienced first officer [Mr Lucas]."

The report said that at the time of the accident, Mr Lucas had had 250 hours experience on HS748s, while Captain Hackett had 3,950 hours.

Making 19 safety recommendations, the report said the Dart engine had failed because of fatigue-cracking of the high pressure turbine disc.

Dramatic event

There had been four similar failures of Rolls-Royce Dart engines over 26 years, and one since - in June 2001, said the report.

Leeds United manager David O'Leary - who was assistant manager at the time - helped in the evacuation and was praised for his actions at a news conference the crew held a few days later.

Captain Hackett, from Derbyshire, had said at the April 1998 news conference: "It was a split-second decision. Normal procedure would have been to do a complete circuit, but our judgment was that we did not have the time.

"We landed on the available runway. Unfortunately it was a little too short.

"The plane ran on to the soft ground and the nose wheel detached, making the event seem more dramatic than it probably was."<<

Tyro - you may have gathered that I do not see ssg's posts (by choice:ok:), but is he trying to use that as an argument FOR aborting above V1? 51 dead?? As I recall the a/c was going like a train at the time:eek: I cannot recall what the accident findings were.

Re the STN 748, I believe there was found to have been a strong possibility that continued take-off and circuit to land would have resulted in the wing detaching downwind, so severe was the damage and fire. A 'lucky' call in my book. Had it gone badly wrong......................

How are you, John, if you are looking?

Robots....
 

Ashling, In your world, planes always fly After V1, only the firelight goes on in the sim, so that should apply to the real world right? As someone who takes guys up in thier own jets and does real world V1 cuts, I can tell you that I am on the look out for that fuel problem, TR deployment, birdstrike, or some idiot on a crossing runway, that might force me to stop, accelerate, whatever to get out of his way...I could sit here and give example after example, after example of how your day will be screwed up adhering to a one fix solution to handle a world of possibilities. If you believe for example, that you can fly out with two TRs deployed right after V1 like another guy did, you will end up like him. RIP

There is a serious 'let's stick out heads in the sand' mentality in here that shouldn't be in the cockpit of any plane, much less an airliner..

I am starting to think that by being in here, my IQ is dropping...

Mutt: Gear up, V2 untill 1500 ft or clear of all obsticles.(second seg)..then V2+10, flaps up...off we go...

Please expand on this.. how do you know that you have cleared all of the obstacles? Do you adjust your takeoff weight for these obstacles, if so, how? 2nd question, how do you know that you can comply with the SID, 3rd Question, how do you know that you can comply with the MAP Gradient?

World of Tweed, thank you for taking the time to explain how things work in the airline world.... Now i want SSG how he does this under FAR91.

Mutt

SSG, re stop after V1. Why do you hold such resentment against SOPs? Why do you consistently argue against what millions of hours of flying and decades of aircraft investigation have proven? Are you trying to stand out as an 'outside the box' thinker that will revolutionise air travel?

See, here's the important bit... You don't own the planes, your don't run the airline, you don't won the company, you are not the 'boss', you do not have free reign over your aircraft to do as you please regardless of SOPs, you do not make the rules. You are trained (and paid!) as a pilot to think and act according to the situation in hand, but always within boundaries. Those boundaries are set by people that have more experience, knowledge and reliable statistics than you.

Re Flex Power, your repeated attempts to exaggerate the seriousness of this procedure 'flying up to the fence' only serves to stir it up, it does not make your point more valid. As mentioned by a few, they are not flown to the fence. Besides, this concept only bothers you because you advocate the use of the 'stop after v1' idea, so you certainly would like max power from the beginning to give you that extra runway before you 'plough through the grass'.
Please don't turn this into a 'Oh god think of the passenger safety!' issue. There will always be a balance between cost and safety, to think otherwise is naive. To say that airlines are prioritising cost saving over safety is wrong, they are merely balancing them. If we were to go with your paranoid philosophy on safety, I can't imagine your airline would last long in the competitive market.

PPRuNe is where you are free to express opinions and discuss (within reason), however your are in preaching mode. Very few agree with you, I suspect the majority never will, and this might be for a reason don't you think? Or is it a case of brainwashed robots again? Hm can never tell. To top it all, you're discussing a procedure for large jets with airlines pilots... You're not an airline pilot!

I always enjoy a heated discussion, especially when it comes to technical and safety related issues, however you keep repeating the same points over and over (3 threads and counting) and I can't help thinking you're feeling a bit desperate. Then again, I may be completely wrong, you have some further interesting points and arguments to make, it's just taking you a while to get there.

Ashling I pasted the report on the 748 re-landing. This was not just a after V1stop but an after takeoff relanding on the remaining runway. Yes there was a severe fire with the wing alite but had the Captain followed normal procedures they would have not made a circuit back to a safe landing.

That is one of the extreme situations where the guy made the right choice.
I would not pitch my miserly 3600 hrs against some of you guys who have had many thousands of hours and diverse experience but maybe part of the problem here is that I fly as a Captain on Citations/Slowtations :-) Like the 748 they are both short field aircraft compared to most Heavies.

At Heathrow I know I could probably take the Citation off or land it three times so V1 will occur around a third down the runway. That itself may colour judgement which makes a stop situation not so clear cut as tons of heavy metal hitting 170kts before rotation.

Pace

Well
 

When gentlemen are arguing about what amounts to the "same thing" eg are unaware that they agree in general, more and more bizarre examples are offered. Those who insist they have "discretion" to reject after V1 really do, but only if the aircraft is unflyable; those who insist V1 means take-off are also correct, and I hope would admit when they have no choice, must do anything and everything to arrest the progress of the flight in a safe manner, to the extent of the crew's training and the incident circumstances. This is what I see having read this thread through.

ATB, Airfoil

hahhahaha....
 

Your right Kerosine....let's not consider the passengers...what do they matter?

All I have ever said...I just think it's stupid to fly a burning uncontrollable wreck through the air, when I had 7000 ft of pavement ahead of me and a 100 miles of flat Iowa cornfields beyond that..

--------------

Mutt - Using max conintous power on take off I might have to reduce fuel(weight) to make whatever is the most limiting to be legal..usualy second segment climb gradient....I think it's safe to say that for second segment, that if I needed 2%, and I am doing 4000 ft/m in the climb I am doin ok..

But to be sure, with the radar alt climbing away, EGPWS showing clear terrain, I show right where I should be on the SID at the the right alt.(SA).using a variety of RMIs, FMS, EFIS tubes depicting VOR/DME and FMS /GPS info..

That answers your first two questions.

Missed Approach Gradient. This is based on standard aircraft performance specs...about a 2% climb gradient, the minimum...

Part 25 aircraft have to be able to do this...if the MAP is non standard...take Missoula MT for instance..down in a Valley...I have the NAPTN ILS appr. approval to fly down to 200 ft on the ILS vs 1200 by the way......because I proved to the FAA that my jet, single engine will climb out of there with thier non standard climb gradient on the procedure, which is higher...

Happy?

:)

Pace

What I was driving at when I said what you quoted was not that you stick blindly to normal procedures when you become aware the nature of your emergency goes outside what your SOPs, briefing and experience to date cover. What I meant was that you hope your experience and training to date and all the experience you have gained along the way will help you identify when you need to step outside the box and then help you take the correct decisions.

Is that any clearer? Probably as mud.

No SOP, briefing or checklist can cover every eventuality. Just the most probable. Anyone supposing you can is rather naive.

The above said I still firmly believe that you should fly what you brief. So with a normal engine failure or fire (if such a thing exists) I would continue above V1.

I'm afraid I'm not that up on the 748 accident although I am aware of it. On the face of it the Captain made the right decision in my view and is to be applauded.

I think the 748s engines are wing mounted aren't they? rather than pod mounted as in most jet aircraft. Will make a difference with a catastrophic failure/fire. An uncontained fore spreading to the wing in a pod mounted engine is much less likely.

I will usually try to visualise an airborne turnback onto reciperical or a cross runway in case I do get an uncontained fire. Top Tip if its an airborne return onto reciperical turn with the wind initially then back into it. This will reduce your risk of flying thru the centerline and needing to increase bank late on in a tightening wind to try to line up.

Also worth checking with the crew if your fire warning goes out as it may be the fire wire has burnt through and the fire is still burning.

How bizarre. This thread is going downhill. Fast.

4000 ft on a single engine, max weight on a hot day? What type of Citation are you flying?

As for the SID, do you plan you escape route before takeoff or wait until you are in the SID? Does you FMS actually show the departure path based upon a single engine?

Mutt

SSG. So you take people up in the REAL world and do V1 cuts. Gosh your hard I'm just so impressed. I used to fail peoples only engine after take off. Guess that makes me harder. (sarcasim guys. I don't think I'm hard)

No planes do not always fly after V1. My view on that is made quite clear in the post to which you refer. There is even an example of such an occurance for you. However in the vast majority of failure situations they will quite happily fly if the crew apply their training.

I clearly stated in my earlier post that if your failure goes outside what you briefed then you can act as you see fit to deal with the situation. Do try to read there's a good chap.

So if both my thrust reversers deploy above V1 (an unbelieably unlikely event) I stop. If I'm airborne I try to put it down were I can after probably shutting down both engines. If a truck/plane crosses the runway ahead of me I make a judgement of whether to get airborne over it, stop on what is left before I hit it and if I can't stop before go onto the grass as slow as I can.

So there are circumstances where you will abort after V1..
:)

SSG and others, please read "Handling the Big Jets" by Davies, a very humble Test Pilot who explains all this and more... That old gent Newton comes to mind as well - specifically (half mass by velocity squared). :hmm:

Just when i was starting to have fun :):)

Anyway, I find it quite amusing that you accuse airlines of endangering the lives of passengers by using Flex Thrust, but yet you are quite happy to takeoff without doing any form of "proper" takeoff analysis that reviews the obstacles in your takeoff path or develop any engine out procedures.

Mutt

>>I'm afraid I'm not that up on the 748 accident although I am aware of it. On the face of it the Captain made the right decision in my view and is to be applauded.<<

Ashling

I did post it but here it is again :-) but it does show your point of a Captain acting quickly and thinking outside the box In the text the AAIB referred the accident as not being a classic scenario and commended him for not following post V1 Engine fire procedures. Many here argued the fact that with an engine fire you continue the takeoff. But how do you know the severity of the fire, whether it will damage controls or systems and whether you can extinguish it. Its a Hard call .My arguement throughout this thread has been totally directed at " NOT CLASSIC SCENARIOS". and especially at a STOL Citation which I could quite happily plonk back down again at somewhere like Heathrow.

Pace


>>A pilot's unorthodox handling of an engine-fire emergency on a plane carrying the Leeds United football team has been backed by air investigators.
They ruled that the captain made the right decision immediately to re-land the aircraft rather than climb away and land later.

The Leeds United team was returning from a match at West Ham on 30 March 1998 when they were caught up in the drama on the flight from Stansted Airport.

The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) report concluded it had been sensible for the captain to take over the controls from his less-experienced co-pilot.

Evacuation drills

The captain managed to get the Hawker Siddeley 748 turbo-prop aircraft back down on the runway after a fire broke out in the right-hand engine.

All 40 passengers and four crew on the flight escaped safely.

The AAIB report said the crew's actions in getting everyone out of the aircraft without fully completing the evacuation drills were "understandable in view of the severity of the fire".

The accident happened at 2330 GMT when the engine failed just after take-off for Leeds Bradford airport.



The co-pilot was at the controls when he and the captain heard a sharp bang.

The chief stewardess told passengers to sit down and advised the pilots that the right engine was on fire.

The AAIB report said that in a situation of this kind normal procedure would be for the pilot at the controls to take the plane into a climb while the other pilot went through an emergency check list.

Then the plane could be positioned to land at the departure airport or at an alternate spot.

But the report added that the sequence of events involving the Leeds plane was not "a classic scenario" and that the captain had decided to take control and re-land.

Engine fatigue

The AAIB went on: "The decision to re-land had to be made rapidly with the information available to him at that instant.

"This decision was sensible in the circumstances, as was his decision to take control from the competent but far less experienced first officer"

Making 19 safety recommendations, the report said the Dart engine had failed because of fatigue-cracking of the high pressure turbine disc.

Dramatic event

There had been four similar failures of Rolls-Royce Dart engines over 26 years, and one since - in June 2001, said the report.

The captain had said at the April 1998 news conference: "It was a split-second decision. Normal procedure would have been to do a complete circuit, but our judgment was that we did not have the time.

"We landed on the available runway. Unfortunately it was a little too short.

"The plane ran on to the soft ground and the nose wheel detached, making the event seem more dramatic than it probably was."<<

So you've already made fun of TCAS resolutions, believe going below minimums is ok, and that V1 is an irrelevant figure. Do you at least wear your seatbelt?

rcl

--------------
 

Mutt,

If you want more detailed instruction in take off procedures, it can't be done via internet thread. It's $50 /Hr. PM me and we discuss hotel and airfare out here.

What's seen in the Leeds incident is a matter of luck. Yes, it was a little too short. That everyone survived was luck. Continuing to post popular press renditions of aircraft mishaps is entertaining, but contributes little to a technical discussion of the facts. That the passengers on board thought the pilot was a "hero" for the successful outcome is nice...but meaningless. Imagine what the families of the deceased might have thought had he failed in his efforts. Equally as meaningless. He was lucky.

What actually happened...

In another case the crew had no choice but to reject above V1 because of locked flight controls. The aircraft received substantial damage in the ensuring rejected takeoff...another illustration that rejects above V1 don't go well, and that it's not nearly as simple as "pulling back the power and applying brakes."

So you've already made fun of TCAS resolutions, believe going below minimums is ok, and that V1 is an irrelevant figure. Do you at least wear your seatbelt?

rcl

You do not have to go ridiculous :-) The going below minimums was an out of the Box situation and not me. It was a KingAir 350 USA to UK past the point of no return with both airports going down in unforecast sea fog.

The pilots landed in 300 metres fog flying the ILS to the ground aided by a radar altimeter for the flare. They landed safely rather than crashing out of fuel.

Where have I implied that V1 is an irrelevant figure? Please read what I am saying

Pace

There is often a range of V1's.

If the split between them is ~30kts, cognizant of that, whats the problem with aborting post minimum V1 (but less than maximum V1)?

I seem to remember we've had this conversation before....

:ok:

I can see the briefing for that one...

"We'll reject for any malfunction prior to eighty knots. Above eighty knots, we'll reject for engine fire, engine failure, loss of directional control, or any outward opening door only. After that, we'll take it airborne and handle it as an airborne emergency. Unless of course we feel like we really ought to keep it on the ground, then we'll make up our mind on the fly past V1 up to say, 30 more knots, and we might stop or we might go. I'll let you know. If we do elect to reject, I will retard the thrust levers to idle and apply reverse. We will use the takeoff autobrakes. Back me up on the speed brake handle, note the airspeed for brake energy, and notify the tower of our situation. Once airborne..."

Nope...when the precalculated and prebriefed V1 is past, so has the time for stopping. Time to make like an airplane and go fly.

Seems pretty sensible to me....

But then I've never liked reducing everything to the lowest common denominator...

This business is about keeping your options open however remote they may be....IMHO of course...

:ok:

>"We'll reject for any malfunction prior to eighty knots. Above eighty knots, we'll reject for engine fire, engine failure, loss of directional control, or any outward opening door only. After that, we'll take it airborne and handle it as an airborne emergency. Unless of course we feel like we really ought to keep it on the ground, then we'll make up our mind on the fly past V1 up to say, 30 more knots, and we might stop or we might go. I'll let you know. If we do elect to reject, I will retard the thrust levers to idle and apply reverse. We will use the takeoff autobrakes. Back me up on the speed brake handle, note the airspeed for brake energy, and notify the tower of our situation. Once airborne..."<

SNS3Guppy so you do have a sense of humour then ? :-) that was seriously funny :-) No hard feelings

Take care

Pace

SSG

I would love to know under whos authority you are allowed to teach perf?

And if you had half a clue what you were talking about you wouldn't be offering to teach people like MUTT.

You mean Mutt, as a professional engineer, recognized in this field and an expert on this subject matter.

How odd.

SSG

I'll believe your idea about aborting after V1, IF you compute a refusal speed for each take-off, ensure it is less than or equal to maximum brake energy speed under the conditions. AND brief your crew as to your intentions, the conditions justifying an abort at the speed range between V! and Vr, assuming Vr is less than refusal speed. And inform your crew and passengers on this take-off "I have deemed the engineering data by Cessna (insert manufacturer here) to be inappropriate and will do as I deem right." Otherwise, you are just guessing your way through a dynamic physics problem by the seat of your pants.

Opinion now, your juvenile, insecure, supercilious posts are invariably written so that you can, in your own mind, belittle, denigrate professional pilots whose actions and methods have been proven over millions of flight hours and the huge efforts of experienced engineers by enterprises who are singular in their fields. These businesses, along with airlines, absolutely must, under pain of being swept aside in an accident, operate their equipment in a responsible way. Every day!!

OR they should just step aside and let you train them! :ugh:

I think if I have a verified engine separation--I MAY abort after V1 if i have excess RWY as you can't really be sure if the plane is still flyable as the DC-10 incident took other critical systems with it---though not likely--- as how would I verify that exactly?---also if I don't do a proper preflight and don't remove gust locks or tie down spoilers-it has happened-- so that I'd be alive for the license revocation hearing with the FAA:}


Oh yeah and will not even begin to argue with the thread's originator -unless I'm attacked myself- I prefer to read the suggestions/ opinions and advice of the industry professionals-stupid me:rolleyes:

What if what happens wasn't briefed?
 

Thanks Animas - You hit it...kind of...more simply...let's say you don't know what exactly happened...

If I see a fire light, the plane yaws over, serious vibration, heavy opposite control aeleron and rudder mputs to stay aligned with the runway...my gosh...what will the plane do when rubber isn't on the runway?

A quick glance to see 7000 ft of remaining runway left...might be an easy choice...pull the levers back, add brakes...

Who cares what the problem was..your stopped, you get the passengers out...you can now take a look...a departing C152 just put his landing gear into your left engine and tail....Glad you stopped?

- no, I think SNS3 was DEADLY serious there and trying to point out the impracticality of what had been posted. Unless we revert to a Vgo and Vstop system (used by some), there has to be a single, simple decision point. However, the Captain has the full range of options open to him/her, but:-
a) Has to be right
b) Has to justify the actions

As an aside, if any airline selectors are reading PPRune, I fear that ssg has seriously worsened the odds of ANY corporate pilot getting an airline job....just in case..........

ssg
Would you care to respond to my earlier post? Here it is again...

TP

.......
 

The Malaga accident showed that a pilot decided the plane was possibly unflyable, he made a descision. No sense arguing the point, the commission found that he made the right descion based on the info at hand...

No SSG your the one out of step.

I doubt anyone here would say there are no circumstances in which they would stop above V1 however those circumstances would be extreme and outside of what their briefing covered.

The scenario you gave was an engine fire between V1 and V2 (VR comes after V1 by the way). You did not give more detail. So everyone here quite rightly said that they would go. That is what is briefed so that is what you do. The aircraft is designed to survive the event and we are trained to deal with it.

You then berate people for not being able to make a decision and acting like robots when in fact they made their decision calmly at the briefing stage as they should. There is one correct answer to your scenario and that is to go.

Now if you accepted that and then asked "so guys are their any circumstances in which you would stop beyond V1" you would open up a very interesting discussion. My view is that their are indeed situations were you may have no choice such as blocked runways, multiple engine failure/fire or control restriction/jam.

You have your own agenda which is every bit as blinkered as you claim us to be. If there are any recuiters out there they may well be picking up the phone to Alaskan and trying to find out who you are so they can too can make a decision.